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HANDUOUiND 
AT THE 



UNIVERSITY OF 



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THE LOEB CLASSICAL LIBRARY 

FOUNDED BY JAAIES I.OEB, I-I^.D. 
EDITED BY 

T. E. PAGE, C.H., MTT.D. 

C/. VPS, PH.D., LL.». W H. D. ROUSE, LITT.D. 



ARISTOTLE 

THE ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION 
THE EUDEMIAN ETHICS 
ON VIRTUES AND VICES 



AKISTOTLE 

THE ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION 
THE EUDEMIAN ETHICS 
ON VIRTUES AND VICES 



WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY 

H. RACKHAM, MA. 

FELLOW AND LECTURER OF CHRIST'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE 





fc^3 



3fc 



LONDON 

WILLIAM HEINEMANN LTD 

CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHLSE'lTS 

HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS 

MCMXXXV 



CONTENTS 



THE ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION 

Introduction .... 

Outline of Contents 
Text and Translation 
Index ..... 



2 
6 

8 
183 



THE EUDEMIAN ETHICS : 




Introduction .... 


. 190 


Text and Translation : 




Book I 


198 


Book II 


234 


Book III 


. 308 


Book VII 


358 


BookVIII 


450 


Index . . . . . . 


479 


ON VIRTUES AND VICES : 




Introduction .... 


484 


Text and Translation 


488 


Index ..... 


. 505 



ARISTOTLE 

THE ATHENIAN 
CONSTITUTION 



INTRODUCTION 

The Po lit EI a I 

The place of the Athenian Constitution in the encyclo- 
pedia of Aristotle's writings is known to us from 
the concluding paragraph of the Nicomachean Ethics. 
That work forms the first volume of a treatise on 
the welfare of man as a social being, of which the 
Politics forms the second volume ; and at the end 
of the former {N.E. x. ix. 21 , 23) a prefatory outline 
of the latter is given, in which occur the phrases ' the 
collections of constitutions,' ' the collected con- 
stitutions ' ; it is stated that on these will be based 
that division of the Politics (i.e. Books III.-VI.) which 
will deal with the stability of states in general and 
of the various special forms of constitution, and with 
the causes of good and bad government. 

These treatises are said in ancient lists of Aristotle's 
writings to have been a hundred and fifty-eight in 
number. Each no doubt consisted, like the volume 
before us, of a constitutional history of the state in 
question followed by a description of its constitution 
at the time of writing. They are frequently spoken 
of as the work of Aristotle, but he may well have 
employed the aid of pupils in their compilation. 
They were not preserved through the Middle Ages 
in the Aristotelian Corpus, and until fifty years ago 
2 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION 

were only known to modern students from numerous 
references and quotations in later writers. 

The Athenian Constitution: MSS. 

But in 1880 two small and much damaged sheets 
of papyrus were found in the sands of Egypt which 
scholars eventually proved to come from a copy of 
the most important of all these constitutional 
treatises, the one on the Constitution of Athens. 
These sheets are now in the Berlin Museum. Palaeo- 
graphers ascribe them to the fourth century a.d. 
Ten years later, among some papyrus rolls acquired 
from Egypt by the British Museum, the Librarian 
F. G. Kenyon recognized four sheets as containing 
a copy of almost the whole treatise. These sheets 
have writing on both sides. On the front are some 
accounts of receipts and expenses kept by a farm 
bailiif named Didymus for his master Epimachus, 
near the Egyptian town of Hermopolis, in the tenth 
and eleventh years of Vespasian, a.d. 78 and 79- On 
the back is the Aristotelian treatise ; its beginning 
is wanting, and the first page of the book is blank, 
showing that it was copied from a damaged copy of 
the work ; and the last roll is very fragmentary. 
Different parts are written in different hands, four 
in all ; the script is said to date the copy at about 
A.D. 100. It was doubtless made for a private person 
(perhaps the writer of one of the four hands), and 
probably buried with its owner at his death. 

Editions 

In 1891 Sir Frederick Kenyon published a facsimile 
of the papyrus, and a printed edition of the text with 



ARISTOTLE 

an introduction and notes. In 1893 a revised text 
with a full and valuable commentary was put out 
by Sandys. Kenyon prepared an edition for the 
Royal Academy of Berlin, published in 1903, in which 
he included the fragments of the fourth roll con- 
jecturally arranged in a consecutive text ; and his 
latest edition was published at Oxford in 1920. Of 
several published abroad, the latest is the Teubner 
text of 1928 by Oppermann, based on the previous 
editions of Blass and Thalheim. 



Text 

The text of the present edition is based on the 
editio princeps of Kenyon, but it has been corrected 
by later scholars' readings of the papyrus. A few 
critical notes and suggested emendations are ap- 
pended ; but in regard to inaccuracies of grammar 
and arithmetic, trifling inelegancies of phrase (e.g. 
T0v8e τρόπον, for which most editors substitute rovOe 
τον τρόπον), exactly how many are due to a copyist's 
carelessness and how many are to be saddled on the 
author, no two scholars will agree. To the papyrus 
text have here been prefixed and appended the 
principal passages from the lost beginning and end 
of the treatise that the learned industry of scholars 
has gleaned from the quotations of later Greek 
authors. 

Dates of Composition 

The latest event mentioned in the Athenian 
Constitution (liv. 7) is the archonship of Cephisophon, 
329 B.C. The book also mentions (xlvi. 1) triremes 
4 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION 

and quadriremes, but not quinquiremes ; and the 
earliest date at which quinquiremes in the Athenian 
navy are recorded is 325 B.C. The treatise can thus 
be dated between 328 and 325 B.C. Moreover it 
speaks (Ixii. 16) of officials still being sent to Samos, 
and Samos ceased to be under the control of Athens 
in the autumn of 322 B.C., the year of Aristotle's 
death. 



OUTLINE OF CONTENTS 
Part I, Constitutional History of Athens to 403 b.c. 

(1) FrA. Original hereditary absolute monarchy. Military 

command transferred from king to war-lord in time 

of Ion. 
Fr. 2. Local division of royal power among four sons of 

Pandion. 
Fr. 3. Unity restored by Theseus. 
Fr. 4. Growth of popular power under Theseus. 

(2) Fr. 5. Constitution in time of Theseus : four Tribes, 

Thirds, Brotherhoods, Clans. 

Fr. 6. Murder of Theseus. Recovery of his bones by 
Athens. 

Fr. 7. End of hereditary monarchy. 

Fr. 8. Conspiracy of Cylon put down by Megacles. 

MS. c. i. Pollution and purification of Athens. 

c. ii. Civil disorders from forced labour of debtors. — 

c. iii. Constitution before Draco. Third archon in- 
stituted, the king retaining religious functions. 
Three archonships finally made annual, and six 
Thesmothetae added. An aristocracy, the nine 
archons being elected by the Areopagus, whose 
members were ex-archons. Conspiracy of Cylon. 
Discontent and poverty of lower orders. 

(3) c. iv. Constitution of Draco, the first code of laws. 

Council of Four Hundred and One. Punishment of 
Alcmaeonidae. 

(4) cc. v.-ix. Constitution of Solon : four property-classes 

with graded functions, the fourth takes part in the - 
assembly and law-courts. 

6 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION 

c. X. Solon's cancellation of debts, and system of 

weights and measures, 
cc. xi., xii. Ten years of party strife. Solon's poems. 

(5) cc. xiii.-xix. Tyranny of Peisistratus and his sons. 

(6) cc. xx.-xxii. Reforms of Cleisthenes. Creation of 

democracy. 

(7) cc. xxiii., xxiv. Supremacy of Areopagus after 

Persian wars. Aristeides and Themistocles. Con- 
federacy of Delos ; taxation of allies. 

(8) cc. xxv., xxvi. Democracy restored by Ephialtes, and 

extended by Pericles. 
.,...^ c. xxviii. Popular leadership, historical review. 

(Sj cc. xxix., XXX. Revolution of the Four Hundred ; after 
failure of Sicilian expedition Athens forced to 
abandon democracy; citizenship to be limited to 
Five Thousand, 
c. xxxi. The Council of Four Hundred govern as an 
oligarchy. 

(10) cc. xxxii.-xxxiv. Counter-revolution : democracy re- 
stored. Then Sparta defeats Athens in the war 
and sets up the Thirty. 

(11) cc. xxxv.-xxxviii. Despotic rule of the Thirty. They 

are put down by exiles led by Thrasybulus. 

(12) cc. xxxix., xl. Extreme democracy restored : the 

people supreme ; payment for attending Assembly, 
c. xli. The eleven revolutions recapitulated. 



Part II. The Existing Constitution 

c. xlii. The franchise. 

cc. xliii.-lx. The officials (a) elected by lot — the 

Council, archons, and others ; 
c. Ixi. (b) elected by vote — military officers. 
c. Ixii. Payment of officials. 
c. Ixiii. and foil. The law-courts : procedure. 



ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ 
ΑΘΗΝΑΙΩΝ ΠΟΑΙΤΕΙΑ 

Primae partis Epitoma Heraclidis 

[Heracleides Lembos in ike second century b.c. compiled 
a book called Ίστοριαι which contained quotations from 
Aristotle's Constitutions. Excerpts made from this book, 
or from a later treatise by another author based upon it, 
have come down to us in a fragmentary form in a 
Vatican us. of the 8th century, now at Paris, under 
the title Έκ των Ήρακλειδου ττερι Πολιτειών. These 
were edited by Schneidewin in 1847 and by others later. 

1. Αθηναίοι το μεν i^ αρχής εχρώντο βασιλεία, 
συνοικησάντος δέ "Ιωνος αντοΐς rare πρώτον 
Ιωνβς εκλήθησαν. 

(Τούτου γαρ οίκησαντος την Άττικην, ώς 
* Αριστοτέλης φησί, τους 'Αθηναίους "Ιωνας κλη- 
^iyvat, και Άττόλλωνα Πατρώοι' αύτοΐς όνο- 
/Αασθτ^'^'^'•• (Harpocration s.v. Άττόλλων ΙΙατρωος.) 

ΪΙατρώον τιμώσιν Άττόλλωνα 'Αθηναίοι επει 
"Ιων ό πολέμαρχος 'Αθηναίων εζ 'Απόλλωνος και 
Κρεούσης της Ή,ούθον^ εγενετο. (Schol. Aristoph. 
Αυ. 1537.)) 

1 Έονθον ■CyvvaiKOsy Rose. 

" A word has perhaps been lost in the Greek, giving 
' the wife of Xuthus ' — unless indeed the text is a ddiberate 



ARISTOTLE— THE ATHENIAN 
CONSTITUTION 

Heracleides' Epitome of the first part 

For a complete study of these contributions to the recon- 
struction of The Athenian Constitution readers must 
consult the standard commentators on the latter; only 
those fragments which belong to the lost early part of the 
treatise are given here. Quotations of the same passages 
of Aristotle made by other writers have been collected by 
scholars, and are inserted in the text in brackets { > where 
they βΙΙ gaps in Heracleides.^ 

Fr. 1 . The Athenians originally had a royal govern- 
ment. It was when Ion came to dwell with them that 
they were first called lonians. 

(For when he came to dwell in Attica, as Aristotle 
says, the Athenians came to be called lonians, and 
Apollo was named their Ancestral god. 

The Athenians honour Ancestral Apollo because 
their War-lord Ion was the son of Apollo and Creusa 
the daughter * of Xuthus.) 

bowdlerization of the legend. Xuthus, King of Peloponnesus, 
married Creusa, daughter of Erechtheus, King of Athens, 
after whose death he was banished ; but Creusa's son Ion 
was recalled to aid Athens in war with Eleusis, won them 
victory, and died and was buried in Attica. 

9 



ARISTOTLE 

2. Ϊ1αν8ίων 8e βασιλ^ΰσας μβτά 'Epe^^ea 
SteVei/xe την αρχήν τοις νΐοΐς (Atyet μβν Βούς την 
TTepL το άστυ χώραν, Ανκω δε την 8ίακρίαν, 
Πάλλαΐ'τι 8e την παραλίαν, Νισω 8e την Meyaplha 
(Id. Vesp, 1223.)) 3. /cat διετελουΐ' ourot στασι'α- 
ζοντε?• Θτ^σευ? 8e €κηρυξε καΐ σννφίβασ€ τούτους 
67Γ ίστ^ και όμοια} (eVciAet ττάι^τα? eVt τοΓ? 
ίσοι? /cat το " δείϊρ' tre, ττάι^τε? λβω " κήρυγμα 
θησ€ωζ yeveadai φασί ττανΒημίαν tlvol καθιστάντος. 
(Plutarch, Theseus 25.)> 

4. (oTt δε πρώτος άπβκλινε ττρός τον οχλον, ώς 

Αριστοτέλης φησίν, καΐ άφηκβ το μοναρχ€Ϊν, eoi/ce 

μαρτυρ€Ϊν και "Ομηρος iv veatv καταλόγω μόνους 

Αθηναίους Βήμον προσαγορβύσας . (Plutarch, ib.)) 

5. {ζϊς Ιστορεί iv τη ^Αθηναίων ΐίολίτζία 
Αριστοτέλης λέγων οϋτως• φυλάς δε αυτών συν- 

νενεμησθαί δ', άπομιμησαμένων τάς iv τοΐς 
ενιαυτοΐς ώρας, ίκάστην δε 8ιηρησθαι βίς τρία 
μ€ρη τών φυλών, όπως yiVTyrat τα πάντα δώδεκα 
μ^ρη, καθάπερ οι μήνες εις τον ενιαυτόν, καλεΐσθαι 
δε α73τά τριττΰς και φρατρίας• εις δε την φρατρίαν 
τριάκοντα γένη Βιακεκοσμησθαι, καθάπερ αϊ ημεραι 
εις τον μήνα, το δε γένος εΐναι τριάκοντα άν8ρών. 
(Lexicon Patm. p. 152 Sakkel.)) 

6. Ούτος ελθών εις Ίΐκΰρον (Αριστοτέλης 
ιστορεί ότι ελθών θήσευς εις Έκΰρον iπι κατα- 
σκοπην εικοτως δια την Αίγεως συγγενειαν . . . 
(Schol. Vatic, ad Eurip. Hipp. 11)) ετελεύτησεν 

^ Schneidewin : bμoίq. μοίρφ (aut τιμ^) codd. 

" Perhaps the formula of the crier sent round to announce 
the meetings of the Ecclesia : cf. άκούβτΐ, \^ψ (' Oyez '). 

10 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, Frr. 2-6 

Fr. 2. Ereehtheus was succeeded as king by Pandion, 
who divided up his realm among his sons (giving the 
citadel and its neighbourhood to Aegeus, the hill 
country to Lycus, the coast to Pallas and the district 
of Megara to Nisus). Fr. 3. And these sections were 
continually quarrelling ; but Theseus made a pro- 
clamation and brought them together on an equal 
and like footing. <He summoned all on equal terms, 
and it is said that the phrase ' Come hither, all ye 
folks ' " was the proclamation of Theseus made when 
he was instituting an assembly of the whole people.) 

Fr. 4. (And that Theseus first leant towards the 
mob, as Aristotle says, and relinquished monarchical 
government, even Homer seems to testify, when he 
applies the term ' people ' ^ in the Catalogue of 
Ships to the Athenians only.) 

Fr. 5. (. . . As Aristotle narrates in his Athenian 
Constitution, where he says : ' And they were grouped 
in four tribal divisions in imitation of the seasons in 
the year, and each of the tribes was divided into 
three parts, in order that there might be twelve 
parts in all, like the months of the year, and they 
were called Thirds and Brotherhoods ; and the 
arrangement of clans was in groups of thirty to the 
brotherhood, as the days to the month, and the clan 
consisted of thirty men.') '^ 

Fr. 6. He having come to Scyros (probably in order 
to inspect it because of his kinship with Aegeus ^) 

* Iliad, ii. 547. 

" After Cleisthenes' reforms, 510 B.C., there were ten tribes, 
each divided into Thirds and also into ten or more 
Demes ; each Deme was divided into Brotherhoods (number 
unknown), and these perhaps into Clans. 

** Aegeus, King of Athens, father of Theseus, is not con- 
nected in any extant myth with the Aegean island of Scyros. 

11 



ARISTOTLE 

ώσθζΐς κατά. ττβτρών ύπο Αυκομη^ονς, φοβηθ€ντος 
μη σφετβρίζηται. την νησον. ^Αθηναΐοί 8e ύστερον 
μ€τά τά Μηδικά μ€Τ€κόμίσαν αύτοΰ τά οστά. 
< Αθηναίοι μετά τά Μτ^δικά κατά μαντείαν άν- 
eXovTes αύτοΰ τά οστά βθαφαν. (Schol. I.e.)) 

7. Άττό 8e Κοδριδών ονκετι βασιλείς ηροΰντο, 
δια το SoKelv τρνφάν και μαλακούς γεγονεναι. 

Ιττττομενης δε εΐς των Κοδριδών βουλόμενος 
άττώσασθαι την ^ιαβολην, λαβών επΙ τη θνγατρι 
Aei/xcovry μοιχόν, εκείνον μεν άνεΐλεν ύποζεύζας 
μετά της θυγατρός^ τω άρματι, την δε ΐππω 
συνεκλεισεν εως άπώλετο. 

8. Του? μετά Κ,νλωνος Βιά την τυραννίδα 
επι τον βωμον της θεον ττεφενγότας οι περί 
Μεγακλεα άπεκτειναν. και τους Βράσαντας ως 
εναγείς ηλαυνον. 

Incipit codex 

1 I. . . . (κατηγορονντοςΥ Μ^νρωνος, καθ ιερών 
όμόσαντες, άριστίν^ην. καταγνωσθ εντός δε του 
άγους, αύτοι μεν εκ τών τάφων εζεβληθησαν, το 
δε γένος αυτών εφνγεν άειφυγίαν. 'ΈιττιμενίΒης δ 
ό }ίρης επί τούτοις εκάθηρε την πόλιν. 

1 Π. Μετά δε ταύτα συνέβη στασιάσαι του? τε 

^ μΐτα των ξνγίων (sic Aristoph. Nub. 122) coni. Blass: seel. 
Koehler. ^ Wilamowitz e Plut. Sol. 12. 

» King of Athens, died 1068 b.c. (by the mythical chron- 
ology). 

^ 722 B.C. ; the Attic nobles deposed him in punishment. 

" This nobleman seized the Acropolis to make himself 
tyrant. When blockaded he escaped. His comrades were 
induced to surrender by the archon, Megacles of the 

12 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, Fb. 6— ii. 1 

met his end by being thrust down a cliiF by Lyco- 
medes, who was afraid that he might appropriate 
the island. But subsequently the Athenians after 
the Persian Wars brought back his bones. (The 
Athenians, after the Persian Wars, in conformity 
with an oracle took up his bones and buried them.) 

Fr. 7. Kings were no longer chosen from the house 
of Codrus," because they were thought to be luxurious 
and to have become soft. But one of the house of 
Codrus, Hippomenes, who wished to repel the slander, 
taking a man in adultery with his daughter Leimone, 
killed him by yoking him to his chariot with his 
daughter [? emend ' with his team '], and locked her 
up with a horse till she died.^ 

Fr. 8. The associates of Cylon" because of his <'>-Ob.c.? 
tyranny were killed by the party of Megacles when 
they had taken refuge at the altar of Athena. And 
those who had done this were then banished as being 
under a curse. 

The MS. begins here 

I. (The Alcmaeonids were tried, on the prosecu- 1 
tion) of Myron, (by jurymen) solemnly sworn in,** 
selected according to noble birth. The charge of sog b.c. 
sacrilege having been confirmed by the verdict, the 
bodies of the guilty men themselves were cast out 

of their tombs, and their family was sentenced to 
everlasting banishment. Thereupon Epimenides of 
Crete purified the city. 596 b.c. 

II. Afterwards it came about that a party quarrel 1 

Alcmaeonid family, who promised to spare their lives, but 
then put them to death. From what follows in the text it 
appears that the movement to punish this sacrilege only 
came to a head after Megacles was dead and buried. 
"* Lit. ' having taken an oath over the sacred victims.' 

13 



ARISTOTLE 

2 γνωρίμους καΐ το πλήθος πολύν χρόνον} ην 
γαρ αυτών η πολιτεία τοις τ' άλλοι? ολιγαρχική 
ττασι και δη και ε^ούλευον οι πένητες τοις 
πλουσιοις και αύτοι και τα τέκνα και αϊ 
γυναίκες' και εκαλοΰντο πελάται, και εκτημόροί' 
κατά ταυτην γαρ την μίσθωσιν ηργάζοντο των 
πλουσίων τους αγρούς (η δε πάσα γη Si* ολίγων 
ην), και ει μη τάς μισθώσεις άποΒώοΐεν , αγώγιμοι 
και αύτοι και οι παίδες εγίγνοντο' και οι Βανεισμοι 
πάσιν επι τοις σώ/χασιρ" ήσαν μέχρι δόλωνος• 
ούτος δε πρώτος εγενετο του 8ημου προστάτης. 

3 χαλεπώτατον μεν ουν και πικρότατον ην τοις 
πολλοίς τών κατά την πολιτείαν το ^ουλεύειν ού 
μην άλλα και επι τοις άλλοις εΒυσχεραινον, ού8εν6ς 
γαρ ώς ειπείν ετύγχανον μετέχοντες . 

1 III. Ή ν δ η τάζις της αρχαίας πολιτείας της 
προ Αράκοντος τοιάΒε. τάς μεν αρχάς καθίστασαν 
άριστίν^ην και πλουτίν^ην ηρχον δε το μεν πρώτον 

2 δια βίου, μετά δε ταύτα Βεκαετειαν. μεγισται δε 
και πρώται τών αρχών ήσαν ^ασιλευ? και πολέμ- 
αρχος και άρχων, τούτων δε πρώτη μεν η του 
βασιλέως, αύτη γάρ ην πάτριος. Βευτερα δ' 
επικατεστη πολεμαρχία δια του γενε'σ^αι τινάς 
τών ^δασιλε'ωΐ' τα. πολέμια μαλακούς• όθεν και τον 

3 "Ιωι^α μετεπεμφαντο χρείας καταλαβούσης . τελευ- 
ταία δ' η τού άρχοντος• οι μεν γάρ πλειους επι 

^ χρονοντονδ-ημον cod. : secl. Kenyon. 

<» χβλάττ;?, ' one who approaches as a dependent,' was later 
used as the Greek for cliens. 

* Apparently this became almost an official title, see 
c. xxviii. 
14 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, π. 1— πι. 3 

took place between the notables and the multitude 
that lasted a long time. For the Athenian constitu- 2 
tion was in all respects oligarchical, and in fact the 
poor themselves and also their wives and children 
were actually in slavery to the rich ; and they were 
called Clients,'* and Sixth-part-tenants (for that was 
the rent they paid for the rich men's land which 
they farmed, and the whole of the country was in 
few hands), and if they ever failed to pay their rents, 
they themselves and their children were liable to 
arrest ; and all borrowing was on the security of the 
debtors' persons down to the time of Solon : it was 
he who first became head ^ of the People. Thus the 3 
most grievous and bitter thing in the state of public 
affairs for the masses was their slavery ; not but 
what they were discontented also about everything 
else, for they found themselves virtually without a 
share in anything. , -, ' '"■ 

III. The form of the ancient constitution that 1 
existed before Draco was as follows. Appointment 
to the supreme offices of state went by birth and 
wealth ; and they were held at first for life, and 
afterwards for a term of ten years. The greatest and 2 
oldest of the offices were the King, the War-lord and 
the Archon. Of these the office of King was the 
oldest, for it was ancestral. The second established 
was the office of War-lord, which was added because 
some of the Kings proved cowardly in warfare 
(which was the reason why the Athenians had 
summoned Ion to their aid in an emergency)." 
The last of these three offices established was 3 
that of the Archon, the institution of which is 
dated by a majority of authorities in the time of 

" See Fr. 1 above. 

15 



ARISTOTLE 

MeSovros, evLoi δ' εττι ^Ακάστον φασί yeveaOai, 
ταντην τ€κμηριον δ' ετηφβρονσιν or ι, οι ivvea 
άρχοντες όμνύουσιν fj τα} βττΐ ^Ακάστον ορκια^ 
ποίήσείν, ώς €7τΙ τούτου της βασιλείας τταρα- 
χωρησάντων των Κοδριδών αντί των 8οθ€ΐσών^ τω 
αρχοντι δωρεών. τοΰτο μεν ονν όποτερως ποτ' 
έχει μικρόν αν τταραΧλάττοι τοις χρόνοις• δτι δε 
τελευταία τούτων εγενετο των αρχών, σημεΐον και 
το μηΒεν των πατρίων τον άρχοντα Βιοικεΐν, ώσπερ 
6 ^ασιλεύ? και 6 πολέμαρχος, αλλ' απλώς τά 
επίθετα' διό και νεωστι γεγονεν η αρχή μεγάλη, 

4 τοις επιθετοις αύζηθεΐσα. θεσμοθεται δε πολλοίς 
ύστερον ετεσιν ηρεθησαν, η8η κατ ενιαυτον αιρου- 
μενων τάς αρχάς, όπως άναγράφαντες τά ^εσ/χια 
φυλάττωσι προς την τών αμφισβητούντων κρίσιν 
διό και μόνη τών αρχών ουκ εγενετο πλείων 

β εΐΊαυσιας•. τοις μεν οΰν χρόνοις τοσούτον προεχου- 
σιν αλλήλων, ήσαν δ ούχ άμα πάντες οι εννέα 
άρχοντες, αλλ' 6 μεν )3ασιλ€ΐ;$• εϊχε το νυν καλού- 
μενον ^ουκόλιον, πλησίον του πρυτανείου {σημεΐον 
δε• €τι και νΰν γάρ της του βασιλέως γυναικός η 
σύμμειζις ενταύθα γίνεται τω Αιονύσω και 6 γάμος), 
6 δε άρχων το πρυτανεΐον, ό δε πολέμαρχος το 
*Έιπιλυκεΐον (ο πρότερον μεν εκαλεΐτο πολεμ- 

^ 9j </oi7jf> τά Wilamowitz. 

* δίκαια (cf. Iv. 5 St/ca/os &p^fiv) Richards. 

' αντιτωνδοθεισων uteris valde obscuris scriptum : άνταπο- 
δοθΐΐσών ? Sandys. 

" Son of Codrus (see Fr. 7 above) and life-archon. 

* Medon's successor. 

" Or, with Sandys's reading, ' corresponding privileges 
being (at the same time) assigned to the Archon.' 
<* The official title of the six junior Archons. 

16 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, in. 3-5 

Medon," though some put it in that of Acastus,*^ ad- 
ducing in evidence the fact that the Nine Archons 
swear that they will perform their oaths even as in 
the time of Acastus, showing that in his time the 
house of Codrus retired from the Kingship in return 
for the privileges bestowed on the Archon.'' Which- 
ever of the two accounts is true, it would make very 
little difference in the dates ; but that this was the 
last of these offices to be instituted is also indicated 
by the fact that the Archon does not administer any 
of the ancestral rites, as do the King and the War- 
lord, but merely the duties added later ; on ac- 
count of which also the Archonship only became 
great in recent times, when augmented by the 
added duties. Legislators'* were elected many years 4 
later, when the elections to the offices were now 683 b.c. 
yearly, to perform the function of publicly recording 
the ordinances and to preserve them for the trial of 
litigants ; hence this alone of the supreme offices was 
never tenable for more than a year. These are the 5 
intervals between the dates of the institution of the 
various supreme offices. And the Nine Archons ^ 
were not all together, but the King had what is now 
called the Bucolium,^ near the town hall ^ (as is indi- 
cated by the fact that even at the present day the 
union and marriage'* of the King's Wife with Dionysus 
takes place there), while the Archon had the Presi- 
dent's Hall, and the War-lord the Epilyceum (which 
formerly used to be called the War-lord's House, but 

* i.e. their official residences and courts. 
' Otherwise unknown. 

» Position uncertain. 

* An annual ceremony by which the god Dionysus was 
incorporated as an Athenian: the lady personifying his 
consort passed a night in his temple. 

c 17 



ARISTOTLE 

αρχβΐον, €7Τ€ΐ he Εττίλυκος άνωκο^όμησ^ καΐ κατ- 
eaKevaaev αυτό ττολβμαρχησας, ΈτηλυκτβΓον €κλή- 
θη), θ^σμοθ^ται δ' et)(^ov το θ€σμοθ€Τ€Ϊον . ΙπΙ he 
ΎιόΧωνος ατταντέ? elς το θeσμoθeτeΐov συνήλθαν. 
KvpioL δ' ήσαν καΐ τάς δικά? αΰτοτελει? KpLveiv, 
/cat ονχ ωσ^τep νυν TrpoavaKplveLV. τα /xev οΰν 
6 7Γ€/)ΐ τα? ap-)(^as τούτον el^e τον τρόπον. ή he 
των ApeoπaγLτώv βουλή την μέν τάζιν et^e του 
8ίατηρ€Ϊν τους νόμους, hicuKet he τα πλeΐστa καΐ 
τα μέγιστα των iv ττ) rroXeL, καΐ κολάζουσα καΐ 
ζημίοΰσα πάντας τους άκοσμοΰντας κυρίως' η 
γαρ aΐpeσις των αρχόντων άpίστLvhηv και πλουτίν- 
8ην ην, e^ ων οΐ ^ Αρ€οπαγΐταί καθίσταντο, διό 
και μόνη των αρχών αυτή μeμevηκe δια βίου και 
νυν. η μεν ουν ττρώτη πολιτεία ταύτην είχε την 
ύπογραφην . 

1 IV. Μετά he ταΰτα, χρόνου τινός ου πολλού 
Βιελθόντος, €π' * Αρισταίχμου άρχοντος δράκων 
τους θεσμούς εθηκεν η he τάζις αϋτη τόι^δε τον 

2 τρόπον elχe. άπehehoτo μεν η πολιτεία τοις όπλα 
παρεχομενοις• ηροΰντο δε τους μεν εννέα άρχοντας 
και τους τα^Μία? ούσίαν κεκτημένους ουκ ελάττω 
δέκα μνών ελευθεραν, τας δ' άλλα? άρχας τας^ 
ελαττους εκ των όπλα παρεχομένων, στρατηγούς 
he και Ιππάρχους ούσίαν άποφαίνοντας ουκ ελάτ- 
τον η εκατόν μνών ελευθεραν^ και πaΐhaς εκ 
γαμέτης γυναικός γνησίους υπέρ δβκα ετη γεγονό- 

^ τάϊ suppletum a Richards et aliis. 
^ edd. : e'KeiSepwv cod. 

" Draco was presumably one of the Thesmothetae, Arist- 
aechmus being Archon Eponymus. For Draco's work see 

18 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, iii. 5— iv. 2 

because Epilycus on becoming War-lord rebuilt and 
furnished it, it received the name of Epilyceum) ; 
and the Legislators had the Legislators' Court. But 
in Solon's time they all came together in the Legis- 
lators' Court. They also had power to give final 
judgement in lawsuits, and not as now merely to hold 
a preliminary trial. Such then were the regulations 
relating to the supreme offices. The Council of 6 
Areopagus had the official function of guarding the 
laws, but actually it administered the greatest number 
and the most important of the affairs of state, inflict- 
ing penalties and fines upon offenders agairist public 
order without appeal ; for the elections of the 
Archons went by birth and wealth, and the members 
of the Areopagus were appointed from them, owing 
to which this alone of the offices has remained even 
to the present day tenable for life. This* then, was the 
outline of the first form of the constitution. 

IV. And after this when a certain moderate length 1 
of time had passed, in the archonship of Aristaechmus, «21 β . 
Draco enacted his ordinances « ; and this system was 
on the following lines. Citizenship had already been 2 
bestowed on those who provided themselves with 
arms ; and these elected as the Nine Archons and the 
Treasurers^ '^ who Λvere owners of an unencumbered 
estate worth not less than 10 minae,'' and the other 
minor offices from those who provided themselves with 
arms, and as Generals and Masters of the Horse 
persons proving their possession of unencumbered 
estate worth not less than 100 minae and sons legiti- 
mately born in wedlock over ten years of age. The 

Politics 1274 b 15 fF. ; it is there said that he ' adapted his 
laws to a constitution that already existed.' 

* For the Treasurers of Athena see xlvii. I. 

" Sav £40. 

19 



ARISTOTLE 

τα?• τούτους δ e8et 8ί€γγναν τους 7τρντάν€ΐς και 
τους στρατηγούς καΐ τους ίπττάρχους τους '4νους 
μ^χρι ευθυνών, εγγυητάς δ' e/c τοΰ αύτοϋ τέλους 
θιγομένους οΰπερ οι στρατηγοί και οΐ ίππαρχοι. 

3 βουλ€υ€ΐν 8e τετρακόσιους και eva τους λαχόντας 
€κ της πολιτείας• κληροΰσθαι Se και ταύτην και τας 
αΛΛα? αρχάς τους υπέρ τριάκοντα ετη γεγονοτας• 
και οις τον αυτόν μη αρχειν προ του παντας 
εξελθεΐν, τότε δε πάλιν εξ ύπαρχης κληροΰν. εΐ δε 
τις των βουλευτών , όταν Ι'δρα βουλής η εκκλησίας 
η, εκΑειποι την συνοοον, απετινον ο μεν πεντα- 
κοσιομεΒιμνος τρεις 8ραχμάς, ό δε ιππεύς δυο, 

4 ζευγίτης^ δε μίαν. η δε βουλή ή εξ 'Αρείου πάγου 
φύλαξ ην των νόμων, και Βιετήρει τάς αρχάς όπως 
κατά τους νόμους άρχωσιν. εξην δε τω α6ικουμένω 
προς την των Αρεοπαγιτών βουλην είσαγγέλλειν, 
αποφαίνοντι παρ* δν άΒικεΐται νόμον. επι δε τοις 
σώ^ασιν ήσαν οι δανεισμοί, καθάπερ ε'ίρηται, και 
η χώρα δι' ολίγων ην. 

1 V. Τοιαύτης δε της τάξεως οϋσης εν τη πολιτεία 
και τών πολλών Βουλευόντων τοις ολίγοις, άντεστη 

2 TOtS" γνωριμοις ό 8ημος. ίσχυράς δε της στάσεως 
ούσης και πολύν χρόνον άντικαθη μένων άλλήλοις, 
εΐλοντο κοινή Βιαλλακτην και άρχοντα Σόλωι^α και 
την πολιτείαν έπετρεφαν αύτώ, ποιησαντι την 
εΛε•}/ειαν ης εστίν αρχή' 

^ δταν . . . rj] δτ€ . . . €Ϊη ? Richards. 

* (κλίτΓοι Heerwerden, Leeuwen. 

^ <ό> ^(υ-/ίτη^ Kontos. 

" Probably before Solon's time this denotes the Archons. 

' See vii. 3. A drachma (say D^d. or 1 franc) was a 
hundredth part of a mina (say £4). 

' On these quotations from Solon see Έ.άιηοηάΒ, Elegy and 
20 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, iv. 2— v. 2 

new officials had to bail the outgoing Presidents <* and 
Generals and Masters of the Horse till the audit, 
accepting four sureties from the same rating as 
that to which the Generals and Masters of the Horse 
belonged. And the Council was to be formed of four 3 
hundred and one members chosen by lot from the 
citizen bod}*, and lots were to be cast both for this 
and for the other offices by the citizens over thirty 
years of age ; and the same person was not to hold 
office twice until the whole num.ber had been gone 
through, and then lots were to be cast among them 
again from the beginning. And if any Councillor, 
whenever there was a sitting of the Council or 
Assembly, failed to attend the meeting, he paid a 
fine of 3 drachmae if of Five-hundred-measure rank, 
2 drachmae if a Knight, and 1 if a Teamster.* The 4 
Council of Areopagus was guardian of th.p laws, and 
kept a watch on the magistrates to make them 
govern in accordance with the laws. A person un- 
justly treated might lay a complaint before the 
Council of the Areopagites, stating the law in con- 
travention of which he was treated unjustly. Loans 
were secured on the person, as has been said, and the ϋ. 2. 
land was divided among few OAvners. 
' V. Such being the system in the constitution, and 1 
the many being enslaved to the few, the people rose 
against the notables. The party struggle being 2 
violent and the parties remaining arrayed in opposi- 
tion to one another for a long time, they jointly 
chose Solon as arbitrator and Archon, and entrusted 594 b.c. 
the government to him, after he had composed the 
elegy " that begins : 

Iambus (L.C.L,), vol. i. pp. 104 fF., especially pp. 120-121, 
142-143, and 148-153. 

21 



ARISTOTLE 

γινώσκω, και μοι φρενός evSodev άλγ€α κείται 

πρεσβντάτην εσορών γαΐαν Ίαονίας 
καινομενην^' 

ev fj ττρος εκατβρους ύπβρ εκατερων μάχεται και 
8ιαμφισβητ€Ϊ, καΐ μετά ταΰτα Koivij παραινεί 
3 καταπαύειν την ενεστώσαν φιλονικίαν. ην δ' 6 
Σίόλων τη μεν φύσει και τη 8όζη των πρώτων, 
τη δ' ουσία και τοις πράγμασι των μέσων, 
ώς εκ τε των άλλων ομολογείται και αυτός εν 
τοΐσ8ε τοις ποιημασιν μαρτυρεί, παραινών τοις 
πλουσίοις μη πλεονεκτεΐν 

ύμεΐς δ' ησυχάσαντες ενι φρεσι καρτερόν ητορ, 
οι πολλών aya^oil•' ες κόρον ηλάσατε, 

εν μετρίοισι^ τίθεσθε μεγαν νόον οϋτε γαρ ημείς 
πεισόμεθ\ οΰθ' ύμΐν άρτια ταυτ'* εσεται. 

και όλως atet την αιτι'αν της στάσεως άνάπτει τοις 
πλουσίοις• δίο και εν αρχή της ελεγείας 8ε8οικεναι 
φησί 

την τε φιλαργυρίαν* την θ* ύπερηφανίαν, 

ώς δια ταΰτα ^ς έχθρας ενεστώσης . 
1 VI. Κύριο? δε γενόμενος των πραγμάτων Σόλων 
τόν τε δημον ηλευθερωσε και εν τω παρόντι και 
εις το μέλλον, κωλύσας ^ανείζειν επι τοις σίό/χασιρ-, 
και νόμους εθηκε, και χρεών άποκοπάς εποίησε 
και τών ίδιων και τών 8ημοσίων, ας σ€ΐσά;ΐ(^€ΐαΓ 

1 κΚίνομένην, καρφομένην nonnulli legunt : καιομένην ? Ed- 
monds. 

* μέτροισι Wilamowitz-Kaibel metri gratia (et Ημεσθε, 
' cut to measure,' Edmonds). 

8 iravT nonnulli legunt : τ&στ Edmonds. 

22 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, v. 2— vi. i 

I mark, and sorrow fills my breast to see, 
Ionia's oldest land being done to death, — 

in which he does battle on behalf of each party 
against the other and acts as mediator, and after this 
exhorts them jointly to stop the quarrel that pre- 
vailed between them. Solon was by birth and re- 3 
putation of the first rank, but by wealth and position 
belonged to the middle class, as is admitted on the 
part of the other authorities, and as he himself testi- 
fies in these poems, exhorting the wealthy not to be 
covetous : 

\ 
Refrain ye in your hearts those stubborn moods. 
Plunged in a surfeit of abundant goods, 
And moderate your pride ! We'll not submit, 
Nor even you yourselves will this befit." 

And he always attaches the blame for the civil strife 
wholly to the rich ; owing to which at the beginning 
of the elegy he says that he fears 

Both love of money and o'erweening pride — , 

implying that these were the causes of the enmity 
that prevailed. 

VI. Solon having become master of affairs made i 
the people free both at the time and for the future 
by prohibiting loans secured on the person, and he 
laid down laws, and enacted cancellations of debts 
both private and public, the measures * that are known 

" ' Nor shall ye possess what ye have now without decrease ' 
(Edmonds). 

* Their actual provisions are quite uncertain. 

* φίλοχρηίαΐ' legit Edmonds (cf. φιΚοχρηματιαν Plutarch. 
Solon 14). 

23 



ARISTOTLE 

2 καΧοϋσιν , ώς άποσ€ΐσαμ€νων^ το βάρος, ev οις 
π€ΐρώνταί rives' ^ιαβάλλβίν αυτόν συνββη γαρ τω 
Σιόλωνι μζλλοντι ποί€Ϊν την σ^ισάχθ^ιαν rrpo^nrelv 
τισΐ των γνωρίμων y eVet^', ώς μέν οΐ δημοτικοί 
Χ4γουσι, τταραστρατηγηθηναι δια των φίλων, ως 
δ' οι βονλόμ€νοί βλασφημ€Ϊν, καΐ αυτόν κοινων€Ϊν. 
8αν€ΐσάμ€νοι γαρ ούτοι συν€πρίαντο πολλην χώραν, 
καΐ μ€τ^ ου πολύ της των χρ€ών αποκοπής 
γ€νομ€νης^ €πλούτουν• όθεν φασί yevea^ai τους 

3 ϋστ€ρον Βοκοΰντας eivai παλαιοπλούτους . ου μην 
αλλά πιθανώτβρος 6 των Βημοτικών λόγος• ου 
γαρ €ίκός iv μεν τοις άλλοι? οΰτω μίτριον ytvea^at 
καΐ κοινόν ωστ', εζόν αύτω τους ίτίρους υπο- 
ποιησάμενον τυραννεΐν της πόλεως, άμφοτεροις άπ- 
εχθεσθαί καΐ περί πλείονος ποιησασθαί το καλόν 
και την της πόλεως σωτηρίαν η την αύτοΰ πλεον- 
εξίαν, εν οΰτω hk μικροΐς και άναζίοις^ καταρρυπαί- 

4 νειν εαυτόν. Οτι δε ταύτην εσχε την εζουσίαν, τά 
τε πράγματα νοσοϋντα μαρτυρεί, καΐ εν τοις ποιη- 
/Αασιν αυτό? πολλαχοϋ μεμνηται, και οι άλλοι 
συνομολογοϋσι πάντες, ταύτην μεν οΰν χρη νομί- 
ζειν φευ^η την αιτιαν efvat. 

1 VII. Πολιτειαν 8ε κατέστησε και νόμους εθηκεν 
άλλους, τοις Βε /Δράκοντος θεσμοΐς επαύσαντο χρώ- 
μενοι πλην των φονικών, άναγράφαντες 8ε τους 

^ Mayor: αττοσισαμενοι cod. 

* Rutherford : -γινομένης cod. 

8 φανεροιζ incerte legit Rutherford. 

24. 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, vi. l— vii. l 

as ' the Shaking-oiF of Burdens,' meaning that the 
people shook off their load. In these matters some 
people try to misrepresent him ; for it happened 2 
that when Solon was intending to enact the Shaking- 
off of Burdens, he informed some of the notables 
beforehand, and afterwards, as those of popular 
sympathies say, he was out-manceuvred by his• 
friends, but according to those who want to malign 
him he himself also took a share. For these persons 
borrowed money and bought up a quantity of land, 
and when not long afterwards the cancellation of 
debts took place they were rich men ; and this is 
said to be the origin of the families subsequently 
reputed to be ancestrally wealthy." Nevertheless, 3 
the account of those of popular sympathies is more 
credible ; for considering that he was so moderate 
and public-spirited in the rest of his conduct that, 
when he had the opportunity to reduce one of the 
two parties to subjection and so to be tyrant of 
the city, he incurred the enmity of both, and valued 
honour and the safety of the state more than his own 
aggrandizement, it is not probable that he besmirched 
himself in such worthless trifles. And that he got 4 
this opportunity is testified by the disordered state of 
affairs, and also he himself alludes to it in many places 
in his poems, and everybody else agrees with him. 
We are bound therefore to consider this charge to 
be false. 

VII. And he established a constitution and made 1 
other laws, and they ceased to observe the ordinances 
of Draco, except those relating to homicide. They 

" Apparently certain well-known families, but not alluded 
to elsewhere. 

25 



ARISTOTLE 

νόμους els τους κύρβεις έστησαν eV rij στοά rfj 
^δασιλειω και ώμοσαν χρησβσθαι vavres' οι δ' 
evvea άρχοντΐς όμννντβς ττρός τω λίθω κατβφάτιζον 
avadrjaeiv ανδριάντα χρυσονν εάν τίνα παραβώσι 
των νομών bdev ert /cat νυν ούτως ομνυουσι. 

2 κατ€κΧ€ΐσ€ν 8e τους νόμους εΙς εκατόν €τη. καΐ 

3 δΐ€τα^€ την πολιτβίαν TOvSe τρόττον τιμηματί 
SielXev^ εΙς τβτταρα τέλη, καθάπερ Βιγιρητο καΐ 
πρότ€ρον, εις πεντακοσιομβ^ιμνον καΐ ίππεα καΐ 
ζευγίτην καΐ θητα' καΐ τάς μεν αλλα?^ άρχας 
άττένειμεν άρχειν €Κ πεντακοσιομεΒίμνων καΐ Ιπ- 
πέων καΐ ζευγιτών, τους εννέα άρχοντας και 
τους ταμίας και τους πωλητάς και τους ένδεκα 
και τους κωλακρετας, εκάστοις ανά Χόγον τω μεγε- 
θει του τιμήματος άποΒώούς εκάστην^ αρχήν 
τοις 8e το θητικόν τελοΰσιν εκκλησίας και 8ικα- 

4 στηρίων μετεΒωκε μόνον. ε8ει 8ε τελεΐν πεντα- 

κοσιομε8ιμνον μεν ος αν εκ της* οικείας ποιη 

πεντακόσια μέτρα τα συνάμφω ζηρά και υγρά, 

ίππά8α δε τους τριακόσια ποιοΰντας — ώς δ' ενιοί 

φασι, τους Ιπποτροφεΐν 8υναμενους• σημεΐον 8ε 

φερουσι τό τε όνομα του τέλους, ώς από* του 

πράγματος κείμενον, και τά αναθήματα τών 

αρχαίων άνάκειται γαρ εν ακροπόλει είκών 

Αιφίλου^ εφ' ^ επιγεγραπται τά8ε' 

1 SieiXev <avTT]vy ? Rutherford. 

* μέι> dWas Diels : μ ... at cod, : μΐ-γίσταί Blass olim. 

* ed. : την cod. * yrjs Bywater. * άτό ed. : αναπω cod. 

' [Δί0ίλοι/] Thompson. 

" Three-sided (or perhaps four-sided) structures of wood 
(or perhaps stone) revolving on pivots; set up in the Stoa 
Basilike, the court of the King-Archon, on the west side of 
the Agora. 

26 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, vii. 1-4 

wrote up the laws on the Boards °• and set them in 
the Royal Colonnade, and all swore to observe them ; 
and the Nine Archons used to make affirmation on oath 
at the Stone ^ that if they transgressed any one of the 
laws they would dedicate a gold statue of a man; 
owing to which they are even now still sworn in with 
this oath. And he fixed the laws to stay unaltered for 2 
a hundred years. And he arranged the constitution in 
the following way : he divided the people by assess- 3 
ment into four classes, as they had been divided 
before, Five-hundred-measure nnian. Horseman, Team- 
ster and Labourer, and he distributed the other offices 
to be held from among the Five-hundred-measure 
men, Horsemen and Teamsters — the Nine Archons, 
the Treasurers," the \^endors of Contracts,^ the 
Eleven « and the Paymasters, assigning each office 
to the several classes in proportion to the amount 
of their assessment ; while those who were rated in 
the Labourer class he admitted to the membership 
of the assembly and law-courts alone. Any man had 4 
to be rated as a Five-hundred-measure man the 
produce from whose estate was five hundred dry and 
liquid measures jointly,-'^ and at the cavalry-rate those 
who made three hundred, — or as some say, those 
who were able to keep a horse, and they adduce as 
a proof the name of the rating as being derived from 
the fact, and also the votive offerings of the ancients ; 
for there stands dedicated in the Acropolis a statue 
of Diphilus y on which are inscribed these lines : 

* Perhaps the altar of Zeus Agoraios. 

" See xlvii. 1. "* See xlvii. 2. « See Hi. 1. 

f i.e. measures of corn and of wine and oil amounting in 
all to five hundred. 

^ ' Of J^iphilus ' is probably a mistaken insertion ; pre- 
sumably the statue was of Anthemion himself. 

27 



< 



ARISTOTLE 

Αίφίλον ^Ανθ€μίων την8^ άνεθηκε θεοΐς . . . 
θητικοΰ άντΙ τέλους ίτΓττάδ' άμειφάμενος — 

/cat παρεστηκεν ΐππος εκμαρτυρών^ ώς την ίπττά^α 
τοντο σημαίνουσαν. ου μην αλλ" εύλογώτερον 
τοις μετροις 8ιηρησθαί καθάπερ τους ττεντα- 
κοσιομεΒίμνους . ζευγίσιον 8e τελεΐν τους Βίακόσια 
τά συνάμφω ττοιοϋντας- τους δ' άλλου? θητικόν, 
ουδεμιάς μετέχοντας άρχης, διό /cat νΰν επεώάν 
ερηται τον μέλλοντα κληροϋσθαί τιν" ο,ρχην ττοΐον 
τέλος τελεί, ουδ' αι^ εις είττοι θητικόν. 

1 VIII. Τά? δ' άρχας εποίησε κληρωτάς εκ προ- 
κρίτων ους εκάστη προκρίνειε^ των φυλών, ττροΰ- 
κριν εν δ' εις τους εννέα άρχοντας εκάστη Βέκα, 
/cat' τούτων εκληρουν*• όθεν ετι Βυαμένει ταΐς 
φυλαΐς το 8εκα κληροΰν εκάστην, εΐτ* εκ τούτων 
κυαμεύειν. ση μείον δ' οτι κληρωτάς έττοίησεν^ 
εκ των τιμημάτων ο περί των ταμιών νόμος 
ω χρώμενοι ^ιατελοϋσιν ετι και νυν κελεύει 
γαρ κληροΰν τους ταμίας εκ πεντακοσιομε^ίμνων. 

2 Σόλων μεν οΰν οϋτως ενομοθέτησεν περί τών 
εννέα αρχόντων το γαρ άρχαΐον η εν "Αρείω 
πάγω βουλή άνακαλεσαμενη και κρίνασα καθ* 
αύτην τον επιτηΒειον εφ" εκάστη τών αρχών επ* 

3 ενιαυτον άρζοντα^ άπέστελλεν . φυλαι δ' ήσαν δ* 

^ ds μαρτύρων coni. Blass. ^ Gertz : ιτροκριν^ι cod. 

lu * κάκ Gomperz fsed cf. xxx. 1, xxxi. 1), 
\V * Kaibel-Wilamowitz : του . . . ληρονν cod. 
^ Bury : ινοιησαν cod . 

• Kaibel : διατάξασα Kenyon : ... τα vel ... σα cod. 

" Apparently the property qualification was ignored, with- 
out being formally repealed. 

* i.e. nine were taken by lot out of forty elected by vote 
28 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, vii. 4— viii. 3 

Anthemion Diphilus's son dedicated this statue to tiie gods 
. . . having exchanged the Labourer rating for the Cavalry — 

and a horse stands beside him, in evidence that 
' cavalry ' meant the class able to keep a horse. 
Nevertheless it is more probable that the cavalry were 
distinguished by their amounts of produce as the 
Five-hundred-measure men were. And men had to 
be rated in the Teamster class who made two hundred 
measures, wet and dry together ; while the rest were 
rated in the Labourer class, being admitted to no 
office : hence even now when the presiding official 
asks a man who is about to draw lots for some office 
what rate he pays, no one whatever would say that 
he was rated as a Labourer.'' 

VIII. For the offices of state he instituted election 1 
by lot from candidates selected by the tribes severally 
by a preliminary vote. For the Nine Archons each 
tribe made a preliminary selection of ten, and the 
election was made from among these by lot ^ ; hence 
there still survives with the tribes the system that each 
elects ten by lot and then they choose from among 
these by ballot.*' And a proof that he made the 
offices elective by lot according to assessments is the 
law in regard to the Treasurers that remains in force 
even at the present day ; for it orders the Treasurers 
to be elected by lot from the Five-hundred-measure 
men. Solon, therefore, legislated thus about the Nine 2 
Archons ; for in ancient times the Council on the 
Areopagus used to issue a summons and select inde- 
pendently the person suitable for each of the offices, 
and commission him to hold office for a year. And 3 

by the four tribes; whereas in the writer's day the pre- 
liminary election was also by lot and produced one hundred 
from the ten tribes. " i.e. by lot again. 

29 



ARISTOTLE 

καθάττ€ρ ττρότζρον και φυλοβασιλέΐς τέσσαρες. 
€Κ δε τί^? φνλης βκάστης ήσαν νβν^μ-ημεναι τριτ- 
τυ€ς μεν τρεις, ναυκραρίαί δε δώδεκα καθ' εκαστην, 
€πΙ δε τών^ ναυκραριών αρχή καθεστηκυία ναν- 
κραροι, τεταγμένη ττρός τε τάς εισφοράς και τας 
δαπάνα? τα? γινομενας• διό και εν τοις νομοις 
τοις Έόλωνος, οΐς ονκετι χρώνται, πολλαχον 
γεγραπται τους νανκράρονς είσπράττειν, και ανα- 

'ί λίσκειν εκ τοΰ ναυκραρικον αργυρίου, βουλην ο 
εποίησε τετρακόσιους, εκατόν εζ εκάστης φυλής, 
TTjv δε των Αρεοπαγιτών εταζεν εττι το νομο- 
φυλακεΐν, ωσττερ ύττηρχεν και ττρότερον επίσκοπος 
ούσα της πολιτείας , rj τά τε άλλα και τα πλείστα 
και τά ]υ,ε')/ιστα των πολιτικών^ Βιετήρει και 
τους άμαρτάνοντας ηϋθυνεν κυρία ούσα και ζη- 
μιοΰν και κολάζειν, και τάς εκτίσεις άνεφερεν εις 
πάλιν ουκ επιγράφουσα την πρόφασιν τοΰ εκτινε- 
σθαι/ και τους επι καταλύσει τοΰ Βημου συνιστά- 
μενους εκρινεν, δόλωνος θεντος νόμον εΙσαγγελίας 

5 περί αυτών. ορών δε την μεν πόλιν πολλάκις 
στασιάζουσαν τών δε πολιτών ενίους δια την 
ραθυμίαν αγαπώντας το αύτόματον, νόμον εθηκε 
προς αυτούς ί,'διον, δς αν στασιαζούσης της πόλεως 
μη θήται τά όπλα μηΒε μεθ* έτερων άτιμον είΡ'αι 
και της πόλεως μη μετεχειν. 

1 IX. Τά μεν οΰν περί τάς αρχάς τούτον είχε τον 
τρόπον. δοκεΓ δε της Σίόλωνος πολιτείας τρία 

^ ^ν δ' έτΓΐ των nonnulli legunt. 
* ΊΓοΧιτικΰν coni. Richards : πολιτωρ cod, 
' ενθνν^σθαί nonnulli legunt, δι' δ τό έκτίνΐσθαι alii. 

" The Naucrariae were forty-eight administrative districts 
into which the country was divided for taxation, each having 

30 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, viii. 3— ix. 1 

there were four Tribes, as before, and four Tribal 
Kings. And from each Tribe there had been assigned 
three Thirds and twelve Ship-boards "• to each, and 
over the Ship-boards there was established the office 
of Ship-commissioners, appointed for the levies and 
the expenditures that were made ; because of which 
in the laws of Solon, which are no longer in force, 
the clauses frequently occur, ' the Ship-commissioner 
to levy ' and ' to spend out of the Ship-commission 
Fund.' And he made a Council of four hundred 4 
members, a hundred from each tribe, but appointed ^ 
the Council of the Areopagus to the duty of guarding 
the laws, just as it had existed even before as over- 
seer of the constitution, and it was this Council that 
kept watch over the greatest number and the most 
important of the affairs of state, in particular correct- 
ing offenders with sovereign powers both to fine and 
punish, and making returns of its expenditure to the 
Acropolis without adding a statement of the reason 
for the outlay, and trying persons that conspired to 
put down the democracy, Solon having laid down a 
law of impeachment in regard to them. And as he 5 
saw that the state was often in a condition of party 
strife, while some of the citizens through slackness 
were content to let things slide, he laid down a special 
law to deal with them, enacting that whoever when 
civil strife prevailed did not join forces with either 
party was to be disfranchised and not to be a member 
of the state. 

IX. This then was the nature of his reforms in 1 
regard to the offices of state. And the three most 

to defray the equipment of one battle-ship. Their presidents 
were Naucrari. Every four Naucrariae formed a Trittys, of 
which there were three in each Tribe. 

31 



ARISTOTLE 



A > 



ταυτ €Lvai τα όημοηκωτατα, πρώτον /xev /cat 
μεγιστον το μτ] 8αν€ίζ€ΐν ΙπΙ τοις σω/^ασιν, έττειτα 
το i^eLvai τω βουλομβνω τιμωρ^ΐν vrrep των 
αδικούμενων, τρίτον δε, ω^ μάλιστα φασιν Ισ^υ- 
κβναι το πλήθος, η et? το ^ικαστηριον €φ€σις• 
κύριος γαρ ων 6 δη/χο? της- φηφου κύριος γίνεται 
2 της πολιτείας . ετι he και δια το μη γεγράφθαι 
τους νόμους απλώς μηΒε σαφώς, αλλ ώσπερ ο 
περί τών κλήρων και επικληρων, ανάγκη πολλάς 
αμφισβητήσεις ytVea^at και πάντα βραβευβιν και 
τα κοινά και τα ί,'δια το ^ικαστηριον. οϊονται μεν 
οΰν τίνες επίτηδες ασαφείς αύτον ποιησαι τους 
νόμους όπως fj της κρίσεως 6 8ημος κύριος' ου 
μην εΙκός, αλλά δια το μη δυι^ασθα6 καθόλου περι- 
λαβεΐν το βελτιστον ον γάρ δίκαιον εκ τών νυν 
γινομένων αλλ' εκ της άλλης πολιτείας θεωρεΐν 
την εκείνου βούλησιν. 

1 Χ. Έν μεν οΰν τοις νόμοις ταύτα δό/ίβι ^etvai 
δημοτικά, προ δε της νομοθεσίας ποιησας^ την 
τών χρεών άποκοπην και μετά ταύτα την τε τών 
μέτρων και σταθμών και την του νομίσματος 

2 αυ^τ^σίΓ. εττ' εκείνου γάρ εγενετο και τά μέτρα 
μείζω τών Φεώωνείων, και η μνα πρότερον έχουσα 
σταθμόν εβ^ομηκοντα ^ραχμάς άνεπληρώθη ταΓ? 
εκατόν. ην δ' ό αρχαίος χαρακτηρ 8ι8ραχμον. 
εποίησε δε και σταθμά προς το ι^ό/χισ/χα, τρεις και 

^ δέ, φ Lipsius : δε cod. * νοιησαι legit Kenyon. 

" King of Argos, probably early 7th century b.c, see 
Politics 1310 b 26. His standards of coinage and weights 
and measures came to prevail through most of Greece. 

' i.e. seventy of the new drachmae : the drachma coin 

32 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, ix. l— x. 2 

democratic features in Solon's constitution seem to 
be these : first and most important the prohibition 
of loans secured upon the person, secondly the liberty ■^ 
allowed to anybody who wished to exact redress on 
behalf of injured persons, and third, what is said to 
have been the chief basis of the powers of the 
multitude, the right of appeal to the jury-court — for 
the people, having the power of the vote, becomes 
sovereign in the government. And also, since the 2 
laws are not drafted simply nor clearly, but like the 
law about inheritances and heiresses, it inevitably 
results that many disputes take place and that the 
jury-court is the umpire in all business both public 
and private. Therefore some people think that 
Solon purposely made his laws obscure, in order that 
the people might be sovereign over the verdict. But 
this is unlikely — probably it was due to his not being 
able to define the ideal in general terms ; for it is 
not fair to -study his intention in the light of what 
happens at the present day, but to judge it from the 
rest of his constitution. 

X. Solon therefore seems to have laid down these 1 
enactments of a popular nature in his laws ; while 
before his legislation his democratic reform was his 
cancellation of debts, and afterwards his raising the 
standard of the measures and weights and of the 
coinage. For it was in his time that the measures 2 
were made larger than those of Pheidon," and that 
the mina, which previously had a weight of seventy 
drachmae,^ was increased to the full hundred. The 
ancient coin-type was the two-drachma piece. Solon 
also instituted weights corresponding to the cur- 
was also enlarged, so that seventy of the new equalled one 
hundred of the old ; and see note on iv. 1. 

D 33 



ARISTOTLE 

ζζήκοντα μνας το τάλαντον άγουσας, καΐ ctti- 
8ιβν€μηθησαν at τρ€Ϊς μναΐ τω στατηρι καΐ τοις 
άλλοι? σταθμοΐς. 

1 XI. Διάταζα? δε την ττολιτβίαν ovTrep ζΐρηται 
τρόπον, irretSr] προσιόντ^ς αύτω irepl των νόμων 
€νώγλουν τά μ^ν βπιτιμώντβς τά δβ άνακρίνοντζς.) 
βουλόμβνοζ μητζ ταύτα klvclv μήτ^ άπβχθάνεσθαί 
παρών, άπο^ημίαν €ποίήσατο κατ' €μπορίαν άμα 
και θβωρίαν ets" Α!ίγυπτον , ειπών ώς ούχ ηζει δέκα 
ετών, ου γαρ ο'ίεσθαι δίκαιον elvai τους νόμους 
ζζηγεΐσθαι παρών αλλ' εκαστον τά γεγραμμενα 

2 ποιησαι. άμα δε /cat συνέβαιναν αντώ τών τε 
γνωρίμων διαφόρους γεγενησθαι πολλούς 8ιά τάς 
τών χρεών άποκοπάς, και τάς στάσεις άμφοτερας 
μεταθεσθαι δια το παρά 8όζαν αύτοΐς '^εΐ'ε'σ^αι 
την καταστασιν. ο μεν γαρ 8ημος ώετο πάντ 
άρ'άδαστα ποιησειν αυτόν, οί δε γνώριμοι πάλιν η 
την αύτην τάζιν άπο8ώσειν η μικρόν παραλ- 
λάζαντα• ό δε Σόλων άμφοτέροις ηναντιώθη, και 
εζόν αύτω μεθ' όποτερων ηβούλετο συστάντα 
τυραννεΐν εΐλετο προς αμφότερους άπεχθεσθαι^ 
σώσας την πατρίΒα και τά βέλτιστα νομοθετησας. 

1 XII. Ταΰτα δ' OTt τούτον τρόπον εσχεν^ οι τ' 
άλλοι συμφωνοΰσι πάντες και αύτος εν τη ποιήσει 
μεμνηται περί αυτώι^ εν τοΓσδε• 

8ημω μεν γάρ ε^ωκα τόσον γέρας δσσον απ- 
αρκεΐ, 
τιμής οϋτ^ αφελών ού'τ' επορεξάμενος, 
^ Wyse : απεχθΐσθηναι cod. * eixivWilamowitz-Kaibpl. 



The weight of a fiftieth part of a mina. 
* See V. 2 n. 



34 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, χ. 2— χπ. ι 

rency, the talent weighing sixty-three minae, and a 
fraction proportionate to the additional three minae 
was added to the stater * and the other weights. 

XI. When Solon had organized the constitution \ 
in the manner stated, people kept coming to him j 
and worrying him about his laws, criticizing some I 
points and asking questions about others ; so as he / 
did not wish either to alter these provisions or to stay ( 
and incur enmity, he went abroad on a journey to \ 
Egypt, for the purpose both of trading and of seeing \ 
the country, saying that he would not come back 
for ten years, as he did not think it fair for him to j 
stay and explain his laws, but for everybody to carry 
out their provisions for himself. At the same time 2 
it befell him that many of the notables had become 
at variance with him because of the cancellations of 
debts, and also that both the factions changed their 
attitude to him because the settlement had dis- 
appointed them. For the people had thought that 
he would institute universal communism of property, ^ 
whereas the notables had thought that he would 
either restore the system in the same form as it was 
before or with slight alteration ; but Solon went 
against them both, and when he might have been 
tyrant if he had taken sides with whichever of the 
two factions he wished, he chose to incur the enmity 

of both by saving the country and introducing the 
legislation that was best. 

XII. That this is how it happened is the unanimous 1 
account of everybody, and in particular Solon him- 
self in his poetry ^ recalls the matter in these words : 

For to the people gave I grace enough, 

Nor from their honour took, nor proffered more ; 

35 



ARISTOTLE 

ol δ' βΐχον Βυναμίν /cat χρημασιν ήσαν άγητοί, 
και τοις βφρασάμην μηΒβν aet/ce? €χ€ίν• 

€στην δ άμφίβαλών Kparepov σάκος άμφοτεροισι 
νικαν δ ουκ βί'ασ ovSerepovs ά8ίκως. 

2 τταλιν δ άποφαινόμ€νος Trepl του πλ-ηθους ώς αύτώ 
Bel χρησθαί• 

Βημος δ' οϋδ' άν άριστα συν -ηγ^μόν^σσιν eVotro, 
μητβ λίαν άνβθβΐς μ'ήτ€ βιαζόμ^νος' 

τίκτζΐ γαρ κόρος ϋβρίν όταν πολύς όλβος '^ττ-ηται 
άνθρώτΓοισιν δσοις μη νόος άρτιος rj. 

3 καΐ πάλιν δ €τ€ρωθί που Aeyet π€ρΙ των Sla- 
ve ίμασθαι την γην βουλομ^νων 

OL δ 60 άρπαγαΐσιν ήλθον βλττ/δ' βΐχ^ον^ άφν€άν, 
κάΒόκουν €καστος αυτών ολβον ^ύρησ^ιν πύλύν, 
και μ€ κωτίλλοντα λίίως τραχύν €κφαν€Ϊν νόον. 
;\;awa μβν τότ' ^φράσαντο, νυν δε μοι χολούμ^νοι 
λοξόν όφθαλμοΐσ' όρώσι πάντες ώστ€ Βηιον, 
ου χρεών α μεν γαρ είπα συν θεοΖσιν ηνυσα, 
άλλα δ' ου μάτην εερΒον, ούΒε μοι τυραννίΒος 
ηνΒάνεν'^ βία τι ρεζειν, ούΒέ πιείρας χθονος 
πατριΒος κακοΐσιν εσθλούς ίσομοιρίαν εχειν. 

4 πάλιν^ Βέ και περί της αποκοπής τών χρεών και 
τών Βουλευόντων μεν πρότερον ελευθερωθεντων Βε 
Βιά την σ€ΐσάχ^6ί.αν• 

^ έφ' apirayij συνηΧθον κάλττίδ' ^ΐχον (commate infra post νόον 
posito) Ziegler : έψ' άρπαΎαΐ$ ^xovres ΐλττίδ' ΐ/λθον Richards. 

* Richards : οί'δαΐ'ίΐ cod. 

^ πάλιν Kenyon : λ^7" Kontos : lacunam cod. 
36 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xii. 1-4 

While those possessing power and graced with wealth, 
These too I made to suffer nought unseemly ; 
I stood protecting both with a strong shield, 
And suffered neither to prevail unjustly. 

And again, when declaring about how the multi- 2 
tude ought to be treated : 

Thus would the people with the chiefs best follow, 
With neither too much freedom nor compulsion ; 
Satiety breeds insolence when riches 
Attend the men whose mind is not prepared. 

And again in a different place he says about those 3 
who wish to divide up the land : 

They that came on plunder bent were filled with over-lavish 

hope, 
Each and all imagining that they would find abundant 

wealth, 
And that I, though smoothly glozing, would display a purpose 

rough. 
Vain and boastful then their fancies ; now their bile 'gainst 

me is stirred. 
And with eyes askance they view me, and all deem me as a 

foe — 
Wrongly : for the things I promised, those by heaven's aid 

I did, ^ 

And much else, no idle exploits ; nothing did it please my 

mind 
By tyrannic force to compass, nor that in our fatherland 
Good and bad men should have equal portion in her fertile 

soil. 

And again about the cancellation of debts, and 4 
those who were in slavery before but were liberated 
by the Shaking-off of Burdens : 

37 



V 



ARISTOTLE 

€γω δε των aev οϋν€κα ζυνηγαγον 
οημον, TL τούτων ττριν τυχ€ΐν €πανσαμην; 
συμμαρτνροίη ταντ αν iv Slkt] \ρόνου 
μήτηρ μεγίστη Βαιμόνων ^Ολυμπίων 
άριστα. Τη /xeAatt'a, της €γώ ποτ€ 
ορονς αν€Ϊλον πολλαχή πβπηγότας , 
προσθεν δε SovXevovaa, νυν iXeudepa} 
πολλούς δ' 'A^ryj/a? ττατριδ' et? θβόκτιτον 
ανήγαγον πραθεντας, άλλον €κ8ίκως, 
άλλον Βίκαίως, τους δ' άναγκαίης ΰπο 
χρειοΰς φνγόντας, γλώσσαν ονκ4τ ^Αττικην 
ί€ντας, ως αν'' πολλαχη ττλανωμζνους, 
τους δ ενθα8* αύτοϋ 8ουλίην aeiKea 
έχοντας, ηθη Βεσποτών τρομευμένους, 
ελευθέρους εθηκα. ταύτα μεν κρατείν, 
ομοΰ^ βίαν τε και Βίκην συναρμόσας , 
ερεξα καΐ Βιηλθον ώς ύπεσχόμην 
θεσμούς θ' ομοίως τω κακω τε κάγαθώ, 
ευθείαν εις εκαστον αρμόσας 8ικην, 
έγραφα, κεντρον δ' άλλο? ώς εγώ λαβών, 
κακοφρα8ής τε καΐ φιλοκτημων άνήρ, 
ουκ αν κατεσχε Βημσν• εΐ γαρ ηθελον 
α τοις εναντίοισιν ην8α)/εν τότε, 
αυθίς δ' α τόΐσιν οΰτι^βφ^φρασαίατο , 
πολλών αν άν8ρών ηδΐ εχηρώθη πόλις. 
των οϋνεκ άλκην πάντοθεν ποιούμενος 
ως εν κυσίν πολλησιν ^^ράφην λύκος. 

5 και τταλιν όνειΒίζων προς τάς ύστερον αυτών 
μεμφιμοιρίας αμφοτέρων \ 

οημω μεν ει χρη 8ιαφρα8ην* 6νει8ίσαι, 
α νυν εχουσιν οϋποτ^ όφθαλμρΐσιν άν 
38 ' 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xii. 4-5 

But what did I leave unachieved, of all 
The ends for which I did unite the people ? 
Whereof before the judgement-seat of Time 
The mighty mother of the Olympian gods. 
Black Earth, would best bear witness, for 'twas I 
Removed her many boundary-posts " implanted : 
^re then she was a slave, but now is free. ■^K' 
/And many sold away I^did bring home 
To god-built At hens, this one sold unjustly. 
That otherjustlxj._othiers-tEatTiad iled 
From'dire constraint of need, uttering no more 
Their Attic tongue, so widely had they wandered, 
And others suffering base slavery 
Even here, trembling before their mas ter;^' humour 
I did set free. /These deeds I made prevaiT 
Adjusting might and right to fit together, 
/And did accomplish even as Τ had promised. 
And rules of law alike for base and noble, , , 
Jitting straig ht Justice u nto each man's case, ^J-^ 
I drafted. Had anofKerTRaiir myself '/) 

Taken the goad, unwise and covetous. 
He'd not have held the people ! Had I willed 
Now that pleased one of the opposing parties. 
And then whate'er the other party bade them. 
The city had been bereft of many men. 
Wherefore I stood at guard on every side, 
A wolf at bay among a pack of houndsJ_______«_ 



And again in his taunting reply to the later 5 
querulous complaints of both the parties : 

If openly I must reprove the people. 

Ne'er in the dreams of sleep could they have seen 

" i.e. posts marking mortgaged estates. 

^ πρόσθΐν SedovXevKvTa vdv δ' iXevdipa Ziegler. 

* ωσάν cod. et fr. Berol. : ώ? 7^ ? ed. 

' κρατ€€ίΐ'ομου cod., κρ ■ τηομου fr. Berol. : Kparei | νόμου edd. 
nonnulli ; cf. vi. 1 . 

* διαφάδην coni. edd. 

39 



ARISTOTLE 

evSovres elSov. . . . 

όσοι he μ^ίζους καΐ βίαν άμείνονες 

aivoXev αν μ€ και φιλον ττοιοίατο• 

et γάρ τις άλλος, φησί, ταύτης της τιμής €τυχ€ν, 

ουκ αν κατβσχε 8ημον, ουδ' επαυσατο 
ττρίν άνταράζας ττΐαρ^ e^etAev γάλα' 
€γώ 8e τούτων ωσττερ ev μ€ταιχμίω 
όρος κατβστην. 

1 XIII. Την μ€ν ονν άποΒημίαν €ποιησατο δια 
ταύτας τάς αίτιας. Σ^όλωνος δ' άποΒημησαντος, 
€Τί της πόλεως τεταραγμενης , επΙ μεν ετη τετταρα 
Βιηγον εν ησυχία- τω δβ πεμτττω μετά την Έόλωνος 
άρχην ουκ κατέστησαν άρχοντα δια την στάσιν, 
καΐ ττάλιν ετει ττεμτττω διά^ την αύτην αΐτίαν 

2 άναρχίαν εποίησαν, μετά Βε ταϋτα δια των αυτών 
χρόνων Δα/χασια? αίρεθείς άργων ετη Βυο και δυο 
μήνας ηρζεν, εως εζηλάθη βία της άρχης. είτ* 
εΒοζεν αύτοΐς δια το στασιάζειν άρχοντας ελεσ^αι 
Βεκα, πέντε μεν εύπατρώών τρεις δε άγροίκων 
δυο δε Βημιουργών, και ούτοι τον μετά Δαμ.ασιαν 
ηρζαν ενιαυτόν. ω και Βηλον δτι μεγίστην €Ϊχεν 
δυνα/χιν ο άρχων φαίνονται γάρ aiei στασιάζοντες 

3 περί ταυττ^? της άρχης. δλως δε διετεΆουι^ νοσοΰν- 
τες τα προς εαυτούς, οι μεν άρχην και πρόφασιν 
έχοντες την των χρεών άποκοπην (^συνεβεβηκει γάρ 
αύτοΐς γεγονεναι πενησιν), οί δε τη πολιτεία 
Βυσχεραίνοντες δια το μεγάλην^ γεγονεναι ^ετα- 
βολην, ενιοι δε δια την προς αλλήλους φιλονικίαν . 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xii. 5— xiii. 4 

The things that they have now . . . 
While all the greater and the mightier men 
Might praise me and might deem me as a friend ; 

for had another, he says, won this office, 

He had not checked the people nor refrained, 
Ere he had churned and robbed the milk of cream ; 
But I as 'twere betwixt their armed hosts 
A frontier-post did stand. 

XIII. Accordingly Solon made his journey abroad 1 
for these reasons. And when he had gone abroad, 
though the city was still disturbed, foi^our years 
they kept at peace ; but in the fifth year after Solon's 589 b.c. ? 
archonship because of party strife they did not 
appoint an archon, and again in the fifth year after "iss b.c. ? 
that they enacted a suspension of the archonship for 
the same cause. After this at the same interval of 2 
time Damasias was elected Archon, and held thessiBx.? 
post for two years and two months, until he was 
driven out of the office by force. Then because of y 
the civil strife they decided to elect ten Archons, 
five from the nobles, three from the farmers and two " 
from the artisans, and these held office for the year 579 b.c. ? 
after Damasias. This shows that the Archon had 
very great power ; for we find that they were always 
engaging in party strife about this office. And they 3 
continued in a state of general internal disorder, 
some having as their incentive and excuse the can- 
cellation of debts (for it had resulted in their having 
become poor), others discontented with the constitu- 
tion because a great change had taken place, and 
some because of their mutual rivalry. The factions 4 

^ ■κΐα.ρ edd. ex Plutarcho : ττυαρ cod. 
^ δίά fr. Berol. : om. cod. 
^ <ού> μβ-γάλην VoUgraf. 

41 



ARISTOTLE 

4 ήσαν δ' at στάσ€ίς τρεις• μία μεν των παραλίων, 
ών προειστηκει Μεγακλης 6 ^Αλκμεωνος, οίττ€ρ 
iSoKovv /ζάλιστα Βίώκβίν την μεσην ττοΧιτβίαν 
άλλη δε των π€8ιακών, οι την ολίγαρχιαν εζητονν, 
ηγβΐτο δ αυτών Αυκοΰργος- τρίτη δ η των 
Βι,ακρίων, ζφ* rj τεταγμένος ην Πεισίστρατο?, 

5 Βημοτίκώτατος eii^at 8οκών. ττροσεκεκόσμηντο δε 
τουτοίς ο? τε αφηρημένοι τα χρεα δια την άπορίαν, 
καΐ οι τω γένει μη καθαροί δια τον φόβον σημεΐον 
δ' δτι μετά την των τυράννων κατάλυσιν εποίησαν 
^ιαφηφισμόν^ ως πολλών κοινωνούντων της πολι- 
τείας ου προσήκον, εΐχον δ έκαστοι τάς επω- 
νυμίας άπο τών τόπων εν οΐς εγεώργουν. 

1 XIV. /^ημοτικώτατος δ' efi'ai Βοκών ο Πεισί- 
στρατο? και σφό^ρ* εύΒοκιμηκώς εν τω προς 
Μ,εγαρεας πολεμώ, κατατραυματίσας εαυτόν συν- 
επεισε τον Βημον, ως ύπο τών αντιστασιωτών 
ταύτα πεπονθώς, φυλακην εαυτώ Souvai του 
σώματος, ^Αριστίωνος γράφοντος την γνώμην. 
λαβών δε τους κορυνηφόρους καλουμένους , επανα- 
στάς μετά τούτων τω Βημω κατεσχε την άκρό- 
πολιν έ'τει Βευτερω^ και τριακοστώ μετά την τών 

2 νόμων θεσιν, επί Κωμεου άρχοντος, λέγεται δε 
Σόλωνα Πεισιστράτου την φυλακην αιτούντος άντι- 
λε^αι, και εΙπεΐν οτι τών μεν εϊη σοφώτερος τών 
δ' άι/δρειότερο?• όσοι μεν γάρ άγνοοΰσι Πεισι- 

^ διαψηφισμον edd. : διαφημισμον cod. 
* δ' (i.e. τΐτάρτψ) coni. Bauer. 

" i.e. by Solon's legislation. 

*" Perhaps the hostilities that ended in the Athenians' 
capture of Nisaea about 570 b.c. 
42 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xiii. 4— xiv. 2 

were three : one was the party of the Men of the 
Coast, whose head was Megacles the son of Alcmaeon, 
and they were thought chiefly to aim at the middle 
form of constitution ; another was the party of the 
Men of the Plain, who desired the oligarchy, and their 
leader was Lycurgus ; third was the party of the 
Hillmen, which had appointed Peisistratus over it, 
as he was thought to be an extreme advocate of the 
people. And on the side of this party were also 5 
arrayed, from the motive of poverty, those who had 
been deprived <^ of the debts due to them, and, from 
the motive of fear, those who were not of pure 
descent ; and this is proved by the fact that after the 
deposition of the tyrants the Athenians enacted a 
revision of the roll, because many people shared the 
citizenship who had no right to it. The different 
parties derived their names from the places where 
their farms were situated. 

XIV. Peisistratus, being thought to be an extreme 1 
advocate of the people, and having won great fame 
in the war against Megara,** inflicted a wound on 
himself with his own hand and then gave out that 
it had been done by the members of the opposite 
factions, and so persuaded the people to give him a 
bodyguard, the resolution being proposed by Aristo- 
phon. He was given the retainers called Club-bearers, 
and with their aid he rose against the people and 
seized the Acropolis, in the thirty-second year after- 
the enactment of his laws, in the archonship of560B.c 
Comeas. It is said that when Peisistratus asked for 2 
the guard Solon opposed the request, and said that 
he was wiser than some men and braver than others 
— he was wiser than those who did not know that 



43 



ARISTOTLE 

στρατον εττίπθίμ^νον rvpavvihi, σοφώτΐρος elvat 
τούτων, δσοι δ' ειδότβ? κατασιωπώσιν , avSpeio- 
τερος. €7Γ€ΐ 8e Χ^γων ουκ eneudev, ^ζαραμ^νος τα 
οττλα ττρο των θυρών αύτος μ€ν βφη β€βοηθηκ€ΐ^αί 
TTJ πατριοί καθ^ όσον ην δυνατός {ηΒη γαρ σφόΒρα 
πρ€σβύτης ην), άζίοΰν 8e καΐ τους άλλους ταύτό 

3 τοϋτο TTOLelv. ΊΰόΧων μεν ούν ούΒβν ηνυσεν τοτ€ 
τταρακαλών ΙΙεισίστρατος 8e λαβών την αρχήν 
8ίωκ€ΐ τα κοινά πολιτικώς μάλλον η τυραννικώς . 
οϋπω 8e της αρχής ερριζωμάνης ομοφρονησαντες 
οι 7Τ€ρι τον MeyaicAea και τον Αυκοΰργον εζεβα- 
λον αύτον €κτω eVet μετά την ττρώτην καταστασιν, 

4 6^' Ήγησίου άρχοντος. eVet δε δωδεκ-άτω^ μετά 
ταΰτα περιελαυνόμενος ο Μεγακλής τή στάσει 
πάλιν επικηρυκευσάμενος προς τον ΙΙεισίστρατον, 
εφ^ ω τε την θυγατέρα αύτοΰ ληφεται κατηγαγεν 
αύτον άρχαίως και λίαν απλώς, προ^ιασπειρας 
γάρ λόγον ως της ^Αθηνάς καταγούσης ΥΙεισί- 
στρατον, και γυναίκα μεγάλην και καλήν εζευρών, 
ώς μεν 'Ηρόδοτο? φησιν εκ του 8ημου τών 
riatat'ecuv, ώς δ' ενιοι λεγουσιν εκ του Κολυττοΰ 
στεφανόπωλιν θρήτταν fj όνομα Φύη, την θεόν 
άπομιμησάμενος τω κόσμω συνεισηγαγεν μετ 
αύτοΰ, και ό μεν ΥΙεισίστρατος εφ άρματος 
είσηλαυνε παραιβατούσης της γυναικός, οι δ εν 
τω άστει προσκυνοΰντες ε^εχοντο θαυμάζοντες. 

1 XV. Ή μεν ούν πρώτη κάθοδος εγενετο τοιαύτη, 
μετά δε ταΰτα ώ?" έζεπεσε το 8εύτερον ετει μάλιστα 
ζβΒόμω μετά την κάθοΒον, — ού γάρ πολύν χρόνον 



^ τίτάρτφ Thompson. 
" ώί del. Wilamowitz-Kaibel. 



44 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xiv. 2— xv. 1 

Peisistratus was aiming at tyranny, and braver than 
those who knew it but held their tongues. But as 
he failed to carry them with him by saying this, he 
brought his armour out " in front of his door and said 
that for his part he had come to his country's aid as 
far as he could (for he was now a very old man), and 
that he called on the others also to do the same. 
Solon's exhortations on this occasion had no effect ; 3 
and Peisistratus having seized the government pro- 
ceeded to carry on the public business in a manner "/-^ 
more constitutional than tyrannical. But before his 
government had taken root the partisans of Megacles 
and Lycurgus made common cause and expelled him, 
in the sixth year after his first establishment, in the 556 b.c 
archonship of Hegesias. In the twelfth year after 4 
this Megacles, being harried by party faction, made 
overtures again to Peisistratus, and on terms of re- 
ceiving his daughter in marriage brought him back, 
in an old-fashioned and extremely simple manner. 
Having first spread a rumour that Athena was bring- 
ing Peisistratus back, he found a tall and beautiful 
woman, according to Herodotus ^ a member of the 
Paeanian deme, but according to some accounts a 
Thracian flower-girl from Colly tus named Phye, 
dressed her up to look like the goddess, and brought 
her to the city with him, and Peisistratus drove in a 
chariot with the woman standing at his side, while the 
people in the city marvelled and received them with 
acts of reverence. 

XV. In this way his first return took place. After- 1 
wards, as he was expelled a second time in about the 
seventh year after his return — for he did not main- 539 rc 
tain his hold for long, but came to be afraid of both 

" Apparently, for some younger man to use. * i. 60. 

45 



ARISTOTLE 

κατ€σχ€ν, άλλα δια το μη βούλβσθαι rfj τον Meya- 
κΧΙους θυγατρί συγγίνεσθαι φοβηθείς άμφοτερας 

2 τα? στάσζΐζ ύπβζηλθβν — • καΐ^ πρώτον μβν συν- 
φκισε π€ρΙ τον θ€ρμαίον κόλπον χωρίον ο καλείται 
'Ραίκηλος, €Κ€Ϊθ€ν δε TraprjXdev ei? τους nepl 
nayyaiop' τόπους, odev χρηματισάμ€νοζ και 
στρατί,ώτας μισθωσάμ€νος , βλθών ei? 'Έιρ€τρίαν 
evheKaTO) πάλιν eVei τό^ πρώτον ανασώσασθαι βία 
την άρχην βπβχβιρβι, σνμπροθυμονμ€νων αυτώ 
πολΧών μ€ν καΐ άλλων μάλιστα δε Θηβαίων και 
Αυγ8άμιος τον Να^ιΌυ, έτι δε τών Ιππ€ων των 

3 εχόντων ev 'Ερέτρια την πολιτβίαν. νικησας δε 
την ετΓΐ Παλλτ^νιδι μάχην και λαβών την πόλιν 
και παρελόμβνος τον 8ημον τα όπλα, κατ€Ϊχ€ν η^η 
την Tvpavviha β€βαίως, και Νάζον ίλών άρχοντα 

4 κατίστησβ Ανγ^αμιν . τταρειλε^ δε του Βημου τά 
όπλα τόνδε τον τρόπον Ιζοπλασίαν iv τω θησ€ΐω* 
ποιησάμ€νος βκκλησιάζβιν Ιπβχείρ^ι, της δε φωνής 
€χάλασ€ν^ μικρόν, ου φασκόντων δε κατακούΐΐν 
ε/<:ε'λευσεν αυτού? προσαναβηναι προς το πρόπυλον 
της άκροπόλξως ίνα γεγώνη μα?<λον• iv ω δ' 
€Κ€Ϊνος Βιίτριβζ Βημηγορών, άνβλόντΐς οι εττι 
τοντω τβταγμίνοι τά όπλα και κατακλησαντβς ει? 
τά πλησίον οικήματα τον θησ€ίον 8ΐ€σημηναν 

δ €λθόντ€ς προς τον ΙΙβισίστρατον. ο δε εττει τόι^ 
άλλον λόγον εττετε'λεσεν, είπε και ττερι τών οπλών 
το γεγονός ως ου χρη θαυμάζειν ούδ' άθνμβΐν, 

^ καΐ fortasse delendum Kenyon. * τύτ€ Blass. 

' irapelXero Rutherford. 

* Άνακΐίφ legunt nonnulli. 

* Kontos : τ a^ec (?) cod. : φθέγ^ΐσθα,ι δ' 

έσίΓούδασΐν Wilamowitz-Kaibel : καΐ χρόνον irpoa^yoptvev 
Kenyon. 

46 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xv. 1-5 

the factions owing to his unwilhngness to live with 
Megacles' daughter as his wife, and secretly with- 
drew — ; and first he collected a settlement at a place 2 
near the Gulf of Thermae called Rhaecelus, but from 
there he went on to the neighbourhood of Pangaeus, 
from where he got money and hired soldiers, and in 
the eleventh year went again to Eretria, and now for 528 b.c? 
the first time set about an attempt to recover his 
power by force, being supported in this by a number 
of people, especially the Thebans and Lygdamis of 
Naxos, and also the knights who controlled the 
government of Eretria. Winning the battle of 3 
Pallenis," he seized the government and disarmed the 
people ; and now he held the tyranny firmly, and he 
took Naxos and appointed Lygdamis ruler. The 4 
way in which he disarmed the people was this : he 
held an armed muster at the Temple of Theseus, and 
began to hold an Assembly, but he lowered his voice 
a little, and when they said they could not hear him, 
he told them to come up to the forecourt of the Acro- 
polis, in order that his voice might carry better ; and 
while he used up time in making a speech, the men 
told off for this purpose gathered up the arms,^ locked 
them up in the neighbouring buildings of the Temple 
of Theseus, and came and informed Peisistratus. He, 5 
when he had finished the rest of his speech, told his 
audience not to be surprised at what had happened 
about their arms, and not to be dismayed, but to go 

" The deme Pallene, dedicated to Athena Pallenis, lay just 
N.E. of Athens. 

* The citizens had piled their arms when Peisistratus 
began to make a speech, and left them behind when they 
went up the hill. 

47 



ARISTOTLE 

αλλ απβλθόντας εττι τών ί^ίων eti^ai, των δε κοινών 
αυτός €7ημ€λήσ€σθαί πάντων. 

1 XVI. Ή μ€ν οδν ΐΐ€ίσίστράτου τυραννίς i^ 
ο-ρχης re κατέστη τούτον τον τρόπον καΐ μ€τα- 

2 βολάς €σχζ τοσαντας . 8ίωκ€ΐ δ' ο Πεισίστρατο?, 
ωσπβρ βϊρηται, τα περί την πάλιν μετρίως και 
μάλλον πολιτικώς η τυραννικώς• ev τ€ γαρ τοις 
άλλοις φιλάνθρωπος ην και πράος και τοις άμαρ- 
τανουσι συγγνωμονικός , και 8η και τοις άπόροις 

Χπροβ^άνειζε χρήματα προς τάς εργασίας, ώστε 
3ίβιατρεφεσθαι γεωργοΰντας . τοντο δ' εποίει hvolv 
χάριν, ίνα μήτε εν τω άστει Βιατρίβωσιν άλλα 
διεσπαρμένοι κατά την χώραν, και όπως εν- 
ποροΰντες τών μέτριων και προς τοις ίδιοι? δντες 
μητ επιθνμώσι μήτε σχολάζωσιν επίιαελεισ^αι 

4 τών κοινών. άμα δε συνεβαινεν αύτώ και τάς 
προσόδους γινεσ^αι μείζονς εζεργαζομενης της 
■χωράς' επραττετο γαρ απο τών γιγνομενων Βεκά- 

5 την. διό και τους κατά Βημους κατεσκεύασε^ 
Βικαστας , και αύτος ^ζηει πολλάκις εις την χώραν 
επισκοπών και διαλύωι^ τους Βιαφερομενονς , όπως 
μη καταβαίνοντες εις το άστυ παραμελώσι τών 

6 έργων. τοιαύτης γάρ τίνος εξόδου τω Πεισί- 
στρατο) γιγνομενης συμβηναί φασι τά περί τον εν 
τω Ύμηττώ γεωργοΰντα το κληθέν ύστερον χωρίον 
ατελές. ώων γάρ τίνα παντελώς πέτρας σκά- 
πτοντα και εργαζόμενον, δια το ^αυ/^άσαι τον 
τταιδα εκελευσεν ερεσθαι τί γίγνεται εκ του χωρίου' 
ο δε " οσα κακά και οδιίι^αι " εφη, " και τούτων 
τών κακών και τών ό8υνών^ ΐίεισίστρατον δει 

^ Wilamowitz-Kaibel : κατεσκβναξ'ΐ cod. 
* [τών κακών καΐ ύδινώΐ'] Hude. 

48 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xv. 5— x\i. 6 

away and occupy themselves with their private affairs, ' ι 
while he would attend to all public business. ' ^ 

XVI. This was the way, therefore, in which the 1 
tyranny of Peisistratus was originally set up, and 
this is a list of the changes that it underwent. 
Peisistratus 's administration of the state was, as has 2 
been said," moderate, and more constitutional than 
tyrannic ; he was kindly and mild in everything, and 
in particular he was merciful to offenders, and more- 
over he advanced loans of money to the poor for their 
industries, so that they might support themselves by i/ 
farming. In doing this he had two objects, to pre- 3 
vent their stopping in the city and make them stay 
scattered about the country, and to cause them to 
have a moderate competence and be engaged in their 
private affairs, so as not to desire nor to have time 
to attend to public business.* And also the land's 4 
being thoroughly cultivated resulted in increasing his 
revenues ; for he levied a tithe from the produce. 
And for this reason he organized the Local Justices," 5 
and often went to the country on circuit in person, 
inspecting and settling disputes, in order that men 
might not neglect their agriculture by coming into 
the city. For it was when Peisistratus was making 6 
an expedition of this kind that the affair of the man 
on Hymettus cultivating the farm afterwards called 
Tax-free Farm is said to have occurred. He saw a 
man at farm-work, digging mere rocks, and because 
of his surprise ordered his servant to ask what crop 
the farm grew ; and the man said, " All the aches and 
pains that there are, and of these aches and pains 

" ch. xiv. § 3. 

'' This policy will be found expressed in general formulae 
in Politics 1311 a 13, 1318 b 6, 1319 a 30, 1320 b 7. 
" See xxvi. 5, liii. 1. 

Ε 49 



ARISTOTLE 

λαββΐν ΤΎΐν ^€κάτην." ο μ€ν οΰν άνθρωπος άπ- 
εκρίνατο άγνοών, 6 8e Πεισίστρατο? rjadels δια 
την τταρρησίαν και την φιλ^ργιαν areXri άτταντων 

7 €ποίησ€ν αυτόν. ovSev δε το πλήθος ουδ' iv τοις 
άλλοις παρηνώχλ€ΐ^ κατά την αρχήν, αλλ' atet 
παρ€σκβύαζ€ν βίρήνην και ^τηρβι την ησυχιαν 
διό καΐ πολλάκις άκούβιν ήν^ ώς ή Πεισίστρατου 
τυραννίς 6 εττι Κρόνου βίος €Ϊη• συνββη γάρ ύστερον 
διαδε^α/χενων τών νΐ€ων πολλω "γβνέσθαι τρα- 

8 χυτβραν την αρχήν. μ€γιστον δε τταντων ην τών 
^ψημένων το Βημοτικόν είναι τω ήθει και 
φιλάνθρωπον. ev τε yap τοΓ? άλλοι? ε^ουλετο 
πάντα διοικεΐν κατά τους νόμους ουδερ,ι'αν εαυτώ 
ττλεονε^ιαν διδου?, και 77θτε προσκληθείς φόνου 
8ικην ει? "ΑρειΌν Trciyov αυτό? ρ,εν άπτ^νττ^σεν ώ? 
άπολογησόμενος ό δε προσκαλεσάμβνος φοβηθείς 

9 ελιπεν. διό και ττολυν χρόνον εμεινεν ev' ττ] άρχη, 
και οτ' εκττε'σοι ττάλιν ανελάμβανε ραΒίως. εβού- 
λοντο γάρ και τών γνωρίμων και τών δημοτικών 
οι πολλοί• τους μεν γάρ ταΐς όρ,ιλιαι? του? δε ται? 
ει? τά ί'δια βοηθέ ίαις προσήγετο, και προς άμ- 

10 φοτερους επεφύκει καλώς. ήσαν δε και τοι? 
Αθηναίοις οι περί τών τυράννων νόμοι πράοι 
κατ εκείνους τους καιρούς οι τ άλλοι και 8ή 
και ο μάλιστα καθήκων προς την της τυραννιδο? 
κατάστασιν.* νόμος γάρ αύτοΐς ην οδε• θεσμια 
τάδε Αθηναίων και πάτρια, εάν τίνες τυραννεΐν 

^ Wyse : παρωχλ€ΐ cod. 

* άκού€ΐν ijv Blass e [Plat.] Ilipparch. 229 β : abrasus cod. 

' iv supplevit Blass. 

* κατάστασιν insertuni a Wilaniowitz-Kaibel. 

50 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xvi. 6-10 

Peisistratus has to get the tithe." The man did not 
know who it was when he answered, but Peisistratus 
was pleased by his free speech and by his industry, 
and made him free from all taxes. And in all other 7 
matters too he gave the multitude no trouble during 
his rule, but always worked for peace and safeguai-ded 
tranquillity ; so that men were often to be heard 
saying that the tyranny of Peisistratus was the Golden 
Age of Cronos ; for it came about later when his sons 
had succeeded him that the government became 
much harsher. And the greatest of all the things 8 
said of him was that he was popular and kindly in 
temper. For he was willing to administer everything y 
according to the laws in all matters, never giving 
himself any advantage ; and once in particular when 
he was summoned to the Areopagus to be tried on a 
charge of murder, he appeared in person to make his 
defence, and the issuer of the summons was frightened 
and left. Owing to this he remained in his office for 9 
a long period, and every time that he was thrown 
out of it he easily got it back again. For both the 
notables and the men of the people were most of 
them willing for him to govern, since he won over the 
former by his hospitality and the latter by his assist- 
ance in their private affairs , and was good-natured 
to both. And also the laws of Athens concerning lo 
tyrants were mild at those periods, among the rest 
particularly the one that referred to the establish- 
ment of tyranny. For they had the following law : 
' These are the ordinances and ancestral principles 
of Athens : if any persons rise in insurrection in 

51 



ARISTOTLE 

€7τανιστώνται [eTrl τυραννί8ίΥ η συγκαθισττ) την 
τυραννίδα ατιμον elvai αντον καΐ yevog.^ 

1 XVII. ΐΐ€ΐσίστρατος μ^ν οΰν εγκατβγ-ήρασβ rfj 
apxfj καΐ airedave νοσησας βττΐ Φιλόν6ω άρχοντος, 
αφ ου μβν κατβστη το πρώτον τύραννος βτη 
τριάκοντα καΐ τρία βιώσας, α δ iv ττ) αρχ-η 
8te/xeivev βνος δέοντα είκοσι, e^euye γαρ τα Χοίττά. 

2 διό καΐ φανξρώς ληροΰσι^ φάσκοντ€ς €ρώμ€νον 
elvai ΐΐβίσίστρατον Έόλωνος καΐ στρατηγ€Ϊν ev 
τω ττρός Meyapea? ττοΧάμω περί Έαλαμΐνος• ου 
γαρ ivSexeTai ταΐς ηλικίαις, βάν τις άναλογίζηται 
τον εκατβρου βιον και βφ ου αττεθανεν άρχοντος. 
τ€λ€υτησαντος δε Πεισιστράτου κατ€Ϊχον οι υΐίΐς 
την αρχήν, ττροαγαγόντβς* τα πράγματα τον αύτον 
τρόπον, ήσαν δε δυο μ€ν €Κ της γαμ€της Ιππίας 
και "Ιππαρχος, δυο δ' €Κ της ^Αργείας Ίοφών και 
'Υίγησίστρατος ω παρωνύμιον ην Θετταλο?. 

3 ξ,γημεν^ γαρ Πεισίστρατο? ef "Αργού? ανδρός 
^Αργβίου θυγατέρα ω όνομα ην Τόργιλος, Ύιμώνασ- 
σαν, ην πρότ€ρον €σχ€ν γυναίκα ^Αρχΐνος 6 Αμ- 
πρακιώτης των Κυι/τελιδώι^• δθβν και η προς τους 

Αργβιους ανέστη φιλία, και συνβμαχβσαντο χίλιοι 
την ετΓΐ Παλληνιδι μάχην, ΥΙγησιτρατου κομι- 
σαντος. γτ^ρ,αι δε' ^ασι την ^Αργίίαν οι μέν 
€κπ€σόντα το πρώτον, οΐ δε κατέχοντα την άρχην. 
1 XVIII. Ήσαν δε κύριοι μέν τών πραγμάτων 
δια τα άζιώματα και δια τα? ηλικίας "Ιππαρχος 
και ΊτττΓία?, πρεσβύτερος δ' ων 6 *\ππίας και τη 

1 Keil. 

* ijirav δέ . . . y^vos] totus locus conflatus et interpolatus ? ed. 

' Χηροΰσιν <οί> edd. * vpoayovres edd. 

' <,έττ^4γημΐν edd., coll. Pint. Cato mat. 24. 

52 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xvi. 10— xviii. 1 

order to govern tyrannically, or if any person assists 
in establishing the tyranny, he himself and his family 
shall be disfranchised.''' 

XVII. Peisistratus,therefore,grew old in office, and 1 
died of disease in the archonship of Philoneos, having 528 b.c. 
lived thirty-three years since he first established 
himself as tyrant, but the time that he remained in 
office was nineteen^ years, as he was in exile for the 
remainder. Therefore the story that Peisistratus was 2 

a lover of Solon and that he commanded in the 
war against Megara for the recovery of Salamis 
is clearly nonsense, for it is made impossible by their 
ages, if one reckons up the life of each and the 
archonship in which he died. When Peisistratus was 
dead, his sons held the government, carrying on 
affairs in the same Λvay. He had two sons by his 
wedded wife, Hippias and Hipparchus, and two by his 
Argive consort, lophon and Hegesistratus surnamed 
Thettalus. For Peisistratus married a consort from 3 
Argos, Timonassa, the daughter of a man of Argos 
named Gorgilus, who had previously been the wife 
of Archinus, a man of Ambracia of the Cypselid 
family. This was the cause of Peisistratus 's friend- 
ship with Argos, and a thousand Argives brought by 
Hegesistratus fought for him in the battle of Pallenis." 
Some people date his marriage with the Argive lady 
during his first banishment, others in a period of 
office. 

XVIII. Affairs were now under the authority of 1 
Hipparchus and Hippias, owing to their station and 
their ages, but the government was controlled by 

" The genuineness of § 10 may be questioned. ^ 

* Politics 1315 b 31 says ' seventeen.' 
" See XV. 8. 

53 



ARISTOTLE 

φύσβι τΓολίτίκος /cat βμφρων εττεστάτει της άρχης' 
6 δε "Ιππαρχος τταιδιώδτ^ς• καΐ ερωτικός καΐ 
φιλόμουσος ην {και τους πβρι ^Ανακρέοντα και 
Έιίμωνώην και τους άλλους ποιητάς ούτος ην 6 

2 μεταπεμπόμβνος) y Θετταλος Se νεώτερος πολύ και 
τω βίω θρασύς και υβριστής, άφ^ ου και συνέβη 
την αρχήν αύτοΐς yerea^ac πάντων των κακών, 
ερασθεις γαρ του 'Αρμοδίου και ^ιαμαρτάνων της 
προς αυτόν φιλίας ου κατείχε τήν οργήν, αλλ' εν 
τε τοις άλλοις ενεσημαίνετο πικρώς και το 
τελενταΐον μελλουσαν αύτοϋ τήν άΒελφήν κανη- 
φορεΐν ΐΐαναθηναίοις εκώλυσεν, λοώορήσας τι τον 
ΆρμόΒιον ώς μαλακόν οντά' όθεν συνέβη παρ- 
οζυνθεντα τον ΆρμόΒιον και τον ^ Αριστογείτονα 

3 πράττειν τήν πράξιν μετεχόντων^ πολλών.^ ή8η 
δε παρατηροΰντες εν άκροπόλει τοις Παι^- 
αθηναίοις Ίππίαν {ετύγχανεν γαρ ούτος μεν δε- 
χόμενος 6 δ' "\ππαρχος άποστελλων τήν πομπήν), 
ιδοΓτε? τινά τών κοινωνούντων της πράξεως 
φιλανθρώπως εντυγχάνοντα τω Ιππία και νομί- 
σαντες μηνύειν, βουλόμενοί τι δράσαι προ της 
συλλήψεως, καταβάντες και προεζαναστάντες τών 
άλλων, τον μεν "Ιππαρχον 8ιακοσμοΰντα τήν 

4 πομπήν παρά το Αεωκόρειον άπεκτειναν, τήν δ' 
ολην ελυμήναντο πράζιν, αυτών δ' 6 μεν 'Αρ- 
μόδιος ευθέως ετελεύτησεν ΰπο τών 8ορυφόρων, 

r 

^ μετά ΊΓοΧιτών nonnulli legunt. 
* <οΰ> πολλών Kaibel e Thuc. 
54 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xviii. 1-4 

Hippias, who was the elder and was statesmanUke 
and wise by nature ; whereas Hipparchus was fond 
of amusement and love-making, and had literary 
tastes : it was he who brought to Athens poets such as 
Anacreon and Simonides, and the others. Thettalus 2 
was much younger, and bold and insolent in his mode 
of life, which proved to be the source of all their mis- 
fortunes. For he fell in love with Harmodius, and 
when his advances were continually unsuccessful he 
could not restrain his anger, but displayed it bitterly 
in various ways, and finally when Harmodius's sister 
was going to be a Basket-carrier " in the procession 
at the Panathenaic Festival he prevented her by 
uttering some insult against Harmodius as being 
effeminate ; and the consequent wrath of Harmodius 
led him and Aristogeiton to enter on their plot with a 
number ** of accomplices. At the Panathenaic Festival 3 
on the Acropolis they were already keeping a watch 514 b.c•. 
on Hippias (who happened to be receiving the pro- 
cession, while Hipparchus was directing its start), 
when they saw one of their partners in the plot con- 
versing in a friendly way with Hippias. They thought 
that he was giving information, and wishing to do 
something before their arrest they went down and 
took the initiative without waiting for their confeder- 
ates, killing Hipparchus as he was arranging the pro- 
cession by the Leocoreum." This played havoc with 4 
the whole plot. Of the two of them Harmodius was 
at once dispatched by the spearmen, and Aristogeiton 

" Baskets holding the requisites for the religious service 
were carried by maidens of high birth. 

* Thucydides (vi. 56. 3) says ' not many.' 

" A monument to three daughters of Leon who in obedience 
to an oracle gave their lives for their country by running 
against the enemy's ranks in battle. 

55 



ARISTOTLE 

6 δ' Άρίστογβίτων varepov, συλληφθείς και ττολυν 
χρόνον αΐκισθβίς. κατηγόρησεν δ' ev ταΐς άνάγ- 
καίς πολλών οι καΐ rfj φύσει των επιφανών και 
φίλοι τοις τνράννοις ήσαν. ου γαρ iSvvavro παρα- 
χρήμα λαβείν ονΒεν 'ίχνος της πράξεως, αλλ' 6 
λεγόμενος λόγος ώς 6 Ιππίας αποστησας απο 
των οπλών τους πομπευοντας εφώρασε τους τα 
εγχειρίδια έχοντας ουκ άληθ-ής εστίν ου γαρ 
επεμπον τότε^ μεθ^ οπλών, αλλ' ύστερον τοΰτο 

5 κατεσκεύασεν 6 ^ημος. κατηγορεί δε των του 
τυράννου φίλων, ώς μεν οι δημοτικοί φασιν, 
επίτηδες ίνα άσεβησαιεν άμα και γενοιντο ασθενείς 
άνελόντες τους αναίτιους και φίλους βαυτώρ», ώς 
δ' ενιοι λεγουσιν , ούχι πλαττόμενος αλλά τους 

6 συνει^ότας έμηνυεν. και τέλος ώς ουκ ε8ύνατο 
πάντα ποιών άποθανεΐν, επαγγειλάμενος ώς άλλους 
μηνυσων πολλούς και πείσας αύτω τον Ιππιαν 
8οΰναι την Βεζιάν πίστεως χάριν, ώς ελαβεν 
όνεώίσας δτι τω φονεΐ του άΒελφοΰ την 8εζιάν 
Βε8ωκε, οϋτω παρώζυνε τον Ίππίαν ώσθ* ύπό της 
οργής ου κατεΐχεν εαυτόν άλλα σπασάμενος την 
μάχαιραν Βιεφθειρεν αυτόν. 

1 XIX. Μετά δε ταϋτα συνεβαινεν πολλώ τραχύ - 
τεραν eiv'at την τυραννίδα- και γαρ δια το τιμωρών^ 
τω ά8ελφώ [και δια τό]^ πολλούς άνηρηκεναι και 

2 εκβεβληκεναι πάσιν ην άπιστος και πικρός. Ιτει 
δε τετάρτω μ,άλιστα μετά τον Ίππαρχου θάνατον, 
επεί κακώς είχεν τα εν τω άστει, την ^ίουνυχίαν 

^ €ΊΓ€μ.ττον τότε Rutherford : επεμττοντο cod. 
* Kokalos : τιμωρών cod. ' Kokalos. 

" A hill above the sea S. of the city, commanding Peiraeus 
and the two other harbours. 

56 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xviii. 4— xix. 2 

died later, having been taken into custody and 
tortured for a long time. Under the strain of the 
tortures he gave the names of a number of men that 
belonged by birth to families of distinction, and were 
friends of the tyrants, as confederates. For they 
were not able immediately to find any trace of the 
plot, but the current story that Hippias made the 
people in the procession fall out away from their arms 
and searched for those that retained their daggers is 
not true, for in those days they did not walk in the ^--o/ 
procession armed, but this custom was instituted Ο 
later by the democracy. According to the account 5 
of people of popular sympathies, Aristogeiton accused 
the tyrants' friends for the purpose of making his 
captors commit an impiety and weaken themselves 
at the same time by making away with men who were 
innocent and their own friends, but others say that 
his accusations were not fictitious but that he dis- 
closed his actual accomplices. Finally, as do what 6 
he would he was unable to die, he offered to give 
information against many more, and induced Hippias 
to give him his right hand as a pledge of good faith, 
and when he grasped it he taunted him with giving 
his hand to his brother's murderer, and so enraged 
Hippias that in his anger he could not control himself 
but drew his dagger and made away with him. 

XIX. After this it began to come about that the 1 
tyranny was much harsher ; for Hippias 's numerous 
executions and sentences of exile in revenge for his 
brother led to his being suspicious of everybody and 
embittered. About four years after Hipparchus's 2 
death the state of affairs in the city was so bad that 
he set about fortifying Munychia,** with the intention 

57 



ARISTOTLE 

€7Τ€χβίρησ€ τβίχίζβιν, ώς €Κ€Ϊ^ μ€θώρνσόμ€νος . ev 
τούτοις δ' ων e^eneaev νττο KAeojUeVofs• του Λα /ce- 
8'ήμονος βασίΧ4α>ς , χρησμών γινομένων ael τοΐς 
Αάκωσι κατάλυαν την τυραννίδα δια Totavh* αίτίαν. 

3 οι φνγά^βς ων οι ^Αλκμεωνβαι ττροβιστηκ€σαν 
αύτοΙ μέν δι' αυτών ουκ iSxjvavTO ττοιησασθαι την 
κάθοΒον, αλλ' aiet προσβπταιον ev re γαρ τοΐς 
άλλοις οΐς βπραττον Βιβσφάλλοντο, και τ€ΐχίσαντ€ς 
iv Tjj χωρά ΑαφύΒριον το ύπ€ρ ΥΙάρνηθος, €ΐς ο 
συνβζηλθόν Ttve? τών €κ του αστ^ω?, έζβπολιορκη- 
θησαν ύττο τών τυράννων, όθεν ύστερον ei'?^ ταύτην 
την συμφοράν η^ον iv τοΐς σκολίοις^' 

atat Αειφύ^ριον προΒωσβταιρον, 
οίους άνδρα? απώλεσα?, ^ααχεσ^αι 
αγαθούς re και €ύπατρι8ας, 
οι τότ έ'δει^αΐ' οΐων πατέρων eaav. 

4 άποτυγχάνοντ€ς οΰν iv άττασι τοΐς άλλοις €μισθώ- 
σαντο τον iv Α^λφοΐς ν€ών οίκοΒομβΐν, odev ηύ- 
πόρησαν χρημάτων προς την τών Αακώνων βοηθζίαν. 
η δ€ ΙΙυθία προίφζρβν aiel τοΐς Αακζ^αιμονιοις 
χρηστηριαζομένοις iλ€υθepoΰv τάς Α^τ^να?, et? 
τοΰθ^ €ως* προΰτρζφζ τους Σιπαρτιάτας, καίπ€ρ 
όντων ζένων αύτοΐς τών ΪΙβισιστρατιΒών σνν- 
€βάλλ€το δε ουκ iλάττω μοΐραν της •6ρμης τοΐς 
Αάκωσιν η προς τους Άργειου? τοΐς ΓΙίίσιστρατί- 

5 δαι? υπάρχουσα φιλία, το μβν οΰν πρώτον ^Αγχί- 
μολον απέστειλαν κατά θάλατταν έχοντα στρατιάν 

^ ^/cf<<(7e> Mayor._^ 

^ els Wilamowitz-Kaibel ex Etym. Mag. : ^era cod. 

* σκοΚίοίί edd. : σκολιοισαΐίΐ cod. 

* roO^' iws Blass : TovTevdews cod, 

58 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xix. 2-5 

of moving his establishment there. While engaged 511 b.c. 
in this he was driven out by the king of Sparta, 
Cleomenes, as oracles were constantly being given 
to the Spartans to put down the tyranny, for the 
following reason. The exiles headed by the Alcmeon- 3 
idae were not able to effect their return by their own 
unaided efforts, but were always meeting reverses ; for 
besides the other plans that were complete failures, 
they built the fort of Leipsydrion <* in the country, 
on the slopes of Parnes, where some of their friends in 
the city came out and joined them, but they were 
besieged and dislodged by the tyrants, owing to 
which afterwards they used to refer to this disaster 
in singing their catches : 

Faithless Dry Fountain ! Lackaday, 
What good men's lives you threw away ! 
True patriots and fighters game. 
They showed the stock from which they came ! 

So as they were failing in everything else, they con- 4 
tracted to build the temple at Delphi,'' and so acquired 
a supply of money for the assistance of the Spartans. 
And the Pythian pi'iestess constantly uttered a com- 
mand to the Spartans, when they consulted the 
oracle, to liberate Athens, until she brought the 
Spartiates to the point, although the Peisistratidae 
were strangers to them ; and an equally great amount 
of incitement was contributed to the Spartans by 
the friendship that subsisted between the Argives and 
the Peisistratidae. As a first step, therefore, they 5 
dispatched Anchimolus with a force by sea ; but he 

" The name suggests 'water-failure.' Parnes is a moun- 
tain in N.E. Attica. 

'' It had been burnt down in 548 b.c. Apparently they 
made a profit on the contract, but rebuilt it to the satisfaction 
of the priestess. 

59 



ARISTOTLE 

ητττηθζντος δ' αύτοΰ και reXevT'qaavros δια το 
Ktveav βοηθησαι τον Θΐσσαλον βχοντα χίλιους 
Ιππείς, προσοργισθέντβς τω γβνομβνω KAeo/xeVTyv 
εζβπβμφαν τον βασιλέα στόλον έχοντα μείζω κατά 
γην, ος επεί τους των Θεσσαλών Ιππείς ενίκησεν 
κωλύοντας αυτόν εις την ^Αττικην παριεναι, κατα- 
κλείσας τον Ίππίαν εις το καλού μενον ΙΙελαργίκον 
6 τείχος επολιόρκει μετά των ^Αθηναίων . προσκαθ- 
ημενου δ' αύτοΰ συνεπεσεν ύπεζιόντας άλώναι τους 
των Πεισιστρατιδών" υΐεΐς• ων ληφθέντων ομο- 
λογίαν επΙ τη των τταιδων σωτήρια ποιησαμενοι 
και τα εαυτών εν πενθ^ ημεραις εκκομισάμενοι 
παρε^ωκαν την ακρόπολιν τοις ^Αθηναίοις επΙ 
'Αρπακτικού άρχοντος, κατασχόντες την τυραννίδα 
μετά την του πατρός τελευτην ετη /χάλιστα βτττα- 
καίΒεκα, τα δε σύμπαντα συν οΐς ό πατήρ ηρζεν 
ενός Βεΐν^ πεντήκοντα. 

1 XX. Κ^αταλυΘείσης δε της τυραννικός εστασιαζον 
προς αλλήλους ^Ισαγόρας 6 ΎεισάνΒρου, φίλος ων 
τών τυράννων, και Ιίλεισθενης του γένους ών τών 
*Αλκμεονώών. ηττημένος^ δβ ταΓ? εταίρε ιαις ο 
Κλεισθένης προσηγάγετο^ τον Βημον, άπο8ώούς 

2 τω πληθει την πολιτείαν. 6 δε Ισαγόρας επιλειπό- 
μενος τη δυνάμει, πάλιν επικαλεσάμενος τον Κλεο- 
μενην οντά εαυτώ ξένον συνεπεισεν ελαυί'ειν το 
άγος, δια το τους ^Αλκμεωνί8ας Βοκεΐν είι^αι τών 

3 εναγών, ύπεζελθόντος δε του Κλεισθένους, μετ 



^ Mayor: Seicod. 

■ήττώμ€νοί edd. ex Herod, v. 66 

* ττροσήΎΐτο Thalheim. 



" The fortification surrounding the west end of the Acropolis. 
60 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xix. 5— xx. 3 

was defeated and lost his life, because the Thessalian 
Cineas came to the defence with a thousand cavalry. 
Enraged at this occurrence, they dispatched their 
king Cleomenes by land with a larger army ; he 
won a victory over the Thessalian cavalry who tried 
to prevent his reaching Attica, and so shut up Hippias 
in the fortress called the Pelargicum " and began to 
lay siege to it with the aid of the Athenians. While he 6 
was sitting down against it, it occurred that the sons 
of the Peisistratidae were caught when trying secretly 
to get away ; and these being taken they came to 
terms on the condition of the boys' safety, and con- 
veyed away their belongings in five days, surrender- 
ing the Acropolis to the Athenians ; this was in the 
archonship of Harpactides, and Peisistratus's sons5iiB.c. 
had retained the tyranny for about seventeen years 
after their father's death, making when added to the 
period of their father's power a total of forty-nine 
years. 

XX. When the tyranny had been put down, there 1 
was a period of faction-strife between Isagoras son 
of Teisander, who was a friend of the tyrants, and 
Cleisthenes, who belonged to the family of the 
Alcmaeonidae. Cleisthenes having got the worst of 
it in the Comradeships * enlisted the people on his side, 
offering to hand over the government to the multi- 
tude. Isagoras began to lose power, so he again 2 
called in the aid of Cleomenes, who was a great friend 
of his, and jointly persuaded him to drive out the 
curse," because the Alcmaeonidae were reputed to 
be a family that was under a curse. Cleisthenes 3 
secretly withdrew, and Cleomenes with a few troops 

* Political clubs with anti-democratic leanings. 
" Cf. ch. i. 

61 



ARISTOTLE 

ολίγων^ ηγηλάτ€ΐ των 'Αθηναίων επτακόσια? 
οικίας' ταύτα δέ ^ιαττραξάμζνος την μ^ν βονλην 
€π€ψατο κατάλυαν Ίσαγόραν δε καΐ τριακόσιους 
των φίλων μ€τ' αύτοΰ κυρίους καθισταναι της 
ττόλβως. της δε βουλής αντίστασης καΐ συν- 
αθροισθέντος του ττληθους οι /χέν ττερι τον Κλεομίνην 
και Ίσαγόραν κατίφυγον €ΐς την άκρόπολιν, 6 δε 
8ημος δυο μβν ημέρας προσκαθεζόμβνος €πολιορκ€ΐ, 
τη δε τρίτη Κλβομβνην μβν και τους μ,ετ' αυτού 
ττάντας άφβΐσαν ύποσπόνΒους , Ιίλΐΐσθένην δε και 

4 τους άλλους φυγάδας μβτβπβμφαντο. κατασχόντος 
δε τοΰ Βημου τα πράγματα Κλβισθβνης ηγεμων ην 
καΐ του 8ήμου προστάτης, αιτιώτατοι γαρ σχβΒον 
εγβνοντο της βκβολης των τυράννων οι Άλκ- 
μεωνί^αι, /cat" στασιάζοντβς τα πολλά διετε'λεσαν. 

5 έτι δε πρότ€ρον των 'Αλκμ€ονώών Κη^ων επίθετο 
τοΙς τυράννοις• διό και η8ον και εις τούτον εν τοις 
σκολίοις' 

εγχει και Κτ^δωνι, διάκονε, μη^' επιληθου, 
ει χρη τοις άγαθοΐς άν^ράσιν οινοχοεΐν. 

1 XXI. Δια μεν οΰν ταύτας τάς αιτίας επίστευεν 
6 Βημος τω Κλεισθενει. τότε δε τοΰ πλήθους προ- 
εστηκώς έ'τει τετάρτω μετά την των τυράννων 

2 κατάλυσιν επι Ίσαγόρου άρχοντος, πρώτον μεν 
συνενειμε^ πάντας εις δέκα φυλάς άντι των τετ- 
τάρων, άνα/ιχεΓ^αι βουλόμενος, όπως μετάσχωσι 
πλείους της πολιτείας- όθεν ελέχθη και το μη 

^ ζάφικόμεΐΌ^ ό Κλεομένη^'} μ(τ όλί-γων Wilamowitz-Kaibel 
ex Herod, v. 72. 

* <οί> καΐ Richards. 

* συνένΗμε Newman : oweui^t cod. 

62 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xx. 3— xxi. 2 

proceeded to expel as accursed seven hundred 
Athenian households ; and having accomplished this 
he tried to put down the Council and set up Isagoras 
and three hundred of his friends with him in sovereign 
power over the state. But the Council resisted, and 
the multitude banded together, so the forces of 
Cleomenes and Isagoras took refuge in the Acropolis, 
and the people invested it and laid siege to it for 
two days. On the third day they let Cleomenes and 
his comrades go away under a truce, and sent for 
Cleisthenes and the other exiles to come back. The 4 
people having taken control of affairs, Cleisthenes was 
their leader and was head of the People. For almost 
the chief initiative in the expulsion of the tyrants 
was taken by the Alcmaeonids, and they accomplished 
most of it by party faction. And even before the 5 
Alcmaeonids Cedon had attacked the tyrants, owing 
to which people also sang in his honour in their 
catches : 

Now fill to Cedon, boy ! let's drink him too, 
If duty bids us toast good men and true. 

/ XXI. These were the causes, therefore, that led the 1 
people to trust in Cleisthenes. And when this time 
he had become Chief of the multitude, in the fourth oos n.c. 
year after the deposition of the tyrants, in the archon- 
ship of Isagoras, he first divided the whole body into 2 
ten tribes instead of the existing four, wishing to 
mix them up, in order that more might take part 
in the government « ; from which arose the saying, 
' Don't draw distinctions between tribes,' addressed 

" Less incompletely stated in Politics iii. 275 b 37 ff. 
Members of the same class might now belong to different 
tribes; and a number of new citizens were enrolled (see 
§ 4), free-born aliens and emancipated slaves, who were not 
members of clans. 

63 



ARISTOTLE 

φυΧοκρινβίν, προς τους e^erct^etv τα γβνη βονλο- 

3 μένους . eVeira τ'ην βουλην ττ^ντακοσίονς αντί 
τ€τρακοσίων κατ€στησ€ν, TrevTiqKovra i^ €κάστης 
φυλής' rare δ' τίσαν βκατόν. δια τοϋτο he ουκ 
els δώδεκα φυλάς συνέταζβν, οττως αύτω μη συμ- 
βαίντ) μέριζαν κατά τάς προϋπάρχουσας τρίττΰς 
(jjaav γάρ €Κ δ' φυλών δώδε/ία τριττύίς), ωστ 
ου συνβτηπτβν άν^ άναμίσγβσθαι το ττληθος. 

4 8ί€ν€ΐ,μ€ δε καΐ την χώραν κατά δήμους τριάκοντα 
μέρη, SeKa μ^ν των Trepl το άστυ, δέκα δε της 
παραλίας, δέκα δε της μ€σογ€ίου• καΐ ταιίτα? 
έπονομάσας τριττΰς Ικληρωσβν τρεις ει? την 
φυλην €κάστην, δπως έκαστη μετέχη πάντων των 
τόπων, καΐ Βημότας έποίησεν άλλτ^λων τους οίκοΰν- 
τας iv έκάστω των Βημων, ΐνα μη πατρόθβν ττροσ- 
αγορ€ύοντ€ς έζελέγχωσιν τους νεοπολίτας, άλλα 
των 8ημων άναγορζύωσιν odev καΐ καλοϋσιν 

5 * Αθηναίοι σφάς αυτούς των Βημων. κατέστησε 
δε /cat δημάρχους την αύτην έχοντας έπιμέλειαν 
τοις πρότερον ναυκράροις• καΐ γάρ τους Βημους 
άντΙ των ναυκραρίών έποίησεν. προσηγόρευσε δε 
των Βημων τους μέν άπο των τόπων, τους δε απο 
των κτίσάντων , ου γάρ άπαντες ύπηρχον εν* τοις 

6 τόποις. τά δε γένη καΐ τάς φρατρίας και τα? 
ίερωσύνας είασεν εχειν έκαστους κατά τά πάτρια. 

^ kf supplevit Hude. 
^ ev fr. Berol. : in cod. alii ec, alii en legunt. 

" See viii. 3 n. 

•" i.e. he made the deme a social group, united by almost 
a family feeling. 

" C/., e.g., xxviii. 3 ' Callicrates of the Paeanian deme,' and 
subsequent designations of persons by their demes ; up to 
that point the father's name is used. 
64 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xxi. 2-6 

to those who want to inquire into people's clans. 
Next he made the Council to consist of five hundred 3 
members instead of four hundred, fifty from each 
Tribe, whereas under the old system there had been 
a hundred. This was the reason why he did not 
arrange them in twelve tribes, in order that he might 
not have to use the existing division of the Thirds " 
(for the four Tribes contained twelve Thirds), with 
the result that the multitude would not have been 
mixed up. He also portioned out the land among the 4 
demes into thirty parts, ten belonging to the suburbs, 
ten to the coast, and ten to the inland district ; 
and he gave these parts the name of Thirds, and 
assigned them among the Tribes by lot, three to each, 
in order that each Tribe might have a share in all the 
districts. And he made all the inhabitants in each of j>^ 
the demes fellow-demesmen of one another,'' in order 
that they might not call attention to the newly 
enfranchised citizens by addressing people by their 
fathers' names, but designate people officially by 
their demes ; owing to which Athenians in private 
life also use the names of their demes as surnames." 
And he also appointed Demarchs, having the same 5 
duties as the former Ship-commissioners,** for he put 
the demes in the place of the Ship-commissions. He 
named some of the demes from their localities, but 
others from their founders, for the demes were no 
longer all corresponding to the places. The clans 6 
and brotherhoods ^ and priesthoods belonging to the 
various demes he allowed to remain on the ancestral 

"* See viii. 3 n. 

* In Politics 1319 b 23 it is said that ' Cleisthenes increased 
the number of the brotherhoods,' but that no doubt refers to 
the new citizens. 

F 65 



ARISTOTLE 

ταΓ? δε φνλαΐς, inoirjaev Ιττωννμονς €κ των ττρο- 
κρίθβντων ίκατον άρχηγβτών ους avelXev η ΐίνθία 
Se/ca . 

1 XXII, Τούτων Se γ^νομβνων Βημοτίκωτίρα ττολύ 
της Έόλωνος iyevcTO η 77θλιτ€ΐα• /cat γαρ συνέβη 
τους μ€ν Σιόλωνος νόμους άφανίσαι την τυραννίδα 
δια το μη χρησθαί, καινούς δ' άλλους deivai τον 
Ιίλβίσθενη στοχαζόμενον του πλήθους, iv οΐς €Τ€θη 

2 /cat 6 TTcpi του οστρακισμοϋ νόμος, πρώτον μεν 
ουν eVet πεμπτω^ μετά ταύτην την κατάστασιν 
€φ* 'Έ,ρμοκρεοντος άρχοντος τη βουλή τοις πεν- 
τακοσίοις τον ορκον εποίησαν ον ετί /cat νυν 
ομνύουσιν . έπειτα τους στρατηγούς ηροΰντο κατά 
φυλάς, εξ εκάστης φυλής ενα, της δε άπάσης 

3 στρατιάς ήγεμών ην ό πολέμαρχος, ετει δε jLtera 
ταύτα Βω^εκάτω νικήσαντες την εν Ma/oa^cDi't 
μάχην, επί Φαινίππου άρχοντος, ^ιαλιπόντες ετη 
Βύο μετά την νίκην, θαρροΰντος ηΒη του Βημου, 
τότε πρώτον εχρησαντο τώ νόμω τώ περί τον 
όστρακισμόν, ος ετέθη Βιά την ύποφίαν τών εν 
ταΓ? Βυνάμεσιν δτι* ΐίεισίστρατος Βημαγωγός και 

4 στρατηγός ών τύραννος κατέστη. και πρώτος 
ωστρακισθη τών εκείνου συγγενών "Ιππαρχος 
\άρμου Κ,ολλυτεύς , δι' ον και μάλιστα τον νόμον 
εθηκεν ο Κ,λεισθενης, e^eAciaat βουλόμενος αυτόν. 
οί γάρ 'Αθηναίοι τους τών τυράννων φίλους, όσοι 
μη συνεζαμαρτάνοιεν^ εν ταΓ? ταραχαΐς, εϊων οι- 
κεΐν την πόλιν, χρώμενοι τη είωθυία του Βήμου 

^ τέμιττω ( = e') Cod. : 6-γ56φ { — η')? Kenyon. 

* Kenyon : ore cod. 

' Poste : αννεξαμαρταΐΌν Cod. 

66 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xxi. 6— xxii. 4 

plan. As eponymous deities of the Tribes he insti- 
tuted ten tutelary heroes selected by an oracle of 
the Pythian priestess from a previously chosen list 
of a hundred. 

XXII. These reforms made the constitution much i 
more democratic than that of Solon ; for it had come 
about that the tyranny had obliterated the laws of 
Solon by disuse, and Cleisthenes aiming at the «^ 
multitude had instituted other new ones, including 
the enactment of the law about ostracism. First of 2 
all, in the fifth year'' after these enactments, in the 
archonship of Hermocreon, they instituted the oath 
of induction for the Council of Five Hundred that is 
still in use. Next they began to elect the Generals 
by tribes, one from each tribe, while the whole , 
army was under the command of the War-lord. 
Eleven years afterwards came their victory in the 3 
battle of Marathon ; and in the archonship of Phaen- 490 b.c. 
ippus, two years after the victory, the people being 488 b.c. 
now in high courage, they put in force for the first 
time the law about ostracism, which had been enacted 
owing to the suspicion felt against the men in the 
positions of power because Peisistratus when leader 
of the people and general set himself up as tyrant. 
The first person banished by ostracism was one of his 4 
relatives, Hipparchus son of Charmus of the deme 
of Collytus, the desire to banish whom had been 
Cleisthenes' principal motive in making the law. 
For the Athenians permitted all friends of the tyrants 
that had not taken part with them in their offences 
during the disorders to dwell in the city, — in this the 
customary mildness of the people was displayed ; and 

" i.e. in 504 b.c. ; but if Marathon (490 b.c.) was eleven 
years later (§ 3), perhaps the Greek should be altered here 
to give ' in the eighth year after.' 

67 



ARISTOTLE 

πραότητι- ών ηγ^μών καΐ προστάτης ην Ίππαρχος, 
δ €νθύς δε τω νστβρω erei €πΙ TeXeaivov άρχοντος 
€κυάμ€υσαν τους ivvea άρχοντας κατά φυλάς e/c 
-^ των προκριθέντων ύπο των Βημοτών^ πεντακοσίων 
TOTe^ μ€τά την τυραννίΒα πρώτον gl_hk πρότεροι 
πάντες ήσαν αιρετοί, καΐ ώστρακίσθη Μεγακλης 

6 'Ιπποκράτους Άλωπεκηθεν. επΙ μεν ουν ετη γ 
τους των τυράννων φίλους ώστράκιζον, ών χάριν 
6 νόμος ετέθη, μετά δε ταύτα τω τεταρτω ετει 
και τών άλλων ε'ί τι? Βοκοίη μείζων etvai μεθιστατο' 
και πρώτος ώστρακίσθη τών άπωθεν της τυραν- 

7 νίΒος Ή^άνθ ίππος 6 ^ Αρίφρονος . ετει δε τριτω 
μετά ταΰτα ΝικομηΒου^ άρχοντος, ώς εφάνη* τα 
μέταλλα τά εν Μαρώνεια καΐ περιεγενετο τη 
πόλει τάλαντα εκατόν εκ τών έργων, συμβουλευ- 
όντων τινών τω Βημω διαι^ει/χασ^αι το άργύριον 
Θεμιστοκλής εκώλυσεν, ου λέγων ο τι χρήσεται 
τοις χρημασιν, άλλα δανεΓσαι κελεύων τοις πλου- 
σιωτάτοις ^Αθηναίων εκατόν εκάστω τάλαντον, 
είτ' ε'άν μεν άρεσκη το άνάλωμα, της πόλεως 
είναι/ ει δε μη, κομίσασθαι τά χρήματα παρά 
τών Βανεισαμενων . λαβών Β επι τούτοις εναυ- 
πηγήσατο τριήρεις εκατόν, εκάστου ναυπηγού- 
μενου τών εκατόν μίαν, αΐς εναυμάχησαν εν 
Σαλα /xtvt προς τους βαρβάρους. ώστρακίσθη δ' 
εν τούτοις τοις καιροΐς ΆριστείΒης ό Αυσιμάχου. 

^ δήμων fr. Berol. * rore Whibley : rots cod. 

* Ί^ικοδημον fr. Berol. 

* <λνσιτ(\έστΐρα> έφάν-η Richards coll. Xen. Red. 4. 31. 

^ post dvai, in cod. alia manus τηνδαπανην supra lineam 
scripsit. 
68 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xxii. 4-7 

Hipparchus was the leader and chief of these persons. 
But directly afterwards, in the next year, in the 5 
archonship of Telesinus, they elected the Nine +87 b.c. 
Archons by lot, tribe by tribe, from a preliminary 
list of five hundred chosen by the demesmen : this 
was the date of the first election on these lines, after 
the tyranny, the previous Archons having all been 
elected by vote. And Megacles son of Hippocrates 
of the deme Alopeke was ostracized. For three years 6 
they went on ostracizing the friends of the tyrants, 
at whom the legislation had been aimed, but after- 
wards in the fourth year it was also used to remove 
any other person who seemed to be too great ; the 
first person unconnected with the tyranny to be 
ostracized was Xanthippus son of Ariphron. Two 7 
years later, in the archonship of Nicomedes, in con- 483 b.c. 
sequence of the discovery of the mines at Maronea,*^ 
the working of which had given the state a profit of a 
hundred talents, the advice \vas given by some per- 
sons that the money should be distributed among the 
people ; but Themistocles prevented this, not saying 
what use he would make of the money, but recom- 
mending that it should be lent to the hundred richest 
Athenians, each receiving a talent, so that if they 
should spend it in a satisfactory manner, the state 
would have the advantage, but if they did not, the 
state should call in the money from the boiTowers. 
On these terms the money was put at his disposal, 
and he used it to get a fleet of a hundred triremes 
built, each of the hundred borrowers having one ship 
built, and with these they fought the naval battle at 
Salamis against the barbarians. And it was during 
this period that Aristeides son of Lysimachus was 

" Possibly five miles north of Cape Suniuni. 

69 



ARISTOTLE 

8 τ€ταρτω^ δ eret KareSe^avro ττάντας τους ώστρα- 
κισμίνους άρχοντος ΎφηχίΒου, δια την Έέρζον 
στρατβίαν καΐ το λοιπόν ωρισαν τοΐζ όστρακίζο- 
μένοίς ivTOs TepaiaTov καΐ Έικυλλαίονζμ,η^/κατ- 
OLKelv η άτιμους elvai καθάτταζ. 

1 XXIII. Tore μεν οΰν μεχρί τούτον προηλθεν 
η ττόλίς, α/χα τη Βημοκρατία κατά μικρόν ανζανο- 
μάνη• μβτά Be τά ΜηΒικά πάλιν ΐσχνσ€ν η iv 
'Apeio) πάγω βουλή και Βιωκ€ΐ την πάλιν, ovSevi 
Βόγματι λαβοΰσα την ηγβμονίαν άλλα δια το 
yevea^at της περϊ Σαλα/χΓνα ναυμαχίας αιτία, 
των γαρ στρατηγών εζαπορησάντων τοις πράγ- 
/χασι και κηρνζάντων σωζβιν €καστον iavTov, 
πορίσασα Βραχμάς ίκάστω οκτώ Βι^Βωκε και 

2 Ινφίβασεν €ΐς τάς ναΰς. Βιά ταυτην Βη την 
αιτίαν παραχωρούν αύτης^ τώ άζιώματι και εττο- 
λιτευ^τ^σαν 'Αθηναίοι καλώς κατά* τούτους τους 
καιρούς- συνάβη γάρ αντοΐς κατά τον χρόνον 
τούτον τά τ€ eis" τον πόλαμον άσκησαι και παρά 
τοις "Έαλλησιν βνΒοκιμησαι και την της θαλαττης 
ηγαμονίαν λαβείν ακόντων τών ΑακεΒαιμονίων . 

3 ήσαν Be προστάται του Βημου κατά τούτους τους 
καιρούς ^ΑριστείΒης ό Αυσιμάχον και Θεμιστο- 
κλής ό ^εοκλεους, 6 μεν τά πολέμια ασκών' 
ό Be τά πολιτικά Βεινός eiv'ai και Βικαιοσύνη τών 

1 τρίτψ Wilamowitz-Kaibel coUato Plut. Aristid. 8. 

* μη supplevit Kaibel (e'/cros pro ivrbs Wyse). 

^ Blass: αυττ^ΐ' cod. 

* κατ& (vel και ζμ€τpίωίy κατά ?) Kenyon : καικατα cod. 

' δοκών Richards : δοκύν άσκΐϊν Kenyon. 

70 



?6- 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xxii. 8— xxiii. 3 

ostracized. Three years later in the archonship of 8 
Hypsechides they allowed all the persons ostracized 
to return, because of the expedition of Xerxes ; and +80 b. 
they fixed a boundary thenceforward for persons 
ostracized, prohibiting them from living'* within a 
line drawn from Geraestus ^ to Scyllaeum " under 
penalty of absolute loss of citizenship. 

XXIII. At this date, therefore, the state had 1 
advanced to this point, growing by slow stages with 
the growth of the democracy ; but after the Persian ^ 
Wars the Council on the Areopag us becam e powerful 
again, and carried on the adminrstraBon, having 
g-ainer| the leadprship by no definite resolution but 
*owmg to its having been the cause of the naval batt le 
of Salarn is. For the Generals had been reduced to 
utter despair by the situation and had made a pro- 
clamation that every man should see to his own 
safety ; but the Council provided a fund and distri- 
buted eig ht dra chmas a head and'got them to man the 
ships. For this reason, therefore, the Generals gave "i! 
place to the Council in esteem. And Athens was well J 
governed in these periods ; for during this time it 
occurred that the people practised^ilitary duties and 
wonliigh esteem among the Greeks and gained the r 
supremacy of the sea against the will of the Lacedae- 
monians. The heads of the People '^ in these periods 3 
were Acigtejdes son of Lysimachus and The misto cles 
son of Neocles, the latter practising to be skilful in mili' 
tary pursuits, and the former in polifics,* and to excel 

" The MS. gives ' enacting that they must live.' 

* The S. point of Euboea. 

" The S.E. point of Argolis. <* See ii. .S n. 

' The Greek should perhaps be altered to give ' the latter 
practising military pursuits, and the former esteemed to be 
skilful in politics.' 

71 



ARISTOTLE 

καθ" eavTov ^ιαφύρβιν διό καΙ €χρωντο τω μ€ν 

4 στρατηγώ τω δε συμβονλω. την μεν ονν των 
τ€ΐχών άνοίκοΒόμησιν κοίνη Βιωκησαν, καίττερ δια- 
φζρόμενοι προς αλλήλους• cttl he την άπόστασίν 
την των "Ιώνων άττο της των Λακεδαιμονίων συμ- 
μαχίας^ "Αριστείδης ην 6 ττροτρεφας, τηρησας τους 

5 Αάκωνας Βιαβεβλημενους δια ΙΙαυσανίαν. διό και 
τους φόρους ούτος ην 6 τάζας ταΐς ττόλεσιν τους 
πρώτους eVei τρίτω μετά την εν Σαλα/χΓνι ναυ- 
/χαχι'αν €771 Ύιμοσθενους άρχοντος, καΐ τους όρκους 
ώμοσε τοις "Ιωσι ώστε τον αυτόν εχθρον eivai και 
φίλον, εφ" οίς και τους μύΒρους εν τω πελάγει 
καθεΐσαν. 

1 XXIV. Μβτα. Se ταύτα θαρροΰσης η8η της 
πόλεως και χρημάτων ηθροισμενων πολλών, συν- 
εβουλευεν άντιλαμβάνεσθαι της ηγεμονίας και κατα- 
jSavTas• εκ τών αγρών οικεΐν εν τω άστει• τροφην 
γάρ έ'σεσ^αι πάσι, τοις μεν στρατευομενοις τοις δε 
φρουροϋσι τοις δε τα κοινά πράττουσι, εϊθ" οϋτω 

2 κατασχησειν την ηγεμονιαν. πεισθεντες δε ταύτα 
και λαβόντες την άρχην τοΐς^ συμμάχοις δε- 
σποτικωτερως εχρώντο πλην Χιών και Αεσβίων 
και Σιαμίων τούτους δε φύλακας εΐχον της άρχης, 
εώντες τάς τε πολιτείας παρ" αύτοΐς και άρχειν 

3 ων ετνχον άρχοντες. κατέστησαν δε και τοις 
πολλοίς εύπορίαν τροφής, ώσπερ "Αριστείδης 

^ καιτηντωνΧακεδαιμονιωνσνμμαχιαν cod., corr. Blass. 
^ Tots Blass : roisre cod. 

" The city fortifications were rebuilt, the harbour of Peiraeus 
completed and the Long Walls built to link Peiraeus and 
Phaierum with the city. 

* The parties swore to keep the covenant until the iron 

72 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xxiii. 3— xxiv. 3 

his contemporaries in justice ; hence the Athenians 
employed the one as general and the other as 
counsellor. So the rebuilding of the walls "• was directed 4 
by both these statesmen joirftTy, although they were 
at variance with one anotTier ;('but the secession of 
the Ionian states from the Lacedaemonian alliance 
was promoted by Aristeidesy who seized the oppor- 
tunity when the Lacedaemonians were discredited 
because of Pausanias. Hence it was Aristeides who 5 
assessed the trib utes of the allied states on the first 
occasion, two years after the naval battle of Salamis, 478 b.u. 
in the archonship of Timosthenes, and who adminis- 
tered the oaths to the l onians when they swore to 
have the same enemies and friends, ratifying their 
oaths by letting the lumps of iron sink to the bottom 
out at sea.'' ^ 

XXIV. Afterjvards, (now that the state was em- 1 ^,^ 
boldened^nd ^uch money had been collected,") he 
bega n to advise them to aim at the leadership , and 
to come down from their farms and live in the cit y, 
telling them that there would be food__^f!it~aJl, some 
serving in the army and others as frontier-guards 
and others conducting the business of the community, 
and then by this method they would kee^ the leader - 
ship. [ Having taken this advice and won the empire, 2 
they treated the allies too masterfully, except Chios, 
Lesbos and Samos, which they kept as outposts of 
empire, and allowed to have their own governments 
and to rule the subjects that they had at the time.^ 
They also established a plentifu l food-sj ipply for the 3 
multitude, as Aristeides had proposed ; for the corn- 
appeared again on the surface, wplv fj τον μύδρον τούτον 
άναφηναι Hdt. i. 165, and Hor. Epodes 16. 25 — 

sed iuremus in haec : ' simul imis saxa renarint 
vadis leuata, ne redire sit nefas.' 



ARISTOTLE 

€ΐσηγ'ησατο' σννββαινξν γαρ άπο των φόρων καΐ 
των τ€Αών καΙ των συμμάχων πλβίονς τ) ΒισμυρΙονς 
^ dvSpag τ ρΐφβσθ at. δικασται μ^ν γαρ ήσαν ίζα- 
jN κίσχίλιοί, τοξόται δ' ίζακόσιοι καΐ χίλιοι και 
/ y προς τούτοις ιππείς χίλιοι και διακόσιοι^ βουλή 
/ δε -πεντακόσιοι, και φρουροί νεωρίων πεντακόσιοι 
και προς τούτοις εν Trj πόλει φρουροί ν' , άρχοι δ' 
ενΒημοι μεν εις επτακοσίους άνΒρας νπερόριοι δ' 
εις επτακόσιους^• προς δε τούτοις, επει συνεστή- 
σαντο^ τον πολεμον ύστερον, όπλΐται μεν Βισχίλιοι 
και πεντακόσιοι, νηες δε φρουρίΒες ε'ίκοσι, άλλαι 
δε νηες αϊ τους φρουρούς^ άγουσαι τους άπο του 
κυαμου ^ισχιλίους άνΒρας• ετι δε πρυτανεΐον και 
ορφανοί και Βεσμωτών φύλακες' απασι γαρ τού- 
τοις απο των κοινών η Βιοικησις rjv. 

1 XXV. Η μεν ουν τροφή τω 8ημω δ6ά τούτων 
εγινετο. ετη δε επτακαιΒεκα μάλιστα μετά τα 
Μτ^δικά 8ιεμεινεν η πολιτεία προεστώτων των 

Αρεοπαγιτών, καίπερ ύποφερομενη κατά μικρόν, 
αύζανομενου δε του πλήθους γενόμενος τοΰ ^ημου 
προστάτης ^Εφιάλτης ό ΈωφωνίΒου και 8οκών* 
ά8ωρο8όκητος είναι και δίκαιο? προς την πολι- 

2 τείαν, επεθετο τη βουλή, και πρώτον μεν άνεΐλεν 
πολλούς τών ^Αρεοπαγιτών αγώνας επιφερων περί 
τών 8ιωκη μένων έπειτα της βουλής επι Κόνωνος 
άρχοντος ατταΐ'τα ττεριεΓλε* τα επίθετα δι' ων ην η 
της πολιτείας φυλακή, και τά μεν τοις πεντα- 

^ numerum e priore versu male repetitum notant Wila- 
mowitz-Kaibel. 

^ συνέστησαν τά <eis> ? ed. : συν€στήσαντο τα fis Wilamowitz- 
Kaibel. 

* Hlass, cf. Ixii. 1 : ^opois cod. 

* δοκών και Kaibel. ^ τηρκίλΐτο Richards. 

74 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xxiv. 3— xxv. 2 

bined proceeds of the tributes and the taxes and the 
allies served to feed more than twenty thousand men. 
For there were six thousand jurymen, one thousand 
six hundred archers and also one thousand two 
hundred cavalry, five hundred members of the 
Council, five hundred guardians of the docks, and 
also fifty watchmen in the city, as many as seven 
hundred officials at home and as many as seven 
hundred " abroad ; and in addition to these, when later 
they settled into the war, two thousand five hundred 
hoplites, twenty guai-d-ships and other ships con- 
veying the guards to the number of two hundred 
elected by lot ; and furthermore the prytaneum,* 
orphans, and warders of prisoners — for all of these 
had their m ainte nance from public funds. 

XXV. By these means the people were provided 1 
with their food-supply. The constitution remained 
under the leadership of the Areopagites for about 
seventeen years after the Persian War, although it 
was being gradually modified. But as the popula- 
tion increased, Ephialte s son of Sophonides, having 
become head of the People ^ and having the reputation 
of being incorruptible and j ust in re«ard to the constitu- 
tion, attac ked the Co uncil. Firswie made away with 2 
many of the Areopagites by bringing legal proceed- 
ings against them about their acts of administration ; 
--s^then in the archonship of Conon he stripped the 462 u.c 
(^2^ouncil of all its added powers which made it the 
safeguard of the constitution, and assigned some of 

" The number is probably repeated frem the previous line 
by mistake ; other\vise ' also ' would be added. 

'' The town-hall, probably in the old Agora, south of the 
Acropolis; in it a fire was kept continually burning, and 
the Prytaneis dined. 

" See ii. 3 n. 



ARISTOTLE 

κοσίοις τα he τω Βημω καΐ τοις Βίκαστηρίας 

3 άπβΒωκβν. errpa^e he ταΰτα σνναιτίου yevoμevoυ 
θeμLστoκλeoυς, δς ην μέν των 'ApeoTraytrcui' 
eμeλλe he Kpiveadai μηhισμoΰ. βουλόμ€νος he 
καταλυθηναι, την βονλην 6 θ€μιστοκλης προς μ€ν 
τον ^Έιφίάλτην eXeyev οτι σvvapπάζeLV αυτόν η 
βονλη μeλλeL, προς he τους ^ Kpeoπaγίτaς δτί 
hei^ei τινάς συνισταμένους ΙπΙ κaτaλύσeι της 
πo\ιτeίaς. άγαγών he τους αΙρ€θ€ντας^ της βουλής 
οΰ hteτpLβ€v 6 ^Έιφίάλτης ίνα h€Lξη τους άθροι- 

4 ζομένους, hieXeyeTO μ€τά σπoυhης αύτοΐς. ό δ' 
^Έιφίάλτης ώς elhev κaτaπλaγelς κάθιζα μονο- 
χίτων €πΙ τον βωμόν. θαυμασάντων he πάντων 
το γ€γον6ς καΐ μeτά ταΰτα συvaθpoLσθeίσης της 
βουλής των π€ντακοσίων κατηγορούν των ^Apeo- 
παγιτών 6 τ ^Κφίάλτης καΐ ό" Θεμιστοκλής, 
καΐ πάλιν ev τω hημω τον αύτον τρόπον, ea»? 
περιείλοντο αυτών την hύvaμιv. /cat' άνηρεθη he 
και 6 ^Έιφιάλτης hoλoφovηθ€ις /χετ' ου πολύν 
χρόνον δι' ^Apιστohίκoυ του Ύαναγραίου. 

ι XXVI. Ή μεν οΰν των ^Αρεοπαγιτών βουλή τού- 
τον τον τρόπον άπεστερηθη της επιμελείας, μετά 
hε ταύτα συνεβαινεν άνιεσθαι μάλλον την πολιτείαν 
δια τους προθύμως hημaγωγoΰvτaς. κατά γάρ 
τους καιρούς τούτους συνέπεσε μηh^ ηγεμόνα εχειν 
τους επιεικέστερους , αλλ' αυτών προεστάναι 
Κίμωνα τον M.ιλτιάhoυ νεώτερον* οντά και προς 

^ Kenyon : αφαιρΐθβνταί cod. 

* ό suppletum a Wilamowitz-Kaibel. 

^ [και] Mayor : καΐ <ό μέν Θεμιστοκλής . . .> Wilamowitz- 
Kaibel. 

* νωθρυν Blass : νωθρώτερον Wilamowitz-Kaibel. 

76 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xxv. 2— xxvi. l 

them to the Five Hundred and others to the People 
and to the jury-courts. For these acts of Ephialtes, ^ 
Themisto cjes ° was partly re sponsible ; he was a 
/member of the Areopagus, but was destined to be 
> put on trial for treasonable dealings with Persia. 
Themistocles desirm g the Council to be jiestroyed 
used to tell Ephialtes that the Council was going to " 
arrest him, while he'^told the Areopagites that he 
would give information about certain persons who 
were conspiring to destroy the constitution. And he 
used to take selected members of the Council to 
the place where Ephialtes resided to show them the 
people collecting there, and conversed with them 
seriously. Ephialtes was dismayed when he saw 4 
this, and took his seat at the altar in only his shirt. 
Everybody was amazed at what had happened, 
and afterwards when the Council of Five Hundred 
assembled Ephialtes and Themistocles kept on 
denouncing t he Are opagites, and again similarly at 
the meetings~of the people, until they deprived 
them of their power. And also Ephialtes was actually 
made away with not long after, being craftily 
murdered by A'ristodicus of Tanagra. 
I XXVI. IrT this way the Council of the Areopagites 1 
fwas deprived of the superintendence of affairs. After 
this there came about an increased^elaxation of the 
constitution, due to the eagerness of those who were 
the leaders of the People. For it so happened that 
during these periods the better classes '' ha dn o leadeT 

at all, but the fh^ιpf^J^ιpr^nη ^p^nnfT thpm , Γ||γ|Γ>Γΐ gon 

of Miltiades, was a rather young man who had only 

"In Politics ii. xii. the place assigned here to Themisto- 
cles is taken by Pericles. 

* Or ' more respectable ' : it is a vague term of social 
approval, cf. § 1 fin, xxvii. 4, xxviii. 1, xxxvi. 9. 

77 



ARISTOTLE 

την ττόλιν οφέ ττροσζλθόντα, ττρός 8e τούτοις 
βφθάρθαι τους ττολλονς κατά 7τόλ€μον• της γαρ 
στρατζίας γινομένης ev τοΐς τότ€ χρόνοις €Κ κατα- 
λόγου καΐ στρατηγών υφισταμένων άττ^ίρων μ€ν 
τον ττοΧζμζΙν τιμωμένων δε δια τα? ττατρικάς 
δό^α?, alel συνέβαινεν των έζιόντων ανά 8ισχιλίονς 
η τρισχιλίους άπόλλνσθαι, ώστ€ άναλίσκ€σΘαι 
τους €πΐ€ΐκ€Ϊς και τον Βημου καΐ των βύπόρων, 

2 τά μ€ν ονν άλλα πάντα διώκουν ονχ ομοίως και, 
7τρότ€ρον τοΐς νόμοις ττροσέγ^οντβς, την he. των 
ivvea αρχόντων αΐρ€σιν ουκ έκίνουν αλλ η^ 
€κτω eVet μ€τά τον ^Εφιάλτου θάνατον έγνωσαν 

(και €κ ζβνγιτών προκρίνζσθαι τονς κληρωσο- 
μένους των εννέα αρχόντων και ττρώτος ηρζ^ν 
έζ αυτών Ήίνησιθβί^ης. οι δε ττρό τούτου ττάντ^ς 
€ζ Ιππέων και π€ντακοσιομ€8ίμνων ήσαν, οί δε* 
ζζυγΐται τάς εγκυκλίους ηρχον, ει μη τι παρ- 

3 €ωράτο των έν τοΐς νόμοις. έ'τει δε πέμπτω μβτα 
/( ταΰτα έπι Αυσικράτους άρχοντος οί τριάκοντα 
ι' 8ικασταΙ κατέστησαν πάλιν οί καλούμ€νοι κατά 

Βημους' καΐ τρίτω μ€τά τούτον έπι Άντώότου 
δια το πλήθος των πολιτών Περικλεου? €ΐποντος 

Λ έγνωσαν μη μ€τέχ€ΐν της ττόλεω? ος αν μη έζ 

ι άμφοΐν άστοΐν η γεγονώς. 

1 XXVII. Μετά δε ταΰτα προς το ^ημαγωγεΐν 

έλθόντος Περικλέους• και πρώτον^ ίύ^οκιμησαντος 

6τ€ κατηγόρησε τάς εύθύνας Κίμωνος στρατη- 

γοΰντος νέος ων, Βημοτικωτέραν έτι συνέβη 

^ ij supplevit Blass. * 5k supplevit Kenyon. 

' πρώτον Blass : ττωτου cod. : πρό τον Jackson. 

• ' ' !l ' ' 

« C/. xvi. 5. 
78 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xxvi. 1— xxvii. 1 

lately entered public life ; and in addition, that the 
multitude had s uffere d seriously in war, for in those 
days fEe expeditionary torce wasraised from a muster- 
roll, and was commanded by generals with no experi- 
ence of war but promoted on account of their family 
reputations, so that it was always happening that the 
troops on an expedition suffered as many as two or 
three thousand casualties, making a drain on the 
numbers of the respectable members both of the 
[people and of the wealthy. Thus in general all 2 
I the administration was conducted without the same 
[attention to the laws as had been given before, 
although no innovation was made in the election of 
the Nine Archons, except that five years after the 
death of Ephialtes they decided to extend to the 
Teamster class eligibility to the preliminary roll 
from which the Nine Archons were to be selected 
by lot ; and the first of the Teamsier class to hold 
the archonship was Mnesitheides. (All the Archons 457 b.c. 
hitherto had been from the Knights and Five-hundred- 
measure-menj while the Teamsters held the ordinary 
offices, unlesssome provision of the laws was ignored. 
Four years afterwards, in the archonship of Lysicrates, 3 
the thirty judges called the Local Justices were in- 453 b.c. 
stituted again " ; and two years after Lysicrates, in 451 b.c 
the year of Antidotus, o^ving to the large number of 
the citizens an enactment was passed on the proposal 
of Pericles confining citizenship to persons of citizen "^ 
birth on both sides. 

XXVII. After this when Pericles advanced to the 1 
leadership of the people, having first distinguished 463 b.c. 
himself when while still a young man he challenged 
the audits of Cimon who was a general, it came about 
that the constitution became still more democratic. 

79 



ARISTOTLE 

γ€ν€σθαι την ττολίτζίαν. καΐ γαρ των 'A/aeo- 
τταγιτών eVta TrapetXeTO, καΐ μάλιστα προντρβφεν 
την πόλιν inl την ναυτίκην Βύναμιν, i^ ης συνέβη 
θαρρήσαντας τους πολλούς αττασαν την ττολίτβίαν 

2 μόίλλον άγ€ΐν et? αύτοΰς. μετά he την iv Σαλα/χΓνι 
ναυ/χαχιαν' ύνος Set ττεντηκοστω eVet ΙττΙ ΥΙυθο- 
8ίόρου άρχοντος ό ττρός ΥΙελοποννησίονς ενίστη 
ττόλεμος, iv ω κατακλεισθείς 6 8ημος iv τω άστ€ΐ 
καΐ συνεθισθείς iv ταΓ? στρατβίαις μισθοφορ€Ϊν, τά 
μεν εκών τά he άκων προηρεΐτο^ την ττολιτείαν 
hiOLKelv αυτός, iπoίησe he καΐ μισθοφόρα τά 
hiKaoTTipia ΥΙ,ερικλης πρώτος, άντώημαγωγών 

3 προς την Κίμωνος ενπορίαν. 6 γάρ Κίμων are 
τυραννικην έχων ούσίαν πρώτον μεν τάς κοινάς 
λητουργίας iλrjτoυpγει λαμπρώς, έπειτα τών 
hημoτώv έτρεφε πολλούς' i^rjv γάρ τω βονλομενω 
AaκLahώv καθ^ εκάστην την ημεραν iλθόvτί παρ' 
αύτον εχειν τά μέτρια, ετι hi τά χωρία πάντα 
άφρακτα ην, όπως i^rf τω βονλομενω της όπώρας 

4 άπολανειν. προς δτ) ταύτην την χορηγίαν επι- 
λειπόμενος ο ΙΙερικλης τη ουσία, συμβουλενσαντος 
αύτώ Aaμωvίhoυ του Οίηθεν {ος ihόκει τών πολλών 
εισηγητής etv-at τω ΥΙερικλει, διό και ώστράκισαν 
αυτόν ύστερον) iπει τοις ιhίoις ηττάτο διδόΐ'αι τοις 
πολλοίς τά αυτών, κατεσκευασε μισθοφοράν τοις 
hικaστηpίoις^• αφ' ων αίτιώνταί rtve? χείρω* 
γενέσθαι, κληρουμενων iπιμελώς άει μάλλον τών 

5 τυχόντων η τών iπιεικώv ανθρώπων, ηρξατο hi 

' προή-γΐτο Richards. 

* (ξτ) Kenyon : εξηι> cod. 

' Blass: δικασται? cod. 

* χΐίρονί Wilamowitz-Kaibel (servato δικασταΐί). 

80 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xxvii. 1-5 

For he took away some of the functions of the Areo- 
pagus, and he urged the state very strongly in the i. 
direction of naval power, which resulted in embolden- 
ing the multitude," who brought all the government 
more into their own hands. Forty-eight years after 2 
the naval battle of Salamis, in the archonship of432B.c. 
Pythodorus, the war against the Peloponnesians broke 
out, during which the people being locked up in the 
city, and becoming accustomed to earning pay on 
their military campaigns, came partly of their own 
will and partly against their will to the decision to 
administer the government themselves. Also Pericles / 
first made service in the jury-courts a paid office, as'" 
a popular counter-measure against Cimon's wealth. 
For as Cimon had an estate large enough for a 3 
tyrant, in the first place he discharged the general 
public services in a brilliant manner, and moreover he 
supplied maintenance to a number of the members 
of his deme ; for anyone of the Laciadae who liked 
could come to his house every day and have a moder- 
ate supply, and also all his farms were unfenced, to 
enable anyone who liked to avail himself of the 
harvest. So as Pericles' means were insufficient for 4 
this lavishness, he took the advice of Damonides of ■ 
Oea (who was believed to suggest to Pericles most of 
his measures, owing to which they afterwards ostra- 
cized him), since he was getting the worst of it with 
his private resources, to give the multitude what was 
their own, and he instituted payment for the jury- 
courts ; the result of which according to some critics 
was their deterioration, because ordinary persons 
always took more care than the respectable to cast lots 
for the duty. Also it was after this that the organized 5 

<• Cf. xxii. 7. xxiv. 1. 

ο 81 



ARISTOTLE 

μ€τα ταΰτα /cat το Se/«x^etv, πρώτου καταΒΐΐ- 
ζαντος ^Ανύτου μετά την iv Πυλω στρατηγίαν 
κρινόμενος γαρ υττό τίνων δια το άποβαλεΐν ΐΐύλον, 
Βεκάσας το δικαστή ριον άπεφυγεν. 

1 XXVIII, "Κως μβν οΰν ΐίερίκλης προαστηκει 
τον Βήμου βελτίω τα κατά την πολιτείαν ην, 
τελεντησαντος he ΙΙερίκλεονς πολύ χείρω. πρώτον 
γαρ τότ€ προστάτην ελαββν ο Βημος ουκ evSoKi- 
μοΰντα παρά τοις επιεικάσιν, iv 8e τοις πρότερον 
χρόνοίς aei Βίετβλονν οΐ^ επιεικείς Βημαγωγονντες . 

2 εζ αρχής μεν γαρ και πρώτος εγενετο προστάτης 
του Βημου Σόλων, δεύτερος 8e ΐίεισίστρατος, 
των ευγενών και γνωρίμων καταλυθείσης 8e 
της τυραννικός Ιίλεισθενης του γένους ων τών 
Άλκμεονώών, και τούτω μεν ούΒεις ην άντι- 
στασιώτης ώς εζεπεσον οι περί τον Ισαγόραν 
μετά 8ε ταΰτα του μεν Βήμου προειστήκει Έάνθ- 
ιππος, τών 8ε γνωρίμων Μιλτιάδη? " έ'ττ^ιτα 
Θεμιστοκλής και 'Αριστείδης- μετά δε τούτους 
'Έιφιάλτης μεν του Βήμου, Κ,ίμων δ' ό Μιλτιάδου 
τών ευπόρων είτα ΐίερικλης μεν του Βήμου, 
θουκυΒίΒης δε τών έτερων, κηΒεστης ών Κίμωνος. 

3 Τίερικλεους 8ε τελευτήσαντος τών μεν επιφανών 
προειστήκει Νικίας 6 εν Έικελία τελευτησας, του 
δε 8ημου Κλέων ό Κλεαινε'του, δς 8οκεΐ μάλιστα 
Βιαφθεΐραι τον 8ημον ταΐς ορμαΐς,^ και πρώτος 

ϊ ετΓΐ τοΰ βήματος άνεκραγε και ελοιΒορησατο και 
περιζωσάμενος εΒημηγόρησε, τών άλλων εν κόσμω 

1 [οΊ] Richards. 
' διανο/χαΐϊ Sandys : νομαΐί Thalheim. 

" Pylos (Navarino) on the W. coast of Peloponnesus, had . 
been taken by Atheas 425 b.c, but was retaken by Sparta 

82 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xxvii. 5— xxviii. 3 

bribery of juries began, Anytus having first shown the <»^ 
way to it after his command at Pylos** ; for when ^, - 
he was brought to trial by certain persons for having 
lost Pylos he bribed the court and got off. 

XXVIII. So long, then, as Pericles held the head- 1 — -— 
ship ^ of the People, the affairs of the state went 
better, but when Pericles was dead they became 
much worse. For the People now for the first time 
adopted a head who was not in good repute with the 
respectable classes, whereas in former periods those 
always continued to lead the people. For Solon 2 
was the first and original head of the People, and the 
second was Peisistratus, who was one of the men of 
nobility and note. After the tyranny had been put 
down, Cleisthenes, a member of the family of the 
Alcmaeonidae, was head of the People, and he had 
no opponent, since the party of Isagoraswas banished ; 
but after this Xanthippus held the headship of the 
People, and Miltiades of the notables ; and then 
Themistocles and Aristeides ; and after them Ephialtes 
held the headship of the People, and Cimon son of 
Miltiades of the wealthy ; and then Pericles of the 
People and Thucydides of the others, he being a 
relation of Cimon. When Pericles died, Nicias, who 3 
died in Sicily, held the headship of the men of dis- 
tinction, and the head of the People was Cleon son 
of Cleaenetus, who is thought to have done the most 
to corrupt the people by his impetuous outbursts, 
and was the first person to use bawling and abuse on 
the platform, and to gird up his cloak before making 
a public speech, all other persons speaking in orderly 

409 B.C. Anytus (see also xxxiv. 3, one of the prosecutors of 
Socrates) was sent with 30 triremes to its relief, but owing 
to weather never got round Cape Malea. 
See note on ii. 3. 

83 



ARISTOTLE 

AeyovTOJi'. etra μ€τά τούτους των μβν €Τ€ρων 
Θηραμβνης 6 "Αγνωνος, του δε δτ^/χου ΥΛ^οφών ο 
λυροποίός, ος καΐ την ^ιωβολίαν^ βπορισβ πρώτος• 
και χρόνον μεν τίνα διεδίδου/ /χβτά he ταΰτα 
κατέλυσε Ιίαλλίκράτης ΥΙαιανίΐύς πρώτος υπο- 
σχόμενος βπίθήσβιν προς τοΐν 8υοΐν όβολοΐν άλλον 
όβολόν. τούτων μεν οΰν αμφοτέρων θάνατον κατ- 
εγνωσαν ύστερον εΐωθεν γαρ καν ί^^αττατη^^ το 
πλήθος ύστερον μισεΖν τους τι προαγαγόντας ποιείν 

4 αυτού? τών μη καλώς εχόντων, από δε Κλεο- 
φώντος η8η 8ίε8εχοντο συνεχώς την ^ημαγωγιαν 
οΐ μάλιστα βουλόμενοι θρασύνεσθαι καΐ χαρι- 
ζεσθαί τοις πολλοίς προς το παραυτίκα βλέποντες . 

5 ^οκοΰσι δε^ βέλτιστοι γεγονεναι τών Αθηνησι 
ιπολιτευσαμενων μετά τους αρχαίους Νικίας και 
^θουκυ^ίΒης και Θηραμένης, και περί μεν Νικίου 

και ΘουκυΒί8ου πάντες σχεΒόν όμολογοΰσιν άνδρας 
γεγονεναι ου μόνον καλούς κάγαθούς άλλα και 
πολιτικούς και τη πόλει πάση πατρικώς χρω- 
μενους, περί δε Θηραμένους δια το συμβηναι κατ 
αυτόν ταραχώδεις τάς πολιτείας είΐ'αι* άμφισ- 
βητησις της κρίσεως εστί. Βοκεΐ μεντοι^ τοις 
μη παρεργως αποφαινομενοις ουχ ωσπερ αυτόν 
Βιαβάλλουσι πάσας τάς πολιτείας καταλύειν, αλλά 
πάσας προάγειν εως μη^έν παρανομοΐεν, ως δυνά- 
μενος πολιτεύεσθαι κατά πάσας, όπερ εστίν αγαθού 
πολίτου έργον, παρανομούσαις οέ ου συγχωρών 
αλλ' άπεχθανόμενος . 

1 διωββλίαν edd. * δίΐδίδοτο Wyse. 

3 δέ : δοι (-δ' οί) cod., f superscripto. 
* €Ϊναι supplevit Richards. ' μέντοι Kenyon : μ(ν cod. 

" By instituting the ' theatre-fund ' (τό θεωρικό»), which was 
84 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xxviii. 3-5 

fashion. Then after these Theramenes son of 
Hagnon was chief of the others and Cleophon the 
lyre-maker of the People, who first introduced the 
two-obol dole ** ; he went on distributing this for a 
time, but afterwards Callicrates of the Paeanian deme 
abolished it, being the first person to promise to add 
to the two obols another obol. Both of these two 
leaders were afterwards condemned to death ; for 
even though the multitude may be utterly deceived, 
subsequently it usually hates those who have led it 
to do anything improper. From Cleon onward the 4 
leadership of the People was handed on in an unbroken 
line by the men most willing to play a bold part 
and to gratify the many with an eye to immediate 
popularity. And it is thought that the best of the 5 
politicians at Athens after those of early times were 
Nicias, Thucydides and Theramenes. As to Nicias 
and Thucydides, almost everybody agrees that they 
were not only honourable gentlemen but also states- 
manlike and patriotic servants of the whole state, but 
about Theramenes, owing to the confused nature of 
the constitutional changes that took place in his time, 
the verdict is a matter of dispute. However, the 
view of wTiters not making mere incidental references 
is that he was not a destroyer of all governments, as 
critics charge him with being, but guided them all 
forward into a fully law-abiding course, since he was 
capable of serving the state under all of them, which 
is the duty of a good citizen, but did not give in 
to them when they acted illegally, but faced their 
enmity.,^ 

a state fund for defraying the cost of an ordinary seat at 
the theatre, 2 obols. Plutarch attributes its institution to 
Pericles. An obol was about l^d., 6 to a drachma. 

85 



ARISTOTLE 

1 XXIX. 'Έα>9 /Aev οΰν Ισόρροπα τα. πράγματα 
κατά τον πόΧεμον ην 8ί€φνλαττον την Βημοκρατίαν. 
€7Γ6ΐ Se μβτά την iv Σικτβλια γ€νομ€νην συμφοράν^ 
Ισχυρότατα'^ τα των Αακ€^αιμονίων ΙγΙνετο δια 
την προς βασιλέα συμμαχίαν, ηναγκάσθησαν κινη- 
σαντ€ς την Βημοκρατίαν καταστησαι την εττι των 

• τ€τρακοσίων ποΧιτβίαν, ΐΐπόντος τον μ^ν προ^ τοΰ 

\ φηφίσματος λόγον ^Ιηλοβίου, την δε γνώμην γρά- 

φαντος ΐΐυθο^ώρου τοΰ ^ Αναφλυστίον * μάλιστα δέ 

συμπ€ΐσθβντων των πολλών δια το νομίζζΐν βασιλέα 

μάλλον ίαυτοΐς συμπολ^μησ^ιν eav δι ολίγων 

2 ποιησωνται την πολιτβίαν. ην δε το φηφισμα τοΰ 
Πυ^οδωρου τοιόΐ'δε• τον Βημον ελβσθαι μβτα των 
προϋπαρχόντων δέκα προβονλων άλλους είκοσι εκ 
των ύπερ τβτταράκοντα €τη γεγονότων, οιτιν^ς 
όμόσαντ€ς η μην συγγράφειν ά αν ηγώνται βέλ- 
τιστα είναι τη ττόλει συγγράφουσι ττερι της 

3 σωτηρίας• e^elvai δε και των άλλων τω βουλομύνω 
γράφειν, ιν ε|• απάντων αιρώνται το άριστον. 
Κλειτο^ών δε τα /αέν άλλα καθάπβρ Πυ^οδωρο? 
ειττεν, προσαναζητησαι δε του? αιρ^θβντας ^γραφβν 
και του? πατρίους νόμους ους Κλεισ^ε'νη? ΐθηκ^ν 
δτ€ καθιστή την 8ημοκρατίαν, δπως^ άκούσαντες 
και τούτων βουλ^ύσωνται το άριστον, ως ου 
Βημοτικην άλλα παραπλησιαν οΰσαν την Κλει- 

4 σθένους ττολιτειαν ττ^ Σόλωνο?. οί δ αιρε^ε'ντε? 
πρώτον /χεν έγραφαν επάναγκ^ς ε?ναι του? ττρυ- 

^ Richards : διαφοραν cod, 

* ίσχυρύτΐρα Mayor, * ττρό] 7re/)i Wyse, 

* Blass: . . . v. τιον cod. 

5 όττω? <&;'> Wilamowitz-Kaibel, 

" Or ' before the resolution.' 
86 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xxix. 1-4 

XXIX. In the period of the war therefore, so long 1 
as fortunes were evenly balanced, they continued to 
preserve the democracy. But when after the occur- 
rence of the disaster in Sicily the Lacedaemonian side 4i3 b.c. 
became very strong owing to the alliance with the 
king of Persia, they were compelled to overthrow the 
democracy and set up the government of the Four 
Hundred, Melobius making the speech on behalf of the 
resolution " but Pythodorus of the deme Anaphlystus 
having drafted the motion, and the acquiescence of 
the mass of the citizens being chiefly due to the belief 
that the king would help them more in the war if they 
limited their constitution. The resolution of Pytho- 2 
dorus was as follows : ' That in addition to the ten 
Preliminary Councillors * already existing the people 
choose twenty others from those over forty years of 
age, and that these, after taking a solemn oath to 
draft whatever measures they think best for the state, 
shall draft measures for the public safety ; and that 3 
it be open to any other person also that wishes, to 
frame proposals, in order that they may choose the 
one that is best out of them all.' Cleitophon moved 
an amendment to the resolution of Pythodorus, that 
the commissioners elected should also investigate the 
ancestral laws laid do\vn by Cleisthenes when he was 
establishing the democracy, in order that they might 
decide on the best course to advise after hearing 
these laws also, on the ground that the constitution 
of Cleisthenes was not democratic but similar to that 
of Solon. The commissioners when elected first pro- 4 

* The ten commissioners appointed at Athens after the 
Sicilian disaster to deal with the emergency (Thuc. viii. 1), 
and later instructed to reform the constitution {ib. Ixvii.). 

87 



ARISTOTLE 

τανβις άπαντα τα Χ^γόμζνα rrepl της σωτηρίας 
€πίφηφίζβιν, €7Γ€ΐτα τάς των παρανόμων γραφάς 
καΐ τάς είσαγγβλίας καΐ τάς προσκλησ€ΐς^ avetXov, 
όπως άν οι €θβλοντ€ς ^Αθηναίοι συμβουλενωσι 
π€ρί των προκ€(,μ€νων• iav Se τις τινα^ τούτων 
χάριν η ζημιοΐ η προσκαληται η ^Ισάγη ei? 
8ίκαστηρίον, evhei^iv αύτον elvai και άπαγωγην 
προς τους στρατηγούς , τους δε στρατηγούς παρα- 

5 Sovvai τοις eV8e/ca θανάτω ζτ^^υ,ιώσαι. μ€τά 8e 
ταύτα την ποΧιτ^ίαν SieTa^av TovBe τρόπον τά 
μεν προσιοντα^ μη εζεΐναι αλλοσε δατταιη^σαι 
η €ΐς τον πόλεμον, τάς δ' αρχάς αμίσθους 
άρχ€ΐν άπάσας €ως αν 6 πόλεμος η, πλην 
των ivvea αρχόντων και των πρυτάνεων οι άν 
ώσιν, τούτους δε φερειν τρεις όβολούς εκαστον 
της ημέρας• την δ' άλλην πολιτείαν επιτρεφαι 
πασαν* 'Αθηναίων τοις Βυνατωτάτοις και τοις 
σώ/χασιν και τοις χρήμασιν λητουργεΐν μη ελαττον 
η πεντακισχιλίοις^ εως άν ο πόλεμος ν• κυρίους δ' 
etvat τούτους και συνθηκας συντίθεσθαι προς ους 
άν εθελωσιν ελεσθαι δ' e/c* της φυλής εκάστης δέκα 
άνδρας ύπερ τετταράκοντα ετη γεγονότας οΐτινες 
καταλεξουσι τους πεντακισχιλίους όμόσαντες καθ* 
ιερών τελείων. 

1 XXX. Ot μεν ούν αίρεθεντες ταύτα σννεγραφαν 
κυρωθέντων δε τούτων εΐλοντο σφών αυτών οΐ 

^ Blass : προκΚ-ησΐΐ^ Cod. 
^ Tij Tiva Richards: tls cod. 

^ Ίτροσίοντα, Richards (cf. xxxix. 2) : χρηματαπροσιοντα cod. : 
Xp. <τά> ττρ. Kenyon. 

* πάσαν Mayor: ττασιν cod. 

* -ων (i.e. ίλαττον νεντακισχιΧίων) v.l. adscr. cod. 

* δ' έκ edd. : 5ΐκαι cod. 

88 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xxix. 4— xxx. 1 

posed that it should be compulsory for the Presidents" 
to put to the vote all proposals made for the public 
safety, and then repealed the procedures of impeach- 
ment for illegal proposals, information and summons, 
in order that those Athenian citizens who wished 
might give advice about the matters before them ; 
and enacted that, if anybody attempted to punish or 
summon or bring them into court for so doing, he be 
liable to information and summary arrest before the 
Generals, and that the Generals should hand him 
over to the Eleven to be punished with death. After < 
this they framed the constitution in the following 
way : that it should not be permissible to spend the 
revenues on any other object than the war ; that all 
the officers of state should be unpaid for the duration 
of the war, excepting those who held the posts of the 
Nine Archons and the Presidents, and these should 
draw three obols '' per man per day ; and that all the 
rest of the functions of government should be en- 
trusted to those Athenians who in person and property 
were most capable of serving the state, not less than 
five thousand, for the duration of the war ; and that 
the powers of this body should include competence to 
contract treaties with whatever people they wished : 
and that they should elect ten men over forty 
years of age from each tribe, who should enroll the 
Five Thousand after taking oath over unblemished 
victims. 

XXX. So the Commissioners drafted these pro- 
posals ; and these being ratified, the Five Thousand 

" The Presidents of the Council, see xliii. 2. 
^ Half a drachma, see iv. 3 n. 

89 



ARISTOTLE 

ΤΓ^ντακίσγ^ίΧιοι, τους αναγράφοντας την ττοΧιτ^ίαν 
βκατόν dvSpas. οΐ δ' alpedevTes ανέγραφαν καΐ 

2 έζηνεγκαν τάδε* βουλ€ν€ΐν μβν κατ' Ινιαυτον τονς^ 
υπέρ τριάκοντα €τη γΐγονότας avev μισθοφορας• 
τούτων δ' elvat, τους στρατηγούς καΐ τους ivvea 
άρχοντας καΐ τον Ιβρομνημονα και τους ταξιάρχους 
και ιππάρχους και φυλάρχους και άρχοντας et? τα 
φρούρια και ταμίας των ΐ €ρ ων χρημάτων τη θ€ω 
και τοις άλλοις θ€θΐς δεκτά και ίΧληνοταμίας^ και 
των άλλων οσίων^ χρημάτων απάντων βίκοσιν οι 
8ιαχ€ΐριοΰσιν,* και Ίζροποιούς και έπιμελητάς δέκα 
ίκατέρους• αιρ€Ϊσθαι δβ πάντας τούτους e/c προκρί- 
των, €Κ των det βουλβυόντων πλ€ΐους προκρίνοντας, 
τάς δ' αλλάς• αρχάς άπάσας κληρωτάς elvat και 
μη €Κ της βουλής• τους δε ίλληνοταμίας οι αν 

3 8ιαχ€ΐρίζωσι τα χρήματα μη συμβουλ^ΰ^ιν . βούλας 
δε ποιησαι τέτταρας e/c της ηλικίας της ίίρημβνης 
βίς τον λοιπόν χρόνον, και τούτων το λαχον μέρος 
βουλίύ^ιν , t'etjLtac he και τους άλλους προς την 
ληξιν ίκάστην. τους δ' εκατόν άνδρα? διανεΓ^ίΐαι 
σφάς Τ€ αυτούς και τους άλλους τ4τταρα μέρη 
ως ίσαίτατα και Βιακληρώσαι, και €ΐς ένιαυτόν 

4: βουλζύβιν τους λαχόντας^• βουλ^ύζσθαι^ he fj αν 

^ Tovs] τ€τρα.κοσίονί Niemeyer. 

* [και έΧληΐΌταμίαί] Sandys. 

' [όσίωΐ'] ? ed. 

* [-V οΐ διαχΐίριοΐσιν] Thompson. 

^ τούί λαχόνταί siippletum a Wilamowjtz-Kaibel. 

' βονλβύεσθαι suppletum a Sandys. 



" The secretary or registrar who with the actual repre- 
sentative, the Pylagoras, was sent by Athens, as by the 
other members, to the Amphictyonic Council. 

90 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xxx. 1-4 

elected a hundred of their members as a committee 
to draw up the constitution. This committee drew 
up and pubhshed the following resolutions : ' The 2 
Council to consist of members over thirty years of 
age holding office for a year and drawing no pay ; 
these members to include the Generals, the Nine 
Archons, the Sacred Remembrancer,'* the Company- 
commanders, ** Officers of the Horse,'' Officers of Tribes ^ 
and officers in command of the Guards,^ the Trea- 
surers of the Sacred Funds of the Goddess^ and the ten 
Treasurers of the other gods, the Greek Treasurers,^ 
and tΛventy Treasurers of all the secular funds as 
well, who shall manage them,'* and Sacrificial Officers 
and Superintendents, ten of each ; and the Council 
to elect all of these from a larger preliminary list of 
candidates proposed by it from its members at the time, 
but all other offices to be elected by lot and not from 
the Council ; and the Greek Treasurers * that are to 
manage the funds not to be members of the Council. 
And four Councils to be formed for the future from 3 
persons of the stated age, and a division of these 
selected by lot to officiate, but the others also to be 
included in each such selection. And the Hundred 
Men to divide themselves and the others ' into four 
divisions as nearly equal as possible, and to cast lots 
among them, and those on whom the lot falls to form 
the Council for a year. And the Council to frame 4 

^ See 1x1. 3. ' See ib, 4. "* See ib. 5. 

* See xxiv. 3. f Athena. 

» This contradicts the end of the section, and the text seems 
to be corrupt. 

* This clause seems to be interpolated from below. 

»■ The managers of the funds paid as tribute by the Con- 
federacy of Delos. 

^ i.e. the rest of the Five Thousand. 

91 



ARISTOTLE 

hoKT) αντοΐς άριστα e^ecv ττ€ρί re των χρημάτων 
οττως άν σώα fj καΐ els το δέον άναλίσκηται, καΐ 
ΤΓβρΙ των άΧλων ως άν Βννωνται άριστα- eav 8e^ 
τι θβλωσιν βονλζνσασθαι μετά ττΧζΐόνων, €7Γ€ΐσ- 
KaXeiv ζκαστον επείσκλητον ον άν iOeXr] των €Κ 
της αντης ηλικίας. τάς δ έδρα? ττοΐ€ΐν της 
βουλής κατά 7Τ€νθημ€ρον, eav μη δεωνται πλειόνων. 

5 κληροΰν δε την βονλην τους ivvea άρχοντας, τάς 
δε χειροτονίας κρίνβιν πέντε τους λαχόντας εκ 
της βουλής, και εκ τούτων ενα κληροΰσθαι καθ* 
εκάστην ημεραν τον επιφηφιοΰντα. κληροΰν δε 
τους λαχόντα? πέντε τους εθελοντας προσελθεΐν 
εναντίον της βουλής, πρώτον μεν Ιερών, Βεχττερον 
δε κήρυξ IV, τρίτον πρεσβείαις, τέταρτον τών άλλων 
τά δε τοΰ πολέμου όταν 8εη άκληρωτι προσαγα- 

6 γόντας τους στρατηγούς χρηματίζεσθ αι. ^ τον δε 
μη ιόντα εις το βουλευτήριον τών βουλευόντων 
την ώραν την προρρηθεΐσαν όφείλειν Βραχμήν τής 
ημέρας εκάστης, εάν μη ευρισκόμενος^ άφεσιν τής 
βουλής άπή. 

1 XXXI. Ύαύτην μεν οΰν εις τον μέλλοντα χρόνον 
ανέγραφαν την πολιτείαν, εν δε τω παροντι καιρώ 
τήν8ε' βουλεύειν μεν τετρακοσίους κατά τά 
πάτρια, τετταράκοντα εξ εκάστης φυλής εκ προ- 
κρίτων ους άν ελωνται οι φυλεται τών υπέρ 
τριάκοντα ετη γεγονότων. τούτους δε τας τε 
αρχάς καταστήσαι, και περί τοΰ όρκου οντινα 
χρή ομόσαι γράφαι, και* περί τών νομών και 
τών ευθυνών και τών άλλων πράττειν fj αν 

2 ήγώνται σνμφερειν. τοις δε νόμοις οΐ άν τεθώσιν 

1 δέ suppletum a Mayor. * χρημάτιζαν Blass. 

3 ΐΰρόμΐνο% Tyrrell. * και supplevit Kenyon. 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xxx. 4-xxxi. 2 

such resolutions as may seem to them likely to be 
best to secure the safe preservation of the funds and 
their expenditure upon necessary objects, and about 
the other affairs to the best of their abihty ; and in 
case of their desiring to consider some matter with 
added numbers, each member to summon as a co- 
opted member anybody of the same age as himself 
that he may wish. To hold the sittings of the 
Council every five days, unless more sittings are re- 
quired. The Council to elect the Nine Archons by 5 ^ 
lot. The tellers to be five persons elected by lot 
from the Council, and one of these to be chosen by 
lot to serve daily as putter of the question. And the 
five tellers elected to cast lots among those who 
desire an audience of the Council, first about matters 
of religion, second for Heralds, third for embassies, 
fourth about other business ; but whenever questions 
relating to war need consideration they are to intro- 
duce the Generals without casting lots and take their 
business. A member of the Council not coming to the 6 
Council-chamber at the time previously announced 
to be liable to a fine of a drachma for each day, unless 
he obtain leave of absence from the Council.' 

XXXI. This constitution, therefore, they drcAV up 1 
for the future, but the following to be in force in 
the present crisis : ' The Council to consist of four ! 
hundred members according to the ancestral regula- 1 1 
tions, forty from each tribe taken from a preliminary ' ' 
list of any persons over thirty years of age that the 
members of the tribe may elect. These to appoint 
the officials, and to draft a proposal about the form of 
oath to be taken, and to take action about the laws 
and the audits and other matters as they may think 
good. And to follow any laws that may be enacted 2 

93 



ARISTOTLE 

Trepl των ττοΧηικών χρησθαι, καΐ μη i^etvai μ€τα- 
KiveTv μη^^ €Τ€ρους θ€σθαί. των Se στρατηγών το 
νυν elvai την alpeaiv Ιζ απάντων ττοιβΐσθαι των 
πεντακίσχίλίων, την Be βονλην eVetSav καταστη^ 
ττοιήσασαν £^ετασιν iv^ οπλοις iXeauai δεκτά 
άνΒρας καΐ γραμματέα τούτοις, τους 8e αίρ^θίντας 
αρχ€ΐν τον βίσιόντα βνιαυτον αυτοκράτορας, και 
αν τι Βεωνταί συμβουλβύβσθαί μετά της βουλής. 
3 eXeoOai 8e καΐ ΐττπαρχον eva^ καΐ φυλάρχους δέκα- 
το δε λοίπον την alpeaiv ποΐ€Ϊσθαι τούτων την 
βουλην κατά τα γβγραμμβνα. των δ άλλων" αρχών 
πλην της βουλής καΐ τών στρατηγών μη e^elvai 
μητ€ τούτοις μητ€ αλλω μηΒ€νΙ πλβΐον η άπαξ 
άρξαι την αύτην αρχήν, ει? δε τον άλλον χρόνον. 
Ινα ν€μηθώσιν οΐ τετρακόσιοι ει? τας τετταρα? 
λήζεις, όταν έκάστοις* γίγνηται /χετά τών άλλων 
βουλεύειν, διανει/χ.άν'των αυτού? οι εκατόν άνδρε?, 

1 XXXII, Οι /χέν ουν εκατόν οι υπό τών ττεντα- 
κισχιλίων αιρεθέντ^ς ταύτην ανέγραφαν την πολι- 
τειαν. ΙπικυρωθΙντων δε τούτων ύπο του πλήθους 
βπιφηφίσαντος ^ Κριστομάχου , ή μβν βουλή η^ εττι 
Καλλίου πριν Βιαβουλεϋσαι κατελύθη μηνός Θαρ- 
γηλιώνος τετράδι εττι δε'κα, οι δε τετρακόσιοι 
ειστ^σαν ενάτη φθίνοντος θαργηλιώνος• έδει δε 
την είληχυΐαν τω κυάμω βουλην εισιε'ναι δ επι 

2 δε'κα Σικιροφοριώνος . ή μεν ουν ολιγαρχία τούτον 
κατέστη τον τρόπον επί Καλλιου μεν άρχοντος 
ετεσιν δ' ύστερον της τών τυράννων εκβολής 

1 Wyse : καταστησψ cod. * fV supplevit Wyse. 

* ^va <καΙ ταξιάρχους δέκα^ Wilamowitz. 

* 'έκαστοι! (vel Toh avTois, αύτοΐς) edd. : τοισαστοΐί Cod. 

^ ή supplevit Rutherford. 

94 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xxxi. 2— xxxii. 2 

about the affairs of state, and not to have powers 
to alter them nor to enact others. The election of 
the Generals for the time being to be made from 
among all the Five Thousand, and the Council as soon 
as it is appointed to hold a review under arms and 
elect ten men to the post, and a secretary for them, and 
those elected to hold office for the ensuing year with 
autocratic powers, and to consult with the Council 
about any matter if they require. And also to elect 3 
one Master of the Horse and ten Tribe-commanders ; 
and for the future the Council to conduct the election 
of these according to the procedure enacted. And 
none of the other officials except the Council and the 
Generals, nor anybody else, to be allowed to hold the 
same office more than once. And for the future, in 
order that the Four Hundred may be divided into the 
four lists,** when each division takes its turn to form 
the Council with the rest, let the Hundred Men 
divide them into sections.' 

XXXII. This then was the constitution drawn up by 1 
the Hundred elected by the Five Thousand. These 
proposals were carried by the multitude, being put 
to the vote by Aristomachus, and the Council in 
Callias's year was dissolved on the 14<th day of the 4i2 b.(;. 
month of Thargelion before it had completed its 
term of office ; while the Four Hundred came into 
office on Thargelion the 21 st ; and the Council elected "X- '^ ' 
by lot was due to enter office on Scirophorion the 
14th. ^ In this way therefore the oligarchy was set 2 
up, in the archonship of Callias, about a hundred 
years after the expulsion of the tyrants, the chief 

« Cf. XXX. 3. 
*" The three dates are about May 31, June 7, and June 30. 



ARISTOTLE 

jLtaAiara Ικατόν, αίτιων /μάλιστα γ€νομ4νων lleia- 
auhpov καΐ Αντιφώντος και Θηραμένους, άνΒρών 
καΐ γ€γ€νημ€νων ev και avveaei και γνώμη hoKovv- 
3 των ^ιαφΙρ€ΐν. γενομένης hk ταύτης της πολιτείας 
οΐ μεν πεντακισχίλιοι λόγω μόνον ηρεθησαν, οι οε 
τετρακόσιοι μετά των 8εκα τών αυτοκρατόρων 
είσελθόντες εις το βουλευτήριον ηρχον τε^ της 
ττόλ^ως και προς ΑακεΒαιμονίους πρεσβευσάμενοι 
κατελύοντο τον πόλεμον εφ' οΐς εκάτεροι τυγ- 
χάνουσιν εχ^οντες, ούχ υπακουόντων δ εκείνων 
εΐ μη και την άρχην της θαλάττης άφησουσιν, 
οϋτως άπεστησαν. 

1 XXXIII, Μτ^ν'α? μεν οΰν ΐσως τετταρας 8ι- 
εμεινεν η τών τετρακοσίων πολιτεία, και ηρζεν εζ 
αυτών Μ,νασίλοχος ^ίμηνον επι θεοπόμπου άρχον- 
τος, δς^ VP^^ τους επιλοίπους 8εκα μήνας, 
ήττηθεντες δε τη περί Ύψετρίαν ναυ/χ^αχια και 
της Έίύβοίας απόστασης δλης πλην Ω,ρεοΰ, 
χαλεπώς ενεγκόντες επι τη συμφορά μάλιστα τών 
προγεγενημενων {πλείω γαρ εκ της Έιύβοιας η 
της 'Αττικής ετύγχανον ωφελούμενοι) κατελυσαν 
τους τετρακοσίους καΐ τα πράγματα παρε8ωκαν 
τοις πεντακισχιλίοις τοις εκ τών οπλών, φηφισα- 

2 μενοι μηΒεμίαν άρχην efvai μισθοφόρον. αιτιω- 
τατοι δ' εγενοντο της καταλχ)σεως Αριστοκράτης 
και Θηραμένης, ου συναρεσκό μενοι τοις υπο τών 
τετρακοσίων γιγνομενοις' άπαντα γαρ δι αυτών 
επραττον, ούΒεν επαναφεροντες τοις πεντακι- 
σχιλίοις. Βοκοΰσι Βε καλώς πολιτευθηναι κατά 
τούτους τους καιρούς, πολέμου τε καθεστώτος 
και εκ τών οπλών της πολιτείας ούσης. 

1 τ£ supplevit Hude. * 5s supplevit Kenyon. 

96 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xxxii. 2— xxxiii. 2 

movers having been Peisander, Antiphon and Thera- 
menes, men of good birth and of distinguished reputa- 
tion for wisdom and judgement. But when this con- 3 
stitution had been set up, the Five Thousand were 
only nominally chosen, but the Four Hundred with 
the aid of the Ten with autocratic powers " entered 
the Council-chamber and governed the state. They 
also sent envoys to the Lacedaemonians and proposed 
to conclude peace on terms of uti possidetis ; but the 
Lacedaemonians would not consent unless Athens 
would also relinquish the empire of the sea, so that 
they finally abandoned the project. 

XXXIII. The constitution of the Four Hundred 1 
lasted perhaps four months, for two of which Mnesi- 
lochus was archon, in the year of the archonship of 411b.c. 
Theopompus, who received the office for the remain- 
ing ten months. But when they had been worsted 
in the naval battle ofFEretria and the whole of Euboea 
except Oreum had revolted, they were more dis- 
tressed at the misfortune than by any previous dis- 
aster (for they were actually getting more support 
from Euboea than from Attica), and they dissolved 
the Four Hundred and handed over affairs to the Five 
Thousand that were on the armed roll,^ having passed 
by vote a resolution that no office should receive pay. 
The persons chiefly responsible for the dissolution 2 
were Aristocrates and Theramenes, who disapproved 
of the proceedings of the Four Hundred ; for they 
did everything on their own responsibility and re- 
ferred nothing to the Five Thousand. But Athens 
seems to have been well governed during this 
critical period, although a war was going on and the 
government was confined to the armed roll. 

" The Ten Generals, see xxxi. 2. ** Cf. iv. 2, xxix. 5. 
Η . 97 



ARISTOTLE 

1 XXXIV. Τούτου? μ^ν οΰν αφείλ^το την ττολι- 
Teiav 6 8ημος δια τάχους' eret δ' ^β^όμω^ /χετα 
TTjv των τετρακοσίων κατάλνσιν , errl Καλλιου τον 
^Αγγζληθεν άρχοντος, γενομένης της εν Άργι- 
νούσαίς ναυμαχία?, ττρώτον μεν τους 8εκα στρατη- 
γούς τους τη ναυ/χαγια νικώντας συνέβη κριθηναι 
/χια χειροτονία πάντας, τους μεν ούΒε συνναυμαχη- 
σαντας, τους δ' εττ' αλλότριας νεως σωθεντας, 
εζαττατηθ εντός του ^ημου δια. του? τταροργίσαντας• 
eVeiTa βουλομενων Αακε^αιμονίων εκ Αεκελειας 
αττιεναι^ εφ* οΐς εχουσιν εκάτεροι καΐ είρηνην 
άγειν^ ενιοι μεν εσπούΒαζον, το δε ττληθος ούχ 
ύττηκουσεν , εζαπατηθεντες ύττο Κ^λεοφώντος, ος 
εκώλυσε γενέσθαι την εΙρηνην ελθών εις την 
εκκλησίαν μεθύων και θώρακα εν8ε8υκώς, ου 
φάσκων επιτρεφειν εάν μη ττάσας άφιώσι Αακε^αι- 

2 μόνιοι τάς πόλεις, ου χρησάμενοι δε καλώς τότε 
τοις πράγμασι /χετ' ου πολύν χρόνον έγνωσαν την 
άμαρτίαν. τω γάρ ύστερον ετει επ* ^Αλεζίου 
άρχοντος ητύχησαν την εν Atyo? ποταμοΐς ι^αυ/χα- 
χίαν, εζ ης συνέβη κύριον γενόμενον της πόλεως 
Αύσαν^ρον καταστησαι τους τριάκοντα τρόπω 

3 τοιώδε• της ειρήνης γενομένης αύτοΐς εφ* ω τε 
πολιτεύσονται την πάτριον πολιτείαν, οι μεν 
δημοτικοί διασωζεΐΓ επειρώντο τον ^ήμον, τών δε 

^ 'έ κτ φ edd, * Mayor: avievai cod. 

■ ^φ' oh . . . a7etc cum schol. Wilamowitz-Kaibel : xau- 
φοΐίΐχονσιΐΊρηνην(κατεροια,'γ(ΐν Cod. 

" ' wSixth ' (in Greek arithmetic ' seventh ') is a mistake for 
' fifth ' (Greek ' sixth ') : the Four Hundred fell in 41 1 , Callias 
was archon 406 b.c. 

* i.e. with his courage artificially stimulated and with 
armour to protect him against assassination (unless we adopt 

98 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xxxiv. 1-3 

XXXIV. So the people speedily took the govern- 1 
jnent out of these men's hands ; and in the sixth " 
year after the dissolution of the Four Hundred, in the 
archonship of Callias of the deme of Angele, after the 
occurrence of the naval battle at Arginusae, it came 
about first that the ten Generals to whom victory 
in the naval battle was due were all condemned by a 
single vote, some of them not even having been in the 
engagement at all and the others having escaped on 
board a ship not their own, the people being com- 
pletely deceived through the persons who provoked 
their anger ; and then, when the Lacedaemonians 
were willing to evacuate Decelea on terms of both 
parties retaining what they held, and to make peace, 
though some persons were eager to accept, yet the 
mass of the people refused to consent, being com- 
pletely deceived by Cleophon, who prevented the 
conclusion of peace by coming into the assembly, drunk 
and wearing a corslet,^ and protesting that he would 
not allow it unless the Lacedaemonians surrendered 
all the cities." But though on this occasion they had 2 
managed their affairs ill, they realized their mistake 
not long afterwards. For in the next year, when 405 b.c. 
Alexius was Archon, they met with the disaster in 
the naval battle of Aegospotami which resulted in 
the city's falling into the hands of Lysander, who 
set up the Thirty in the following way. The peace 3 
having been concluded on terms of their carrying on 
the government according to the ancestral constitu- 
tion, the popular party endeavoured to preserve the 

the conjecture that μεθύωι> και θώρακα evdedvKws is a mistaken 
paraphrase of some original record giving θώρακα ΐχων in 
the slang sense of ' well primed with liquor,' cf, Aristoph. 
Ran. 1504). 

* i.e. those that they had taken in the war. 

99 



ARISTOTLE 

γνωρίμων ol μ^ν iv ταΐς eraipeiai? οντ€ς, και των 
φυγάδων οΐ μ€τά την ζίρηνην ι<ατ€λθόντ€ς , ολιγ- 
αρχίας βττ^θύμουν, οι 8' iv iratpeia μβν ouSe/Mta 
συγκαθ€στώτ€ς άλλως δε 8οκοΰντ€ς ούΒβνος ετη- 
λείπβσθαι των πολιτών την ττάτριον πολιτ€ΐαν 
εζητουν ων ην μεν και ^Αρχΐνος καΙ "Ανυτος 
καΐ Ιίλεηοφών καΐ Φορμίσιος και έτεροι πολλοί, 
προειστηκει 8ε μάλιστα Θηραμένης. ΑυσάνΒρον 
8ε προσθεμένου τοις όλιγαρχικοΐς καταπλαγείς ο 
8ημος ηναγκάσθη χειροτονεΐν την όλιγαρχιαν. 
έγραφε 8ε το φηφισμα ΑρακοντίΒης Αφι8ναΐος. 

1 XXXV. Ot μεν οΰν τριάκοντα τούτον τον 
τρόπον κατέστησαν επι ΐΙυθο8ώρου άρχοντος, 
γενόμενοι 8ε κύριοι της πόλεως τα μεν άλλα τα 
8όζαντα περί της πολιτείας παρεώρων, πεντα- 
κόσιους 8ε βουλευτάς και τάς άλλα? αρχάς κατα- 
στησαντες εκ προκρίτων εκ των χιλιωΐ'/ και 
προσελόμενοι σφίσιν αύτοΐς του ΙΙειραιεως άρ- 
χοντας 8εκα και του 8εσμωτηρίου φύλακας εν8εκα 
και μαστιγοφόρους τριακόσιους ύπηρετας κατεΐχον 

2 την πόλιν δι' εαυτών, το μεν οΰν πρώτον μέτριοι 
τοις πολίταις ήσαν και προσεποιοΰντο 8ιοικεΐν^ την 
πάτριον πολιτείαν , και τους τ' 'Έφιάλτου και 

{/ * Αρχεστράτου νόμους τους περί τών ^Αρεοπαγιτών 
καθεΐλον εζ 'Αρείου πάγου καί τών Έόλωνος 
θεσμών όσοι 8ιαμφισβητησεις εΐχον, και το κΰρος 
ο ην εν τοις 8ικασταΐς κατελυσαν, ως επανορ- 

1 {(Κ των] χιλίων Herwerden : [έκ των χιλίων] Rutherford : 
φνλων pro χιλίων Hude. 
^ διώκ€ΐν edd. 

100 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xxxiv. 3— xxxv. 2 

democracy, but the notables who belonged to the 
Comradeships and those exiles who had returned 
after the peace were eager for oligarchy, while those 
notables who were not members of any Comradeship 
but who otherwise were inferior in reputation to none 
of the citizens were aiming at the ancestral constitu- 
tion ; members of this party were Archinus, Anytus, 
Cleitophon and Phormisius, while its chief leader was 
Theramenes. And Λvhen Lysander sided with the 
oligarchical party, the people were cowed and were 
forced to vote for the oligarchy. The motion was 
proposed by Dracontides of Aphidna. 

XXXV. So in this manner the Thirty were estab- i 
lished, in the archonship of Pythodorus. Having be- 404 b.c. 
come masters of the state they neglected most of the 
measures that had been resolved on in regard to the 
constitution, but appointed five hundred Councillors 
and the other offices from among persons previously 
selected from the Thousand," and also chose for them- 
selves ten governors of Peiraeus, eleven guardians 
of the prison, and three hundred retainers carrying 
whips, and so kept the state in their own hands. At 2 
first, then, they were moderate towards the citizens 
and pretended to be administering the ancestral form 
of constitution, and they removed from the Areopagus 
the laws of Ephialtes and Archestratus ^ about the 
Areopagites, and also such of the ordinances of Solon 
as were of doubtful purport, and abolished the 
sovereignty vested in the jurymen, claiming to be 
rectifying the constitution and removing its un- 

" i.e. from the knights ; but the text can hardly be correct, 
and may be emended to give 'from among a thousand 
persons previously selected.' 

* Probably a supporter of Ephialtes, for whose legislation 
see ch. xxv. 

101 



ARISTOTLE 

θοΰι^τ€ς και ποίονντ€ς άναμφισβητητον την ττολι- 
reiav, οίον Trepl του δούναι τα εαυτού ω άν ideXrj 
κύριον 7τοίήσαντ€ς καθάπαζ, τάς Se προσονσας 
δυσκολία? " iav μη /χανιών η γηρως (eveKaY η 
γυναίκΐ ττιθόμ^νος ' ' άφβΐλον όπως μη η τοις 
συκοφάνταις ^φο^ος• ομοίως δε τοΰτ' έ'δρων και 

3 ετΓΐ των άλλων, κατ' αρχάς /xev ονν ταυτ' Ιττοίονν 
και τους συκοφάντας και τους τω Βημω ττρος 
χάριν όμιλοΰντας παρά το βελτιστον και κακοπραγ- 
μονας οντάς και πονηρούς άνηρουν, εφ οΐς έχαιρεν^ 
η πόλις γιγνομίνοις, ηγούμενοι του βέλτιστου 

4 χάριν ποιεΐν αυτούς, επει δε την πάλιν εγκρατε- 
στερον εσχον, ούΒενός άπείχοντο των πολιτών, 
αλλ' άπεκτειναν τους και ταΐς ούσίαις και τω 
γένει και τοις ά^ιώ/χασιν προέχοντας, ύπεξαιρού- 
μενοί τε τον φόβον και βουλόμενοι τας ουσίας 
Βιαρπάζειν και χρόνου Βιαπεσόντος βραχεος ουκ 
ελάττους άνηρήκεσαν η χίλιους πεντακόσιους. 

1 ΧΧΧνί. Ού'τω? δε της πόλεως ύποφερομενης 
Θηραμένης άγανακτών επΙ τοις γινομενοις της 
μεν ασέλγεια? αύτοΐς παρηνει τταυσασ^αι μετα- 
δουναι δε των πραγμάτων τοις βελτίστοις. οι δε 
πρώτον^ εναντιωθεντες, επει Βιεσπάρησαν οι λόγοι 
προς το πλήθος και προς τον θηραμενην οίκείως 
είχον οΐ πολλοί, φοβηθεντες μη προστάτης γενό- 
μενος τοΰ Βημου κατάλυση την Βυναστειαν κατα- 
λε'γουσιν των πολιτών τρισχιλιους* ώς μετα- 

2 δώσοντε? της πολιτείας. Θηραμένης δε ττάλιν 

^ ^€κα Ύ7ΐρω$ Wyse : •^/ηρων cod. 

* SidgWJck (cf. xxxiv. 1 το δέ πληθοί ούχ νπ-ήκονσεν, ίξαττατη- 
eivres) : exaipov cod. 

^ edd. : ττρωτοί cod. * edd. : δισχιλιου; cod. 

102 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xxxv. 2— xxxvi. 2 

certainties : for example, in regard to the bestowal 
of one's property on whomsoever one wishes, making 
the single act of donation valid absolutely, while 
they removed the tiresome qualifications ' save when 
in consequence of insanity or of old age, or under the 
influence of a woman,' in order that there might be 
no opening for blackmailers ; and similarly they did 
this in the other matters as well. At the outset, there- 3 
fore, they were engaged in these matters, and in 
removing the blackmailers and the persons who con- 
sorted undesirably with the people to curry favour 
and were evil-doers and scoundrels ; and the state 
was delighted at these measures, thinking that they 
were acting with the best intentions. But when 4 
they got a firmer hold on the state, they kept their 
hands off none of the citizens, but put to death those 
of outstanding wealth or birth or reputation, in- 
tending to put that source of danger out of the way, 
and also desiring to plunder their estates ; and by 
the end of a brief interval of time they had made 
away with not less than fifteen hundred. 

XXXVI. While the state was thus being under- 1 
mined, Theramenes, resenting what was taking place, 
kept exhorting them to cease from their wantonness 
and to admit the best classes to a share in affairs. 
At first they opposed him, but since these proposals 
became disseminated among the multitude, and the 
general public were well disposed towards Thera- 
menes, they grew afraid that he might become head 
of the People and put down the oligarchy, and so 
they enrolled three thousand of the citizens with the 
intention of giving them a share in the government. 
But Theramenes again criticized this procedure also, 2 



103 



I 



ARISTOTLE 

βττιτιμα και τούτοις, ττρώτον μ^ν δτι βουλομβνοί 
μ€ταΒοΰναι τοις επιεικεσι τρίσχιλίοις μόνοις μβτα- 
διδοασι, ώς iv τοντω τω πλήθ^ι της αρετής 
ώρισμ€νης, βπ€ΐθ' οτι δυο τα εναντιώτατα ττοιοΰσιν, 
βίαων τ€ την αρχήν καΐ των αρχομένων ηττω 
κατασκβυάζοντβς . οι δε τούτων μβν ώλιγωρησαν, 
τον δε κατάλογον των τρισχιλίων ττολνν μεν 
χρόνον νττερεβάλλοντο^ και τταρ' αύτοΐς Ιφύλαττον 
τους εγνωσμένους, ore δε και ho^eiev αύτοΐς 
€κφ4ρ€ΐν τους μεν εξηλβιφον των εγγεγραμ- 
μένων'^ τους δ' άντενεγραφον των έζωθεν. 
1 XXXVII. "Ηδ-)7 δε του χειμώνος ενεστώτας, 
καταλαβόντος Θρασυβούλου μετά των φυγάδων 
Φυλην και κατά την στρατιάν ην έξηγαγον οι 
τριάκοντα κακώς αποχωρήσαντες , έγνωσαν τών 
μεν άλλων τα οττλα παρελέσθαι Θηραμένην δε 
8ιαφθεΐραι τόνδε τρόπον, νόμους είσήνεγκαν εις 
την βουλην δυο κελεύοντες έπιχειροτονεΐν, ων ο 
μεν εις αυτοκράτορας έττοίει τους τριάκοντα τών 
πολιτών άποκτεΐναι τους μη του καταλόγου μετ- 
έχοντας τών τρισχιλιων, 6 δ' έτερος εκωλυε 
κοινωνεΐν της παρούσης πολιτείας όσοι τυγχα- 
νουσιν το εν Ήετιωΐ'εια, τείχος κατασκάφαντες η 
τοις τετρακοσίοις εναντίον τι πράζαντες τοΐς^ 
κατασκεύασασι την προτέραν όλιγαρχιαν ων ετυγ- 
χανεν αμφοτέρων κεκοινωνηκώς ό Θηραμένης, 
ώστε συνέβαινεν έπικυρωθέντων τών νόμων εξω 

^ ΰτΓΐρ€βάλ\οντο <,ίκφέρΐΐν'ρ Gertz. 

2 ίγ^ί'^ραμμένων Herwerden : -^("γραμμ^νων cod. 

^ τ6ΐ% Herwerden : T/rots cod. 

104 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xxxvi. 2— xxxvii. 1 

first on the ground that although willing to share the 
government with the respectable they were only 
giving a share to three thousand, as though moral 
worth were limited to that number, and next because 
they were doing two absolutely incompatible things, 
making their rule one of force and at the same time 
weaker than those they ruled. But they despised 
these remonstrances, and for a long time went on 
postponing the roll of the Three Thousand and keep- 
ing to themselves those on whom they had decided, 
and even on occasions when they thought fit to 
publish it they made a practice of erasing some of the 
names enrolled and writing in others instead from 
among those outside the γοΙΙ.** 

XXXVII. Winter had already set in, when Thrasy- 1 
bulus with the exiles occupied Phyle, and things went 
badly with the Thirty on the expedition that they 
led out against them ; so they decided to disarm the 
others and to destroy Theramenes in the following 
way. They introduced two laws into the Council, 
with orders to pass them ; one was to give the Thirty 
absolute powers to execute any citizens not members 
of the roll of Three Thousand, and the other pro- 
hibited admission to citizenship under the present 
constitution for all who had actually taken part in the 
demolition of the fort ^ on Eetionea, or in any act of 
opposition to the Four Hundred who had instituted 
the former oligarchy ; in both of these proceedings 
Theramenes had in fact participated, so that the 
result was that when the laws had been ratified he 

" So that no one would be sure of being on it. 

' A projecting mole on the northern side of Peiraeus 
harbour, commanding the entrance. It had been begun, 
but was then demolished at the instigation of Theramenes 
(Thuc. viii. 90-92). 

105 



ARISTOTLE 

τ€ γίγνεσθαι της ττοΧιτβίας αύτον και του? τριά- 
2 κοντά κυρίους elvai θανατοΰντας . άναιρ^θίντος δε 
Θηραμένους τά τ€ όπλα τταρβίλοντο πάντων πλην 
των τρισχίλίων καΐ iv τοΐς άλλοι? ττολυ προς 
ωμότητα και πονηρίαν βπ^Βοσαν. πρβσβζΐς δε^ 
πέμφαντες eiV Λακεδαί/χονα του τε Θηραμένους 
κατηγορούν και βοηθ^ΐν αύτοΐς ηζίουν ων άκού- 
σαντ€ς οΐ Λακεδαι/χόνιοι Ιίαλλίβίον άττε'στειλαι^ 
άρμοστην και στρατιώτας ως επτακόσιους , at την 
άκρόπολιν ελθόντβς ^φρουρούν. 

1 XXXVIII. Μετά δε ταύτα καταλαβόντων των 
άπο Φυλής την Μ,ουνιχίαν και νικησάντων μάχη 
τους μ€τά των τριάκοντα βοηθησαντας, εττανα- 
■χωρησαντες μετά τον κίν^υνον οι εκ τοΰ άστεως 
και συναθροισθεντες ει? την άγοράν τη ύστεραία, 
τους μεν τριάκοντα κατελυσαν αίροΰνται δε δέκα 
των πολιτών αυτοκράτορας επι την τοΰ πολέμου 
κατάλυσιν. οι δε παραλαβόντες την άρχην εφ*^ 
οΐς μεν ηρεθησαν ουκ επραττον, επεμπον δ ει? 
Λακεδαί)αονα βοηθειαν μεταπεμπόμενοι και χρη- 

2 ματα δανειζόμενοι, χαλεπώς δε φερόντων επι 
τούτοις των εν τη πολιτεία, φοβούμενοι μη κατα- 
λυθώσιν της άρχης και βουλόμενοι καταπληζαι 
τους άλλους {δπερ εγενετο) , συλλαβόντες Αημ- 
άρετον ούΒενος οντά δεύτερον των πολιτών άπ- 
εκτειναν, και τά πράγματα βεβαίως^ ^ι^χον, συναγω- 
νιζόμενου Καλλι^ιου τε και τών ΪΙελοποννησιων 
των παρόντων και προς τούτοις ενιων τών €V 
τοΐς ίππεΰσι• τούτων γάρ τινε? μάλιστα τών 
πολιτών εσπούΒαζον μη κατελθεΐν τους απο 

^ δ^ supplevit Mayor. 
^ έφ' edd. : ev cod. '^ βιαίως Mayor. 

106 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xxxvii. 1— xxxvni. 2 

became outside the constitution and the Thirty had 
authority to put him to death. Theramenes having 2 
been put out of the way, they disarmed everybody 
except the Three Thousand, and in the rest of their 
proceedings went much further in the direction of 
cruelty and rascality. And they sent ambassadors 
to Sparta to denounce Theramenes and call upon 
the Spartans to assist them ; and when the Spartans 
heard this message they dispatched Callibius as 
governor and about seven hundred troops, who came 
and garrisoned the Acropolis. 

XXXVIII. After this the refugees in Phyle took 1 
Munichia, and defeated in action the force that came 
with the Thirty to the defence ; and the force from 
the city, on their return after this dangerous ex- 
pedition, held a meeting in the market-place the day 
after, deposed the Thirty, and elected ten of the 
citizens as plenipotentiaries to bring the war to a 
conclusion. These, however, having obtained this 
office did not proceed to do the things for the purpose 
of which they had been elected, but sent to Sparta 
to procure help and to borrow funds. But this was 2 
resented by those within the constitution, and the 
Ten, in their fear of being deposed from office and 
their desire to terrify the others (which they suc- 
ceeded in doing), arrested one of the most leading 
citizens, Demaretus, and put him to death, and kept 
a firm hold upon affairs, while Callibius and the 
Peloponnesians at Athens actively supported them, 
and so did some members of the corps of Knights as 
well ; for some of the Knights were the most eager 
of all the citizens that the men at Phyle should not 

107 



ARISTOTLE 

3 Φυλ-^?. o)5 δ' ol τον Retpatea και την Μοννυχίαν 
€χοντ€ς άποστάντος άπαντος του Βημου ττρος 
αυτούς^ €π€κράτουν τω ττολβμω, τότε καταλυσαν- 
Tes• τους δέκα τους ττρώτους αίρζθίντας , άλλους 
βΐλοντο SeKa τους βέλτιστους etvai ^οκοΰντας, €φ 
ων συνέβ-η καΐ τάς διαλύσει? yeveadai και κατ- 
ελθεΐν τον δη/χον, συναγωνιζόμενων και προθυμου- 
μενων τούτων, προει,στηκβσαν δ' αύτων μάλιστα 
'Ρίνων τ€ 6 Παιαι^ιεύ? και Φάυλλος 6 ^ΑχερΒονσιος' 
οΰτοί γαρ ττρίν τε Παυσαι^ιαν^ άφικεσθαι δι- 
επβμποντο προς τους iv Heipaiei και άφικομενου 

4 συνβσπού^ασαν την κάθο^ον. €πι πέρας γαρ ηγαγε 
την είρηνην και τα? διαλύσει? Παυσανία? ό των 
ΑακεΒαιμονίων ^ασιλεύ? μετά των δέκα διαλ- 
λακτών των ύστερον άφικομενων εκ Λακεδαι- 
μονος ους αυτό? εσττουδασεν ελθεΐν. οι δε 77ερι 
τον 'ΡΙνωνα διά τε την εΰνοιαν την ει? τον Βημον 
επηνεθησαν, καΐ λαβόντες την επιμελείας εν ολιγ- 
αρχία τάς εύθύνας εδοσαν εν δημοκρατία, και 
ούδει? ουδει^ ενεκαλεσεν αυτοί? ούτε των εν αστει 
μεινάντων ούτε των εκ Υϊειραιεως κατελθ όντων, 
άλλα διά ταΰτα καΐ στρατηγός ευθύς ηρεθη 'Ρίνων. 

ι XXXIX. ^Έιγενοντο δ' αί διαλύσει? εττ' Ευ- 
κλει'δοι» άρχοντος κατά τάς συνθήκας τάσδε. τους 
βουλομενους ^Αθηναίων των εν αστει μεινάντων 
εζοικεΐν εχειν Ελευσίνα επίτιμους οντάς και 
κυρίους και αυτοκράτορας εαυτών και τα αυτών 

2 καρπουμενους . το δ' ίερον είναι κοινον αμφο- 

^ Blass : αντην cod. 
2 re II αυσαί-ίο)/ Richards: 7?7rai'<ra»'ta»'re cod. 

108 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xxxviii. 3— xxxix. 2 

return. But the party holding Peiraeus and Munichia, 3 
ποΛν that the whole of the people had come over to 
their side, began to get the upper hand in the war, 
and so finally they deposed the ten who had been 
elected first, and chose ten others whom they thought 
to be the best men, and while these were in power 
there took place the reconciliation and the return of 
the people, with the active and eager support of the 
ten. The most prominent among them were Rhinon 
of the Paeanian deme and Phayllus of the Acherdusian ; 
for these men had repeatedly gone on missions to 
the men at Peiraeus before Pausanias's arrival, and 
after his arrival they zealously supported the return. 
For it was Pausanias the king of the Lacedaemonians 4 
who brought the peace and reconciliation to fulfilment, 
with the aid of the ten mediators who later an-ived 
from Sparta, and whose coming was due to the efforts 
of the king himself. Rhinon and his companions 
were commended for their goodwill towards the 
people, and having been appointed to superintend 
these negotiations under an oligarchy they gave 
in their accounts under a democracy, and no one 
made any charge against them whatever, whether of 
those who had remained in the city or of those who 
had returned from Peiraeus ; indeed, on the contrary 
Rhinon was immediately elected general because of 
his conduct in this office. 

XXXIX. The reconciliation took place in the 1 
archonship of Eucleides on the following terms : 403 b.c. 
' That those of the Athenians who have remained 
in the city that desire to emigrate do have Eleusis, 
retaining their full rights, and having sovereignty and 
self-government, and enjoying their own revenues. 
And that the temple be the common property of both 2 

109 



ARISTOTLE 

τίρων, €πιμ€λ€Ϊσθαυ Be Κήρυκας καΐ ΈνμολπίΒας 
κατά, τα ττάτρια. μτ] i^etvai he /χτ^τε τοΙς Ελευ- 
aivoOev els ro άστυ ju^re rot? e/c τοΰ άστεω? 
Έλευσίναδ' elaievai πλην μυστηρίοις ίκατίρους. 
συvτeλeΐv he άττο των ττροσίόντων els το συμ- 

3 μαχικον καθάπερ τους άλλους 'Αθηναίους, eav δε 
τιν€ς των άτηόντων οΐκίαν λαμβάνωσι,ν Έλβυσΐνι, 
συμπe^θeιv τον κeκτημevov^ eav he μη συμ- 
^αινωσιν άλλήλοις τιμητάς eXeadai τpeΐς €κάτ€ρον,^ 
καΐ ηντιν' αν οΰτοι τάζωσι τιμήν λαμβάν€ίν. 
*Έιλ€υσίνίων he auvoLKelv ους αν ουτοι^ βούλωνται. 

4 τήν δ' άττογραφήν elvat τοις βουλομ4νοις e^oiKetv, 
τοις μ€ν €πώημοΰσίν αφ' ης αν ομόσωσιν τους 
όρκους heKa ήμepώv, την δ' έζοίκησιν eiKoai, τοις 
δ' ά■πohημoΰσιv εττειδάν €πώημήσωσιν κατά ταύτα. 

δ μή e^eZvai he άρχειν μηheμίav αρχήν των ev τω 
αστει τον Έλευσΐνι κατοικοΰντα πρΙν άττογράφηται 
πάλιν ev τω άστει κατοικ€Ϊν. τάς he hίκaς τοΰ 
φόνου etvat κατά τα πάτρια, el τις τίνα auro^etp 

6 άπeκτeιvev ή eτpωσev.^ των he παρ€ληλυθότων 
μηhevL προς μηΒ^να μνησικακ€Ϊν e^eZvai πλην προς 
τους τριάκοντα και τους heKa και τους evheKa 
καΐ τους τοΰ Ileιpaιeως άρζαντας, μηhe προς 
τούτους eav hιhώσιv eύθύvaς. eύθύvaς he hoΰvaι 
τους μεν ev Heipatet άρζαντας ev τοις ev Ueipaiel, 
τους δ' ev τω άστ€ΐ ev τοις* τά τιμήματα παρ- 

^ ίκάτβρον Bury : (κατ€ρωρ cod. 
* αύτοί Richards. 
* et τΐί . . . ίτρωσ(ν Blass, partim ex aliis : valde confusa cod. 
* iv Totj <ev τφ άστ€ΐ> ? Kenyon. 



" See Ivii. 1. 
* Perhaps ' in the city ' should be inserted after ' property, 

110 






ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xxxix. 2-6 

sections, and be under the superintendence of thie 
Heralds and the Eumolpidae " according to the an- 
cestral practice. But that it be not lawful for those 
at Eleusis to go into the city, nor for those in the city 
to go to Eleusis, except in either case at a celebration 
of the Mysteries. And that they contribute from 
their revenues like the other Athenians to the fund 
for the common defence. And that any of those who 3 
go away that take a house at Eleusis be helped to 
obtain the consent of the owner ; and if they can- 
not come to terms with one another, each party to 
choose three valuers, and to accept whatever price 
these valuers assess. And that of the people of 
Eleusis those whom the settlers may be willing to 
allow do dwell in the place with them. And that the 4 
registration of those that Avish to migrate be, for those 
who are in the country, within ten days of the date 
of their swearing the oaths of peace, and their 
migration within twenty days, and for those abroad 
similarly from the date when they return. And that 5 
it be not permitted for anyone residing at Eleusis 
to hold any of the offices in the city until he removes 
himself from the roll in order to reside again in the 
city. And that trials for homicide be in accordance 
with the ancestral ordinances, if a man has killed or 
wounded another with his own hand. And that there 6 
be a universal amnesty for past events, covering 
everybody except the Thirty, the Ten, the Eleven, 
and those that have been governors of Peiraeus, and 
that these also be covered by the amnesty if they 
render account. And that those who had been 
governors in Peiraeus render account before the 
courts held in Peiraeus, but those in the city before a 
court of persons that can produce ratable property ^ ; 

111 



ARISTOTLE 

€χομ€νοίς• eW* οϋτως i^oiKciv τους μη^ εθίλοντας. 
τα δε χρήματα α iSaveiaavTO els τον ττόλβμον 
€κατ€ρονς απο^οΰναι χωρίς. 

1 XL, Τενομενων 8e τοιούτων των διαλύσεων, 
καΐ φοβούμενων όσοι μετά. των τριάκοντα συνεττολε- 
μησαν, και πολλών μεν επινοονντων εζοικεΖν ανα- 
βαλλόμενων δε ΤΎ)ν άπογραφην'^ εΙς τάς εσχάτα? 
ημέρας, όπερ εΐώθασιν ποιείν άπαντες, ^Αρχΐνος 
συνώών το πλήθος καΐ βουλόμενος κατασχεΐν αυ- 
τούς ύφεΐλε τάς υπολοίπους ημέρας της απογραφής, 
ώστε συναναγκασθηναι μενειν πολλούς άκοντας 

2 εως εθάρρησαν. /cat δοκεί τοΰτό τε πολιτεύσασθαι 
καλώς Άρχΐνος, καΐ μετά ταΰτα γραφάμενος το 
φηφισμα το Θρασυβούλου παρανόμων, εν ω μετ- 
εδιδου της πολιτείας πάσι τοις εκ ΧΥειραιεως συγ- 
κατελθοΰσι, ων ενιοι φανερώς ήσαν δούλοι, και 
τρίτον, επεί τι? ηρζατο τών κατεληλυθότων μνησι- 
κακεΐν, (XTTayaycut' τούτον επι την βουλην και 
πείσας άκριτον άποκτεΐναι, λέγων οτι νυν Βειζουσιν 
εΐ βούλονται την Βημοκρατίαν σωζειν και τοις 
ορκοις εμμενειν άφεντας μεν γαρ τούτον προτρε- 
φειν και τους άλλους, εάν δ' άνελωσιν παράδειγμα 
ποιησειν απασιν. όπερ και συνεπεσεν αποθανόν- 
τος γάρ ού^εις πώποτε ύστερον εμνησικάκησεν, 
άλλα Βοκοΰσιν κάλλιστα 8η και πολιτικώτατα 
απάντων και ΙΒία και κοινή χρησασθαι ταΓ? προ- 

3 γεγενημεναις συμφοραΐς• ου γάρ μόνον τα? ττερι 



^ TOVS μη Blass : tovs δ cod. (δ supra lineam), 
* Jackson : ανα-^ραψην cod. 



112 






ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xxxix. 6— xl. 3 

or that those who will not render account on these 
terms do migrate.'* And that each party separately 
repay their loans contracted for the war.' 

• XL. The reconciliation having been made on these 1 
terms, all those who had fought on the side of the 
Thirty were alarmed, and many intended to migrate, 
but put off their registration to the latest days, 
as everybody usually does ; so Archinus perceiving 
their numbers and wishing to retain them, cancelled 
the remainder of the days allowed for registration, 
so that many should be jointly compelled to stay 
against their will until they recovered courage. This 2 
seems to have been a statesmanlike act of Archinus ; 
as was also later his indicting as unconstitutional 
the decree of Thrasybulus admitting to citizenship 
all those who had come back together from Peiraeus, 
some of whom were clearly slaves ; and his third act 
of statesmanship was that when somebody began 
to stir up grudges against the returned citizens, he 
arraigned him before the Council and persuaded it 
to execute him without trial, saying that this was 
the moment for them to show if they wished to save 
the democracy and keep their oaths ; for by letting 
this man off they would incite the others too, but if 
they put him out of the way they would make him 
an example to everybody. And this is what actually 
occurred ; for never since he was put to death has 
anybody broken the amnesty, but the Athenians 

I appear both in private and public to have behaved 
towards the past disasters in the most completely 
honourable and statesmanlike manner of any people 
in history ; for they not only blotted out recrimina- 3 

" A variant reading («^' οϋτω^ έ^οικείν rovs (e^Xovras) gives 
' then those who wish are to emigrate on these terms.' 

I 113 



ARISTOTLE 

των ττροτίρων αίτιας e^rjXeiipav άλλα και τα 
χρήματα Λακεδαι/χονίοι? ο. οΐ τριάκοντα προς τον 
πόλεμον ζλαβον άττί^οσαν Koivrj, KeXevovaojv των 
συνθηκών ίκατίρονς άττο^ώόναι χωρίς, τους τ εκ 
τοΰ άστεως καΐ τους Ικ του Iletpateajs, ηγούμενοι 
τοντο πρώτον αρχειν heiv της ομονοίας' iv δε 
ταΐς άλλαυς πόλεσιν ονχ οΐον eVc προστιθέασιν 
τών οίκβίων οΐ 8ημοκρατησαντ€ς^ άλλα /cat την 
4 χώραν άνά8αστον ποίοϋσιν. ^ιελύθησαν oe και 
προς τους iv 'Έιλβυσΐνι κατοικήσαντας eret τρίτω 
μ€τά την εζοίκησιν €πΙ Ξεναινετου άρχοντος. 

1 XLI. Ταϋτα μ€ν οΰν iv τοις ύστερον συνέβη 
γενέσθαι καιροΐς, τότε δε κύριος 6 Βημος γενό- 
μενος τών πραγμάτων ενεστήσατο την νυν ούσαν 
πολιτείαν iπι ΥΙυθοΒώρου μεν άρχοντος .Βοκοΰντος 
δε δικαίως'' τοΰ 8ημου λαβείν την πολιτείαν δια 
το ποιησασθαι την κάθο8ον δι' αύτοΰ τον 8ημον. 

2 ην δε τών μεταβολών ενδέκατη τον αριθμόν αύτη . 
πρώτη μεν γαρ εγενετο η κατάστασις' τών εξ 
άρχης "Ιωνος και τών /χετ' αύτοΰ συνοικισαντων 
τότε γαρ πρώτον εις τάς τετταρας συνενεμηθησαν 
φυλάς και τους φυλοβασιλεας κατέστησαν . δευτέρα 
8ε, καΐ πρώτη μετά ταύτην εχουσά τι πολιτείας 
τάξις* ή iπl Θησέως γενομένη, μικρόν παρεγ- 
κλίνουσα της βασιλικής, μετά δε ταύτην η επι 
Αράκοντος, εν fj και νόμους ανέγραφαν πρώτον, 
τρίτη δ' η μετά την στάσιν η επι Έόλωνος, αφ 

^ οι δήμοι κρατήσαντΐ'ϊ edd. 

* δίκα/ου Richards. ' μετάστασίί alii legunt. 

* Wilamowitz : (χουσαιιτοΚιταανταξίν cod. 

» The Greek text is very doubtful, but apparently tin 
114 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xl. 3— xli. 2 

tions with regard to the past, but also pubUcly 
restored to the Spartans the funds that the Thirty 
had taken for the war, although the treaty ordered 
that the parties in the city and in Peiraeus were 
each to make restitution separately. The Athenians 
thought that they must take this as a first step to 
concord, whereas in the other states those who have 
set up democracy not only do not pay any more out 
of their own property but even make a redistribution 
of the land. They also made a reconciliation with 4 
those that had settled at Eleusis two years after the 
migration, in the archonship of Xenaenetus. 40i b.c. 

XLI. These events then came about in the follow- 1 
ing periods ; but at the date mentioned the people 
having become sovereign over affairs established 
the now existing constitution, in the archonship of 
Pythodorus, when the People's having accomplished 
its return by its own efforts made it appear just for 402 b.o. 
it to assume the government. In the list of reforms 2 
this was the eleventh in number. There first occurred 
the organization of the original constitution after the 
settlement at Athens of Ion and his companions, 
for it was then that the people were first divided into 
the four Tribes and appointed the Tribal Kings. The 
second constitution, and the first subsequent one 
that involved a constitutional point," was the reform 
that took place in the time of Theseus, which was a 
sUght divergence from the royal constitution. After 
that one came the reform in the time of Draco, in 
which a code of laws was first published. Third was 
the one that followed the civil disturbance in the time 
of Solon, from which democracy took its beginning. 

constitution in the time of Ion is taken as the starting-point, 
and the eleven revolutions follow. 

115 



ARISTOTLE 

'^S αρχή δημοκρατίας iyeveTO. τετάρτη δ' η eirl 
Πεισιστράτου τνραννίς. πβμπτη δ' η μ€τά την 
τών^ τυράννων κατάλυσιν η ¥>.λβίσθ€νονς, ^-ημοτι- 
κωτ€ρα της Σ^όλωνος. €κτη δ' η μ€τά τα. Μηδικά, 
της εζ 'Apeiou πάγου βουλής βπιστατούσης. 
ββΒόμη δε /cai^ μ€τά ταυτην ην Άριστειδτ^? μ^ν 
ύττε^αζβν ^Εφιάλτης δ' eneTeXeaev καταλυσας την 
Αρ€θ7ταγΐτι.ν βουλην, iv fj ττλβιστα συνίβη την 
ι / ττόΧιν δια του? δημαγωγούς άμαρτάνβιν δια' την 
της θαλάττης άρχην. ογΒόη δ' η των τετρακοσίων 
κατάστασις , καΐ μετά ταυτην ενάτη δε η δημοκρατία 
τταλιν. Βεκάτη δ' η των τριάκοντα και η των 
8eKa τυραννίς. ενδέκατη δ' η μετά την άπο 
Φυλής και εκ ΐίεψαιεως κάθοΒον άφ^ ης δια- 
γεγενηται μέχρι της νΰν, άει προσεπιλαμβάνουσα 
τω πληθει την εζουσίαν. απάντων γαρ αύτος 
αυτόν πεποίηκεν 6 ^ημος κύριον καΐ πάντα δι- 
οικείται φηφίσμασιν και 8ικαστηρίοις εν οΐς ό ^ημος 
εστίν 6 κρατών, και γαρ αϊ της βουλής κρίσεις 
εΙς τον Βημον εληλύθασιν. και τοΰτο δοκουσι 
ποιεΐν ορθώς• εύΒιαφθορώτεροι γαρ oAtyoi τών 
3 πολλών εισιν και κε'ρδει και χάρισιν. μισθοφόρον 
δ' εκκλησίαν το μεν πρώτον άπεγνωσαν ποιεΐν 
ου συλλεγομένων δ' εις την εκκλησίαν , άλλα ττολλα 
σοφιζομενων τών πρυτάνεων όπως προσιστηται το 
πλήθος προς την επικύρωσιν της χειροτονίας, 
πρώτον μεν Άγύρριος όβολον επόρισεν, μετά δε 

^ Τ7)ν τΰν Kenyon: τωρ cod. 

" και seel. Blass : ή coni. Mayor. 

' <καΙ> διά, κΛτά, δια . . . άρχην <θαρρήσασαρ> coni. edd. 

116 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xli. 2-3 

Fourth was the tyranny in the time of Peisistratus. 
Fifth the constitution of Cleisthenes, following the 
deposition of the tyrants, which was more democratic 
than the constitution of Solon. Sixth the reform 
after the Persian War, under the superintendence of 
the Council of Areopagus. Seventh followed the 
reform outlined by Aristeides but completed by 
Ephialtes when he put down the Areopagite Council, 
during which it came about because of the dem- 
agogues that the state made many mistakes, because 
of the empire of the sea." Eighth was the establish- 
ment of the Four Hundred, and after that, ninth, 
democracy again. Tenth was the tyranny of the 
Thirty and that of the Ten. Eleventh was the con- 
stitution established after the return from Phyle and 
from Peiraeus, from which date the constitution has 
continued down to its present form, constantly taking 
on additions to the power of the multitude. For the 
people has made itself master of everything, and 
administers everything by decrees and by jury- 
courts in which the people is the ruling power, for 
even the cases tried by the Council have come to the 
people. And they seem to act rightly in doing this, 
for a few are more easily corrupted by gain and by 
influence than the many. The proposal to introduce 3 
payment for attendance at the Assembly was on the -' 
first occasion rej ected ; but as people were not attend- 
ing the Assembly but the presidents kept contriving 
a number of devices to get the multitude to attend 
for the passing of the resolution by show of hands, 
first Agyrrhius introduced a fee of an obol, and after 

" Here again the exact text is doubtful. 

117 



ARISTOTLE 

τούτον 'ΥίρακλζίΒηζ 6 KAa^o/xevio? 6 Βασιλεύς 
€τηκαλούμ€νος Βιώβολον, πάλιν δ' ^Αγνρριος 
τριώβολον. 

1 XLII. "Έιχ€ΐ δ' η νυν κατάστασις της ττολιτεια? 
TovSe τον τρόπον. μ€Τ€χονσίν μβν της πολιτβίας 
οΐ Ιζ αμφοτέρων γβγονότβς αστών, εγγράφονται 
δ' ets" τους Βημότας οκτωκαί^βκα €τη γ€γονότ€ς. 
όταν δ' €γγράφωνται 8ιαφηφίζονται π€ρΙ αυτών 
όμόσαντ€ς οι ^ημόται, πρώτον μ€ν el 8οκοΰσι 
γβγονέναι την ηλικίαν την €Κ του νόμου, καν μη 
Βό^ωσι άπ€ρχονται πάλιν €ΐς τταΓδας", SeijTepov δ' 
ei ελ^ύθ^ρός βστι και γβγονβ κατά τους νόμους• 
67Γ6ΐτ' άν^ άποφηφίσωνται^ μη etvat έλζύθβρον, 
6 μέν έφίησιν βις το Βικαστηριον, οι δε δτ^^όται 
κατηγόρους αίροΰνται vreWe άνδρα? e^ αυτών, 
καν μ€ν μη 8όζη δικαίως ίγγράφ^σθαι, πωλξΐ 
τούτον η πόλις' iav δε νικηση, τοις ^ημόταις 

2 €πάναγκ€ς ^γγράφζίν. μετά δε ταΰτα Βοκιμάζβι 
τους έγγραφίντας η βουλή, καν τι? ^όζη νεώτερος 
οκτωκαίΒεκα ετών είναι, ζημιοΐ τους 8ημότας 
τους εγγράφαντας. επάν δε Βοκιμασθώσιν οι 
έφηβοι, συλλεγεντες οι πατέρες αυτών κατά φυλάς 
όμόσαντες αίροΰνται τρεις εκ τών φυλετών τών 
ύπερ τετταράκοντα ετη γεγονότων ους αν ηγώνται 
βέλτιστους ειΐ'αι και επιτη^ειοτάτους επιμελεΐσθαι 
τών εφήβων, €Κ δε τούτων 6 Βήμος ενα της φυλής 
εκάστ7)ς χειροτονεί σωφρονιστήν, και κοσμητήν εκ 

3 τών άλλων Αθηναίων επι πάντας. συλλαβόντες 
δ' οΰτοι τους εφήβους, πρώτον μεν τά Ιερά περι- 
ήλθαν, εΓτ' εις ΥΙειραιεα πορεύονται και φρουροΰ- 

^ iLf Papageorgios : ανμεν cod. ^ Wyse ; €πιψ. cod. 

118 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xu. 3— xlii. 3 

him Heracleides of Clazomenae, surnamed ^ King, two 
obols, and Agyrrhius again three obols. 

XLII. The present form of the constitution is as 1 
follows. Citizenship belongs to persons of citizen 
parentage on both sides, and they are registered on 
the rolls of their demes at the age of eighteen. At 
the time of their registration the members of the 
deme make decision about them by vote on oath, first 
whether they are shown to have reached the lawful 
age, and if they are held not to be of age they go back 
again to the boys, and secondly whether the candi- 
date is a freeman and of legitimate birth ; after this, 
if the vote as to free status goes against him, he 
appeals to the jury-court, and the demesmen elect 
five men from among themselves to plead against 
him, and if it is decided that he has no claim to be 
registered, the state sells him, but if he wins, it is 
compulsory for the demesmen to register him. After 2 
this the Council revises the list of persons that have 
been registered, and if anyone is found to be under 
eighteen years of age, it fines the demesmen that 
registered him. And when the cadets have been 
passed by this revision, their fathers hold meetings 
by tribes and after taking oath elect three members 
of the tribe of more than forty years of age, whom 
they think to be the best and most suitable to super- 
vise the cadets, and from them the people elects by 
show of hands one of each tribe as disciplinary officer, 
and elects from the other citizens a marshal over 
them all. These take the cadets in a body, and 3 
after first making a circuit of the temples then go to 

° Or ' nicknamed ' (as was Peisistratus in Eupolis's 
comedy Demos) : but perhaps his family claimed royal 
descent in Asia Minor. 

119 



ARISTOTLE 

σιν οι /xev την Μοννιχίαν οι δε την Άκτην. 
XeipoTovel δε και τταώοτρίβας αντοΐς 8υο και 
διδασκάλου? oirive? 6πλομαχ€Ϊν και To^evevv και 
άκοντίζ^ίν και καταττάλτην αφι^ναι διδάσκουσιν/ 
διδα>σι δε και ei? τροφην tols μ -ev σωφρονισταΐς 
^ραχμην α ίκάστω, toZs δ' ξφηβοις τετταρα? 
όβολούς ίκάστω• τα δε των φνλίτών των αντοΰ 
λαμβάνων 6 σωφρονιστής έκαστος άγοράζβι τα 
ε'τΓίτιίδεια ττασιν ει? το κοινόν (συσσιτοΰσι γαρ 
κατά φυλάς), και των άλλων εττι/χελειται πάντων. 

4 και τον μ€ν πρώτον iviavTOv όντως Βιαγουσι• 
τον δ' νστβρον, ίκκλησίας iv τω θβατρω γενομένης 
άτΓοδει^ά/χε^οι τω 8ημω τά πβρί τάς τά^ει? και 
λαβόντες ασπίδα και δόρυ παρά της πόλεως, περι- 
πολοϋσι την χώραν και Βιατρίβονσιν εν τοις 

5 φυλακτηρίοις . φρουρονσι δε τά δυο ετη' χλα/χυδα? 
έχοντες' και ατελει? εισι πάντων και Βίκην ούτε 
διδόασιν οντε λαμβάνονσιν, ίνα μη πρόφασις η του 
άτΓίε'ναι/ πλην περί κλήρου και επικλήρον καν 
TLVL κατά* γένος Ιερωσννη γεντ^ται. Βιεξελθόντων 
δε των» δυειν' ετών ήΒη μετά τών άλλων είσιν. 

1 XLIII. Τά μεν οΰν περί την τών πολιτών 
εγγραφήν και τους εφήβους τούτον έχει τον 
τρόπον. τάς δ' αρχάς τάς περί την εγκυκλιον 
Βιοίκησιν άπάσας ποιοϋσι κληρωτάς, πλην ταμιου 
στρατιωτικών και τών επι τών θεωρικών και του 
τών κρηνών επιμελητού• ταύτας δε χειροτονοΰσιν, 
και οι χειροτονηθεντες άρχουσιν εκ Πανα^τ^ι^αιων 

1 ζιδάξονσίν Rutherford. 

^ πρόφασίί . . . άπι^ναι legit Blass, sed incertus cod. 

* κατά Wilamowitz-Kaibel : κατατο cod. 

120 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xlii. 3— xliii. 1 

Peiraeus,and some of them garrison Munichia," others 
the Point. ^ And the people also elects two athletic 
trainers and instructors for them, to teach them their 
drill as heavy- armed soldiers, and the use of the 
bow, the javelin and the sling. It also grants the 
disciplinary officers one drachma a head for rations, and 
the cadets four obols a head ; and each disciplinary 
officer takes the pay of those of his own tribe and buys 
provisions for all in common (for they mess together 
by tribes), and looks after everything else. They go 4 
on with this mode of life for the first year ; in the 
following year an assembly is held in the theatre, and 
the cadets give a display of drill before the people, 
and receive a shield and spear from the state ; and 
they then serve on patrols in the country and are 
quartered at the guard-posts. Their service on 5 
patrol goes on for two years ; the uniform is a mantle ; 
they are exempt from all taxes ; and they are not 
allowed to be sued nor to sue at law, in order that 
they may have no pretext for absenting themselves, 
except in cases concerning estate, marriage of an 
heiress, and any priesthood that one of them nnay 
have inherited. When the two years are up, they 
now are members of the general body of citizens. 

XLIII. Such, then, are the regulations about the i 
registration of the citizens and about the cadets. All 
the officials concerned with the regular administration 
are appointed by lot, except a Treasurer of Military 
Funds, the Controllers of the Spectacle Fund, and the 
Superintendent of Wells ; these officers are elected 
by show of hands, and their term of office runs from 



" See xix. 2 n. 
* The southern promontory of Peiraeus. 



121 



ARISTOTLE 

elg ΐΐαναθηναια. χ€ψοτονοΰσί he καΐ τάς ττρος 
τον ττόλβμον άττάσας. 

2 Βουλτ^ δε κληροΰται φ', ν' άττο φνλης έκαστης. 
πρυταν€ν€ί δ' iu jaepet των φυλών έκαστη καθ* δ 
τι άΐ' λάγ^ωσιν, αί μέν ττρώται τβτταρβς ζ' καΐ λ' 
ημέρας έκαστη, αί δε ?■' αί νστ^ραι πέντ€ και 
λ' ημέρας έκαστη' κατά σελήνην γαρ αγουσιν τον 

3 ένιαυτόν. οι he πρυτανεύοντας αυτών πρώτον μέν 
συσσιτοϋσιν έν τη θόλω, λαμβάνοντες άργυριον 
παρά της πόλεως, έπειτα συνάγουσιν καΐ την 
βουλην καΐ τον 8ημον, την μεν οΰν^ βουλην 
δσαι ημέραι,^ πλην εάν τις άφέσιμος η, τον δε 
Βημον τετράκις της πρυτανείας εκάστης, και όσα 
8εΐ χρηματίζειν την βουλην, και δ τι έν εκάστη 
τη ήμερα, και δπου καθίζειν,^ ούτοι προγράφουσι. 

4 προγράφουσι δε και τάς εκκλησίας ούτοι• jutav 
μεν κυρίαν, έν fj δει τάς αρχάς έπιχειροτονεΐν ει 
Βοκοΰσι καλώς άρχειν, και περί σίτου και περί 
φυλακής της χώρας χρηματίζειν, και τάς εισ- 
αγγελίας έν ταύτη τη ήμερα τους βουλομενους 
ποιεΐσθαι, και τάς άπογραφάς τών 8ημευομένων 
άναγινώσκειν, και τάς λήξεις τών κλήρων και τών 
έπικλήρων άναγινώσκειν,'^ δπως μηΒένα λάθη μη^έν 

Γ) έρήμον γενόμενον έπι δε της έκτης πρυτανείας 
προς τοις είρημένοις και περί της όστρακοφορίας 
έπιχειροτονίαν διδόασιν ει δοκεΓ ποιεΐν ή μή, και 
συκοφαντών προβολάς τών Ά^ηΐ'αιων και τών με- 

^ [ore] edd. * όσημέραι Kenyon. 

^ Wilamowitz-Kaibel ; οπονκαθι^ίΐ cod. 

* [avayivwcKeiv] Gennadios. 

" i.e. in every four years ; the Great Panathenaic Festival, 
as also the Pythian, was held in the third Olympic year. 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xliii. 1-5 

one Panathenaic Festival to the next." All military 
officers also are elected by show of hands. 

The Council is elected by lot, and has five hundred 2 
members, fifty from each tribe. The Presidency is 
filled by each tribe in turn, in an order settled by lot, 
each of the first four selected holding the office for 
thirty-six days and each of the latter six for thirty- 
five days ; for their year is divided into lunar months.'' 
Those of them serving as Presidents first dine to- 3 
gether in the Round-house," receiving a sum of money 
from the state, and then convene meetings of the 
Council and the People, the Council indeed meeting 
on every day excepting holidays, but the People four 
times in each presidency. And the Presidents put up 
written notice of the business to be dealt with by the 
Council, and of each day's agenda, and of the place of 
meeting. They also put up written notice of the 4 
meetings of the Assembly : one ^ sovereign meeting, 
at which the business is to vote the confirmation of 
the magistrates in office if 'they are thought to 
govern Avell, and to deal with matters of food supply 
and the defence of the country ; and on this day 
informations have to be laid by those who wish, and 
the inventories of estates being confiscated read, 
and the lists of suits about inheritance and heiresses, 
so that all may have cognizance of any vacancy in 
an estate that occurs. In the sixth presidency in 5 
addition to the business specified they take a vote 
on the desirability of holding an ostracism, and on 
preliminary informations against persons charged as 
malicious informers, citizens and resident aliens, up 

'' Alternate months of 29 and 30 days make a year of 
354 days, as does 36 χ 4+35 χ 6. 

" At the N.E. of the Areopagus, near the Council-chamber. 
'^ One in each presidential term of office. 

123 



ARISTOTLE 

τοίκων fiexpL τριών ίκατίρων , καν τις ύττοσχ6μ€νός 
β τι μη ποιηστ) τω 8ημω. €Τ€ραν δε ταΐ? ικ€τηρίαις, 
€V η deig 6 βουλόμβνος [κ€τηρίαν virep ων αν 
βούληται και ι6ίων και δημοσίων διαλέγεται προς 
τον 8ημον. αι δε δυο ττερι των άλλων elaiv, iv 
αίς κβλβύουσιν οι νόμοι τρία μ^ν ι^ρών χρηματίζ€ΐν, 
τρία δε κήρυξιν και πρβσββίαις, τρία δ' οσίων, 
χρηματίζουσιν δ' ενίοτε και άνευ προχειροτονίας. 
προσέρχονται δε και οι κήρυκες και οι πρέσβεις 
τοις πρυτανεσιν πρώτον, και οι τάς επιστολάς 
φέροντες τούτοις αποδιδόασι. 
ι XLIV. "Εστί δ' επιστάτης τών πρυτάνεων εις 6 
λαχών οΰτος δ' επιστατεΐ νύκτα και ήμεραν, και 
ουκ έ'στιν οϋτε πλειω χρόνον οντε δι? τον αυτόν 
γενέσθαι, τηρεί δ' ούτος τάς τε κλεΐς τάς τών 
Ιερών εν οΐς τα χρΎ}ματ^ εστίν καΐ τά^ γράμματα 
τη πόλει, και την Βημοσίαν σφραγίδα, και μενειν 
άναγκαΐον εν τη θόλω τοΰτόν εστίν και τριττύν 

2 τών πρυτάνεων ην άν οΰτος κελεύη. και επεώάν 
συναγάγωσιν οί πρυτάνεις την βουλήν η τον ^ημον 
οΰτος κλήροι προέδρους εννέα, ενα εκ της φυλής 
εκάστης πλην της πρυτανευούσης, και πάλιν εκ 
τούτων επιστατην ενα, και τταραδιδωσι το πρό- 

3 γράμμα αύτοις• οί δε παραλαβόντες της τ' εύ- 
κοσμίας επιμελούνται και ύπερ ών δει χρηματίζειν 
προτιθεασιν και τας χειροτονίας κρινουσιν και τά 
άλλα πάντα ^ιοικοΰσιν και τοΰ^ άφεΐναι κύριοι εισιν. 



^ τά suppletum ab edd. 
* του Richards : τοντ cod. : τοΰ δ' Hude. 



124 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xliii. δ— xi.iv. 3 

to the number of not more than three crimes of 
either class, and cliarges of failure to perform a 
.Jservice promised to the People. Another meeting q 
.'js given to petitions, at Avhicli anyone Avho wishes, 
after placing a suppliant-bi-anch," may speak to 
- the People al)out any matter he may wish whether 
■^public or private. The tAvo other meetings deal Aviih 
l-aW other business, at wliich the laws enact that three 
iipases of sacred matters are to be dealt A\'ith, three 
ijlAudiences for heralds and embassies, and three cases 
'^of secular matters. And sometimes they do business 
r.V'ithout a preliminary vote being taken. Also tlie 
'^Presidents give a first audience to lieralds and to am- 
■^bassadors, and to the Presidents dispatches are de- 
^■Jivered by their bearers. 

??i XLIV. I'he Presidents have a single Head elected 1 
φγ Jot ; he holds office for a day and a night, and may 
■ not hold office longer, nor serve a second time. Pie 
: keeper of the keys of the temples in which tlie 
i.iuuey and documents of the state are lodged, and 
-'.of the state seal, and he is required to stay in the 
' iiound - house, and so is Avhichever Thiid * of the 
".Presidential Boards he orders. And Avhenever the 2 
;;jPresidents call a meeting of the Council or of the 
/People, this official selects by lot nine Chairmen, one 
:.:from each tribe except the tribe presiding, and ag in 
^"from these a single Plead, and he hands over the hst 
■^of agenda to them ; and after receiviiig it they super- 3 
I;intend procedure, bring forward the business to be 
i dealt Avith, act as tellers, direct all the other busi- 
^mess and have power to dismiss the meeting. A man 

,, " -^" olive-branch wreathed with wool was carried by the 
j suppliant ' and placed on the altar in the assembly. 
^ * See viii. 30 n. 

125 



ARISTOTLE 

/cat hr LOT arrja at ftev ουκ ζζ^στιν ττλζΐον η ατταζ iv 
τω ii'iavrw, TrpoeSpeuGLV δ' c^cartu ατταζ iirl τη; 
Trpuraveias €κάστϊ]ς. 
4 ΐίοιονσι Be καΐ αρχαιρεσίας^ στρατηγών καΐ 
ιππάρχων και, των άλλαη' των ττρος rov πόΧεμον 
άρχων iv rfj εκκλησία, καθ^ ο τι αν τω Βημω BoKfj 
ποιοΰσι δ ol μετά την ζ' πρυτανεύοντες εφ* ων 
αν εύσημία γενηται. Βεΐ Be προβονλενμα γενεσθα 
και περί τούτων. ■'• 

1 XLV. Η Βε βουλή πρότερον μεν ην κυρία κα\ 
χρήμασιν ζημί,ώσαι και Βησαι και άποκτεΐναί. 
και Αυσίμαχον Β'' αί^τ-ί]? άγαγούσης ώς τον Βημιον, 
καθημενον ηΒη μέλλοντα άποΟνησκειν Έιύμηλί- 
Βης ό ^ΑλωπεκηΟεν άφείλετο, ου φάσκων Βεΐν άνεν 
Βικαστηριου γνώσεως ούΒενα των -πολιτών άπο~ 
θνήσκειν και κρίσεο)ς εν Βικαστηρίω γενομένης 
6 μεν Αυσίμαχος άτίεφυγεν, και επωνυμίαν εσχεν 6 
άπο του τνπάνου• 6 Βε Βημος άφείλετο της βουλη^^ 
το θανατοΰν και Βεΐν και χρημασι ζημιοΰν, καΐ 
νόμον εθετο, αν τίνος άΒικεΐν η βουλή καταγνώ η 
ζημιώση, τάς καταγνώσεις καΐ τάς επιζημιώσεις 
είσάγειν τους θεσμοθετας εις το Βικαστηριον, 
και ο τι αν οΐ Βικασταΐ φηφίσοηηαι τοΰτο κύριον 
είναι. 

2 KptVet δε τάς αρχάς η βουλή τάς πλείστας, καΐ 
μάλισθ* οσαι χρήματα Βιαχειρίζουσιν ου κυρία, δ' 
η κρίσις αλλ' εφεσιμος εις το Βικαστηριον. εζεστι 
Βε και τοις ΙΒιώταις εΙσαγγέλΧειν ην άν βούλωνται 

^ edd. : δ€καίδ€καρχαΐ[>(σια$ (dittographia) cod. 
^ Αυσίμαχον δ' Papageorgios : και\νσψαχον codex. - 

126 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xliv. 3— xlv. 2 

r.m'ot become Head more than once a year, but he 
ii be Chairman once in each presidency. 
They also conduct elections of Generals, and 4 
Lvalry Commanders and the other military officers 
Lhe Assembl}', in Avhatever manner seems good to 
People ; and these elections arc held by the first 
i.-d of Presidents, after the sixth Presidency," in 
. term of office favourable Mcatl)er-omens may . 
r. These matters also require a preliminary 
vuutiou of the Council. 

XLV. The Council formerly had sovereign power 1 
!">ftss sentences of fine, imprisonment and death. 
. , .-, it -once it had brought L3'simachus to the public 
'••'ieriuirAUtioner, Mhen, as he already sat awaiting death, 
. i;lic:jii^lides of the dcme Alopece rescued him, saying 
\ ^that^io citizen ought to die without sentence by a 
t't •*3 UE}•' i and when a trial Avas held in a jury-court 
'r ; iJTsijjiachus s:ot off, and he "fot the nickna)ne of ' the 
ί' ,nr~afrom the drum-stick ' ^ ; and the People deprived 
•- 'tli/'. Council of the power to sentence to death and 
-onment and to impose fines, and made «i law 
ill verdicts of guilty and penalties passed by the— 
ruicil must be brought before the jury-court by the κ 
"' lators, and that any vote of the jurjanen should 
. ereign. 

Is of officials are held in most cases by the 2 
•il, particularly those of the officials who handle 
; but the verdict of the Council is not sovereign, : 
iibject to apjjeal to the jurj^-cciurt. Private 
^s also liave the right to lay an information 

. the Prosidcnts holding tlie seventh or a later term 

c, see xliii. 2. Rain, thunder, etc., were bad omens, 

■e regulation liad a practical value for- the ojien-air 

ί iii^-s in the Pnyx. 

' V.-'.the man who escaped the bastinado. 



I 



ARISTOILE 

των άρχώΐ' μη χρησθαι τοις νόμοις• €φεσις ?,έ ι , 
τούτοι,ς εστίν etV το Βίκαστηριον εάν αντοη• \ V 
βουλί] καταγνω. 

3 Αοκιμάζζΐ δε καΐ τονς βονλεντάς τονς τον νσΐίη 
evLai'Tov βονλευσοντας και τονς -eiWa αργό:- •. 
καί τιροτερον μεν -ην αττοοοκιμασαι κνρια, νν. 
τούτοις^ εφεσις εστίν εις το Βικαστ-ήριηΐ' _ :, 

4 Τουτωΐ' μεν ονν ακυρός εστίν -η βονΧη, ττρο- 
βονΧεύει δ' εΙς τον S -ημον, καΐ ουκ £^€στί.ν ovuh- 
απροβουλευτον ούΒ* 6 τι αν μ-η ττρογράφωσίν' Όί 
πρυτάνεις φηφισασθαί τω S-ημcρ' κατ^ . αυτά '. 
ταΰτα ένοχος εστίν 6 νίκησας γραφτ) ηαραΐ'όμ ~•. 

1 XLVI. Έιπιμελεΐται he καΐ τών ττειτοιημεΜύν 
τριηρών και των σκευών καΐ των νεωσοίκων,::•καί 
ποιείται καινάς^ τριήρεις η τετρηρεις, όποτζρ'Χς 
αν ο 8ημος χειροτόνηση, και σκευή ταύτα.ις- ;κό} 
νεϋίσοικονς' χειροτονεί δ αρχιτέκτονας ο 8ήι. Ος 
εττι τας ναΰς. αν δε μη τταρα^ώσιν εζειργασμίι'α 
ταΰτα τη νεα βουλή, την 8ωρεάν ουκ εστίν ά,ντοΐς 
λαβείν εττι γαρ της ύστερον βουλής λαμβανήνσίν'., 
ττοιεΐται δε τάς τριήρεις, δέκα άνΒρας εζ QxrcY}< 

2 ελομενη τριηροποιοΰς. εζετάζει δε και τα ηίικσ- 
Βομηματα, τά δϊ^/Μοσια ττάντα, καν τις ά^ικεΐν'.αντ'^ί 
^όζη τω τε 8ημω τούτον άττοφαινει και καταγνρ^ου, 
τταραδιδωσί δικαστήριο). -.. 

1 XLVII. ΣιυνΒιοικεΐ δε καΐ ταΐς άλλαι? ά/0Τ(.ιί 

τά πλείστα. πρώτον μεν γαρ οι ταμιαό,'τη 

Αθηνάς εισι μεν Βεκα, κληροϋται δ εις εκ-,-ττ.- 

φυλης, εκ πεντακοσιομεΒίμνων κατά τον Σόλωίτ 

\ <καί> Toi'rots Wilamowitz-Kaibcl. ":; 

^ Kaifas Kenyon : K-atvasSe cod.- ;: 

*-καταγί'0!'τοϊ Wilamowitz-Kaibel- ■"- 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xr.v. 2-χιλ'π. 1 

Γ illegal piOccdure against any official they may wish; 
oat in these cases also there is an appeal to the reo])le 
/ if the Council passes a verdict of guilty. 
ί The Council also checks the qualifications of the 3 
I Councillors v.ho are to hold office for the folhnving 

Lyear, and of the Nine Archons. And formerly it iiad 
sovereign power to reject them as disqualified, but 
"how they have an appeal to the jury-court. 
ί In these matters therefore the Council is not 4 
k ■ sovereign, but it prepares resolutions for the People, 
:^ and the People cannot pass any measures that have 
I _not been prepared by the Council and published in 
';_ writing in advance by the Presidents ; for the pro- 
ί poser Λνΐιο carries such a measure is ipso facto liable 
% to penalty by indictment for illegal procedure. 
i XL\ I. The Council also inspects triremes after 1 
^ construction, and their rigging, and the naval sheds, 
.• and has new triremes or quadriremes, Avhichever the 
'^'"Peojilc" votes for, built and rigged, and naval sheds 
built ; but navaljirqhitccts are clected.by the People. 
«, If the outgoing Council does not hand over these 
works completed to the new Couiicil, the members 
cannot draw their lionorarium, Mhich is payable Λvhen 
the next Council is in office. For the building of 
\ triremes it elects ten of its own members as Naval 
Constructors. It also inspects all public buildings, ο 
and if it finds any commissioner in default it rej)orts 
Jiim to tlie People, and if it gets a verdict of guilty 
liands hira over to a jury-court. 

XLVII. The Council also shares in the administra- 
tion of the other offices in most affairs. First there 
are the ten Treasurers of Athena, elected one from 
a tribe by lot, from the Five-hundred-bushel class, 
according to tlie law of Solon (>vhich is still in force), 



i 



ARISTOTLIi 

νόμον (ert γαρ 6 νόμος KvpLos cotlv), αρχζί δ' ό 
λαχων καν ττάνυ Tievr^s fj. τταραλαμβάνουσί δε τό 
re αγαλ/χα rijs * Αθηνάς καΐ τάς Νίκας καΐ τον 
άλλον κόσμον καΐ τά χρήματα εναντίον της 
βουλής. 

2 "ΈιπίΐΘ* οί ττωλι^ταΐ ι μίν elai, κληροΰται δ' €Ϊς 
e/c της φυλής, μισθονσι Se τά μισθώματα ττάντο 
καΐ τά μέταλλα τίίϋλ,ονσι καΐ τά τέλη μ€τά τον 
ταμίου των στρατιωτικών καΐ τών Ιττι το θβωρικον 
γιρημάνων ivainriw της βουλής, και κυροΰσιν οτω 
αν η βονλη χειροτόνηση , και τά irpaOevra μέταλλα 
τά τ* εργάσιμα^ τά εις τρία ετη ττεπρο^μενα και τά 
συγκεχοίρημενα το. ζΐς . . .' ετη ττεττραμενα. και τας 
ουσίας τών εζ * Αρείου ττάγου φευγόντων και τών 
άλλων εναντίον της βουλής ττωλοΰσιν, κατακυρονσι 
δ' οΐ Ο' άρχοντες, καΐ τά τέλη τά εις ενιαντον 
πεπραμενα άναγράφαντες εις λελευκωμενα γραμ_- 
ματεΐα τόν τε ηριάμενον και οσου^ αν ττρϊηται τη 

3 βουλή 7ταραΒι8όασιν. άναγράφουσιν Βε χωρίς μεν 
ους Bel κατά ττρυτανείαν εκάστην καταβαλλειν εις 
Βεκα γραμματεία, χο)ρ\ς Β ους τρις του ενιαντον, 
γραμματεΐον κατά την καταβολην εκάστην τγοιύ^- 
σαντες, χωρίς Β' ους εττι της ενάτης ττρντανείας. 
άναγράφουσι Βε και τά χωρία καΐ τάς οικίας 
τάττογραφίέντα καΐ ττραθεντα εν τω Βικαστηρίω- 
και γάρ τανθ^ οΰτοι ττωλοΰσιν. εστί Be τών μςν 
οικιών εν ε' ετεσιν ανάγκη την τι^τ^''' άποΒονναι, 

' τά τ' <apya, και τά> ΐρ-γάσιμα Sandys. 

* numcrum rasum alii ι', alii y legunt. 

^ erasum supplevit Wilamowitz. 

" Golden figures, tept in the Parthenon; probably there 
130 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xlvii. 1-3 

and the one on whom the lot falls holds office even 
though he is quite a poor man. They take over the 
custody of the statue of Athena and the Victories" 
and the other monuments and the funds in the 
presence of the Council. 

Then there are the ten Vendors, elected by lot 2 

one from a tribe. They farm out all public contracts 

and sell the mines and the taxes, with the co-operation 

of the Treasurer of Military Funds and those elected to 

superintend the Spectacle Fund, in the presence of 

. the Council, and ratify the purchase for the person 

I for whom the Council votes, and the mines sold and 

the workings that have been sold for three years and 

the concessions sold for . . .^ years. And the estates 

of persons banished by the Areopagus and of the 

ί others they sell at a meeting of the Council, but the 

; sale is ratified by the Nine Archons. And they draw 

. up and furnish to the Council a list written on 

whitened tablets " of the taxes sold for a year, showing 

ί the purchaser and the price that he is paying. And 3 

; they draw up ten separate lists of those who have to 

] pay in each presidency, and separate lists of those 

j who have to pay three times in the year, making a 

I list for each date of payment, and a separate list of 

i those who have to pay in the ninth presidency. They 

I also draw up a list of the farms and houses written 

' off ** and sold in the jury-court ; for these sales are also 

: conducted by these officials. Payment must be made 

for purchases of houses within five years, and for 

had been ten, but eight were melted down for coinage 
towards the end of the Peloponnesian War. 
J " The ilumber half erased may be 10 or 3. 

•^ Wooden boards coated with chalk, on which notices were 
i scratched; they could be easily rubbed oiF, c/. xlviii. 1. 
•* i.e. registered as confiscated. 

131 



ARISTOTLE 

των δε χωρίων iv 8e/ca• καταβάλλουσιν 8e ταύτα 

4 €πΙ της ενάτης πρυτανείας. εΙσφερει δε και ο 
βασιλεύς• τα? μισθώσεις των τέμνων αναγραφας 
iv γραμματείοις λελενκωμενοις. εστί 8ε και τού- 
των ή μεν μίσθωσις εις ετη δέκα, καταβάλλεται 
δ' επί της θ' πρυτανείας• διό καΐ πλείστα χρη- 

5 ματα επί ταύτης συλλεγεταί της πρυτανείας, εισ- 
φέρεται μεν οΰν εις την βουλην τά γραμματεία 
κατά τάς καταβολάς άναγεγ ραμμένα, τηρεί δ ό 
δημόσιος' όταν δ' fj χρημάτων καταβολή, παρα- 
δι'δωσι τοις άπο^εκταις αυτά ταύτα καθελών απο 
των επιστυλίων ων εν ταυττ7 τη ημέρα hεΐ τα 
χρήματα καταβληθηναι καΐ άπαλειφθηναι, τά δ 
άλλα απόκειται χωρίς Ινα μη προεξαλειφθη. 

1 XLVIII. Εισι δ' άπο^έκται 8έκα κεκληρωμένοι 
κατά φυλάς' ούτοι δε παραλαβόντες τα γραμματεία 
άπαλείφουσι τά καταβαλλόμενα χρήματα εναντίον 
της βουλής εν τω βουλευτήρια) και πάλιν απο- 
διδόασιι^ τά γραμματεία τω 8ημοσίω • καν τι? ελλίπη 
καταβολην, ενταΰθ^ εγγέγραπται, και διττλασιαν , 
ανάγκη το ελλειφθεν καταβάλλειν η ^εΒεσθαΐ' Ι 
και ταΰτα είσπράττειν η βουλή και δησαι κυρία 

2 κατά τους νόμους εστίν, τη μεν ούν προτεραία 
δέχονται τάς καταβολάς^ και μερίζουσι ταΓ? αρχαΐς, 
τ^δ' ύστεραία τόν τε μερισμόν είσφέρουσι γράφαντες 
εν σανίδι και καταλεγουσιν εν τω βουλευτήρια), 
και προτιθέασιν εν τη βουλή ει τις τίνα οώεν 
άΒικοΰντα περί τόν μερισμόν η άρχοντα η ώιώτην, 
και γνώμας επιφηφίζουσιν εάν τις τι ^οκη α^ικεΐν. 

1 τάί καταβολάί (vel ras waaas) Kaibel: τα s cod. 

182 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xlvii. 3— xlviii. 2 

farms within ten ; and they make these payments in 
the ninth presidency. Also the King-archon intro- 4 
duces the letting of domains, having made a list of 
them on whitened tablets. These also are let for ten 
years, and the rent is paid in the ninth presidency ; 
hence in that presidency a very large revenue comes 
in. The tablets written up with the list of pay- δ 
ments are brought before the Council, but are in the 
keeping of the official clerk ; and whenever a payment 
of money is made, he takes down from the pillars 
and hands over to the receivers just these tablets 
showing the persons Λvhose money is to be paid on 
that day and wiped oif the record, but the other 
tablets are stored away separately in order that they 
may not be wiped off before payment is made. 

XLVIII. There are ten Receivers elected by lot, 1 
one from each tribe ; these take over the tablets and 
wipe off" the sums paid in the presence of the Council 
in the Council-chamber, and give the tablets back 
again to the official clerk ; and anybody that has 
defaulted in a payment is entered on them, and has 
to pay double the amount of his arrears or go to 
prison ; and the legal authority to impose this fine 
and imprisonment is the Council. On the first day, 2 
therefore, they receive the payments and apportion 
them among the magistrates, and on the second day 
they introduce the apportionment, written on a wooden 
tablet, and recount it in the Council-chamber, and 
bring forward in the Council any case in which some- 
body knows of anyone, either an official or a private 
person, having committed a wrong in relation to the 
apportionment, and put resolutions to the vote in case 
anyone is found to have committed any wrong. 

" See xlvii. 2 n. 

133 



ARISTOTLE 

3 Κληροΰσί he καΐ λογιστας i^ αυτών οι βονλζυταΐ 
θ€κα τους ΧογιουμΙνους τοις άρχαΐς κατά την 

4 ττρντανβιαν βκάστην. κληροΰσί he καΐ (ύθύνους, 
eva της φυλής ίκάστης, και irapehpovg β' €κάστω 
των ζύθύνων, οΐς άναγκαΐόν εστί ταΓ? άγοραΐς^ 
κατά τον e^τώvυμov τον της φυλής έκαστης 
καθησθαι, καν τι? βουληταί τινι των τάς €ύθυνας 
ev τω hικaστηpίω hehωκότωv €ντ6ς y' ημερών 
αφ ης ehωκe τάς εύθύνας εϋθυναν αν τ' ιδίαν αν re 
hημoσίav e/xj3aAeCT^ai, γράφας ei? ττινάκιον λελευκω- 
μενον τούνομα το θ αύτοΰ και το του φει'γοντος 
και το α8ικημ 6 τι αν Ιγκαλη, και τίμημα έπιγρα- 
φαμενος δ τι άν αύτώ hoKrj, hίhωσιv τω εύθυνω• 

5 ο he λαβών τοϋτο και άναγνούς, eav^ καταγνώ 
τταραδιδωσιν τα μέν ί'δια τοις hικaστaΐς τοις κατά 
hημoυς τοις την φυλην ταύτην €ΐσάγονσιν,^ τά 
he hημόσιa τοις θεσμοθ4ταις επιγράφει. οι he 
θεσμοθεται eav παραλάβωσιν πάλιν εισάγουσιν 
ταυτην την* εΰθυναν εις το 8ικαστηριον, και ο τι 
αν γνώσιν οι hικaστaι τοϋτο κύριόν εστίν. 

1 XLIX. Αοκιμάζει he και τους ίππους η βουλή, 
καν μεν τις καλόν ΐππον έχων κακώς hoKrj 
τρεφειν, ζημιοΐ τω σίτω, τοις hε μη hυvaμevoις 
ακολουθεΐν η μη θελουσι μενειν αλλ' άνάγουσι^^ 
τροχον επι την γνάθον επιβάλλει, και ο τοϋτο* 
παθών άhόκιμός εστί. hoκιμάζ€l he και τους 

^ Kenyon, sed γ incertuin, op desunt. 

^ eav Herwerden : eav^tv cod. 

^ δίκάζονσιν Richards. 

* ταύτην ante την supplet Blass. 

^ άλ,ν άνά-γουσί Blass, sed incertum : άλλ' avay<.wyoisy oDol 
(' unbroken ') Wyse. 

' -γνάθον . . . TovTo Blass (et partim alii) : -γναθ . . . ουτο cod. 
134. 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xlviii. 3— xlix. 1 

The Council also elect by lot ten of their own body 3 
as Accountants, to keep the accounts of the officials 
for each presidency. Also they elect by lot Auditors, 4 
one for each tribe, and two Assessors for each Auditor, 
who are required to sit at the tribal meetings accord- 
ing to the hero after Avhom each tribe is named," 
and if anyone wishes to prefer a charge, of either a 
private or a public nature, against any magistrate 
who has rendered his accounts before the jury- 
court, within three days from the day on which he 
rendered his accounts, he writes on a tablet his 
own name and that of the defendant, and the 
offence of which he accuses him, adding whatever 
fine he thinks suitable, and gives it to the Auditor ; 
and the Auditor takes it and reads it, and if he con- 5 
siders the charge proved, he hands it over, if a private 
case, to those jurymen in the villages who introduced 
this tribe, and if a public suit, he marks it to the 
Legislators. And the Legislators, if they receive it, 
introduce this audit again before the jury-court, and 
the verdict of the jurymen holds good. 

XLIX. The Council also inspects the Knights' 1 
chargers, and if anybody having a good horse keeps it 
in bad condition, it fines him the cost of the feed, and 
horses that cannot keep up with the squadron or 
will not stay in line but jib it brands on the jaw 
with the sign of a wheel, and a horse so treated 
has failed to pass the inspection. It also inspects 

" i.e. one Auditor and two Assessors are assigned to each 
tribe, the assignment being indicated by the name of the 
hero after whom the tribe was named. See liii. 5 n. 

135 



ARISTOTLE 

προΒρόμονς όσοι αν avrfj ^οκώσιν €7ητη8βιοι προ- 
8ρομ€ύ€ίν elvai, καν rtv* άποχβίροτονηστ], κατα- 
βββηκβν ούτος. 8οκίμάζ€ί δε και τους άμιππους, 
καν τίνα άποχαροτονηστ] , ττάτταυται μισθοφόρων 

2 οντος. τους δ' ιππέα? καταλζγουσιν οι καταλογβΐς , 
ους αν 6 Βημος χβιροτονηστ] δέκα άνδρα?* ους ο 
αν καταλξζωσι παραδιδοασι τοις ιππαρχοις και 
φυλάρχοις, ούτοι δε παραλαβόντ€ς ^ισφ4ρονσι τον 
κατάλογον €ΐς την βονλην και τον ττίνακα αν- 
οίζαντ€ς iv ω κτατασεστ^/χασ/χεί'α τα ονόματα των 
ιππέων εστί, τους μβν €^ομνυμ€νους των ττροτ€ρον 
ζγγβγραμμβνων μη δυνατούς είναι τοι? σώ/χασιν 
ίππευειν ε'^αλειc^oυσt, τους δε κατειλεγ/χε'νου? 
καλοΰσι, καν /χε'ν τι? βζομόσηται μη δυνασθαι τω 
σώματι ίππευειν η τη ουσία τούτον αφιασιν, τον 
δε μη βζομνυμβνον Βιαχβιροτονοΰσιν οΐ βουΑ^υται 
ττότβρον επιττ^δειό? εστίν ιππευειν η ου' καν μ€ν 
χ€ΐροτονησωσιν , βγγραφουσιν ει? τον πίνακα, ει 
δε μή, και τούτον ά</>ιασιν. 

3 "Εκρινεν δε' ποτέ και τα τταρα^ζίγματα και^ τον 
ττάττΧον η βουλή, νυν δε το Βικαστηριον το λαχόν 
€8όκουν γαρ ούτοι καταχαρίζίσθαι την κρίσιν, 
και της ποιησ^ως των Νικών και των άθλων των 
€ΐς τα Πανα^τ^ναια συνεπι/χελειται /χετά του ταμίου 
των στρατιωτικών. 

4 Αοκιμάζ€ΐ δε και του? άδι^νάτου? η βουλή• 
νόμος γάρ εστίν ος κελεύει τους εντό? τριών μνών 
Κ€κτημ€νους και το σώμα ττ€ττη ρω μένους ωστ€ 

^ καΐ] τα it's coniecit Blass. 

" Woven for Athena at every Panathenaic Festival and 
carried in the procession. 
136 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xlix. 1-4 

the mounted skirmishers, to see which it considers 
fit for skirmishing duty, and any that it votes to 
reject are thereby deposed from that rank. It 
also inspects the, foot-soldiers that fight in the 
ranks of the cavalry, and anyone it votes against is 
thereby stopped from drawing his pay. The Knights' 2 
roll is made by the ten Roll-keepers elected by the 
People ; and they pass on the names of all whom 
they enroll to the Cavalry Commanders and Tribe 
Commanders, and these take over the roll and bring 
it into the Council, and opening the tablet on which 
the names of the Knights have been inscribed, they 
delete those among the persons previously entered 
who claim on oath exemption from cavalry service 
on the ground of bodily incapacity, and summon 
those enrolled, and grant discharge to anyone who 
claims exemption on oath on the ground of bodily 
incapacity for cavalry service or lack of means, 
and as to those who do not claim exemption the 
Councillors decide by vote whether they are fit for 
cavalry service or not ; and if they vote for them as 
fit they enter them on the tablet, but if not, these 
also they dismiss. 

At one time the Council used also to judge the 3 
patterns for the Robe," but now this is done by the 
jury-court selected by lot, because the Council was 
thought to show favouritism in its decision. And the 
Council has joint supervision with the Steward of the 
Army Funds over the construction of the Victories 
and over the prizes for the Panathenaic Games. 

The Council also inspects the Incapables ; for 4 
there is a law enacting that persons possessing less 
than 3 minae * and incapacitated by bodily infirmity 

* See iv. 4 n. 

137 



ARISTOTLE 

μη δυνασ^αι μη^βι^ epyov €ργάζ€σθαί 8οκίμάζ€ΐν 
jxev TTjv βουλην, διδόναι δε Βημοσία τροφην δυο 
οβολονς ίκάστω της ημέρας, καΐ τα/χια;? iarlv 
αύτοΐς κληρωτός. 

Συΐ'διοικεΓ δε /cat ταΐς άλλαις άρχαΐς τα TrXeCaO* 
ως έτΓΟ? eLTTelv. 

1 L. Τα μ€ν οΰν υπό της βουλής 8ιοικουμ€να 
ταΰτ €στίν. κληροΰνται δβ /cat Ιερών βτησκευα- 
σται δe/cα άν8ρ€ς, οΐ λαμβάνοντες τριάκοντα μνας 
τταρα των airoheKTchv Ιπισκενάζονσιν τα /χάλιστα 

2 ^εόμενα των Ιερών, /cat αστυνόμοι δe/cα• τούτων 
he e μεν άρχουσιν εν Fletpatet πέντε δ' εν άστει, 
και τάς τε αύλητρβας /cat τα? φαλτρίας /cat τάς 
κιθαρίστριας ούτοι σκοποΰσιν δπως μη πλείονος 
η Βυεΐν Βραχμαΐς μισθωθησονται, καν πλείους την 
αύτην σπου^άσωσι λαβείν οΰτοι 8ιακληροΰσι και 
τώ λαχόντι μισθοΰσιν . και δπως τών κοπρολόγων 
μηΒεις εντός ι' σταδίων του τείχους καταβαλεΐ 
κόπρον επιμελούνται, και τάς ό^ούς κωλύουσι 
κατοικο8ομεΐν και Βρυφάκτους ΰπερ τών οδών 
ύπερτείνειν και οχετούς μετεώρους εις την ό8ον 
εκρουν έχοντας ποιεΐν και τάς θυρίδας εις την 
oSov άνοίγειν και τους εν ταί? όδοΓ? άπογιγνο- 
μενους άναιροΰσιν, έχοντες δημοσίους ύπηρετας. 

1 LI. Ιίληροΰνται Βέ και άγορανόμοι t'/ πέντε 
μεν εΙς Iletpatea, e' δ' εις άστυ. τούτοις δε ύπό 
τών νόμων προστετακται τών ώνίων €7Γΐ]υ.ελ€Γσσαι 
πάντων, όπως καθαρά και άκίβ^ηλα πωληται. 

2 Υ^ληροΰνται δε και μετρονόμοι t'/ πέντε μεν 
εις άστυ, ε' δε εις ΥΙειραιεα• και οΰτοι τών μέτρων 

^ numerum ι' bis supplevit Papageorgios. 
138 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xlix. 4— li. 2 

from doing any work are to be inspected by the Council, 
which is to give them a grant for food at the pubUc 
expense at the rate of 2 obols*^ a day each. And 
there is a Treasurer for these persons, elected by lot. 

The Council also shares in the administration of 
virtually the greatest number of the duties of the 
other offices. 

L. These then are the matters administered by the 1 
Council. Also ten men are elected by lot as Restorers 
of Temples, who draw 30 minae ^ from the Receivers 
and repair the temples that most require it ; and ten 
City Controllers, five of whom hold office in Peiraeus 2 
and five in the city ; it is they who supervise the flute- 
girls and harp-girls and lyre-girls to prevent their re- 
ceiving fees of more than two drachmas,* and if several 
persons want to take the same girl these officials cast 
lots between them and hire her out to the winner. 
And they keep watch to prevent any scavenger from 
depositing ordure within a mile and a quarter of the 
wall ; and they prevent the construction of buildings 
encroaching on and balconies overhanging the roads, 
of overhead conduits with an overflow into the road, 
and of windows opening outΛvard on to the road ; 
and they remove for burial the bodies of persons 
who die on the roads, having public slaves for this 
service. 

LI. Also Market-controllers are elected by lot, five 1 
for Peiraeus and five for the city. To these the laws 
assign the superintendence of all merchandise, to 
prevent the sale of adulterated and spurious articles. 

Also ten Controllers of Measures are appointed by 2 
lot, five for the city and five for Peiraeus, who super- 



Say threepence. 
* See iv. 4 n. 



139 



ARISTOTLE 

/cat των σταθμών €7ημ,βλοννταί πάντων, δττως οι 
ττωλονντ^ς χρησωνται^ δίκαιοι?. 

3 ^Ησαν 3e και σίτοφνλακες κληρωτοί ι / π€ντ€ 
μβν els rieipaiea, ττέντ€ δ' els άστυ, νυν δ είκοσι 
μ^ν els άστυ, ττεντεκαιδεκα δ' ei? Ileipaiea. 
ούτοι δ eπtμeλoΰvτaL ττρώτον μev οττω? ο ev 
άγορα σίτο? apyos" ώνιο? έ'σται δικαιω?, eTreiv 
oτΓωs οΐ Te μνλωθροί npos tcls τLμas των κριθών 
τα αλφιτα πωλήσονσιν και οί άρτοττώλαι προ? τα? 
τίμάs τών πυρών tovs apTOVs, καΐ τον σταθμον 
ayovTas όσον αν ούτοι τάζωσιν ο γαρ νομο5 
toUtovs KeXevei ταττειν. 

4 ^Εμπορίου δ' eπιμeλητάs δέκα κληρονσιν του'τοι? 
δε προστέτακται τών τ' εμπορίων iπιμeλeΐσθaι, 
και τον σίτου του κaτaπλeovτos ει? το σιτικον 
€.μπόριον τα δυο μeprj του? ε/χττόρου? άvaγκάζeιv 
els το άστυ κoμLζeιv. 

1 LII. Κα^ιστασι δε και του? ένδεκα κληpωτoύs, 
επιμ€λησομ€νον5 τών εν τω Β€σμωτηριω, και tovs 
άπaγoμevovs κλε'τττα? και του? άι^δραποδιστα? και 
TOVS λωπoSύτas αν μίν όμολογώσι θανάτω ζημιω- 
σοντα?, αν δ' άμφισβητώσιν elσάζovτas ει? το 
Βικαστηριον, καν /χέν άποφνγωσιν άφήσovτas, ει 
δε μη τότε ^ανατώσοντα?, και τα άπoγpaφόμeva 
χωρία και οικία? εισά^οντα? ει? το ^ικαστηριον 
και τα Βόζαντα δτ^/χόσια είναι πapahώσovτas τοΓ? 
πωλ•)7ταΓ?, και τα? ε'νδει'^ει? εισά^οντα? — και ya/o 
ταύτα? εtσάyoυσιv οί ένδεκα* είσάyoυσι δε τών 
ενδείξεων τίνα? και οι θεσμοθΐται. 

1 χρή(Το;'ται Rutherford. 

* ι' suppletum ex Harpocratione a Wilamowitz-Kaibel. 

* ά.στικ6ν vel Άτταόι/ edd. (v.ll. ex Harpocratione). 

140 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, li. 2— lii. l 

intend all measures and weights, in order that sellers 
may use just ones. 

Also there used to be ten Corn-wardens elected by 3 
lot, five for Peiraeus and five for the city, but now 
there are twenty for the city and fifteen for Peiraeus. 
Their duties are first to see that unground corn in 
the market is on sale at a fair price, and next that 
millers sell barley-meal at a price corresponding with 
that of barley, and baker-women loaves at a price 
corresponding with that of wheat, and weighing the 
amount fixed by the officials — for the law orders that 
these shall fix the weights. 

They elect by lot ten Port-superintendents, whose 4 
duty is to superintend the harbour-markets and to 
compel the traders to bring to the city tΛvo-thirds of 
the sea-borne corn that reaches the corn-market. 

LII. They also appoint the Eleven, officers chosen 1 
by lot to superintend the persons in the prison, 
and to punish with death people arrested as thieves 
and kidnappers and footpads that confess their guilt, 
but if they deny the charge to bring them before the 
Jury-court, and if they are acquitted discharge them, 
but if not then to execute them ; and to bring before 
the Jury-court lists of farms and houses declared to 
be public property and to hand over to the Vendors " 
those that it is decided to confiscate ; and to bring 
in informations — for these too are brought in by the 
Eleven, though the Legislators also bring in some 
informations. 

" See xlvii. 2. 

141 



ARISTOTLE 

2 Κληροΰσι 8e και ^ΙσαγωγΙας e dvSpag, ot, τα? 
€μμ'ήνους ^Ισάγουσι δικά?, hvoiv φνλαΐν βκαστος. 
elai δ' έμμηνοι προικός, eav τις οφειλών μη άττοδω, 
καν τις inl δραχμή ^ανεισάμβνος anoorepfj, καν 
τι? iv αγορά βονλόμενος εργάζεσθαι Βανεισηται 
τταρά τίνος άφορμην έτι δ αΐκειας και ερανικας 
καΐ κοίνωνι,κάς και άνδραττόδων καΐ υποζυγίων 

3 /cat τριηραργίας καΐ τραπεζιτι,κάς} ούτοι μεν ούν 
ταύτα? οικαί,ουσιν έμμηνους εισαγοντες, οι ο 
άποΒεκται τοις τελώι^αις• και κατά των τελωνών, 
τα μεν μ^χρι Βεκα δραχμών οντες κύριοι, τα δ 
αλλ' εΙς το 8ικαστήριον εισάγοντες έμμηνα. 

1 LIII. Κληροϋσι δε και^ τετταράκοντα, τετταρας 
εκ της φνλης εκάστης, προς ους τάς άλλα? δικά? 
λαγχάνουσιν οι πρότερον μεν ήσαν τριάκοντα και 
κατά δήμους περιόντβς^ ε^ίκαζον, μετά Βε την 
επι των τριάκοντα όλιγαρχίαν τετταράκοντα γεγο- 

2 νασίΓ. και τά μεν μέχρι Βεκα 8ραχμών αυτοτελείς 
είσι Βικάζειν, τά δ' ύπερ τοΰτο το τίμημα τοις 
Βιαιτηταΐς παρα^ώόασιν. οΐ Βέ παραλαβοντες εαν 
μη δυι^ωνται Βιαλΰσαι^^γιγνώσκουσι, καν μεν αμ- 
φοτεροις άρεσκη τά γνωσθεντα και εμμενωσιν, 
έχει τέλος η Βίκη. αν δ' 6 έτερος εφη των αντι- 
δίκων εΙς το Βικαστήριον, εμβαλόντες τα? μαρ- 
τυρίας και τάς προκλήσεις και τους νόμους εις 
εχίνους, χωρίς μεν τάς του Βιώκοντος χωρίς be 
τάς του φεύγοντας, και τούτους κατασημηνάμενοι 

* έρανικαι . . . κοινωνικαΐ . . . τραπε^ιτικαΐ Bury. 

* καΐ <τοι>ϊ> Wilamowitz-Kaibel. 

* irepuovTes Kenyon. 



ο A drachma a mina a month = 12 per cent per annum. 
" i.e. particularly an action to recover expenses, brought 

142 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, lii. 2— liii. 2 

They also elect by lot five men as Introducers, who 2 
introduce the cases to be tried within a month, each 
official those of two tribes. These cases include prose- 
cutions for non-payment of dowry due, actions for the 
recovery of loans borrowed at a drachma interest,"* 
and of capital borrowed from one party by another 
wishing to do business in the market ; and also actions 
about outrage, friendly-society business, partnerships, 
slaves, draft animals, naval command,* and bank cases. 
These officials, therefore, bring into court and decide 3 
these suits within a month ; but the Receivers '^ decide 
suits brought by tax-farmers or against them, having 
power to deal summarily with suits up to ten francs 
but bringing the others into the Jury-court within a 
month. 

LIII. They also elect by lot forty persons,'* four 1 
from each tribe, who are the court before which the 
other suits are brought ; formerly they were thirty 
and went on circuit trying cases in each parish, but 
since the oligarchy of the Thirty their number has 
been raised to forty. They have summary jurisdiction 2 
in claims not exceeding ten drachmas, but suits above 
that value they pass on to the Arbitrators. These 
take over the cases, and if they are unable to effect a 
compromise, they give judgement, and if both parties 
are satisfied with their judgement and abide by it, 
that ends the suit. But if one of the two parties 
appeals to the Jury-court, they put the witnesses' 
evidence and the challenges and the laws concerned 
into deed-boxes, those of the prosecutor and those 
of the defendant separately, and seal them up, and 
by the captain of a trireme against his successor who had 
failed to relieve him when his year of office was over. 

"^ See xlviii. 1. 

<* Perhaps the Greek should be altered to give ' the Forty.' 

143 



ARISTOTLE 

/cat την γνώσιν του διαιττ^του γζγραμμβνην iv 
γραμματεία) ττροσαρτ'ησαντζς , ττα/οαδιδόασι τοις 8' 

3 τοις την φνλην τον φεύγοντας δικάζουσιν. οι Se 
παραλαβόντες είσάγουσιν εις το ^ικαστηριον, τα 
μεν εντός χιλίων εις ενα και Βιακοσίους, τα δ' 
ύπερ χίλίας εις ενα καΐ τετρακόσιους, ουκ εζεστι 
δ' οντε νόμοίς ούτε ττροκλησεσι ούτε μαρτυρίαις 
αλλ' η ταΐς παρά του Βίαιτητον χρησθαι ταΐς εις 

4 τους εχίνους εμβεβλημεναις . διαιττ^ται δ' είσΐν οΐς 
αν εζηκοστον έτος fj• τοΰτο δε hijXov εκ των 
αρχόντων και των επωνύμων εισι γαρ επώνυμοι 
8εκα μεν οι τών φυλών, δυο δε καΐ τετταράκοντα 
οΐ τών ηλικιών οι δ' έφηβοι εγγραφόμενοι πρό- 
τερον μεν εις λελευκωμενα γραμματεία ενεγρά- 
φοντο, και επεγράφοντο αύτοΐς ο τ' άρχων εφ' ου 
ενεγράφησαν και 6 επώνυμος 6 τω προτερω^ ετει 
8ε^ιαιτηκώς, νυν δ' εΙς στηλην χαλκην αναγρά- 
φονται, και ϊσταται η στήλη προ του βουλευτήριου 

5 παρά τους επωνύμους. τον δε τελευταΐον τών 
επωνύμων λαβόντες οι τετταράκοντα Βιανεμουσιν 
αύτοΐς τάς δίαιτα? και επικληροΰσιν άς έκαστος 
διαιττ^σει• και άναγκαΐον άς αν έκαστος λάχη 
δίαιτα? εκδιαιταν, 6 γαρ νομός άν τις μη γενηται 
διαιτητής της ηλικίας αύτώ καθηκούσης άτιμον 
είναι κελεύει, πλην εάν τύχη άρχην άρχων τινά εν 
εκείνω τω ενιαυτώ η αποΒημών ούτοι δ ατελείς 

^ irpbrepov edd. hiatus causa. 

» Of the 100 Attic heroes 10 gave their names to the 
Tribes (see xxi. (i), and of the remaining 90, 42 names were 
affixed to the successive years of active citizenship, military 
service being from the age of 18 to 59, and those in their 
60th year serving as diaetetae. As each year expired, the 
144 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, liii. 2-5 

attach to them a copy of the Arbitrator's verdict 
written on a tablet, and hand them over to the four 
judges taking the cases of the defendant's tribe. 
When these have received them they bring them before 3 
the Jury-court, claims within 1000 drachmas before 
a court of two hundred and one jurymen, and claims 
above that before one of four hundred and one. The 
litigants are not permitted to put in laws or chal- 
lenges or evidence other than those passed on by the 
Arbitrator, that have been put into the deed-boxes. 
Persons fifty-nine years of age may serve as Arbi- 4 
trators, as appears from the regulations for the 
Archons and Name-heroes ; for the Heroes giving 
their names to the Tribes are ten in number and those 
of the years of military age forty-two," and the cadets 
used formerly when being enrolled to be inscribed 
on whitened tablets, and above them the Archon ^ in 
whose term of office they were enrolled and the 
Name-hero of those that had been Arbitrators the 
year before, but now they are inscribed on a copper 
pillar and this is set up in front of the Council-chamber 
at the side of the list of Name-heroes. The Forty 5 
take the last one of the Name-heroes and distribute 
the arbitration-cases among those of his year and 
assign by lot the cases that each is to arbitrate upon ; 
and it is compulsory for each of them to complete 
the arbitration of the cases allotted to him, for the 
law enacts the disfranchisement of anybody who does 
not become Arbitrator when of the proper age, unless 
he happens to hold some office in that year or to be 
abroad, these being the only grounds of exemption. 

Name-hero of the men now passing the age of 60 was trans- 
ferred to those now just 18. 

'> i.e. the senior of the Nine Archons, called 'Επώΐ'νμο$ 
because his name dated the year. 

L 145 



ARISTOTLE 

6 €ΐσΙ μόνοι, εστίν δε καΙ etVayyeAAetv els τους 
Βιαιτητάς^ εάν τις ά^ικηθΎ] νττο του Βιαιτητοΰ, καν 
τίνος καταγνώσιν άτιμοΰσθαι κελεύουσιν οι νομοί' 

7 εφεσις δ' εστί και τούτοις. χρώνται δε τοις 
βπωνυμοις και προς τάς στρατειας, και όταν 
ηλικίαν εκπεμπωσι προγράφουσιν άττο τίνος άρχον- 
τος και επωνύμου μ^χρι τίνων δει στρατεύεσθαι. 

1 LIV. Κ.ληροΰσι δε και τάσδε τάς αρχάς• όδο- 
ττοιούς ττεντε, οΐς ττροστετακται δημοσίους εργατας 

2 εχουσι τάς οδού? εττισκευάζειν και λογιστάς δε'κα 
και συνηγόρους τούτοις δε'κα, ττρος ους απαντάς 
ανάγκη τους τάς αρχάς άρζαντας λόγον άπενεγκεΐν. 
ούτοι γάρ είσιν οί^ μόνοι τοις ύπευθύνοις λογι- 
ζόμενοι και τάς εύθύνας εις το Βικαστήριον εισ- 
άγοντες. καν μεν τίνα κλεπτοντ εζεΧεγζωσι, 
κλοπην οι οικασται καταγινωσκουσι, και το 
γνωσθεν άποτίνεται 8εκαπλοΰν• εάν 8ε τίνα οώρα 
λαβόντα επώειζωσιν και καταγνώσιν οι δικασται, 
Βώρων τι/χώσιν, άποτίνεται δε και τοΰτο οεκα- 
πλοΰν αν δ' ά^ικεΐν καταγνώσιν, άΒικιου τι/χώσιν, 
άποτίνεται δε τοϋθ* άπλοΰν εάν προ της θ πρυ- 
τανείας εκτείση τι?, ει δε μη, Βιπλοΰται- το δε' 
Βεκαπλοΰν ου Βιπλοϋται. 

3 Κληροΰσι δε και γραμματέα τον κατά πρυτα- 
νείαν καλούμενον, δς τών γραμμάτων* εστί κύριος 
και τά ψηφίσματα τά γιγνόμενα φυλάττει και 
τάλλα πάντα αντιγράφεται και παρακάθηται τη 
βουλή, πρότερον μεν ουν ούτος ην χειροτονητός, 

^ δικαστάί Kenyon. 

» €ΐσιν οί Jos. Mayor : eiai cod. ^ δέ supplevit Kenyon. 

* ex Harpocratione edd. : -γραμματίων cod. 

" Perhaps διa^τητάs is a mistake for δικαστάί, 'jurymen.' 
146 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, liii. 6— liv. 3 

Anybody unjustly dealt with by the Arbitrator may 6 
indict him before the Arbitrators,* and the laws 
prescribe the penalty of disfranchisement for an 
Arbitrator found guilty ; but the Arbitrators also 
have an appeal. The Name-heroes also are employed 7 
to regulate military service ; when soldiers of a 
certain age are being sent on an expedition, a notice 
is posted stating the years that they are to serve, 
indicated by the Archon and Name-hero of the 
earliest and latest. 

LIV. They also elect by lot the following officials : 1 
five Highway-constructors, whose duty is to repair 
the roads, with workmen who are public slaves ; and 2 
ten Auditors and ten Assessors with them, to whom 
all retiring officials have to render account. For these 
are the only magistrates who audit the returns of 
officials liable to account and bring the audits before 
the Jury-court. And if an official is proved by them 
to have committed peculation, the Jury convict him 
of peculation, and the fine is ten times the amount of 
which he is found guilty ; and if they show that a man 
has taken bribes and the Jury convict, they assess the 
value of the bribes and in this case also the fine is ten 
times the amount ; but if they find him guilty of 
maladministration, they assess the damage, and the 
fine paid is that amount only, provided that it is paid 
before the ninth presidency ; otherwise it is doubled. 
But a fine of ten times the amount is not doubled. 

They also appoint by lot the officer called Clerk for 3 
the Presidency, who is responsible for documents, is 
keeper of the decrees that are passed and supervises 
the transcription of all other documents, and who 
attends the sittings of the Council. Formerly this 
officer was elected by show of hands, and the most 

147 



ARISTOTLE 

και Tovs €νΒοζοτάτους καΐ πιστότατους €χ€ΐρο- 
τόνουν, καΐ γαρ iv ται? στηλαίς προς ται? σνμ- 
μ,αχίαις καΐ προζζνίαις και πολιτβίαις ούτος άναγρά- 

4 φ^ταί• νυν δε yeyove κληρωτός, κληροΰσι δε καΐ 
ετΓΐ τους νόμους^ €Τ€ρον ος παρακάθηται ttj βουλτΙ, 

5 και άντιγράφβται καΐ ούτος ττάντα?. χ€ίροτον€Ϊ 
δε /cat ο δήμος γραμματέα τον άναγνωσόμ^νον 
αύτω καΐ ttj βουλή, καΐ ούτος ουδενό? εστί κύριος 
αλλά του avayt'cut'at. 

6 Ιίληροΐ δε καΐ Ι^ροποιούς δε'κτα τους εττί τα 
βκθύματα καλουμένους, οι τά τε μαντευτά ιερά 
θυουσιν, καν τι καλλιερησαι δε'τ^ καλΧιεροΰσι μετά 

7 των μάντεων, κλήροι δε και έτερους δε' /ca τού? 
κατ' ενιαυτόν καλουμένους, οι θυσίας τε τινας 
θύουσι και τάς πεντετηρίδας άπάσας διοικοΰσιν 
πλην ΐΐαναθηναίων . είσι δε πεντετηρίδες μία μεν 
η εις Αηλον (εστί δε και επτετηρις ενταύθα), 
δευτέρα δε Βραυρώνια, τρίτη δε 'Ηράκλεια, 
τετάρτη δε Ελευσίνια• ε' δε Πανα^τ^ναια, και 
τούτων ούΒεμια'^ εν τω αύτω εγγίνεται. νυν δε 
πρόσκειται και 'Υίφαίστια εττι' Ιίηφισοφώντος 
άρχοντος. 

^ Ιίληροΰσι δε και εις Σαλαju,t^'α άρχοντα και εις 

ΐίειραιεα Βήμαρχον, οι τά τε Διονυσία ποιοΰσι 

εκατερωθι και χορηγούς καθισταοιν εν Σιαλαμΐνι 

δε και τοϋνομα του άρχοντος αναγράφεται. 

^ e Polluce Kenyon : €πιτοντοίίΐΌμοΐ' cod. 

^ Wilamowitz-Kaibel : ονδΐμια cod. 

' άπό Blass. 

" An honourable office assigned to a citizen of another 
state who represented Athenian interests there. 

* i.e. taking place once in every four or six years : in Greek 
this is called " five-yearly," " seven-yearly." 
148 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, liv. 3-8 

distinguished and trustworthy men used to be elected, 
for this officer's name is inscribed on the monumental 
slabs above records of alliances and appointments to 
consulships " and grants of citizenship ; but now it has 
been made an office elected by lot. They also elect 4 
by lot another officer to superintend the laws, who 
attends the sittings of the Council, and he also has 
copies made of all the laws. The People also elect 5 
by show of hands a clerk to read documents to the 
Assembly and to the Council ; he has no duties except 
as reader. 

The People also elects by lot the ten sacrificial 6 
officers entitled Superintendents of Expiations, who 
offer the sacrifices prescribed by oracle, and for busi- 
ness requiring omens to be taken watch for good 
omens in co-operation with the soothsayers. It also 7 
elects by lot ten others called the Yearly Sacrificial 
Officers, who perform certain sacrifices and administer 
all the four-yearly ^ festivals except the Panathenaic 
Festival. One of the four-yearly festivals is the 
Mission to Delos (and there is also a six-yearly "^ 
festival there), a second is the Brauronia, a third the 
Heraclea, and a fourth the Eleusinia ; a fifth is the 
Panathenaic, which is not held in the same year as 
any of the others mentioned. There has now been 
added the Festival of Hephaestus, instituted in the 
archonship of Cephisophon. 329 b.c. 

They also elect by lot an archon for Salamis and 8 
a demarch for Peiraeus, who hold the Festivals of 
Dionysus ^ in each of those places and appoint Choir- 
leaders ; at Salamis the name of the archon is re- 
corded in an inscription. 

" Both the text and the facts are most uncertain. 
'^ τά Αιοννσια τά κατ' aypous. 

149 



ARISTOTLE 

1 LV. Αύται μ€ν οΰν αϊ άρχαΐ κληρωταί re 
και κύριαι των ειρημβνων πάντων^ elaLv. οι 8e 
καλούμενοι ivvea άρχοντες το μεν εζ ο,ρχης ον 
τρόπον καθίσταντο εΐρηταΐ' νυν δε κληροΰσιν θεσμο- 
θετας μεν εζ καΐ γραμματέα τούτοις, ετι δ' 
άρχοντα και βασιλέα και πολεμαρχον, κατά μέρος 

2 εζ εκάστης φυλής. Βοκιμάζονται δ' ούτοι πρώτον 
μεν εν ttj βουλτ^ τοις φ' , πλην του γραμματέως , 
οΰτος δ' εν 8ικαστηρίω μόνον, ωσττερ οι άλλοι 
άρχοντες {πάντες γαρ και οι κληρωτοί και οΐ 
χειροτονητοι 8οκιμασθεντες άρχουσιν), οι δ' εννέα 
άρχοντες εν τε τη βουλή και πάλιν εν 8ικαστηρίω. 
και πρότερον μεν ουκ ηρχεν οντιν" άποΒοκιμάσειεν 
ή βουλή, νυν δ' εφεσίς eWiv* εις το ^ικαστηριον, 

3 και τοΰτο κύριόν εστί της δοκιμασίας, επερωτώσιν 
δ' οταΓ Βοκιμάζωσιν πρώτον μεν " τις σοι πατήρ 
και πόθεν τών Βήμων, και τις πατρός πατήρ, και 
τις μητηρ, και τις μητρός πατήρ και πόθεν τών 
Βημων;" μετά δε ταύτα ei εστίν αύτω Άπόλλωΐ' 
Πατρώο? και Zeu? 'Έιρκεΐος, και που ταΰτα τα 
ιερά εστίν είτα ηρία ει εστίν και που ταύτα* 
επεηα γονέας ει ευ ποιεί, κεί^ τά τέλη τελεΐ, και 
τάς στρατείας ει έστράτευται. ταΰτα δ' άν- 
ερωτησας " κάλει" φησιν "τούτων τους μάρ- 

4 τυράς." επειΒάν Βέ παράσχηται τους μάρτυρας, 
επερωτά "τούτου βούλεταί τι? κατηγορεΐν;" 
καν μεν ^ τις κατήγορος, δού? κατηγορίαν και 

^ Ίτάντων Kenyon : νράξβων alii : ... ων cod. 
* Thalheim : και cod. {καΐ τά τέλη <ei> Wilamowitz-Kaibel). 



" Chaps, iii., viii., xxii., xxvi. 
150 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, lv. 1-4 

LV. These offices, then, are elected by lot and have 1 
authority over all the matters stated. As to the 
officials designated the Nine Archons, the mode of 
their appointment that was originally in force has 
been stated before * ; but now the six Lawgivers and 
their clerk are elected by lot, and also the Archon,** 
King and War-lord, from each tribe in turn. The 2 
qualifications of these are first checked in the Council 
of Five Hundred, except the Clerk, but he is checked 
only in a Jury-court, as are the other officials (for all 
of them, both those elected by lot and those elected 
by show of hands, have their qualifications checked 
before they hold office), while the Nine Archons are 
checked in the Council and also again in a Jury- 
court, Formerly any official not passed by the 
Council did not hold office, but now there is an 
appeal to the Jury-court, and with this rests the final 
decision as to qualification. The questions put in 3 
examining qualifications are, first, ' Who is your 
father and to what deme does he belong, and who is 
your father's father, and who your mother, and who 
her father and what his deme ? ' then whether he has 
a Family Apollo and Homestead Zeus," and where 
these shrines are ; then whether he has family tombs 
and where they are ; then whether he treats his 
parents well, and whether he pays his taxes, and 
whether he has done his military service. And after 
putting these questions the officer says, ' Call your 
witnesses to these statements.' And when he has 4 
produced his witnesses, the officer further asks, * Does 
anybody wish to bring a charge against this man ? ' And 
if any accuser is forthcoming, he is given a hearing and 

* i.e. the Archon Eponymus, see liv. 4 n. 
« The gods of the Athenian's home. 

151 



ARISTOTLE 

άττολογίαν, ούτω 8ί8ωσιν iv μεν rfj βουΧγι την 
επιχβίροτονίαν iv δε τω Βικαστηρίω την φηφον 
iav δε μηΒβΙς βονληται κατηγορβΐν, €νθνς διδωσι 
την φηφον και ττρότζρον μ€ν €Ϊς ενββαλλζ την 
φηφον, νυν δ' ανάγκη ττάντας έ'στι ^ίαφηφίζζσθαι, 
πβρί αυτών. Ινα αν τις πονηρός ών άπαλλάζη τους 
κατηγόρους €πι τοις Βικασταΐς yevT^rac τούτον 
5 άπο8οκιμάσαι. 8οκιμασθ€ν^ δε τούτον τον τρόπον, 
βα^ίζουσι προς τον λίθον βφ* ου τα τόμι eartf 
(ε0 ου και οι 8ιαιτηται όμόσαντβς αποφαίνονται 
τα? δίαιτα? και οι μάρτυρες έζόμνυνται τάς μαρ- 
τυρίας), άναβαντ€ς δ' εττι τούτον ομνυουσιν δικαίως 
άρξειν και κατά τους νόμους, και δώρα μη 
ληφεσθαι της άρχης eveKa, καν τι λάβωσιν αν- 
δριάντα άναθησειν χρυσοΰν. εντεύθεν δ' όμόσαντες 
εις άκρόπολιν βα8ίζουσιν και πάλιν εκεί ταυτά 
ομνυουσι, και /χετα ταϋτα εις την άρχην είσ- 
ερχονται. 

1 LVI. Ααμβάνουσι δε και πάρεδρους δ τε άρχων 
και 6 ^ασιλεί)? και 6 πολέμαρχος δυο έκαστος 
ους αν βούληται, και ούτοι δοκιμάζονται εν τώ 
Βικαστηρίω πριν παρεΒρεύειν, και εύθύνας διδοασιι/ 
επάν παρεΒρεύσωσιν . 

2 Και ό μεν άρχων ευθύς εισελθών πρώτον μεν 
κηρύττει δσα τις εΐχεν πριν αυτόν είσελθεΐν εις 
την άρχην ταΰτ εχειν και κρατεΐν μέχρι άρχης 

3 τέλους. έπειτα χορηγούς τραγωΒοΐς καθίστησι 
τρεις, εξ απάντων ^Αθηναίων τους πλουσιωτάτους' 
πρότερον δε και κωμωΒοΐς καθιστή πέντε, νυν δε 

^ δοκιμασθέν<τΐί'> Rutherford. 
152 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, lv. 4— lvi. 3 

the man on trial an opportunity of defence, and then 
the official puts the question to a shoAV of hands in the 
Council or to a vote by ballot in the Jury-court ; but 
if nobody wishes to bring a charge against him, he 
puts the vote at once ; formerly one person used to 
throw in his ballot-pebble, but now all are compelled to 
vote one way or the other about them, in order that 
if anyone being a rascal has got rid of his accusers," 
it may rest with the jurymen to disqualify him. And 5 
when the matter has been checked in this way, they 
go to the stone on which are the victims cut up for 
sacrifice (the one on which Arbitrators also take oath 
before they issue their decisions, and persons sum- 
moned as witnesses swear that they have no evidence 
to give), and mounting on this stone they swear 
that they will govern justly and according to the laws, 
and will not take presents on account of their office, 
and that if they should take anything they will set 
up a golden statue. After taking oath they go from 
the stone to the Acropolis and take the same oath 
again there, and after that they enter on their office. 

LVI. The Archon, the King and the War-lord also 1 
take two assessors each, chosen by themselves, and 
the qualifications of these are checked in the Jury- 
court before they hold office, and they are called to 
account when they retire from office. 

Immediately on coming into office the Archon first 2 
makes proclamation that all men shall hold until 
the end of his office those possessions and powers 
that they held before his entry into office. Then he 3 
appoints three Chorus-leaders for the tragedies, the 
wealthiest men among all the Athenians ; and for- 
merly he used also to appoint five for the comedies, 

" i.e. has bribed them to let him oiF. 

153 



ARISTOTLE 

τούτους^ αϊ φυλαΐ φέρουσιν. erreiTa παραλαβών 
τονς χορηγούς τους Ινηνβγμένους νττο τών φυλών 
els /Διονύσια avSpdaiv καΐ τταίσΐν καΐ κωμωΒοΐς 
καΐ εΙς Θαργήλια άνΒράσιν καΐ παισίν (etat δ' οι 
μ,εν elg Αίονύσια κατά φυλάς, els Θαργήλια 8e^ 
8υ€Ϊν φυλαΐν εις, παρέχει δ' iv μ€ρα ίκατέρα 
τών φυλών) τούτοις τάς αντιφάσεις ποιεί και 
τάς σκήφεις εΙσάγει Ιάν τι? η λελητουργκη- 
κεναι φ-η πρότερον ταντην τ-ην λητουργιαν η 
ατελής ett'at λελητουργηκως ετεραν λτ^τουργιαν και 
τών -χρόνων αύτώ της ατέλειας μή εζεληλυθοτων 
ή τα ετη μή γεγονεναι (δει γαρ τον τοις τταισιν 
■χορηγοΰντα ύπερ τετταράκοντα ετη γεγονεναι). 
καθίστησι he και εις Αήλον χορηγούς και αρχι- 
θεωρον τώ τριακοντορίω τώ τους ήιθεους αγοντι. 

4 πομπών δ' επεμελεΐται της τε τω Ασκληπιώ 
γινομένης όταν οικουρώσι μύσται, και της Αιο- 
ννσίων τών μεγάλων μετά τών επιμελητών, ους 
πρότερον μεν 6 Βήμος εχειροτόνει 8εκα οντάς, 
και τά εις τήν πομπήν άναλώματα παρ αυτών 
άνήλισκον, νυν δ' ενα της φυλής εκάστης κλήροι 

5 και διδωσιν εις τήν κατασκευήν εκατόν μνάς' επι- 
μελείται δε και της εις 0apyr;Aia και της τώ Διι 
τώ Ίίωτήρι. Βιοικεΐ δε και τον αγώνα τών Αιονυ- 
σίων ούτος και τών Θαργηλίων, εορτών μεν ούν 

6 €πιμελεΐται τούτων, γραφαι δε και 8ίκαι λαγχά- 

^ Wyse : Toirrois cod. * δέ supplent edd. 



" A festival in May, at which there were competitions of 
cyclic choruses and a procession (§ 5). 

* A citizen appointed to one of these expensive public 
offices could challenge another as better able to afford it, 

154 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, lvi. 3-6 

but these are now returned by the Tribes. After- 
wards he receives the Chorus-leaders nominated by 
the Tribes for the men's and boys' competitions and 
the comedies at the Dionysia and for men and boys 
at the Thargeha <* (for the Dionysia one for each tribe, 
for the Thargelia one for two tribes, which take 
turns to supply them), and deals with their claims for 
substitution by exchange of property,'' and brings 
forward their claims to exemption on the ground 
of having performed that public service before, or of 
being exempt because of having performed another 
service and the period of exemption not having 
expired, or of not being of the right age (for a man 
serving as Chorus-leader for the boys must be over 
forty). He also appoints Chorus-leaders for Delos and 
a Procession-leader for the thirty-oared vessel that 
carries the youths.'' He supervises processions, the 4 
one celebrated in honour of Asclepius when initiates 
keep a watch - night, and the one at the Great 
Dionysia, in which he acts jointly with the Super- 
visors ; these w^ere formerly ten men elected by 
show of hands by the People, and they found the 
expenses of the procession out of their own pockets, 
but now they are elected by lot, one from each tribe, 
and given 100 minae for equipment ; and he also 5 
supervises the procession of Thargelia, and the one 
in honour of Zeus the Saviour. This official also 
administers the competition of the Dionysia and of 
the Thargelia. These, then, are the festivals that he 
supervises. Criminal and civil law-suits are instituted 6 

and the man challenged could only escape undertaking 
the office by exchanging estates with the challenger. 

" For the festival at Delos see liv, 7 ; boys' choruses went 
from Athens. 

155 



ARISTOTLE 

νονται προς αυτόν, άς άνακρίνας els το Βικαστήριον 
ζΐσάγζί, γονέων κακώσ^ως {αύται 8e eloiv άζήμίοι 
τω βουλομβνω διώκαν), ορφανών κακωσεως (αύται 
δ etat Λτατά των βττίτρόττων) , βτηκληρον κακώσ€ως 
(αύται Se eiai κατά των επιτρόπων και των συν- 
οικούντων), οΐκου όρφανικον κακωσβως [elai δε 
και αύται κατά των επιτρόπων), παράνοιας, idv 
τις αιτιάται τίνα παρανοοΰντα τά υπάρχοντα^ 
άπολλυναι, et? 8ατητών aipeaiv, idv τι? μη deXr] 
κοινά τα οντά νεμβσθαι, βίς επιτροπής κατάστασιν , 
€ΐς βπιτροπης διαδικασία^, €ΐς εμφανών κατά- 
στασιν, επιτροπον αυτόν εγγράφαι, κλήρων και 

7 επικληρων επιδικασιαι. επιμελείται δε και τών 
ορφανών και τών επικλήρων και τών γυναικών 
όσαι αν τελευτησαντος του ανδρός σκηπτωνται 
κύειν, και κύριος εστί τοις άΒικοΰσιν επιβάλλειν 
η είσάγειν εις το Βικαστηριον. μισθοί δε και τους 
οίκους τών ορφανών και τών επικλήρων εως αν τι? 
τετταρακαώεκετις^ γενηται και τά άποτιμήματα 
λαμβάνει, και τους επιτρόπους^ εαν μη διδώσι τοις 
παισίν τον σΐτον ούτος εισπράττει. 

1 LVII. Και ο μεν άρχων επι/χελειται* τούτων, ό 
δε ^ασιλεύ? πρώτον μεν μυστηρίων επιμελείται 
μετά τών επιμελητών ους ό 8ημος εχειροτονεΐ, δυο 
μεν εζ * Αθηναίων απάντων, ενα δ' εζ ΈιύμολπιΒών , 
ενα δε εκ Κηρύκων, έπειτα Αιονυσίων τών Έττι- 

^ Blass (alii alia) : τα . . . . απολλιψ . . cod. 

* Blass : εττικλ ακαιδΐ . . ris cod. 

* Brooks : /cat .... oij cod. 
* Blass : καιο ... at cod. 

156 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, lvi. 6— lvii. 1 

before him, and after a preliminary trial he brings 
them in before the Jury-court : actions for ill-usage 
of parents (in which anybody who wishes may act as 
prosecutor without liability to penalty) ; for ill-usage 
of orphans (which lie against their guardians) ; for 
ill-usage of an heiress (which lie against the guardians 
or the relations that they live with) ; for injury to an 
orphan's estate (these also lie against the guardians) ; 
prosecutions for insanity, when one man accuses 
another of wasting his property when insane ; actions 
for the appointment of liquidators, when a man is un- 
willing for property to be administered in partner- 
ship ; actions for the institution of guardianship ; 
actions for deciding rival claims to guardianship ; 
actions for the production of goods or documents ; 
actions for enrolment as trustee ; claims to estates 
and to heiresses. He also supervises orphans and 7 
heiresses and women professing to be with child 
after the husband's death, and he has absolute 
power to fine offenders against them or to bring them 
before the Jury-court. He grants leases of houses 
belonging to orphans and heiresses until they are 
fourteen years of age, and receives the rents, and he 
exacts maintenance for children from guardians who 
fail to supply it. 

LVII. These are the matters superintended by the 1 
Archon. But the King superintends, first, the mys- 
teries, in co-operation with Superintendents elected 
by show of hands by the People, two from the whole 
body of the citizens, one from the Eumolpidae 
and one from the Heralds." Next the Dionysia in 

" The Eumolpidae and Kerykes were two ancient priestly 
families at Athens. 

157 



ARISTOTLE 

ληναίων^' ταντα δ' earl πομττη re και αγων.^ 
την μ€ν ονν πομπην KOivfj ττέμττουσιν ο re βασιλεύς 
/cat οι ετημβληταί, τον δε aycova ^ιατίθησιν ο 
βασιλζύζ. τίθησί δε και τους των λαμπάδων 
αγώνα? απαντάς, ώς δ' €πος elrreiv και τα? 

2 πατρίους θυσίας διοικεί οΰτος πάσας, γραφαι δε 
λαγχάνονταί προς αυτόν άσβββίας, καν τις ΐ€ρω- 
σύνης άμφισβητη προς τίνα. διαδικάζει δε κ:αι τοις 
γ4ν€σι και τοις ίερεΰσι τα? αμφισβητήσεις τα? 
ύπ€ρ των γερών άπάσας οΰτος. λαγχάνονται δε 
και αι τοΰ φόνου δίκαι ττασαι προς τούτον, και ο 
προαγορβύων εϊργβσθαι των νομίμων ούτος εστίν. 

3 ει'σι δε φόνου Βίκαι και τραύματος , αν μεν εκ 
προνοίας άποκτείνη^ η τρώση, εν Άρειω πάγω, 
και φαρμάκων, εάν άποκτείνη 8ούς, και πυρκαας- 
ταύτα γαρ ή βουλή μόνα δικάζει, τών δ' ακουσίων 
και βουλευσεως καν οίκετην άποκτείνη τι? η 
μέτοικον ή ζενον, οι επι Παλλαδιω• εάν δ απο- 
κτεΐναι μεν τι? ομόλογη, φή δε κατά του? νόμους, 
οίον μοιχόν λαβών ή εν πολεμώ αγνοησας ή εν 
άθλω αγωνιζόμενος, τούτω επι Αελφινίω δικά- 
ζουσιν εάν δε φεύγων φυγήν ων άρεσις εστίν 
αιτιαν εχη άποκτεΐναι ή τρώσαί τίνα, τούτω δ εν 
Φρεάτου δικάζουσιν, ό δ' άττολογειται προσ- 

4 ορμισάμενος εν πλοίω. δικάζουσι δ' οί λαχόντε? 
ταΰτ' εφεται πλην* τών εν Άρείω πάγω γιγνο- 

^ ένΐ ληναίω Bywater. 

* Van Leeuwen : εστί . . . η . . . cod. 

8 ίττοκτύντι <jisy Papageorgios. 

* Kenyon : τα . . . ττ\•ην cod. 

" Held at the Limnae, S.E. of the Acropohs, at the end 
of January. The 7th Attic month, Gamelion (January- 
February), was in old Ionic called Lenaeon. 

158 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, lvii. 1-4 

Lenaeon '^ ; this festival consists of a procession and 
a competition, the former conducted by the King and 
the Superintendents jointly, the latter organized by 
the King. He also holds all the Torch-race Com- 
petitions ; also he is the director of practically all 
the ancestral sacrifices. He holds the court that 2 
tries charges of impiety and disputed claims to 
hereditary priesthoods. He adjudicates between 
clans and between priests in all disputed claims to 
privileges. Before him are also brought all murder 
cases, and proclamations of exclusion from customary 
rites are made by him. Trials for deliberate murder 3 
and wounding are held in the Areopagus, and for 
causing death by poison, and for arson ; for these only 
are tried by the Council, whereas involuntary homicide 
and plotting to murder, and murder of a slave or 
resident alien or foreigner, come before the court at 
the Palladium ^ ; and one who admits homicide but 
declares it to have been legal (for instance when he 
has killed a man taken in adultery), or who in war has 
killed a fellow-citizen in ignorance, or in an athletic 
contest, is tried at the Delphinium ; but if, when a 
man has taken refuge in exile after an offence that 
admits of satisfaction, he is charged with homicide 
or wounding, he is tried at the Precinct of Phreatus,<' 
and delivers his defence from a ship anchored 
near the shore. Commissioners appointed by lot 4 
try these cases, except those that are held on the 
Areopagus ; the cases are introduced by the King, 

'' This shrine and the Delphinium were probably S.E. of 
the Acropolis. 

'' Near the harbour of Zea; doubtless the eponymous 
hero was fictitious, the place being really named from a 
well, φρέαρ. If the defendant had landed he would have 
been arrested for his former offence. 

159 



ARISTOTLE 

μβνων elaayei δ' ο βασιλβύς, καΐ Βικάζουσιν ev 
ίβρω καΐ ύτταίθριοί, και ό ^ασιλ^ύ? δταν Βικάζτ) 
nepiaipeirai τον στίφανον. 6 he την αιτιαν έχων 
τον μ€ν άλλον χρόνον βΐργβται των Upcov καΐ ούδ 
et? την άγοράν νόμος ^μβαλβΐν αυτω, τότβ δ ets' 
το lepov €ΐσ£λθών άπολογ€Ϊται. όταν Se μη etSfj 
τον ΤΓΟιησαντα, τω Βράσαντι λαγχάν€ί, Βι,κάζβι δ 
ο βασίλβύζ καΐ οΐ φυλοβασίλζΐς , καΐ τα? των 
άφνχων καΐ των άλλων ζώων. 

1 LVIII. Ό δε πολέμαρχος θυβι μ^ν θυσίας την 
re τη ^Αρτ€μώ(, τη Άγροτβρα καΐ τω Έι^υαλιω, 
^ιατίθησι δ' aycoi'a τον €πιτάφίον [και]^ τοις τ€Τ€- 
λευτηκόσιν iv τω πολεμώ, καΐ Άρ/χοδιω και 

2 'AptCTToyeiTOVt et'ttyta/xara ttoicl. ^ίκαι Se λαγ- 
χάνονται προς αυτόν ΐ'διαι μόνον,^ αι re τοις 
μ,βτοίκοις καΐ τοις ΙσοτζλΙσι καΐ (αίΥ τοις προ- 
ζ4νοις γίγνόμ€ναι• καΐ δει τούτον λα^όι^τα /cat 
8ίαν€ίμαντα δέκα μ^ρη τό λα;;^όν €κάστη τη φυλή 
μ€ρος προσθ^ίναι, τους δε την φυλην δικάζοντας 

3 τοις Βιαίτηταΐς άπο8οΰναί. αυτός δ' εισάνει Οίκας 
τα? τ€ του αποστασιου και απροστασιου και 
κλήρων καΐ ζ,πικληρων τοΙς μετοίκοις, /cat ταλλ 
όσα τοις πολίταις ο άρχων ταύτα τοις μ€τοίκοίς ο 
πολέμαρχος . 

1 LIX. 01 δε θβσμοθέται πρώτον μ^ν του προ- 
γράφαι τά δικαστήρια είσι κύριοι τίσιν ημβραις 
δει δικτάζειν,* εττειτα του 8οΰναι ταΓ? αρχαΐς- 
καθότι γαρ αν ούτοι 'όώσιν, κατά τοϋτο χρώνται. 

^ Kenyon secundum Pollucem. 

' μόνον Wilamowitz-Kaibel: με»» cod. 

» Kaibel. * καθίί^ίΐν Richards. 

<• A form of Ares. 
160 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, lvii. 4— lix. 1 

and the court sits within the sacred precinct in the 
open air, and Avhen the King is acting in a case he 
takes oiF his crown. The accused man all the rest of 
the time is debarred from sacred places and is even 
forbidden by law from setting foot in the market- 
place, but at the trial he enters the precinct and 
makes his defence. When the King does not know 
who committed the act, he institutes proceedings 
against ' the guilty man,' and the King and Tribal 
Kings try the case, as also prosecutions of inanimate 
objects and animals for homicide. 

LVIII. The War-lord offers sacrifices to Artemis the 1 
Huntress and to Eny alius," and arranges the funeral 
games in honour of those who have fallen in war, and 
makes memorial offerings to Harmodius and Aristo- 
geiton. Only private law-suits are brought before 2 
him in which resident aliens, ordinary and privileged, 
and foreign consuls are concerned ; he has to take 
the list of cases and divide it into ten portions 
and assign one portion by lot to each tribe, and to 
assign the jurymen for each tribe to the Arbitrators. 
He himself brings forward cases in which resident aliens 3 
are concerned, on charges of acting without their pro- 
tectors ^ or of lacking a protector, and as to estates 
and heiresses ; and all other actions that in the case 
of citizens are brought in by the Archon, in the case 
of resident aliens are introduced by the War-lord. 

LIX. The Lawgivers are responsible, first, for 1 
preparing lists of the days on which the jury-courts 
are to sit, and then for giving them to the officers, for 
these follow the arrangements that the Lawgivers 

* A metoikos (other than the isoteleis, who for taxation 
and military service ranked with citizens) had to be enrolled 
under a citizen, whose sanction was necessary for his actions 
if important. 

Μ l6l 



ARISTOTLE 

2 €Τ6 δε τάς ^Ισαγγελίας ^ΙσαγγέΧλουσιν^ €ΐς τον 
Βημον, καΐ τάς καταχαροτονίας /cat τά^ προβολάς 
αττασα? ^ισαγουσιν ούτοι, και γραφας τταρανομων, 
και νόμον μη Ιτητη^€ΐον deivai, καΐ ττροε^ρικην 

3 και €τηστατικΎ]ν καΙ στρατηγοΐς evOvvas. βίσΐ Se 
και γραφαΐ προς αυτούς ών τταράστασις τίθεται, 
ξενίας καΐ Βωροξενίας {αν τις δώρα 8ούς αποφυγή 
την ζβνίαν) και συκοφαντίας και δώρων και 
φευ^βγγραφης και φβυΒοκλητείας και βουλευσεως 

4 και αγραφιου και μοιχείας. εισάγουσιν δε και 
τα? δοκιμασίας ταΓ? άρχαΐς άττάσαι?, και τους 
απεφηφισμενους υπό των δημοτών, και τάς κατα- 

6 γνώσεις τάς εκ της βουλής. εισάγουσι δε και 
8ίκας ιΒίας, εμπορικάς και μεταλλικάς, και Βουλών, 
αν τις τον ελεύθερον κακώς λεγη. και επι- 
κληροΰσι ται? άρχαΐς ούτοι τά δικαστήρια τά τ^ ιδία 

6 και τα δτ^/χοσια. και τά σύμβολα τά προς τάς 
πόλεις ούτοι κυροϋσι, και τάς 8ίκας τάς από τών 
συμβόλων εισάγουσι, και τά φευ^ομαρτύρια τά' 
εζ 'Αρείου πάγου. 

7 Ύούς δε 8ικαστάς κληροΰσι πάντες* οι εννέα άρ- 
χοντες Βεκατος δ' ο γραμματεύς 6 τών θεσμοθετών, 
τους της αύτοϋ φυλής έκαστος. 

1 LX. Τα μεν ούν περί τους θ' άρχοντας τούτον 
έχει τόν τρόπον, κληροΰσι δε και άθλοθετας 8εκα 
άνΒρας, ενα τής φυλής εκάστης, ούτοι δε δοκτι- 
μασθεντες άρχουσι τετταρα ετη, και Βιοικοΰσι 
την τε πομπήν τών ΥΙαναθηναίων και τόν aycDva 

^ <&s άν Tivfsy (ίσαγγέλλωσι Blass: eic. . . . δημοί' seel. 
Wilamowitz-Kaibel. * τ suppletum a Kaibel. 

* τά suppletum a Bernadakis. 

* πάντΐί coni. Kenyon : iruvras cod. 
162 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, lix. 2— lx. 1 

assign. Moreover it is they who bring before the 2 
People indictments, and bring in all votes of re- 
moval from office, preliminary informations sent on 
by the Assembly, impeachments for illegal procedure, 
proceedings against inexpedient legislation, a suit 
against a President or a Superintendent, and audits 
imposed on Generals. Also they hear indictments for 3 
which a fee is paid, on charges of alien birth, alien 
corruption (that is, if a person charged with alien 
birth secures his acquittal by bribery), malicious 
information, bribery, false entry of public debts, 
personation of a witness, conspiracy, non-registration, 
adultery. They also introduce " the tests of qualifica- 4 
tion for all offices, and claims to citizenship rejected 
by vote of the deme, and verdicts of guilty passed 
on from the Council.^ They also introduce private 5 
actions in commercial and mining cases, and actions 
against slaves for slandering a freeman. And they 
assign the public and the private jury-courts by lot 
among the magistrates. They ratify contracts with 6 
other states, and bring into court suits arising under 
those contracts, and prosecutions for false witness 
instituted by the Areopagus. 

All the Nine Archons with the Lawgivers' Clerk, 7 
making ten, elect by lot the jurymen, each electing 
those of his own tribe. 

LX. These are the functions of the Nine Archons. 1 
They also elect by lot ten men as Stewards of the 
Games, one from each tribe, who when passed as 
qualified hold office for four years, and administer the 
procession of the Panathenaic Festival, and the con- 

" i.e. before the bodies that checked these qualifications, 
see Iv. 2-4. * See xliv. 2 fin. 

163 



ARISTOTLE 

της μουσικής /cat τον γυμνικον ά^ώι^α και την 
ιππο8ρομίαν, καΐ τον π€ττλον ποιούνται, και τους 
αμφορ€Ϊς ποιούνται μετά της βουλής, και το eXaiov 

2 τοις άθληταΐς άπο8ι8όασι. συλλέγεται δε τό^ 
ελαιον άπο των μορίων εισπράττει 8έ τους τά 
χωρία κεκτημένους εν οΐς αϊ μορίαι είσιν 6 άρχων, 
τρι ημικοτύλια απο του στελέχους εκάστου, πρό- 
τερον δ επώλει τον καρπόν η πόλις, και ει τις 
εξορύζειεν ελαιαΐ' μορίαν η κατάζειεν, εκρινεν η 
εξ Αρείου πάγου βουλή, και ει του καταγνοίη, 
θανάτω τούτον εζημίουν. εζ ου δβ το ελαιον 6 
το χωρίον κεκτημένος άποτίνει, 6 μεν νόμος εστίν, 
η δε κρίσις καταλελυταΐ' το δ'^ ελαιον εκ του 
κτήματος, ουκ άπο των στελεχών, εστί τη πόλει. 

3 συλλεζας ουν 6 άρχων το εφ^ εαυτού γιγνόμενον 
τοις τα/χιαι? παρα8ίΒωσιν εις άκρόπολιν, και ουκ 
εστίν άι^α^δτ^ι^αι πρότερον εις "Αρειον πάγον πριν 
αν άπαν τταραδώ τοις τα/χιαι?. οι 8ε ταμίαι τον 
μεν άλλον χρόνον τηροΰσιν εν άκροπόλει, τοΖς δε 
ΙΙαναθηναίοις άπομετροΰσι τοις άθλοθεταις, οι δ' 
αθλοθεται τοις νικώσι των αγωνιστών, εστί γάρ 
άθλα τοις μεν την μουσικήν νικώσιν άργύριον^ και 
χρυσά, τοις δε την εύανΒρίαν άσπίΒες, τοις δε τον 
γυμνικον αγώνα και την ιπποΒρομιαν ελαιον. 

1 LXI. ^ειροτονοΰσι δε και τάς προς τον πόλεμον 
αρχάς άπάσας, στρατηγούς 8εκα, πρότερον μεν 
άφ' εκάστης* φυλής ενα, νυν δ' εζ απάντων, και 
τούτους 8ιατάττουσι τη χειροτονία, ενα μεν επί 

^ 5k τό Richards : τοδ cod. * δ' : yap coni. Blass. 

* Wilamowitz-Kaibel : apyvpia cod. 

* έκάστηί supplevit Kenyon : αφφυ\η$ cod. 

" See xlix. 3 n. 
164 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, lx. 1— lxi. l 

test in music, the gymnastic contest and the horse- 
race, and have the Robe** made, and in conjunction 
with the Council have the vases ^ made, and assign the 
olive-oil to the competitors. The oil is procured from 2 
the sacred trees ; and the Archon levies it from the 
owners of the farms in which the trees are, three 
quarters of a pint from each trunk. Formerly the state 
used to sell the fruit, and anybody who dug up or cut 
down a sacred olive-tree was tried by the Council of 
Areopagus, and if found guilty punished vnth death ; 
but ever since the olive-oil has been provided as rent by 
the owner of the farm, though the law still stands, the 
trial has gone out ; and the state's claim to the oil 
is calculated on the estate and not on the number 
of trees.'' So the Archon collects the tribute of oil 3 
accruing in his year, and passes it on to the Treasurers 
at the Acropolis, and he is not allowed to go up to 
the Areopagus before he has handed the full quantity 
over to the Treasurers. These have it in their keeping 
in the Acropolis always, except that at the Pan- 
athenaic Festival they dole it out to the Directors 
of the Games and these to the victorious competitors. 
For the prizes are for the victors in music silver money 
and gold vessels, for those in manly beauty shields, 
and for those in the gymnastic contest and the horse- 
race olive-oil. 

LXI. They also elect by show of hands all the 1 
military officers — ten Generals, formerly one from 
each tribe, but now from all the citizens together, and 
the vote decides the assignment of duties to these 

* In athletic contests the prize was a vase of oil and a 
garland of foliage from the sacred olive-trees. 

■^ i.e. the amount per tree stated above is only approxi- 
mately calculated. 

165 



ARISTOTLE 

Tovs όπλίτας, os ηγείται των οπλιτών αν εξίωσι, 
€va δ €πΙ την χωράν, os φνλάττ€ΐ, καν πόλεμος 
ev Trj χωρά γίγνηται πολεμεί ούτος• 8νο δ' επΙ τον 
Ueipaiea, τον μεν εις την Μουνυχίαν τον δ' εις 
την Άκτην, οΐ της φυλακής^ επιμελούνται τών^ 
εν ΙΙειραιεΐ' ενα δ' επι τάς συμμορίας, δς τους 
τε τριήραρχους καταλέγει και τάς άντώόσεις αύτοΐς 
ποιεί και τα? διαδικασία? αύτοΐς εΙσάγει• τους δ' 
άλλους προς τα παρόντα πράγματα εκπεμπουσιν. 

2 επιχειροτονία δ' αυτών εστί κατά την πρυτανείαν 
εκάστην, ει 8οκοΰσιν καλώς άρχειν καν τίνα άπο- 
χειροτονησωσιν , κρίνουσιν εν τω 8ικαστηρίω, καν 
μεν άλω τιμώσιν δ τι χρη παθεΐν η άποτεΐσαι, αν 
δ αποφυγή πάλιν άρχει, κύριοι 8ε εισιν οται/ 
ηγώνται και 8ησαί τόν^ άτακτοΰντα και εκ- 
κηρΰζαι* και επιβολην επιβάλλειν ουκ ειώθασι 8ε 
επιβάλλειν. 

3 ^ειροτονοΰσι 8έ και ταζιάρχους 8εκα, ενα της 
φυλής εκάστης• ούτος δ' ηγείται τών φυλετών και 
λοχαγούς καθίστησιν. 

4 Ύ^ειροτονοϋσι 8ε και ιππάρχους 8ύο εζ απάντων 
ούτοι δ' ηγούνται τών ιππέων, 8ιελόμενοι τάς 
φυλάς ε' εκάτερος• κύριοι 8έ τών αύτώΐ' είσιν ώνπερ^ 
οι στρατηγοί κατά τών οπλιτών, επιχειροτονία 8ε 
γίνεται και^ τούτων. 

5 ^ειροτονοΰσι 8έ και φυλάρχους ι',' ενα της 

^ φνλακηί coni. Kenyon, φνλης secundum codicem dedit. 

* των Wilamowitz-Kaibel : καίτων cod. 

•'' Tiv cod. : corr. Wilamowitz-Kaibel. 

* κ-ηρνξαι cod. : corr. Blass. 

' (ΙσΙ» ώντΓΐρ Wilamowitz-Kaibel : wvirepeiaiv cod. 

• και suppleuit Gertz. 

' nnmerum i' suppleuit Richards. 

166 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, lxi. 1-5 

— one being appointed to the heavy infantry, who 
commands them on foreign expeditions ; one to the 
country, who guards it and commands in any war 
that takes place in it ; two to Peiraeus, one of them 
to Munychia and the other to the Point, who super- 
intend the protection of the population of Peiraeus ; 
one to the Symmories,'* who enrols the Captains of 
triremes and carries out their exchanges and intro- 
duces their claims for exemption ; and the others they 
dispatch on expeditions as occasion arises. A con- 2 
firmatory vote is taken in each presidency upon the 
satisfactoriness of their administration ; and if this 
vote goes against any officer he is tried in the jury- 
court, and if convicted, the penalty or fine to be 
imposed on him is assessed, but if he is acquitted he 
resumes office. When in command of a force they 
have power to punish breach of discipline with im- 
prisonment, exile, or the infliction of a fine ; but a 
fine is not usual. 

They also elect by show of hands ten Regimental 3 
Commanders, one of each tribe ; these lead their 
fellow-tribesmen and appoint company-commanders. 

They also elect by show of hands two Cavalry 4 
Commanders from the whole body of citizens ; these 
lead the Knights, each commanding a division con- 
sisting of five tribes, and their powers are the same as 
those of the Generals over the heavy infantry. The 
Cavalry Commanders' election also is submitted to a 
confirmatory vote. 

They also elect by show of hands ten Tribal Com- 5 

" The 20 companies in which the 1200 richest citizens 
were enrolled for payment of the ΐίσφορά or property-tax 
levied to meet emergency expenses of war. 

167 



ARISTOTLE 

φνλης, τον ηγησόμ€νον των Ιππβων^ ωσττβρ οι 

ταζίαρχοί τών οπλιτών. 
6 ^eipoTOVouat 8e καΐ εΙς Αημνον ΐππαρχον, δς 

e77t/xeAetTai τών ίττττβων τών iv Αημνω. 
1 ^(ΐροτονοΰσι Se καΐ ταμίαν της Παράλου καΐ 

νϋν^ της του "Αμμωνος. 

1 LXII. At δε κληρωτοί άρχαΐ ττρότβρον μ€ν ήσαν 
at μβν μ€τ evvia αρχόντων €Κ της φυλής δλης 
κληρουμ€ναι, at δ' ei^ Θησβίω κληρούμ^ναι δι- 
ηροΰντο ets" τους 8ημους• €π€ώη δ' €πώλουν οΐ 
8ημοι, καΐ ταύτας €κ της φυλής δλης κληροΰσι, 
πλην βουλευτών καΐ φρουρών τούτους δ' etj τους 
8ημους άποΒώοασι. 

2 Μισθοφοροΰσι δβ πρώτον ο 8ημος ται? μ€ν 
άλλαί? €κκλησίαις Βραχμην, τη δε κυρία ivvea 
οβόλους^' €π€ίτα τα δικαστήρια τρεις όβολούς• €ΪΘ' 
η βουλή π€ντ€ οβολούς. τοις Se πρυτανεύουσιν €ΐς 
σίτησιν όβολός προστίθεται [δέκα προστίθενται].* 
έ'ττειτ' εις σίτησιν λαμβάνουσιν εννέα άρχοντες 
τετταρας όβολούς έκαστος, και παρατρεφουσι 
κήρυκα και αύλητην επειτ' άρχων εις Σ^αλαμΐνα 
Βραχμην της ημέρας, άθλοθεται δ εν πρυτανείω 
^ειπνοΰσι τον 'Έικατομβαιώνα μήνα orar η τά 
Eiat'a^Tyvaia, αρζαμενοι από της τετρα8ος ιστά- 
μενου, άμφικτύονες εις Αηλον ^ραχμην της ημέρας 
εκάστης εκ Αηλου λαμβάνουσι.^ λαμβάνουσι δε 

^ τών ί-πττέων suppleuit Kenyon. 

* νυν Blass: erasuni, δίχα legit Kenyon. 

' 6β6\ουί suppletum a Wilamowitz-Kaibel. 

« Blass, 
' λαμβάνουσι suppleuit Kenyon (cf. Ivii. 2). 
168 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, lxi. 5— lxii. 2 

manders, one for each tribe, to lead the cavalry as the 
Regimental Commanders lead the heavy infantry. 

They also elect by show of hands a Cavalry Com- 6 
mander for Lemnos, to take control of the cavalry in 
that island. 

They also elect by show of hands a Treasurer of 7 
the Paralus," and at the present day a Treasurer of 
the ship of Ammon. 

LXII. The officials elected by lot were formerly 1 
those elected from the whole tribe together with the 
Nine Archons and those now elected in the temple of 
Theseus who used to be divided among the demes ; 
but since the demes began to sell their offices, the 
latter also are elected by lot from the whole tribe, 
excepting members of the Council and Guards ^ ; 
these they entrust to the demes. 

Payment for public duties is as follows : first, the 2 
People draw a drachma for ordinary meetings of the 
Assembly, and a drachma and a half for a sovereign 
meeting <= ; second, the Jury-courts half a drachma ; 
third, the Council five obols ; and those acting as 
president have an additional obol for food. Also the 
Nine Archons get four obols each for food, and have 
to keep a herald and a flute-player as well ; and the 
archon for Salamis gets a drachma a day. Games- 
directors dine in the Prytaneum in the month of 
Hecatombaeon, during the Panathenaic Festival, 
from the fourth of the month onward. Amphictyons 
for Delos get a drachma a day from Delos. All the 

" One of the state triremes used for embassies, etc. The 
other, the Salaminia, was superseded by the one named 
after Zeus Ammon, specially used to convey missions to 
Cyrene on the way to the shrine of Zeus Ammon. 

* Possibly the guards of the docks, mentioned at xxiv. 3. 

" See xliii. 4. 

169 



ARISTOTLE 

/cat οσαι αποστέλλονται άρχαΐ ei? Σιάμον η Υικΰρον 
η Αημνον η "Ιμβρον els σίτησιν άργύρι,ον. 
3 ApxeLv δε τα? μβν κατά πόλβμον αρχάς ε^εστι 
ττλβονάκίς, των δ' άλλων ονΒβμίαν, πλην βου- 
λευσαι δι?. 

1 LXIII. Τα δε Βικαστήρια κληροΰσιν οι θ' άρ- 
χοντες κατά φυλάς, 6 δε γραμματεύς των θεσμό - 

2 θετών της Βεκάτης φυλής. ^ εϊσο8οί δε elatv εΙς 
τα δικαστήρια δε'κτα, μία τη φυλή εκάστη, και 
κληρωτήρια είκοσι, δυο τη φυλή εκάστη, καΐ 
κιβώτια εκατόν, 8εκα τη φυλή εκάστη, και έτερα 
κιβώτια εις ά^ εμβάλλεται τών λα;!^οντων δικαστών 
τα ττινακια, και ύ8ρίαι δυο και βακτηρίαι παρα- 
τίθενται κατά την εί'σοδον' εκάστην δσοιπερ οι 
δικασται, και βάλανοι εις την υδριαν εμβάλλονται 
ισαι ται$• βακτηρίαις, γεγραπται δε ε'ν ταΓ? βαλάνοις 
τά στοιχεία άπο του ενδεκάτου, του λ,* οσαπερ αν 

3 μελλη τά δικαστήρια πληρωθήσεσθαι. Βικάζειν δ' 
εζεστιν τοις υπέρ λ' ετΐ7 γεγονόσιν, όσοι αυτών μη 
οφειλουσιν τω 8ημοσίω η άτιμοι είσιν εάν 8ε τι? 
8ικάζη οίς^ μη εζεστιν, ενδείκνυται και εις το 
8ικαστηριον εισάγεται, εάν δ' άλω προστιμώσιν 
αύτώ οι δικασται ο τι άν 8οκη άζιος είναι παθεϊν 
η άποτισαι• εάν δε αργυρίου τιμηθη δει αύτον δε- 

^ Tjj δΐκάτΎ} φν'ΚΎΐ ? Richards. 

^ κιβώτια δέκα ei's ά (uel ors)alii: κιβω Cod. 

^ Kenyon : Ιζοδοί' Hommel •. e . . . cod. 
* Kenyon: post λ inserit τριακοστού (inter pretans) cod. 
^ ψ Richards. 

° 'The dicasts in each tribe are distributed over all the 
10 divisions into which all the dicasts are divided. In each 
tribe all the tickets {πινάκια) bearing the names of the dicasts 
in the division A are placed in the first κιβωτών, those of 
170 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, lxii. 2— lxiii. 3 

officials sent to Samos, Scyros, Lemnos or Imbros also 
get money for food. 

The military offices may be held repeatedly, but 3 
none of the others, except that a man may become a 
member of the Council twice. 

LXIII. The Jury-courts are elected by lot by the 1 
Nine Archons by tribes, and the Clerk of the Law- 
givers from the tenth tribe. The courts have ten 2 
entrances, one for each tribe, twenty rooms, two for 
each tribe, in which courts are allotted to jurors, a 
hundred small boxes, ten for each tribe," and other 
boxes into which the tickets of the jurymen drawn by 
lot are thrown, and two urns. Staves are placed at 
each entrance, as many as there are jurymen, and 
acorns to the same number as the staves are thrown 
into the urn, and on the acorns are written the letters 
of the alphabet, starting with the eleventh, lambda, as 
many as the courts that are going to be filled. Right 3 
to sit on juries belongs to all those over thirty years 
old who are not in debt to the Treasury or dis- 
franchised. If any unqualified person sits on a jury, 
information is laid against him and he is brought 
before the jury-court, and if convicted the jurymen 
assess against him whatever punishment or fine he is 
thought to deserve ; and if given a money fine, he has 

division Β in the second, and so on for all the 10 divisions. 
According to the number of dicasts required, an equal 
number of tickets is draΛvn by lot from each of the 100 
κφώτια. Each ticket so drawn has a court assigned to it 
by lot ; and the tickets are now all placed in the second set 
of 10 κίβώτια, all tickets assigned to dicasts of any special 
court being placed in the κιβωτών which bears the letter 
corresponding to that court. The names of all the dicasts 
selected to serve are thus distributed over the several courts 
that are to sit on the day in question ' (Sandys). See further 
ch. Ixiv. 

171 



ARISTOTLE 

SeaOaL €ως αν εκτίσΊ] τό re πρότερον οφλημα €φ' 
ώ βνβΒζίχθη και δ τι αν αύτω προστιμ-ήσ-η τό 

4 ^ικαστιηριον . €χ€ΐ δ' ζκαστος δικαστή? ev πινάκιον 
ττύζινον, Ιπιγεγραμμένον τό όνομα τό iavrov πα- 
τρόθβν και τοΰ 8'ημου και γράμμα ev των στοι- 
χ€ΐων μ^χρι τοΰ κ• νβνβμηνται γαρ κατά φυλάς 
δεκτά μ€ρη οι δι/cασταt, παραπλησίως Ισοι iv 
€Κάστω τω γράμματι. 

5 Εττειδάν δε ό θεσμοθίτιις €πικληρώ(Γη τά γράμ- 
ματα α δει ττροσπαρατίθεσθαι τοις Βικαστηρίοις, 
€π€θηκ€ φβρων 6 υπηρέτης €φ' €καστον τό Βικα- 
στηριον το γράμμα το λαχόν. 

Only fragments of the remaining pages of the ms. 
survive, much defaced. The most legible passages are 
here appended, gaps having been filled in without note 
where the restoration is generally accepted or is very 
probable. 

1 LXIV. Τά δε κιβώτια τά δέκα κείται ev τω 
€μ7Γροσθ€ν της εισόδου κα^' €κάστην την φυλην. 
βπιγβγραπται δ εττ αϋτώι^ τά στοι^^εΐα μ^χρι τοΰ 
κ. εττειδάν δ' €μβάλωσιν οι δικασται τά πινάκια 
€ΐς το κιβώτιον ε0' ου αν η βττιγεγραμμένον το 
γράμμα το αύτο owep im τω πινακίω €στιν αύτω 
των στοιχείων, Βιασείσαντος τοΰ ύττηρ4του έλκει 6 
θεσμοθέτης εζ εκάστου τοΰ κιβωτίου ττινάκιον εν 

2 ούτος δε καλείται εμπήκτης, και εμττηγνυσι τά 
πινάκια τά εκ τοΰ κιβωτίου εις την κανονίΒα 
εφ 'ής τό αυτό γράμμα επεστιν όπερ επι τοΰ 
κιβωτίου, κληροΰται δε ούτος ϊνα μη άει 6 αυτός 
εμπηγνύων κακουργη. εισι δε κανονίΒες πεντε^ 

172 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, lxiii. 3— lxiv. 2 

to go to prison until he has paid both the former debt, 
for which the information was laid, and whatever 
additional sum has been imposed on him as a fine by 
the court. Each juryman has one box-wood ticket, 4 
with his own name and that of his father and deme 
written on it, and one letter of the alphabet as far as 
kappa ; for the jurymen of each tribe are divided 
into ten sections, approximately an equal number 
under each letter. 

As soon as the Lawgiver has drawn by lot the 5 
letters to be assigned to the courts, the attendant 
immediately takes them and affixes to each court its 
allotted letter. 



LXIV. The ten boxes lie in front of the entrance for 1 
each tribe. They have inscribed on them the letters 
as far as kappa. When the jurymen have thrown 
their tickets into the box on which is inscribed the 
same letter of the alphabet as is on the ticket itself, 
the attendant shakes them thoroughly and the Law- 
giver draws one ticket from each box. This attendant 2 
is called the Affixer, and he affixes the tickets taken 
from the box to the ledged frame on which is the 
same letter that is on the box. This attendant is 
chosen by lot, in order that the same person may not 
always affix the tickets and cheat. There are five 

^ πέντ€ Blass, 5έκα alii : lacunam cod. 

173 



ARISTOTLE 

3 iv €κάστω των κληρωτηρίων. όταν Se ζμβάλτ} 
τους κύβους, 6 άρχων την φυλην κλ-ηροΐ κατά 
κληρωτηριον. elal 8e κύβοι χαλκοΐ μελανές καΙ 
Χζυκοί• όσους δ' αν hlrj λαχ^ΐν Βίκαστάς, τοσούτοι 
€μβάλλοντα(, λευκοί, κατά ττάντ€ πινάκια €Ϊς, οι 
δε μΙΧανβς τον αύτον τρόπον, επεώάν δ' i^aiprj^ 
τους κύβους, καλβΐ τους ξίληχότας 6 κηρυζ' 

4 υπάρχει he και 6 €μπ'ήκτης βίς τον αριθμόν. 6 Sc 
κληθ€ΐς και ύπακούσας e'A/cet βάλανον e/c της 
ύΒρίας, και όρεξας αύτην άνβχων το γράμμα, Bei- 
κνυσιν πρώτον μεν τω άρχοντι τω εφζστηκότι• 6 
Be άρχων βττειδάν ιΒη, εμβάλλει το πινάκιον αύτοΰ 
€ΐς το κιβώτιον οπού αν η επιγεγραμμενον το 
αύτο στοιχεΐον όπερ εν τη βαλάνω, ΐν^ εις οίον 
άν λάχη εισίη και μη εΙς οίον άν βούληται, μηΒε 
η συναγαγεΐν εις Βικαστηριον ους άν βούληται τι?. 

6 παράκειται Be τω άρχοντι κιβώτια δσαπερ άν 
με?<λη τά Βικαστηρια πληρωθησεσθαι, έχοντα στοι- 
χεΐον εκαστον όπερ άν fj επι του Βικαστηριου 
εκάστου είληχός. 

1 LXV. Αυτός Βε Βείζας πάλιν τω υπηρέτη €?τ' 
εντός εισέρχεται της κιγχλίΒος.^ 6 Βε υπηρέτης 
ΒίΒωσιν αύτω βακτηρίαν ομόχρων τω Βικαστηρίω 
εφ* ου τό αυτό γράμμα εστίν όπερ εν τη βαλάνω, 
ίνα α.ναγκαΐον η αύτω εισελθεΐν εις δ εϊληχε Βικα- 
στηριον εάν γάρ εις έτερον εισίη εξελέγχεται υπό 

2 του χρώματος της βακτηρίας• τοις γάρ Βικα- 
στηρίοις χρώματα^ επιγεγραπται εκάστω επι τω 
σφηκίσκω της είσόΒου. ό Βε λαβών την βακτηρίαν 

^ ^ξΐλ-τϊ alii : e . . . cod. 

' primae sententiae supersunt tantum paucae literae incertae. 

* χρώμα edd. e schol. Aristoph. Plut. 277. 

174 



. ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, lxiv. 3— lxv. 2 

ledged frames in each of the balloting-rooms. When 3 
he has thrown in the dice, the Archon casts lots for 
the tribe for each balloting-room ; they are dice of 
copper, black and white. As many white ones are 
thrown in as jurymen are required to be selected, one 
white die for each five tickets, and the black dice 
correspondingly. As he draws out the dice the herald 
calls those on whom the lot has fallen. Also the 
Affixer is there corresponding to the number. The 4 
man called obeys and draws an acorn from the urn 
and, holding it out with the inscription upward, shows 
it first to the superintending Archon ; when the 
Archon has seen it, he throws the man's ticket into 
the box that has the same letter written on it as the 
one on the acorn, in order that he may go into what- 
ever court he is allotted to and not into whatever 
court he chooses and in order that it may not be 
possible to collect into a court whatever jurymen a 
person wishes. The Archon has by him as many 5 
boxes as courts are going to be filled, each lettered 
with whichever is the letter assigned by lot to each 
court. 

LXV. And the man himself having again shown it 1 
to the attendant then goes inside the barrier, and the 
attendant gives him a staff of the same colour as the 
court bearing the same letter as the one on the acorn, 
in order that it may be necessary for him to go into 
the court to which he has been assigned by lot ; for if 
he goes into another, he is detected by the colour of 
his staff, for each of the courts has a colour painted 2 
on the lintel of its entrance. He takes the staff and 



175 



ARISTOTLE 

jSaSt^ei et? το Si/caarr^piov το όμόχρων μ€ΐ' τύ] 
βακτηρία €χον Be το αυτό γράμμα όπερ iv τω 
βαλάνω. €7Τ€ΐ8άν δ' είσ^λθτ], τταραλαμβάνεί σνμ- 
βολον 8ημοσία πάρα του βίληχότος ταντην την 

3 αρχήν. €ΐτα την τ€ βάλανον /cat την βακτηρίαν^ 
iv τώ Βίκαστηρίο) τούτον τρόπον εΙσεΧηΧυθότες. 
τοις δ' άπολαγχάνουσιν άττοδιδόασιν οΐ εμπηκται 

4 τα πινάκια, οΐ he ύπηρ4ται οι δημόσιοι από της 
φνλης 4κάστης τταραδιδόασι τα κιβώτια, ev €πι το 
8ικαστήριον εκαστον, ev ω eveuTi τα ονόματα της 
φυλής τα όντα ev Ικάστω των δικαστηρίων, 
παραόιόόασι he τοις είληχόσι ταύτα άττοδιδοι^αι 
τοΓ? δικασται? iv έκάστω [τώ]^ Βικαστηριω αριθμώ 
τά πινάκια όπως iK τούτων σκοποϋντες απο• 
Βώώσι τον μισθόν. 

1 LXVI. Έπβιδάν Se πάντα πλήρη η τά δικα- 
στήρια, τίθεται iv τω πρώτω των δικαστηρίων 
β' κληρωτήρια και κύβοι χαλκοί ev οίς επι- 
γεγραπται τά χρώματα των δικαστηρίων, και 
€Tepoi κύβοι iv οΐς ioTiv των αρχών τά ονόματα 
iπιγeγpaμμeva. λαχόντες be τών θεσμοθετών δυο 
χωρίς εκατερων τους κύβους iμβάλλoυσιv , ο μεν 
τά χρώματα εις το εν κληρωτήριον, 6 δε τών 
αρχών τά ονόματα εις το έτερον, η 8 αν πρώτη 
λάχη τών αρχών, αύτη αναγορεύεται ύπο τοΰ 
κήρυκος οτι χρήσεται τω πρώτω λαχόντι δικα- 
στή ρ ίω. . . . 

Ofcc. Ixvi. 2-lxviii. 2 (ms. pp. S3, 34) only fragments 
remain, variously put together and supplemented by 
editors. 



176 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, lxv. 2— lxviii. 1 

goes to the court of the same colour as his staff and 
having the same letter as is on the acorn. And when 
he has come into it he receives a token publicly from 
the person appointed by lot to this office. Then 3 
with the acorn and the staff they take their seats 
in the court, when they have thus entered. And to 
those to whom the lot does not fall the Affixers give 
back their tickets. And the public attendants from 4 
each tribe hand over the boxes, one to each court, 
in which are those names of the tribe that are in 
each of the courts. And they hand them over to the 
persons appointed by lot to restore the tickets to 
the jurymen in each court by number, in order that 
according to these when they examine them they 
may assign the pay. 

LXVI. When all the courts are full, two ballot- ] 
boxes are placed in the first of the courts, and copper 
dice with the colours of the courts painted on them, 
and other dice with the names of the offices written 
on them. And two of the Lawgivers are chosen by 
lot, and throw the two sets of dice in separately, one 
throwing in the coloured dice into one ballot-box and 
the other the names of the offices into the other. And 
to whichever of the offices the lot falls first, it is 
proclaimed by the herald that this will use the first 
court allotted. ... 

^ βακτ-ηρίαν <,^χοΐ'τε$ Kaei^'ovffii'y Kenyon : <άποηθέασιν> 
Thalheim. 

^ si recte legitur, dittographiam seel. ed. 



177 



ARISTOTLE 

2 LXVIII. . . . μζτα τον γ' (άττοδιδού? γαρ γ' 
λαμβάνει) ίνα φηφίζωνται ττΟΛ>τ€ς' ου γαρ βστί 

3 λαβ(ΐν σνμβολον ovSevi eav μη φηφίζηται. elal δε 
αμφορείς δυο Κ€ίμ€νοι iv τω 8ικαστηρίω, 6 μ^ν 
χαλκούς ό δε ξύλινος, διαιρετοί όπως μη λάθτ] 
υποβάλλων τις φηφους, ει? ους φηφίζονται οΐ 
δικτασται, ό μ€ν χαλκούς κύριος ό δε ζυλινός άκυρος, 
€χων 6 χαλκούς επίθημα ^ιβρρινημένον ωστ αυτήν 
μόνην χωρ€Ϊν την φηφον, ίνα μη δυο ο αυτός 

4 ζμβάλλη. ε'ττειδάν δε 8ιαφηφίζ€σθαι μβλλωσιν οι 
οικασταί, 6 κηρυζ αγορεύει πρώτον αν βπισκη- 
πτωνται οι αντιΒικοι ταΐς μαρτυρίαις' ου γαρ 
€στιν €πισκήφασθαι όταν άρζωνται Βιαφηφίζβσθαι. 
εττειτα πάλιν ανακηρύττει " η τ€τροπημ4νη του 
προτ€ρον λέγοντος η δε πλήρης του ύστερον 
λέγοντος." 6 δε Βικαστης λαβών άμα^ εκ του 
λυχνείου τάς φηφους, πιεζων τον αύλίσκον της 
φηφου και ου δεικνύων τοις άγωνιζομενοις ούτε 
το τετροπημενον ούτε το πλήρες, εμβάλλει την 
μεν κυριαν εις τον χαλκοΰν αμφορέα την δε άκυρον 
εις τον ζύλινον. 

1 LXIX. ΐΐάντες δ' επειδά»^ ωσι 8ιεφηφισμενοι, 
λαβόντες οι ύπηρεται τον αμφορέα τον κύριον 
εξερώσι επι αβακα τρυπήματα έχοντα δσαιπερ 
εισιν αι φηφοι, Ιν^ αύται φανεραΐ προκειμεναι 
εύαριθμητοι ώσιν, και τα τρυπητά και τα πλήρη 
8ηλα τοις άντώίκοις. οι δε επι τάς φηφους είλη- 
χοτες 8ιαριθμοΰσιν αυτά? ε'ττι τοΰ άβακος, χωρίς 
μεν τας πλήρεις χωρίς δε τάς τετρυπημενας. 

' και αναγορεύει ο κηρυζ τον αριθμόν τών φήφων, 

^ \aβ6μevos alii : λα | . . . cod. 
178 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, lxviii. 2— lxix. 1 

LXVIII. . . . <a copper token marked with a> 2 
3 (for on giving this up he gets three obols), so that 
they all may vote ; for nobody can get a token if 
he does not vote. And there are two jars placed in 3 
the court, one of copper and one of wood, separate 
so that a man may not secretly throw in pebbles 
undetected, into which the jurymen put their votes, 
the copper jar to count and the wooden jar for 
pebbles not used, the copper jar having a lid with 
a hole in it only large enough to take just the 
pebble alone, so that the same man may not throw in 
two. And when the jury are about to give their 4 
verdict, the herald first asks whether the litigants 
wish to challenge the evidence of the witnesses ; for 
they are not allowed to challenge it after the voting 
has begun. Then he proclaims again, ' The pebble 
with the hole through it is a vote for the first speaker, 
and the whole pebble one for the second speaker.' 
And the juryman when taking the pebbles out of the 
lamp-stand presses the pebble against the lamp-stand 
and does not let the parties to the action see either the 
perforated pebble or the whole one, and throws the 
one that he wishes to count into the copper vessel and 
the one that he discards into the wooden one. 

LXIX. And when all have voted, the attendants 1 
take the vessel that is to count and empty it out on to 
a reckoning-board with as many holes in it as there 
are pebbles, in order that they may be set out visibly 
and be easy to count, and that the perforated and 
the whole ones may be clearly seen by the litigants. 
And those assigned by lot to count the voting-pebbles 
count them out on to the reckoning-board, in two 
sets, one the whole ones and the other those per- 
forated. And the herald proclaims the number of 

179 



ARISTOTLE 

τοΰ μεν Βιώκοντος τάς τ€τρυπημ€νας του 8e 
φζνγοντος τα? πλήρεις• οττοτίρω δ' αν πλείων 
γενηται, οντος νικά, άν 8e ΐσαι, 6 φεύγων. 
2 €π€ΐτα πάλιν τιμώσι, άν Scrj τιμησαι, τον αντον 
τρόπον φηφιζόμενοι, το μεν σύμβολον απο- 
δίδοντες βακτηρίαν 8ε πάλιν παραλαμβάνοντες' ή 
δε τίμησίς εστίν προς ημίχονν ν8ατος εκατερω. 
επεώάν δε αντοΐς fj δεδικασμένα τα εκ των νόμων, 
απολαμβάνουσιν τον μισθον εν τω μέρει ου ελαχον 



180 



ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, lxix. 1-2 

votes, the perforated pebbles being for the prosecutor, 
and the whole ones for the defendant ; and whichever 
gets the larger number wins the suit, but if the votes 
are equal, the defendant wins. Then again they 
assess the damages, if this has to be done, voting in 
the same way, giving up their ticket and receiving 
back a staff; as to assessment of damages each 
party is allowed to speak during three pints of water. 
And when they have completed their legal duties as 
jurymen, they take their pay in the division to which 
each was assigned by lot. . . . 



181 



INDEX L— PROPER NAMES 



{References are to chapters except that 'fr.' denotes one of the fragments 
printed before c. 1.) 



Acastus, 3 
Acherdusian, 38 
Acte, 42, 61 
Aegeus, fr. 2, fr. 6 
Aegospotami, 34 
Agyrrhius, 41 
Alcmaeon, 13 

Alcmaeonidae, 1, 19, 20, 28 
Alexias, 34 
Alopece, 22, 45 
Ammon, 61 
Ambracia, 17 
Anacreon, 18 
Anaphlystius, 29 
Anchirnolus, 19 
Angele, 34 
Anthemion, 7 
Antidotus, 26 
Antiphon, 32 
Anytus, 27, 34 
Aphidnn, 34 
Apollo, fr. 1, 55 
Archestratus, 35 
Archinus, 17, 34, 40 
Arginusae, 34 
Argos, 17, 19 
Ariphron, 22 
Aristaechmus, 4 
Aristeides, 22-24, 28, 41 
Aristion, 14 
Aristocrates, 33 
Aristodiciis, 25 
Aristogeiton, 18, 58 
Aristomachus, 32 
Artemis, 58 



Asclepius, 56 
Athena, 14, 47 

Brauron, 54 
Bucolium, 3 

Callias, 32, 34 
Callibius, 37, 38 
Callicrates, 28 
Cedon, 20 
Cephisophon, 54 
Charmos, 22 
Chios, 24 
Chronos, 12 
Cimon, 25-28 
Cineas, 19 
Clazoinenae, 41 
Cleisthenes, 20«•., 28, 41 
Cleitophon, 29, 34 ^ 
Cleomenes, 19, 20 
Cleon, 28 
Cleophon, 28, 34 
Codridae, fr. 7 
Codrus, 3 

CoUytus, 14, 22 , 
Corneas, 14 
Conon, 25 
Creusa, fr. 1 
Cronos, 16 
Cylon, fr. 8 
Cypselidae, 17 

Damasias, 18 
Damonides, 27 
Decelea, 34 



183 



ARISTOTLE 



Delos, 54, 56, 62 
Delphi, 19 
Delphinium, 57 
Demaretus, 38 
Dionysia, 54, 56, 57 
Dionysus, 3 
Diphilus, 4 
Draco, 3, 4, 7, 41 
Dracontides, 84 

Eetionea, 87 
Egypt, 11 
Eleusis, 39, 40, 54 
Bnyalius, 58 

Ephialtes, 25 f., 28, 35, 41 
Epilycenm, 3 
Epimenides, 1 
Erechtheus, fr. 2 
Bretria, 15, 33 
Euboea, 33 
Eucieides, 39 
Eumelides, 45 
Eumolpidae, 39, 57 

Geraestus, 22 
Gorgilus, 17 

Hagnon, 28 
Harmodias, 18, 58 
Harpactides, 19, 45 
Hegesias. 14 
Hegesistratus, 17 
Hellenes, 23 
Hephaestus, 54 
Heracleides, 41 
Hermocreon, 22 
Herodotus, 14 
Hipparchns, 17-19, 22 
Hippias, 17-19 
Hippomenes, fr. 7 
Homer, fr. 4 
Hymettus, 16 
Hypsechides, 22 

Imbros, 62 • 

Ion, fr. 1, 3, 41 
Ionia, 5 
lonians, fr. 1 
lophon, 17 
Isagoras, 20, 21, 28 

Laciadae, 27 
Leimone, fr. 7 
Leipsydrion, 19 



Lemnos, 61 f. 
Lenaeum, 57 
Leocoreum, 18 
Lesbos, 24 
Lycomedes, fr. 6 
Lycurgus, 13, 14 
Lycus, fr. 2 
Lygdainis, 15 
Lysander, 34 
Lysicrates, 26 
Lysimacbus, 21, 23, 45 

Marathon, 22 
Maronea, 22 
Medon, 3 

Megacles, /r. 8, 13 f., 22 
Megara, fr. 2, 14, 17 
Melobius, 29 
Miltiades, 26, 28 
Mnesilochus, 83 
Mnesitheides, 26 
Mimycbia, 19, 38, 42, 61 
Myron, 1 

Naxos, 15 
Neocles, 23 
Nicias, 28 
Nicodemus, 22 
Nisus, fr. 2 

Oea, 27 
Olympians, 12 

Paeanians, 14, 38 

Palladium, 57 

Pallas, fr. 2 

Pallenis, 15, 17 

Panathenaea, 53, 60, 62 

Pandion,/r. 2 

Paiigaeus, 15 

Paralus, 61 

Parnes, 19 

Pausanias, 23, 38 

Peiraeus, 35, 38, 89, 40, 54, 61 

Peisander, 32, 61 

Peisistratus, 13-17, 22, 41 

Pelargicum, 19 

Pericles, 26 f. 

Phaenippus, 22 

Phayllns, 38 

Pheidon, 10 

Philoneos, 17 

Phormisius, 84 

Phreatto, 57 



184 



INDEX I. TO ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION 



Phye, 14 
Phyle, 37, 38, 41 
Point, 42, 61 
Poseidon, 67 
Pylos, 27 
Pythia, 19, 21 
Pythodorus, 27, 29, 35, 41 

Rhaicelos, 15 
Rhinon, 38 

Salamis, 17, 22, 23, 27, 54, 62 f. 

Samoa, /r. 6, 24, 62 

Scyllaeum, 22 

Scyros, fr. 6, 62 

Sicily, 28, 29 

Simonides, 18 

Solon, 2, 5-14, 17, 22, 28, 35, 41, 47 

Sophonides, 25 

Soter, 56 

Spartiates, 19 



Tanagra, 25 
Telesines, 22 
Thargelia, 56 
Thebes, 15 
Themistocles, 22-25 
Tbeopompus, 33 
Theramenes, 28, 33 f., 
Theseum, 15, 62 
Theseus, Jr. 0, 41 
Thettalos, 17 f. 
Thrasybulus, 37, 40 
Thucydides, 28 
Timonassa, 17 
Timosthenes, 23 

Xanthippus, 22, 38 
Xenaenetus, 40 
Xerxes, 22 
Xuthus, fr. 1 

Zeus, 55, 56 



185 



INDEX II.— SUBJECTS 

(References are to chapters and sections. Notes will sometimes le Jound 
under the first reference.) 



άβαξ, 69. 1 

αγορά, 38. 1, 51. 3, 51 2, 57. 4 

ayopai, 48. 4 

άγοράι/ομοι, 51. 1 

S.yoς, 1. 1, 20. 2 

άγραφίου -γραφή, 59. 3 

aypoiKOi, 13. 2 

αδόκιμο;, 49. 1 

άδύι/ατοί, 49. 4 

ά^ίφνγία, 1. 1 

άθλοβί'ται, (50. 1, 3, 62. 2 

a'lKtia, 52. 2 

άκον'σιοι φόΐΌΐ, 57. 3 

αμιπτΓΟι, 49. 1 

αμφικτνον€ς eU Δήλον, 62. 2 

αμφορείς, 60. 1, 68. 3 

άΐ'αρχία, 13. 1 

άμδραττοδισταί, 52. 1 

άι/τίδοσίϊ, 56. 3, 61. 1 

άτΓοδβ'κται, 48. 1 

άίΓοκοτΓτ) χρβών, 6. 1, 2, 10. 1, 11. 2, 

4, 13. 3 
άποστοσίου δίκη, 58. 3 
άποτίμ-ημα, 56. 7 
άττροστασίου δίκτ), 58. 3 
Άρίιοπαγΐται (etc.), 3. 6, 4. 4, 8. 2, 

23. 1, 26. 1, 57. 4 
άρβσΐϊ, 57. 3 
αρμοστεί, 37. 2 
άρτοιτώλαι, 59. 3 
όρ;(»)γ6'ται, 21. 6 
άρχιθίιοροί, 56. 3 
opxireKTOi-es ejrl τάϊ caCs, 46. 1 
άρχωΐ' «ττώΐ'νμος, 3. 2, .06 
άσίβ^ίας ypaφaί, 57. 2 
άστννομόι, .50. 2 
άτί'λίΐα, 56. 3 
άτίλίϊ xupiof, 16. 6 

186 



ατιμία, 67. 5 
αϋτόχ6ΐρ, 39. 5 
άφε'σιμοϊ, 43. 3 
άψυχων δίκαι, 57. 4 

βακτηρία, 63. 2, 64. 4 
βάΚανος, 63. 2, 64. 4 
βασίλειο; στοά, 7. 1 
Βασιλειίϊ, 41. 3 
βασιλΕΪ»? άρχωμ, 57. 1 
βου\€νσ(ως γραφή, 57. 3, 59. 3 
βουλή, 43. 2 ff. 

γάμος (Ιίρός), 3. 5 
γονίων κάκωσις, 57. 6 
γραμματ€ΐα λβλευκωμενα, 47. 3 
γραμματείς, 54. 3 
γυμνικός άγων, 60. 1, 3 

&ΐκα, οι, 38. 1, 3, 41. 2 

δίκά^ειμ, 27. 5 

Βημαγωγοί, 28, 41. 2 

δήμαρχος, 21. 5, 54. 8 

δ>)μ€υσΐϊ, 67. 5 

δημιοϊ, 45. 1 

δημιουργοί, 13. 2 

δήμοι, 21. 4 

δημόσιοι', 63. 3 

δημόσιος, 47. 5, 48. 1 

δημότης, 21. 4 

δημοτικοί, 16. 9 

διαδικασία, 56. 6, 61. 1, 67. 2 

διαιτηταί, 53. 1, 4, 5, 55. 5, 58. 2 

διάκριοι, 13. 4 

διαλλάκτης, 3S, 4 

διαμ(τρ«ω, 67. 3, 4 

διδάσκαλοι, 42. 3 

δίδραχμου, 10. 2 



INDEX II. TO ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION 



δικαστήρια, 03. 1 ff. 
Διοΐ'υσια, 56. 4, 5 
διωβολία, 28. 3 
διώβολον, 41. 3 
δοκιμασία, 49. 1 
δούλων δίκη, 63. •5 
δρνφακτοι, ϊ>0. 2 
δωροξίνία, 59. 3 
δώρων -γραφή, 59. 4 

€νκύκλιοϊ, 26. 2, 43. 1 

εισαγγελία, 8. 5, 29. 4, 43. 4, 52. 2 

εισαγωγεΐϊ, 52. 2 

έκθύματα, 54. 6 

€κκλτ)σία, 43. 4 

έκττ)μοροι, 2. 2 

Ελαιοι/, 60. 2 

έλληΐΌταμίαι, 30. 2 

έμμηνοι δίκαι, 52. 2 f. 

εμττηκττ)?, 64. 2 f. , 65. 3 

εμτΓΟρικαί δίκαι, 59. 4 

εμτΓορίου εττιμεληταί, 51. 4 

ίνα-γίσματα, 58. 1 

Ιι/δει^ϊ, 29. 4, 52. 1 

ένδεκα, 52. 2 

ίνδημοι αρχαί, 24. 3 

έ|ετασΐί, 31. 2 

έ^οττλασία, 15. 3 

έτΓίεικείϊ, 26. 1, 27. 4, 28. 1, 36. 2 

έττίκληροϊ, 9. 2, 42. 5, 56. 6 

έπιστατικτ) γραφή, 59. 3 

επιτάφιος άγώι/, 58. 1 

(πίτροπος, 56. 7 

έπώι/υμο?, 53. 4, 7 

ιρανικοί, δίκαι, 52. 2 

έταιρεΐαι, 20. 1, 34. 3 

εΰβυνοι, 48. 4 

εύπατρίδαι, 13. 2 

εφ>)ί3οι, 42. 2 ff., 53. 4 

ζ^νγίσιον τε'λοϊ, 7. 4 
^υγίττ)?, 4. 3, 7. 3, 12, 26. 2 
^ωωι/ δίκαι, 57. 4 

Θαργήλια, 56, 5 
θεσμοθε'ται, 59. 1 
θίωρικόν, 43. 1, 47. 2 
βήτεϊ, 7. 3, 4 
θόλος, 43. 3, 44. 1 

ϊερομι/τ}μων, 30. 2 

ίεροτΓοιοί, 30. 2, 54. 6 

ΐκετηρίαι, 43. 6 

'ίτΓτταρχοϊ, 4. 2, 30. 2, 3. 3, 44.4, 61. 



ίττπεΐί, Ι'η-τΓοι, 4. 3, 6. 2, 7. 3, 38. 2, 

49. 1, 68. 4 
Ιπποδρομία, 60. 1, 3 
ΐσοτελεΐϊ, 58. 2 

κανηφορ^ΐν, 18. 2 

Κήρυκες, 39. 2, 57. 1 

κλεψΰδραι, 67. 2 

κλήρος, 4. 1, 8. 1, 62. 1 

κλοττη, 54. 1 

κοιί'ωΐΊΚαΙ δίκαι, 52. 2 

κοΉ-ρολόγοι, 50. 2 

κορυνηφόροι, 14. 1 

κοσμ-ητής, 41. 2 

κρηνών έπιμεληταί, 43. 1 

κυαμοϊ, 8. 1, 22. 5, 24. 3, 32. 1 

κύρβεΐϊ, 7. 1 

κωλακρίται, 7. 3 

κωμωδοί, 56. 3 

λαμπάδω»» αγώνες, 57. 1 
λτ)τουργία, 27. 3, 29. 5, 56. 3 
λί'βος, 7. 1, 55. 5 
λογισταί, 48. 3, 54. 2 
λοχαγοί, 61. 3 
λνχνεΐον, 68. 4 
λωτΓοδυ'της, 52. 1 

μάντεις, 54. 6 

μαστιγοφόροι, 35. 1 

μεσόγειος, 21. 4 

μέταλλα, 22. 7, 47. 2, 59. 5 

μέτοικοι, 43. 5, 57. 3, 58. 2 

μέτρα, 10. 1, 51. 2 

μετρονόμοι, 51. 2 

μηδισμός, 25. 3 

μισβός, 27. 2, 4, 30. 1, 33. 1, 41. 3, 49. 

1, 62. 2 
μνά, 4. 2, 10. 2, 49. 4, 56. 4 
μνησικακεΐν, 39. 6, 60. 2 
μοιχεία, 57. 3, 59. 3 
μορίαι, 60. 2 
μύδροι, 23. 5 
μυλωθροί, 51. 3 
μιίσται, 56. 4 
μυστήρια, 39. 2, 57. 1 

νανκραρία, 8. 3, 22. 5 

^ενία, 59. 3 

όδοτΓΟίοί, 54. 1 

οροί, 12. 4 

ορφανοί, 24. 3, 54. 1, 56. 6 f. 

187 



ARISTOTLE 



όστρακοφορία, 43. 5 
όχ€τοί, 50. 2 

παιδοτριβαί, 42. 3 

παλαιόττλουτοι, 6. 2 

παράλιοι, 13. 4, 21. 4 

παράνοια., 54. (3 

παραΐ'όμωμ -γραφή, 25. 4, 40. 2, 46. 4, 

59. 2 ^ 
ττεδιακοι, 13. 4 
ττελάται, 2. 2 

π^ιτακισχιλιοι, 29. 5-32. 2 
ΤΓβΐ'τακόσιοι, 25. 2 
π€ντακοσίθμί&ιμνοι., 4. 3, 7. 3, 8. 1, 

2(5. 2, 47. 1 
πβντίτηρίδίς, 54. 7 
πβττλοϊ, 49. 3, (ίΟ. 2 
νινακίον, 48. 4, ()3. 2, 66. 2 
πολΕμαρχο!, 08. 1 
πρόδρομοι, 49. 1 
προβδρικτ) -γραφή, 59. 2 
πρόεδροι, 44. 2 
προικοϊ St'ictj, 52. 2 
πρόξ(νοι, 54. 3, 58. 2 
προστάται τοΰ £^μου, 28. 1 ff. 
πρυταΐ'ίϊοΐ', 3. 5, 24. 3, 62. 2 
ιτυρκαϊά, 57. 3 
πιαληταί, 47. 2, 52. 1 

σ6ΐσα)(ίίία, 6. 1, 12. 4 

σίτησίϊ, 62. 2 

OΊτoφυλαίce?, 51. 3 

σταθμοί, 10. 1, 2, 51. 2 

στατ^ρ, 10. 2 

tTTeAe^os, 60. 2 

στοά βασι'λβιος, 7, 1 

στρατηγοί, 61. 1 

στρατιωτικά, 43. 1, 47. 2, 49. 3 

συκοφανταί, 35. 2, 59. 3 

σύμβοΚον, 59. 7, 65. 2, 68. 2, 69. 2 

συμμ€ΐ^ΐϊ, 3. 5 

σνμμορίαι, 61. 1 



σφηκισκός, 65. 2 
σφραγίς, 44. 1 
σωφροι/ιστης, 42. 2 

Tei'xij, 18. 5, 23. 4, 37. 1, 50. 2 

τίλώι-αι, 52. 3 

Τίτρακόσιοι, οι, 29. 1, 31. 3ff., 32. 1, 

2, 37. 1, 41. 2 
τ€τταράκοΐ'τα, οι, 53. 1, 5 
το^όται, 24. 3 
τρα•γω8οί, 56, 3 
τραπί^ιτικαΐ δίκαι, 52. 3 
τραν'ματοϊ δίκαι, 57. 3 
τριάκοντα, οΊ, 34. 2-41. 3 
τρι-ηραρχικαϊ δίκαι, 52. 2 
τριηροτΓοιοι, 46. 1 
τρισχι'λιοι, οί, 36. 1-37. 1 
TpiTTves, 8. 3, 21. 3 
τριώβολοί', 41. 3 
-τύραννοι, 41. 2 

vSpia, 63. 2, 64. 4 
vStap, 66. 2, 67. 2, 4 

φαρμάκων 8ίκαι, 57. 3 

φόΐΌϊ, 7. 1, 16. 8, 39. 5, 57. 2, 3 

φρατριαι, ρ. 1 § 5, 21. 6 

φυ-γή, 57. 3, 67. 5 

φυλαι, 8. 3, 21. 3 

φΰλαρχοι, 30. 2, 31. 2, 49. 2, 61. 5 

φι;λο|3ασιλ€Ϊϊ, 8. 3, 41. 2, 58. 4 

φυλοκριΐ'ίϊΐ', 31. 1 

χορηγία, 28. 4 

χορηγοί, 53. 3, 54. 8, 56. 3 ff. 
Xpeiyv αποκοπή, 6. 1, 10. 1, 11. 2, 4, 
13. 3 

φαΚτρίαι, 50. 2 
ψ6υδ6γγροφη, 57. 3 
ψίυδοκλητβία, 59. 3 
φίυδομαρτνρία, 59. 6 



189 



THE EUDEMIAN ETHICS 



INTRODUCTION 

I. Place of the Evdemian Ethics in the 
Aristotelian Corpus 

All the extant books attributed to Aristotle (in- 
cluding probably the recently recovered treatise 
on the Athenian Constitution) belong to the group 
of his works designated by ancient authorities άκρυα- 
τικυΐ λόγοι, ' lecture-courses.' These are scientific 
treatises, in places hardly more than mere outlines, 
though for the larger part fully written out argu- 
ments ; presumably they are records of Aristotle's 
doctrine made for his pupils, and preserved in the 
library of the Peripatetic School. The other class of 
his writings, now lost, were more popular exposi- 
tions intended for the general reader ; some of them 
were in dialogue form. They were published, and 
they are alluded to as βκδ^δο/χά'οι λόγοι. 

The former group includes three works on the 
philosophy of conduct, entitled the Eudemian Ethics, 
the Nicomachean Ethics and Magna Moralia. The 
two former are full scientific treatises, in eight and 
ten Books respectively. Magna Moralia is a smaller 
work, more discursive in style, of which only two 
Books survive, the latter part being lost ; its contents 
correspond partly with the Eudemian and partly with 
the Nicomachean Ethics ; it was probably compiled 
190 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS 

by a Peripatetic of the generation after Aristotle. 
Eudemus was the pupil of Aristotle who followed 
his doctrine most closely ; Nicomachus was Aristotle's 
son, who fell in battle when a mere lad. Both may 
have been the compilers of the treatises that bear 
their names : Cicero (De Finibus v. 12) says that 
the Nicomachean Ethics, though attributed to Aristotle 
himself, can well have been by his son, and Diogenes 
of Laerte quotes from it as by Nicomachus. But the 
early commentator Porphyry speaks of both works as 
' dedicated to ' the persons whose names they bear. 
Whatever the truth may be, the Nicomachean Ethics 
has always been accepted as the authoritative ex- 
position of Aristotle's moral science ; and it seems 
probable that the Eudemian, so far as it differs, 
represents an earlier stage of its development." 
This view is not necessarily precluded by the fact 
that in some places the Eudemian Ethics is fuller in 
expression or more discursive than the Nicomachean. 

II. The Eudemian-Nicomachean Books 

For about one third of the whole the two works 
overlap, the Eudemian Books IV., V., VL being 
identical with the Nicomachean V., VI., VII. ; these 
are given in the mss. and editions of the latter work 
only. Scholars have debated to which they really 
belong, some holding that they fit the argument of 

" This is the view of Jaeger, followed by Burnet in his 
Essays and Addresses and by Mansion ; but the Eudemian 
Ethics is regarded as later than the Nicomachean by Spengel, 
Susemihl 1900, and Stocks (in the Oxford Aristotle vol. ix.), 
as it was by Burnet in his earlier work, his edition of N.E. 
Magna Moralia is put last by almost all scholars, but first 
of the three treatises by Schleiermacher and Arnim. 

191 



ARISTOTLE 

the Eudemian and that the corresponding parts of 
the Nicomachean have been lost, others the opposite. 
But all Aristotle's treatises are so loosely put together 
that the arguments for neither view are convincing. 
It is more probable • that the three common Books 
represent his final doctrine, except in so far as they 
are modified by other parts of his works — thus the 
excursus on the ethical value of pleasure in E.E. VI. 
= N.E. VII. was doubtless superseded by the more 
accurate treatment of the topic at the beginning of 
N.E. X. 



III. The Eudemian Ethics : Outline of Contents 
AND Comparison with the Nicomachean 

Book I. introduces the subject — the nature of 
Happiness or Well-being, the supreme End or Aim 
of human conduct. This is a practical study : know- 
ledge of the good is an aid to its attainment. The 
different views that prevail are crystallized in thl^e 
typical Lives, the philosopher's life of thought, tiie 
statesman's life of action, the voluptuary's life of 
pleasure. The Platonic theory of an Absolute Good 
is of questionable philosophic validity, and in any 
case has no bearing on practical life. 

Book II. c. i. defines Happiness as consisting in 
the right exercise of the functions of man's nature, 
moral and intellectual. The contents of E.E. so far 
correspond with those of N.E. Book I. ; the remainder 
of Book II. with N.E. II. and III. i.-v. It examines 
the nature of Moral Goodness or \lrtue, which is 
defined as a fixed disposition of character that in 
action or emotion steers a middle course between 
too much and too little. The various virtues are 
192 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS 

tabulated, with the vices of excess and defect that 
correspond to each. The problem of the Freedom 
of the Will is studied in the light of the psychology 
of Volition and Purpose. 

Book III. discusses the Virtues and some minor 
Graces of Character seriatim, each with its corre- 
sponding pair of Vices. The list tallies with that in 
N.E. III., vi. if. and IV., except that it inserts the 
virtue of Mildness between Temperance and Liber- 
ality, and adds to the minor Graces of Character 
Nemesis (righteous indignation at another's un- 
deserved good or bad fortune), Friendliness and 
Dignity, while it omits Gentleness and Agreeable- 
ness {N.E. IV., v., vi.). 

(Books IV., v., VI. are omitted in mss. and editions 
of the Eudemian Ethics, as they are the same as 
Books v., VI., VII. of the Nicomachean ; the first of 
these three Books deals with Justice, thus completing 
the examination of the Moral Virtues ; the second 
treats the Intellectual Virtues of Prudence or 
Practical Wisdom and Theoria or Speculative Wisdom ; 
the third forms an appendix to the section on Moral 
Virtue — it examines Weakness of Will and studies 
the psychology of Pleasure — a subject again treated 
differently and more accurately in N.E. X. init.) 

The subject of Book VII. is Friendship. The term 
includes all forms of friendly mutual regard, whether 
between equals or superior and inferior, relatives or 
other associates, and whether based on the motive of 
utility or the pleasure of society or respect for worth. 
The psychology of friendship is analysed in relation 
to that of self-love. 

In N.E. VIII. and IX. Friendship is discussed at 
greater length with fuller detail ; the arrangement 

ο 1.93 



ARISTOTLE 

of the topics is different but there is perhaps no 
striking discrepancy of view. 

E.E. VIII. notices the epistemological aspect of 
Virtue (treated in N.E. I., ix., but differently) ; and 
discusses the ethical bearing of Good Luck (more 
fully dealt with in a different connexion in c. iii. of 
N.E. yiI.=E.E. VI.), and there follows an essay on 
Kalokagathia, Moral Nobility (a virtue merely alluded 
to without analysis in N.E., as a necessary quality of 
the Great-spirited man, 1124 a 4 and 1179 b 10); 
it is treated as the consummation of the particular 
virtues. In conclusion there is a glance at Theoria, 
the activity of Speculative Wisdom, as the highest 
life of man ; at Book II. init. this was coupled with 
Moral Conduct as constituting happiness. There is 
nothing corresponding to the full treatment of 
Theoria as the consummation of human well-being 
that is given in N.E. X. vii., viii., or to the transition 
from ethics to politics (glancing at the importance of 
public education) which concludes that Avork. 

IV. Text, MSS. and Editions 

The Eudemian Ethics is not contained in the two 
best MSS. of Aristotle, the 10th c. Laurentianus 
(denoted by the sign K^) and the 12th c. Parisiensis 
(L^) ; we derive it chiefly from Vaticanus (P**), a 
13th c. copy of K^, and the early 15th c. Marcianus 
(Mb), not so good a text as P'' but an indispensable 
adjunct to it — according to Jackson, who refers to 
the text of these two mrs. as ' the Greek tradition.' 
Other later copies certainly contain more errors, and 
are of little value as actual traditions of a sound text 
— some of their variants may be mere conjectural 
194 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS 

corrections ; their readings are only occasionally given 
in this edition. 

The 13th c. Latin translation attributed to William 
of Moerbeke follows the Greek very closely, and is 
almost equivalent to another ms. ranking in value 
next to Vaticanus and Marcianus ; it is occasionally 
adduced in this edition either in Latin or in its original 
Greek Λvhen this can be inferred with certainty. 

There is an old Latin version of Book VIIL c. ii. 
with Magna Moralia Book IL c. viii., entitled De 
Bona Fortuna, printed in a Latin Aristotle of 1482, 
which indicates an independent Greek text of that 
passage. 

The earliest printed edition of Aristotle is the 
Aldine, Venice 1498. The foundation of all modern 
work on the text is the monumental Berlin edition, 
with a Latin translation, scholia and indices, published 
by the Academia Regia Borussica in 1831 and the 
following years. The text, edited by Bekker, forms 
Volumes I. and Π. which are paged consecutively, 
the Eudemian Ethics occupying pp. 1214-1249 ; the 
Berlin pages, the columns (indicated by a and b) and 
the numbering of the lines are shown in the margin 
of the present text. 

Fritsche's edition of the Eudemian Ethics (Ratisbon 
1851) has an introduction on the authorship and 
contents, a text with explanatory notes, illustrative 
quotations and critical notes, a Latin translation and 
a Greek index. 

The Teubner text of Susemihl (Leipzig 1884) has 
useful critical notes, collecting the corrections of other 
scholars published in the learned journals. 

Henry Jackson contributed a valuable study of the 
text and contents of Book VH. cc, i.,ii. to The Journal 

195 



ARISTOTLE 

of Philology xxxii. pp. 170 ff. ; and also supplied a 
number of printed notes to the Oxford translator, 
J. Solomon. 

Solomon's translation, in Volume IX. of the Oxford 
Aristotle 19^5, is the most recent work on the book. 
Mr. Solomon in his footnotes gives full references 
to the corresponding passages of the Nicomachean 
Ethics and Mag?ia Moralia ; and his notes on the 
readings of the Greek that he has adopted make 
his work a valuable critical edition : they include 
conjectures of the translator himself, of Professor 
Ross the general editor of the series, and of other 
scholars, among them the notes of Henry Jackson 
referred to above. 

In view of the comparatively scanty amount of 
work on the text hitherto published, the present 
editor has thought himself justified in making a 
considerable number of conjectural emendations of 
his own. Some freedom has been used in incor- 
porating these and those of other scholars in the 
text ; it seems in keeping with the purpose of this 
series to present the reader directly with what 
Aristotle probably wrote, leaving him to glance at 
the critical notes to discover what he is represented 
as having written by his copyists. At the same time 
in the interests of scholarship emended passages in 
the text are marked by a number referring to the 
corresponding note. 

Similarly, the style of the translation is intended 
to make it serve as an aid to a student reading 
the original. It is as interpretative as >vas possible 
without becoming a mere paraphrase ; it is not 
intended as a substitute for tlie Greek, which miglit 
take the form either of a rigidly literal version or 

196 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS 

of a rendering into idiomatic English conveying the 
sense but ignoring the form of the original. 

The following signs are used in the critical notes : 

MSS. 

ph =Vaticanus. 
M*^ = Marcianus. 
cet. =all the other mss. collated by editors where 

their readings agree, 
v.l. = the reading of one or some of these other 

MSS. 

Guil. = the Latin version of William of Moerbeke. 
Γ =the conjectured Greek original of this. 
B^ =De Bona Fortuna. 

The following abbreviations are used for the names 
of some editors and commentators quoted for the 
text : 

Aid. = editio princeps Aldina. 

Bek. =Bekker. 

Bus. =Busolt. 

Bz. =Bonitz. 

Cas. =Casaubon. 

Fr. = Fritsche. 

lac. = Henry Jackson. 

Rac. =the present editor. 

Ras. =Rassow. 

Ric. = Richards. 

Sol. = Solomon. 

Sp. ^Spengki'. <^^ Η 

Sus. =Susemihl. 

Syl. = Sylburg. 

Vict. = Victorius. 

H. R. 
November 1934. 

197 



ΗΘΙΚί2Ν ΕΤΔΗΜΙ$2Ν Α 

1214 a 

Ι. Ό μβν ev Αήλω παρά. τω θζώ την αντοΰ 1 
γνώμην άποφηνάμ€νος συνβγραφβν €πΙ το προ- 
πύλαυον του Αητώου SlcXouv ώς^ ονχ υπάρχοντα 
πάντα τω αύτώ το re αγαθόν καΐ το καλόν και το 
rjSij, ποιησας 

5 κάλλίστον το Βικαίότατον, λωστον δ' iyiaiveiv, 
πάντων ηΒιστον δ'^ ου τίς ipa το τυχ€Ϊν. 

ημβΐς δ' αύτω μη συγχωρώμβν η γαρ ευδαι/χονια 
κάλλίστον καΐ άριστον απάντων ούσα η^ιστόν 

ioTLV. 

Πολλών δ' όντων θ βω ρημάτων α π€ρΙ €καστον 2 
10 πράγμα καΐ πβρί ίκάστην φύσιν άπορίαν €χ€ΐ καΐ 
δειται σκ€φ€ως, τά μ€ν αυτών συντΐίν^ί προς το 
γνώναί μόνον, τά he καΙ π^ρΐ τάς κτησ€ίς^ καΐ 
π€ρΙ τάς πράζεις του πράγματος, όσα μ^ν οΰν 3 
€χ€ΐ φιλοσοφίαν μόνον θεωρητικην, ΧεκτΙον κατά 
τόν €π ψάλλοντα καιρόν 6 τι πβρ αν οίκ€Ϊον η* τη 

^ ώ? add. Sp. 

* δ' hie Vr. : ante ήδιστον aut cm. codd. 

' χρ-ήσΐΐί Sp. * Ric. : 6 τι vep οίκΰον 1]v. 

" Theognis (255 f. with sHght variation, quoted also in 
N.E. i., 1099 a 27). 

198 



THE EUDEMIAN ETHICS 

BOOK I 

1 I. The man " who at Delos se^ forth in the precinct Books i. ix. 
of the god his own opinion co^^iposed an inscription ^ess. 

for the forecourt of the temj,{j of Leto in which he ii>troduc- 
distinguished goodness, beauty and pleasantness as (cci.-vi.) : 
not all being properties of the same thing. His Η^^^^^''^'"*' 
verses are : 

Justice * is fairest, and Health is best, 
But to win one's desire is the pleasantest. 

But for our part let us not allow that he is right ; 
for Happiness ^ is at once the pleasantest and the 
fairest and best of all things whatever. 

2 About every thing and every natural species there its mode of 
are many views that involve difficulty and require ^""ΐ"ΐ**''^'θ"> 
examination ; of these some relate only to our ΙίηοΛν- 

ledge of the thing, others deal also with modes of 

3 acquiring it and of acting in relation to it. As to 
all those views therefore that involve only specula- 
tive philosophy, we must say whatever may be proper 
to the inquiry when the suitable occasion occurs. 

* Or ' Righteousness ' ; the term includes more than 
justice. 

" Or ' Well-being ' ; the Greek word is entirely non- 
committal, and does not necessarily denote a state of feeling, 
consciousness of welfare. 

199 



ARISTOTLE 

1214 a 

15 μζθόΒω. πρώτον 8e σκ€τττ4ον iv tlvl to ev ζην 4 
και πώς κτητόν, πότβρον φνσ€ί γίνονται πάντ€ς 
€ύοαιμον€ς οι τνγχάνοντ€ς ταύτης της προσηγορίας, 
ωσπβρ μεγάλοι και μικροί και την χροιάν δια- 
φεροντ€ς, η δια μαθήσεως , ώς οΰσης επιστήμης 
τίνος της ευδαιμονίας, η δια τίνος ασκήσεως 

20 {πολλά γαρ οϋτε κατά φνσιν οϋτε μαθοΰσιν αλλ' 
εθισθεΐσιν υπάρχει τοις άνθρώποις, φαΰλα μεν 
τοις φαύλως εθισθεΐσι, χρηστά Βέ τοις χρηστώς) ; 
η τούτων μεν κατ' ο^δβ^α τών τρόπων, ΒυοΙν δέ 5 
θατερον, ήτοι καθά'^-'ρ οι νυμφόληπτοι και θεό- 
ληπτοι τών άνθρώπ(^ν, επιπνοία Βαιμονίον τινός 

25 ωσπερ ενθουσιάζοντες , η δια την τύχην (πολλοί 
γαρ ταυτον φασιν eivai την εύ^αιμονίαν και την 
εύτυχίαν) , 

Ότι μεν οΰν η παρουσία^ δια τούτων απάντων η 6 
τινών η τίνος υπάρχει τοις άνθρώποις, ουκ ά^ηλον 
αττασαι γαρ αι γενέσεις σχεδόν πίπτουσιν εις 
ταιίτα? τάς αρχάς {και γάρ τάς^ από της διανοίας 

30 αττασας• προς τα? απ επιστήμης αν τις συναγάγοι 
πράξεις) . τό δ' εύδαιμονεΐν και τό ζην μακαρίως 7 
και καλώ? εϊη αν εν τρισι μάλιστα τοις etvai 
! οοκοΰσιν αίρετωτάτοις• οι μεν γάρ την φρόνησιν 
μεγιστον είναι φασιν aya^ov, οι 8ε την άρετήν, οι 
8ε την η8ονην. και προς την εύ8αιμονίαν ενιοι 8 
1214 b Trepi του μεγέθους αυτών 8ιαμφισβητοΰσι, συμ- 
βάλλεσθαι φάσκοντες θάτερον θατερου μάλλον εις 

^ ν.1. παρουσία rijs €ύδαιμονίαί. ^ τάϊ add. Cas. 

" The Greek term here still retains the general sense that it 
has in Plato. In the Nicomachean Ethics it is limited to 

aoo 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, I. i. 4-8 

4 But we must consider first what the good hfe con- 
sists in and how it is to be obtained — whether all of 
those who receive the designation ' happy ' acquire 
happiness by nature, as is the case with tallness and 
shortness of stature and differences of complexion, 
or by study, which would imply that there is a science 
of happiness, or by some form of training, for there are 
many human attributes that are not bestowed by 
nature nor acquired by study but gained by habitua- 
tion— bad attributes by those trained in bad habits 
and good attributes by those trained in good ones. 

5 Or does happiness come in none of these ways, but 
either by a sort of elevation of mind inspired by 
some divine ροΛνβΓ, as in the case of persons possessed 
by a nymph or a god, or, alternatively, by fortune ? 
for many people identify happiness Avith good for- 
tune. 

6 Now it is pretty clear that the presence of happi- 
ness is bestowed upon men by all of these things, or 
by some or one of them ; for almost all the modes in 
which it is produced fall under these principles, in- 
asmuch as all the acts that spring from thought may 
be included with those that spring from knowledge. 

7 But to be happy and to live blissfully and finely its three 
may consist chiefly in three things deemed to be "tftuents 
most desirable : some people say that Wisdom ° 

is the greatest good, others Goodness * and others 

8 Pleasure. And certain persons debate about their 
importance in relation to happiness, declaring that one 
contributes more to it than another — some holding 

Practical Wisdom, prudentia, ' prudence,' as distinct from 
θεωρία, sapientia, ' speculative wisdom.' 

* It must always be remembered that the Greek term is 
less limited in meaning than ' virtue,' and may denote 
excellence in any department, not only moral goodness. 

201 



ARISTOTLE 

1214 b ^ ^ , , , ^ • ^ 

αντην, OL μβν ώς ονσαν μΐΐζον αγαθόν την 

φρονησίν της aperrjg, οΐ δε ταύτης την άρ€την, 

OL δ αμφοτέρων τούτων την η^ονην καΐ τοις μβν 

5 €Κ ττάντων δο /cer τούτων, τοις δ' e/c hvolv, τοις δ 

ev ivL TLVi τούτων elvai το ζην €ν^>αιμ6νως . 

II. Yiepl δτ) τούτων €πιστησαντας άπαντα τον 1 

Βυνάμενον ζην κατά την αντον ττροαίρεσιν ^βσ^αι 

TLva σκοπόν του καλώς ζην, ήτοι τιμήν η δο^αν 

η πλοντον η τταώείαν, ττρός δν άττοβλεττων ττοιησεται 

10 πάσας τάς πράξεις {ώς τό γ€ μη συντ€τάχθαι τον 
βίον προς τι τέλος αφροσύνης πολλής σημεΐον 
εστίν), μάλιστα δτ) δέΐ πρώτον εν αύτω ^ιορίσασθαι 2 
μήτε προπετώς μήτε ραθύμως εν τίνι τών ημέτερων 
το ζην εν και τίνων άνευ τοις άνθρώποις ουκ 
ενδέχεται τοΰθ^ ύπάρχειν. ου γαρ ταύτον ών τ 

15 άνευ ούχ οΐόν τε uyiatVeii' και το i5yiatVetv, ομοίως 3 
δ' έχει τοΰτο και εφ^ έτερων πολλών ώστ ούΒέ 
τό ζην καλώς και ών άνευ ου Βυνατον ζην καλώς. 
έ'στι δε τών τοιούτων τα μεν ουκ ί'δια της uyteia? 4 
ούΒε της ζωής άλλα κοινά πάντων ώς ειπείν, και 

20 τών εζεων και τών πράξεων, οΐον άνευ του αναπνεΐν 
η εγρηγορεναι η κινήσεως μετεχειν ούθεν αν 
νπάρζειεν ήμΐν ούτ^ άγαθον ούτε κακόν, τα δ 
ίδια μάλλον περί εκάστην φύσιν, ου γάρ ομοίως 
οίκεΐον προς εύεξίαν τοις είρημενοις κρεωφαγια 
και τών περιπάτων οι μετά ^εΐπνον. α 8εΐ μη 

» C/. Ν.Ε. i., 1094 a 22, 1095 a 22-26. 
202 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, I. i. 8— ii. 4 

that Wisdom is a greater good than Goodness, 
others the reverse, and others that Pleasure is a 
greater good than either of them ; and some think 
that the happy hfe comes from them all, others from 
two of them, others that it consists in some one of 
them. 

1 II. Havingthen inregard to this subject established its essential 
that everybody able to live according to his own pur- 
posive choice should set before him some object for 

noble living to aim at"— either honour or else glory 
or wealth or culture^— on which he Mdll keep his eyes 
fixed in all his conduct (since clearly it is a mark 
of much folly not to have one's life regulated with 

2 regard to some End), it is therefore most necessary 
first to decide within oneself, neither hastily nor 
carelessly, in Avhich of the things that belong to us 
the good life consists, and what are the indispensable 
conditions for men's possessing it. For there is a 
distinction between health and the things that are 

3 indispensable conditions of health, and this is simi- 
larly the case with many other things ; consequently 
also to live finely is not the same as the things with- 

4 out which living finely is impossible. And in the 
latter class of things some that are indispensable 
conditions of health and life are not peculiar to 
special people but common to practically all men — 
both some states and some actions — for instance, 
without breathing or being awake or participating 
in movement we could not possess any good or any 
evil at all ; whereas others are more peculiar to 
special types of natural constitution — for instance, 
eating meat and taking walking exercise after 
dinner are not closely related to health in the same 
way as the conditions mentioned. And these facts 

203 



ARISTOTLE 

1214 b 

25 λάνθαναν^ έ'στι γαρ ταντ αίτια της άμφισβητ'ησ€ως 5 
7T€pt του βύΒαιμονΐΐν τι εστί καΐ yiVerai δια τίνων 
ών avev γαρ ούχ οΐόν re €ύ8αιμον€Ϊν eViot ^eprj 
της ΐύΒαιμονίας eti^at νομίζονσιν. 

III. Πάσα? μ^ν ονν τάς δό^α? Ιτησκοττ^Ιν όσας 1 
€.χουσι τινβς ττβρί αύτης ττερίζργον . ττολλά γαρ 

30 φαίνεται και τοις παώαρίοις και τοις κάμνονσι 
και τταραφρονοΰσι nepl ών άν ούθεις νουν €χων 
Βιαττορησειεν, SdovTai γαρ ου λόγων, αλλ' οι μβν 
ηλικίας iv fj μεταβαλοΰσιν^ οι he κολάσβως 
ιατρικής η πολιτικής (κόλασις γαρ η φαρμακεία 
των πληγών ουκ Ιλάττων εστίν) • ομοίως he 2 

1215 a ταυται? oi)he τας των πολΧών, εική γαρ λεγουσι 

σχehov περί απάντων και μάλιστα περί ταύτης, 
τάς hε των σοφών^ έπισκεπτεον μόνας• άτοπον 
γαρ προσφερειν λόγον τοις λόγου μηhev hεoμ€Voις 
αλλά πάθους* επει δ' είσιν άπορίαι περί εκάστην 3 

5 πραγματείαν οίκεΐαι, hηλov οτι και περί βίου του 
κρατίστου και ζωής της άριστης είσίν ταύτας ουν 
καλώς έχει τάς hόξaς εζετάζειν, οι γάρ τών 
αμφισβητούντων έλεγχοι τών εναντιουμενων αύταις^ 
λόγων άπohείζεις είσίν. 

Έιτι hε προ έργου το τά τοιαύτα μη λανθάνειν 4 
μάλιστα προς α hei συντείνειν πάσαν σκεφιν, εκ 

10 τίνων evhεγετaι μετασχεΐν του ευ και καλώς ζην 

^ & , . . \ανθάνΐΐν hie Rac. : supra post ψύσιν. 

" Sp. : μ€ταβά\\ονσιν. 

' ταντη$ . . . σοφών add. Ρ*• marg. (δέ add. Rac). 

* vtidovs lac. * Rac. : αύτοΐί. 

° In the Mss. this clause comes before the preceding one, 
' for instance, eating meat . . . mentioned.' 

" Cf. N.E. i., 1095 a 28-30, b 19 ff. 
204. 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, I. ii. 5— iii. 4 

5 must not be overlooked," for these are the causes of 
the disputes about the real nature of happiness and 
about the means of procuring it ; for some people 
regard the things that are indispensable conditions 
of being happy as actual parts of happiness. 

1 III. Now to examine all the opinions that any Considered 
people hold about happiness is a superfluous task.'' "^the"*'''^ 
For children and the sick and insane have many nature of 
opinions which no sensible man would discuss, for '''^ρ^""^*" 
these persons need not argument but the former 

time in which to grow up and alter and the latter 
medical or official chastisement (treatment with 
3rugs being chastisement just as much as flogging 

2 is). And similarly it is also superfluous to examine 
the opinions of the multitude " either ; for they talk 
at random about almost everything, and especially 
about happiness. We ought to examine only the 
opinions of the wise '^ ; for it is out of place to apply 
reasoning to those who do not need reasoning at all, 

3 but experience. But since every subject has special 
difficulties related to it, it is clear that there are such 
in regard to the highest life and the best mode of 
existence ; it is then well to examine the opinions 
putting these difficulties, since the refutations ad- 
vanced by those who challenge them are demon- 
strations of the theories that are opposed to them. 

4 Moreover to notice such matters is especially are of prac- 
advantageous with a view to the subjects to which γΟγ'^η,Γ^"* 
all inquiry ought to be xlireeted — the question what attainment. 
are the ipeans that make it possible to participate 

> in living Λν^Ι and finely (if ' blissfully ' is too invidious 

" Cf. N.E. i., 1095 b 19. 

** The words translated ' happiness ' and ' the opinions of 
the wise ' are conjectural insertions in the Greek. 

205 



ARISTOTLE 

121V 

{el To^ μακαριως επιφθονώτβρον ΐίπβΐν), καΐ προς 
την ελτΓίδα την irepl €καστα γβνομβνην άν των 
€τηακών. el μ€ν γαρ ev τοις δια τνχην γι,νομίνοις 5 
■ί) Ύοΐς δια φνσι,ν το καλώς ζην eoTLV, άν^λτηστον 
αν €'ίη πολλοίς, ου γάρ εστί δι' eπLμeλeίaς η 

15 κτησις ovSe^ ctt' αύτοΐς ούδε' της αυτών πραγ- 
ματείας• el δ ev τω αύτον ποιόν τίνα elvat καΐ 6 
τα? κατ αύτον πράζεις, κοινότερον αν εΐη το 
αγαθόν καΐ deiOTepov, κοινότερον μεν τω πλείοσιν 
€νΒ4χεσθαι μετασχεΐν, deioTepov he τω κεΐσθαι 
την εύ^αιμονίαν τοΐς^ αυτούς παρασκευάζουσι 
ποίούς τίνα? καΐ τας πράξεις. 

20 IV. "Εσται δε φανερά τα πλείστα των άμφισ- 1 
βητουμενων καΐ Βιαπορουμενων άν καλώς όρισθη 
τι χρη νομίζειν είναι την ενΒαιμονίαν, πότερον εν 
τω ποιόν τίνα μόνον efvat την φυχην, καθάπερ 
Ttre? ωηθησαν τών σοφών και πρεσβυτέρων, η 

25 8εΐ μεν και ποιόν τίνα ύπάρχειν αυτόν, μα?0(ον 8ε 
8εΐ τάς πράξεις eii^at ποιας τινας. 

Αιηρημενων δε τών βίων και τών μεν ουδ'* 2 
αμφισβητούντων της τοιαύτης ευημερίας αλλ' 
αλλω?' τών αναγκαίων χάριν σπουΒαζομενων , οΐον 
τών περί τάς Τ€;)^να9 τα? φορτικάς και τάς 
βάναυσους^ και τών περί χρηματισμόν {λέγω δε 

30 φορτικάς μεν τάς προς 8όξαν π ραγματευομενας 
μόνον, βάναυσους δε τα? εδραία? και μισθαρνικάς, 

^ το Vict., τφ τό Fr. : τφ. 

* ουδέ om. Sp. ^ » ουδέ διά. Ρ»>. 

* ν.1. έν TOis : if τφ . . . ιταρασκΐυάζΐΐν ? Rac. 

* ούδ' add. Βζ. * Sp. ws. 

' Sp. : καΐ ταί βαναύσονί post χρηματισμόν. 

" The word ψυχή, usually rendered * soul,' has no term 
exactly corresponding to it in English, as it denotes the whole 

206 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, I. in. 4— iv. 2 

an expression) — and with a view to the hope that we 
may have of the things that are good in the various ' 

5 departments. For if hving finely depends on things 
that come by fortune or by nature, it would be be- 
yond the hopes of many men, for then its attainment 
is not to be secured by effort'^ and does not rest with 
men themselves and is not a matter of their own 

6 conduct ; but if it consists in oneself and one's own 
actions having a particular quality, the good would 
be more common and more divine — more common 
because it would be possible for more people to share 
it, and more divine because happiness would then be 
in store for those who made themselves and their 
actions of a particular quality. 

1 IV. Most of the points debated and the difficulties Character or 
raised ΛνΙΙΙ be clear if it be satisfactorily determined '='^"'^"'^*• 
what the proper, conception of happiness is — does 
it consist merely in a person's possessing some par- 
ticular quality of spirit," as some of the sages and 
the older thinkers held, or although a particular 
personal character is indeed an indispensable con- 
dition, is a particular quality of conduct even more 
V; necessary ? 
'2 There are various different modes of life, and some Three 
do not lay any claim to well-being of the kind under ^>'Ρ"^''' •'^'^^• 
consideration, but are pursued merely for the sake 
of things necessary — for instance the lives devoted 
to the vulgar and mechanic arts and those dealing 
with business (by vulgar arts I mean those pursued 
only for reputation, by mechanic the sedentary and 
wage-earning pursuits, and by arts of business those 

vitality of a living creature, with the unconscious factors of 
nutrition and growth as well as conscious feelings or emo- 
tions and thoughts. 

207 



ARISTOTLE 

1216 8 

χρημαηστικας 8e τάς προς ωνάς αγοραίας^ και 

πράσ€ΐς καττηλικάς), των δ' ets" άγωγην εύδαι/ζ,ο- 
νίκην ταττομενων τριών όντων των καΐ πρότ€ρον 
ρηθζντων αγαθών' ώς μβγίστων τοις άνθρώποίς, 

3δ apcTTJs και φρονησίως και ηΒονης, Tpeis ορώμ^ν 

καΐ βίους οντάς ους οι ζζουσίας^ τυγχάνοντ€ς 

i2i5h προαιρούνται ζην ατταντ^ς, πολιτικον φιλοσοφον 

άπολαυστικόν . τούτων γαρ 6 μβν φιλόσοφος 3 

βούλ^ται TTcpi φρόνησιν et^at και την θ^ωριαν την 

TTepi την άληθβιαν, ό 8e πολιτικός π€ρι τάς πράζ^ις 

τάς καλάς {αύται δ' eloiv αΐ άπο της άρβτης), 6 

ό Ο απολαυστικός π€ρι τάς η^ονάς τάς σωματικάς . 

δίόττερ eVepos"' eTcpov* ζύ^αίμονα προσαγορβύβι, 4 

καθάπβρ βλβχθη και πρότ€ρον, και^ ^Αναξαγόρας 

μβν 6 ]ίλαζομ€νιος βρωτηθβΐς τις ό €ύ^αιμον€στατος , 

ούθβίς " €Ϊπ€ν " ών συ νομίζζΐς, αλλ άτοπος αν 

τις σοι φανβίη." τούτον δ άπβκρινατο τον τρόπον 

10 €Κ€Ϊνος όρων τον €ρόμ€νον αδύνατοι^ ύπολαμβάνοντα 
μη μβγαν οντά και καλόν η πλούσιον ταύτης 
τνγχάν€ΐν της προσηγορίας, αυτός δ ίσως ώετο 
τον ζώντα άλύπως και καθαρώς προς το Βικαιον 
η τίνος θεωρίας κοινωνοΰντα θ^ίας, τούτον ως 
άνθρωπον βιπ€Ϊν^ μακάριον eti^ai. 

15 V. TLepi πολλών μ€ν οΰν και έτερων ου paSiov 1 

^ Sol. : irpbs ayopat μέν. 

^ Sp. : έπ έξονσίαί : etr' ίξουσίαΐ <6»'Tes> τυ-γχάνοντεί ? Rac, 

* irepoi add. Ras. * irepov Rac, : ^repov τόν. 

* και add. ? Sus. ' eiireh <5e(»'> ? Ric. 

« See 1214 a 30-b 5. 

* Perhaps the Greek should be emended to give ' those 
who happen to be in power.' 

* i.e. active citizenship : ' statesmanship ' is too lofty a 
term. 

208 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, I. iv. 2— v. 1 

concerned with market purchase and retail selling) ; 
but on the other hand, the things related to the happy 
conduct of life being three, the things already men- 
tioned'* as the greatest possible goods for men — 
gopdjiess, .wisdom and pleasure, we see that there are 
also three ways of life in which those to whom: for- 
,ΐίΐηε gives opportunity * invariably choose to live, the 
life of politics,'' the life of philosophy, and the life 

3 of enjoyment. Of these the philosophic life denotes 
being concerned with the contemplation of truth, the 
political life means being occupied with honourable 
activities (and these are the activities that spring 
from goodness), and the life of enjoyment is con- 

4 cerned with the pleasures of the body. Owing to this, 
different people give the name of happy to different 
persons, as was said before too ; and Anaxagoras ^ 
of Clazomenae when asked ' Who is the happiest 
man t ' said ' None of those whom you think, but 
he would seem to you an odd sort of person.' But 
Anaxagoras answered in that way because he saw 
that the man who put the question supposed it to 
be impossible to receive the appellation ' happy ' 
without being great and beautiml or rich, whereas 
he himself perhaps thought that the person who 
humanly speaking enjoys bliss is he that lives by the 
standard of justice without pain and in purity, or 
participates in some form of divine contemplation.* 

1 V. While there are many different things as to Various 

opinions 
" The physical philosopher, 500-428 b.c, born at Clazo- ^^*^,"*^'' 
menae in Ionia, taught at Athens. 

« i.e. the man who displays the virtues of Temperance, 
Justice and Wisdom (the fourth cardinal virtue, Courage, is 
omitted), enhanced by pleasure or freedom from pain. This 
passage illustrates how Aristotle prepared the way for the 
hedonism of Epicurus. 

Ρ 209 



ARISTOTLE 

1215 b , ^ ^ , ^ X r - «- 

TO κρΐναι καλώς, μάλιστα Be TTcpi o5 ττασι ραστον 

€?ναι δο /cet καΐ τταντος ανθρώπου το ^νώναι, τι 
των iv τώ ζην alperov, καΐ λαβών αν τι? εχοι 
πλήρη την έπιθνμίαν. πολλά γάρ εστί τοιαύτα 
τών άποβαινόντων δι' ά προΐ^νται το ζην, οίον 

20 νόσους π^ριω^υνίας χ€ΐμώνας• ώστ€ Βηλον οτι 
καν εζ άρχης alpeTov ην, el τις αϊρεσιν εδιδου, 
δια γ€ ταΰτα το μη γενέσθαι, προς δε τούτοι? ό^ 2 
βίος δν ζώσιν έτι τταιδε? οι^τε?' καΐ γάρ €πΙ τούτον 
άνακάμφαι πάλιν ούδει? αν υπομείνειβν ευ φρονών. 

20 ετι δε πολλά τών τε μη^εμίαν εχόντων ή^ονην η 3 
λυπην, καΐ τών εχόντων μεν η^ονην μη καλην 
δε, τοιαΰτ' εστίν ώστε το μη είναι κρεΐττον είναι 
Toy ζην. όλως δ' ε'ί τι? άπαντα συναγαγοι όσα 4 
πράττουσι μεν και πάσχουσιν άπαντες, εκόντες 
μεντοι μηθεν αυτών δια το /χηδ' αυτού χάριν, και 

30 προσθείη χρόνου πλήθος άπεραντόν τι, ου μάλλον 
ενεκ αν τι? τούτων ελοιτο ζην η μη ζην. αλλά 5 
μην ουδέ δια T17V της τροφής μόνον ηΒονην η την 
τών αφροδισίων, άφαιρεθεισών τών άλλων η8ονών 
άς το γινώσκειν η βλεπειν η τών άλλων τις 
αισθήσεων πορίζει τοις άνθρώποις, οι)δ αν ει? 

35 προτιμήσειε το ζην μη παντελώς ων άνδράττοδον, 
Βήλον γάρ οτι τω ταύτην ποιουμενω την αιρεσιν 
ούθεν αν Βιενεγκειε ■)/ενε'σ^αι θηρίον ή άνθρωπον 

1216 a ο γοΰν εν ΑΙγύπτω βοΰς, δν ως Άπιν τιμώ)σιν, εν 6 

πλείοσι τών τοιούτων εξουσιάζει πολλών μοναρχών.^ 

^ <Tis> ό . . . ; Cas. ^ Γ : μοναρχιών. 

" C/. Soph. O.C. 1225 μη ψυναι τόν άπαντα viKqi λ070ΐ'. 
210 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, I. v. 1-7 

which it is not easy to make a right judgement, this 
is especially the case with one about which every- 
body thinks that it is very easy to judge and that any- 
body can decide — the question which of the things 
contained in being alive is preferable, and which when 
attained would fully satisfy a man's desire. For 
many of life's events are such that they cause men 
to throw life away, for instance, diseases, excessive 
pains, storms ; so that it is clear that on account of 
these things any way it would actually be preferable, 
if someone offered us the choice, not to be born at 

2 all." And in addition, the kind of life that people 
live while still children is not desirable — in fact no 
sensible person could endure to go back to it again. 

3 And further, many of the experiences that contain no 
pleasure nor pain, and also of those that do contain 
pleasure but pleasure of an ignoble kind, are such 
that non-existence would be better than being alive. 

4 And generally, if one collected together the whole 
of the things that the whole of mankind do and ex- 
perience yet do and experience unwillingly, because 
not for the sake of the things themselves, and if one 
added an infinite extent of time, these things would 
not cause a man to choose to be alive rather than 

5 not alive. But moreover, also the pleasure of food! 
or of sex alone, with the other pleasures abstracted! 
that knowledge or sight or any other of the senses ! 
provides for human beings, would not induce any- | 
body to value life higher if he were not utterly ■ 
slavish, for it is clear that to one making this choice 
there would be no difference between being born a 

6 beast or a man ; at all events, the ox in Egypt, which 
they reverence as Apis, has a greater abundance of 

7 such indulgences than many monarchs. Nor like- 

211 



ARISTOTLE 

1216 a 

ομοίως 8e ovhk δια την του KadevSeiv YjSovrjV' τι 7 
γαρ 8ιαφβρ€ΐ KaOevSeiv aveyeprov νττνον άπο τη? 
πρώτης ημέρας μ^χρι της τελευταία? €τών αριθμόν 
5 χιλίων η όποσωνονν ,^ η ζην οντά φυτόν; τά γονν 
φυτά. τοιαύτης τινός eoiKe μζτ€χ€ΐν ζωής, ώσττ^ρ 
και τά τταιδία* και γό,ρ ταύτα κατά την πρώτην 
iv τη μητρί^ yiveaiv πζφυκότα μβν διατελεί 
καθ^ύ^οντα δε τον ττάντα χρόνον. ώστ€ φαν^ρόν 8 
εκ των τοιούτων οτι διαφεύγει σκοπούμενους τΊ 

10 τό ευ και τι τό aya^oi' τό iv τω ζην. 

Ύόν μ€ν οΰν ^Αναζαγόραν φασίν άποκρίνασθαι 9 
προς τίνα Βιαποροΰντα τοιαΰτ* άττα και Βΐΐρωτώντα 
τίνος evcK αν τις eXoiTo ■}/εΐ'ε'σ^αι μάλλον η μη 
yeveadai " του " φάναι " θβωρησαι τόν ούρανόν 
και την ττερι τόν δλον κόσμον τάζιν." οΰτος μ€ν 

15 οΰν επιστήμης τινός €V€K€v την αιρεσιν ω€το 
TtjLttW είναι τοΰ ζην οι δε ΈαρΒανάπαλλον 10 
μακαρίζοντ€ς η Ί1μιν8υρί8ην τόν Έυβαρίτην η 
των άλλων Tim? των ζώντων τόν άπολαυστικον 
βίον, ούτοι δε πάντες iv τω γαίρ^ιν φαίνονται 
τάττ€ΐν την €ύΒαιμονίαν• έτεροι δε' τινε? οΰτ αν 11 

20 φρόνησιν ούΒ€μίαν οϋτ€ τάς σωματικός η^ονάς 
ζλοιντο μάλλον η τά? πράζβις τα? απ αρετής• 
αιροϋνται γοΰν ου μόνον evioi Βόζης χάριν αύτας 
αλλά και μη μέλλοντας βύΒοκιμησζίν. αλλ' οι 12 
ττολλοι των πολιτικών ουκ αληθώς τυγχάνουσι 

^ ν. Ι. ^TU)f άρίθμων χίλιον αριθμόν τ) όττοσονονν : ΐτων χιλίων 
il όποσωνονν? (exciso αριθμόν gloss, ad όττοσονονν erratum) 
Rac. * μήτρφ V. 

" See 1215 b 6 η. 

* A mythical king of Assyria, proverbial for luxury, cf. 
N.E. i., 1295 b 22. 
212 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, I. v. 7-12 

wise would anyone desire life for the pleasure of 
sleep either ; for what is the difference between 
slumbering without being awakened from the first 
day till the last of a thousand or any number of years, 
and living a vegetable existence ? any way plants seem 
to participate in life of that kind ; and so do children 
too, inasmuch as at their first procreation in the 
mother, although alive, they stay asleep all the time. 

8 So that it is clear from considerations of this sort 
that the precise nature of well-being and of the good 
in life escapes our investigation. 

9 Now it is said that when somebody persisted in 
putting various difficulties of this sort to Anaxagoras " 
and went on asking for what object one should choose 
to come into existence rather than not, he replied 
by saying, ' For the sake of contemplating the 
heavens and the whole order of the universe.' 
Anaxagoras therefore thought that the alternative 
of being alive was valuable for the sake of some kind 

10 of knowledge ; but those who ascribe bliss to Sar- 
danapallus ^ or Smindyrides of Sybaris " or some of 
the others living the life of enjoyment, all appear for 

11 their part to place happiness iti delight ; while a 
different set would not choose either wisdom of any 
kind or the bodily pleasures in preference to the actions 
that spring from goodness : at all events, some people 

choose those actions not only for the sake of reputa-<ii\)^Sf^0ff'^ 
tion but even when they are not going to get 

12 any credit. But the majority of those engaged in 
politics are not correctly designated * politicians,' for 

" Greek colony in S. Italy. For SmindjTides, who 
travelled with 1000 slaves in attendance, see Herod vi. 127, 
Athenaeus, v. p. 273. 

213 



35 



ARISTOTLE 

1216 a 

της ττροσηγορι,ας' ου γάρ elai πολιτικοί κατά τον 
25 aXrjOeiav, ο μ€ν γάρ πολιτικός των καλών €στι 
ττραξζων προαιρετικός αυτών χάριν, οι 8e πολλοί 
χρημάτων και πλεονεξίας ένεκεν άπτονται του 
ζην οϋτως. 

E/C μεν οΰν τών ειρημενων φανερον δτι πάντες 13 
επι τρεις βίους φερουσι την εύ^αιμονίαν , πολιτικον 
φιλοσοφον άπολαυστικόν . τούτων δ' η μεν περί 
30 τα σώματα και τάς απολαύσεις ηΒονη και τίς και 
ποια τις γίνεται και δια. τίνων ουκ ά^ηλον, ώστ 
ου τίνες εισΧ δει ζητεΐν ημάς^ αλλ' ει συντείνουσί 
τι προς εύΒαιμονίαν η μη, και πώς συντείνουσί, 
και ποτερον, ει 8εΐ προσάπτειν τω ζην καλώς' 
η8ονάς τινας, ταύτας 8εΐ προσάπτειν η τούτων 
μεν άλλον Tti^o, τρόπον ανάγκη κοινωνεΐν, ετεραι 
ο εισίν at' rjSovai δι' ας ευλόγως οΐονται τον 
εύΒαίμονα ζην ήΒεως και μη μόνον άλύπως. 

Αλλά περί μεν τούτων ύστερον επισκεπτεον , ΐ4 
περί ο αρετής και φρονησεως πρώτον θεωρησωμεν 
την τε φύσιν αυτών εκατερου τίς εστί και πότερον 
40 μόρια ταύτα της aya^Ty? ζωής εστίν*' αυτά η αΐ 
1216 b πράξεις αϊ άπ αυτών, επεώη προσάπτουσιν αυτά 
καν ει μη πάντες εις την εύ^αιμονίαν αλλ' ουν οΐ 
λόγου άξιοι τών ανθρώπων πάντες. 

Χωκράτης μεν οΰν ό πρεσβύτης ωετ είναι τέλος 15 
το γινώσκειν την άρετην, και επεζητει τί εστίν η 
5 hικaιoσύvη και τί η ανδρεία και εκαστον τών 

^ Ft. : αύτά$. * Βζ. : κα\ά$. 

' αί add. Rac. ■• Rac. : έστΙν ή. 

" The Greek word is specially associated with sensual 
pleasures. 

" The promised discussion does not occur, but see N.E. 
vii„ 1153 b 7-25. 

314 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, I. v. 12-15 

they are not truly political, since the political man is 
one who purposely chooses noble actions for their own 
sake, whereas the majority embrace that mode of life 
for the sake of money and gain. 

13 What has been said, therefore, demonstrates that f'^?°P^, 
all men ascribe happiness to three modes of life — the threetypi- 
political, the philosophic, and the life of enjoyment." "*' ^'^'^^• 
Among these, the nature and quality of the pleasure 
connected with the body and Avith enjoyment, and 

the means that procure it, are not hard to see ; 
so that it is not necessary for us to inquire what these 
pleasures are, but whether they conduce at all to 
happiness or not, and how they so conduce, and, if it 

^^ (be the case that the noble life ought to have some 
pleasures attached to it, whether these are the pleas- 
ures that ought to be attached, or whether these 
must be enjoyed in some other way, whereas the 
pleasures which people reasonably believe to make 

^. ithe happy man's life pleasant and not merely pain- 

■ "^ less are diiferent ones. 

14 But these matters must be examined later. ^ Let Eihicsa i 
us first consider Goodness and Wisdom ^ — what subject / 
the nature of each is, and also whether they them- 
selves or the actions that spring from them are 

parts of the good life, since that they are connected 
with happiness is asserted, if not by everybody, 
at all events by all of mankind who are worthy of 
consideration. 

15 Accordingly Socrates the senior ^ thought that the 
End is to get to know virtue, and he pursued an 
Inquiry into the nature of justice and courage and 

" See 1214 a 33 note ; but practical wisdom is specially 
implied here. 

•* Gf. 1235 a 37. A younger Socrates was a pupil of Plato. 

215 



ARISTOTLE 

121β b 

μορίων αντης. enoUi 8e^ ταυτ' ευλόγως' βττιστημας 

γαρ ωετ' etvaL πάσας τάς άρ€τάς, ώσθ α^α 

σνμβαίν€ίν ei8eVat re την SiKaLoavvrjV και eivat 

δίκαιον a/ia yap μ^μαθ-ηκαμεν την γεωμ^τριαν 

καΐ οΙκοΒομίαν καΐ εσμεν οικοδόμοι και γβωμετραΐ' 

10 διοττερ εζι^τει τι iartv άρετη αλλ ου ττώ? yiverat 
και €κ τίνων, τοΰτο δε em /xei' των εττι,στημών 16 
σνμβαΙν€ί των θεωρητικών, ούθεν γαρ έτερον 
τελος'^ εστί της αστρολογίας ονΒε της ττερί φύ- 
σεως επιστήμης ονΒε γεωμετρίας πλην το γνωρισαι 
και θεωρησαι την φύσιν των πραγμάτων των 

15 υποκείμενων ται? επιστημαις [ου μην άλλα ίίατα 
σνμβεβηκος ονθέν κωλύει προς πολλά των avay- 
](αίων eti^ai χρησίμους αύτάς ημΐν), των δε Π 
ποιητικών επιστημών έτερον το τέλος της επι- 
στήμης και γνώσεως, οίον uyteta μεν ιατρικής, 
ευνομία 8ε η τι τοιονθ^ έτερον της πολιτικής, 
καλόν μεν οΰν και το γνωρίζειν εκαστον τών 18 

■20 καλών, ου μην άλλα περί y'^ άρετης ου το ειδει^αι 
τιμιώτατον τί eoTtl•" άλλα το γινώσκειν εκ τίνων 
εστίν, ου γάρ εΐ^εναι βουλόμεθα τί εστίν άνΒρεία 
άλλ' eti^at άν8ρεΐοι, ούδε τί εστί δικαιοσύνη άλλ 
ttvai δίκαιοι, καθάπερ και uytatVeti^ μα?<λον η 
γινώσκειν τί εστί το uyiatVetl•" και εδ εχειν την 

25 ^^*•^ μάλλον η γινώσκειν τί εστί το ευ εχειν. 

^ Fr. : yap. ^ rdXos add. Cas. 

* Ric. : ye wepi. 

" The Greek term primarily denotes biology, rather than 
physics in the modern sense (with which contrast the modern 

216 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, I. v. 15-18 

each of the divisions of virtue. And this was a 
reasonable procedure, since he thought that all the 
virtues are forms of knowledge, so that knowing 
justice and being just must go together, for as soonl ν 
as we have learnt geometry and architecture, we>" 
are architects and geometricians ; owing to which 
he used to inquire what virtue is, but not how and 

16 from what sources it is produced. But although this 

does happen in the case of the theoretical sciences, \ i-j, — ψ 
inasmuch as astronomy and natural science ** and .' V 
geometry have no other End except to get to know 
and to contemplate the nature of the things that are 
the subjects of the sciences (although it is true that 
they may quite possibly be \iseful to us accidentally 

17 for many of our necessary requirements), yet the 
End of the productive sciences is something different 
from science and knowledge, for example the End 
of medicine is health and that of political science 
ordered government, or something of that sort, 
different from mere knowledge of the science. 

18 Although, therefore, it is fine even to attain a know- 
ledge of the various fine things, all the same neverthe- 
less in the case of goodness it is not the knowledge of 
its essential nature that is most valuable but the 
ascertainment of the sources that produce it. For 
our aim is not to know what courage is but to be 
courageous, 'not to know what justice is but to be 
just, in the same way as we want to be healthy rather 
than to ascertain what health is, and to be in good 
condition of body rather than to ascertain what good 
bodily condition is. 

limitation of the term 'physiology,' and of 'physic' in the 
sense of medicine) ; accordingly it does not here include 
astronomy. 

217 



ARISTOTLE 

1216 b / , X / / 

VI. IleLpaTeov Se Trepl τούτων πάντων^ ζ'ητ€Ϊν 1 

την ττίστιν δια των Χόγων, μαρτυρίοίς καΐ τταρα- 
^^ίγμασί χρώμ€νον τοις φαινομβνοις. κράτιστον 
μβν γαρ ττάντα? άνθρώττονς φαίνβσθαι συνάμα - 
λογοΰντας τοις ρηθησομβνοις, el 8e μη, τρόπον 

30 ye TLva ττάντας.^ oirep μζταβίβαζόμβνοι ποιησονσίν 
€χ6ΐ γαρ έκαστος οΙκβΖόν τι προς την άλήθβιαν, 
€ζ ών άναγκαΐον heLKvvvaL πως π^ρΐ αυτών e/c 
γαρ των αληθώς μβν λεγομένων ου σαφώς Se 
προΐοΰσιν έ'σται και το σαφώς, μ^ταλαμβάνουσιν 
ael τά γνωριμώτ€ρα τών^ ^Ιωθότων Aeyea^at 

35 συγκεγυμίνως . Βιαφβρουσι δ οι λόγοι π€ρι 2 
€κάστην μίθο^ον οΐ τ€ φιλοσόφως λ^γόμβνοι καΐ οι 
μη φίλοσόφως• διόττερ και τώ πολιτικώ* ου χρη 
νομίζ€ΐν πζρίεργον efrai την τοιαύτην θβωρίαν δι 
■^ς ου μόνον το τι φαν^ρόν αλλά και το δια τι• 
φιλόσοφον γαρ το τοιούτο π€ρΙ ίκάστην μέθο^ον. 

40 heiTai μίντοι τοϋτο πολλής εύλαβζίας. €ΐσι γάρ 3 

1217 a τιν€ς οΐ δια το hoKelv φιλοσόφου elvai το μηθ^ν 

€ΐκη λβγβιν άλλα jnera λόγου πολλάκις λανθάνουσι 
λ€γοντ€ς αλλότριους λόγους της πραγματείας και 
κενούς [τοΰτο hk ποιοΰσιν ότ€ μεν δι αγι^οιαν ore 4 
δε δι' άλαζονείαν), ύφ^ ών άλίσκβσθαι συμβαίνει 
και τους έμπειρους και δυνάμενους πραττειν ύπο 
5 τούτων τών μητ εχόντων μήτε Βυναμενων διανΌΐαι/ 
άρχιτεκτονικην η πρακτικην, πάσχουσι δε τοΰτο 5 

^ πάντα (vel 27 χρωμ^ΐΌν$) Sp. * Vic. : ττάντωί. 

* <άΐ'τί> των ? Ric. * Ric. : τών πολιτικών. 

« Or perhaps ' led on step by step.' 

* i.e. practical men often think that any string of arguments ^ 
constitutes philosophy, though the arguers may be mere j 
charlatans. 

218 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, I. vi. 1-5 

1 VI. And about all these matters the endeavour The method 
must be made to seek to convince by means oftoobsirvj^ 
rational arguments, using observed facts as evi- ^^^cts and 
dences and examples. For the best thing would be their ^'^ 

if all mankind were seen to be in agreement with the reasons. 
views that will be stated, but failing that, at any 
rate that all should agree in some way. And this 
they will do if led to change their ground,** for every- 
one has something relative to contribute to the 
truth, and we must start from this to give a sort 
of proof about our views ; for from statements that 
are true but not clearly expressed, as we advance, 
clearness will also be attained, if at every stage we 
adopt more scientific positions in exchange for the 

2 customary confused statements. And in every in- 
vestigation arguments stated in philosophical form 
are different from those that are non-philosophical ; 
hence we must not think that theoretical study of 
such a sort as to make manifest not only the nature 
of a thing but also its cause is superfluous even for 
the political student, since that is the philosophic pro- 
cedure in every field of inquiry. Nevertheless this 

3 requires much caution. For because to say nothing 
at random but use reasoned argument seems to 
mark a philosopher, some people often without being 
detected advance arguments that are not germane 
to the subject under treatment and that have nothing 

4 in them (and they do this sometimes through ignor- 
ance and sometimes from charlatanry), which bring 
it about that even men of experience and practical 
capacity are taken in by these people, who neither 
possess nor are capable of constructive or practical 

5 thought.^ And this befalls them owing to lack of 

219 



ARISTOTLE 

1217 a ^ ^ ^ ^ , / , V ./ 

δι' άπαώζυσίαν άτταιδευσια γαρ εστί ττβρι €καστον 
ττραγμα το μη hvvaaOaL κρίναν τους τ' οικείου? 
λόγους του πράγματος καΐ τους αλλότριους. 

10 καλώ? δ' €χ€ΐ καΐ το χωρίς κρίν€ΐν τον της αίτιας 6 
λόγον καΐ το Ββικνυμενον, δια re το ρηθέν αρτιως, 
ΟΤΙ 7τροσ€χ€ΐν ου het ττάντα τοΓ? δια των λόγων 
άλλα τΓολλάκι? μάλλον τοις φαίνομίνοις {νΰν δ 
όττότ' αν λύ€ίν μη βχωσυν αναγκάζονται τηστ€υ€ΐν 

15 τοις €ΐρημ€νοις) , καΐ διότι ττολλακι? το^ υττο του 
λόγου δεδεΐχθαι δοκούν αληθές μβν cotlv ου μβντοι 
δια ταύτην την αίτίαν δι' ην φησιν ό λόγος, εστί 
γαρ δια φβύΒους αληθές δεΐ^αι• δηλον δ' eV των 
αναλυτικών . 

VII. ΙΙξπροοιμιασμβνων δε και τούτων, λίγωμ^ν 1 
άρζάμ€νοι πρώτον απο τών πρώτων, ωσπ€ρ 

20 €Ϊρηται, ου σαφώς λ^γομ^νων , ζητοΰντ€ς έττειτα' 
σαφώς eipelv τι βστιν τ^ ευδαιμονία, ομολογείται 2 
δ')7 μεγιστον eit'ai και άριστον τοϋτο τών aya^cul•' 
Tcur ανθρωπίνων (ανθρώπινον he λεγομεν οτι ταχ 
αν ε'ίη και βελτίονός τίνος άλλου τών όντων 
ευδαιμονία, οίον θεοΰ) • τών* γαρ άλλων ζωών, οσα 3 

25 χείρω την φύσιν τών ανθρώπων εστίν, ούθέν 
κοινωνεί ταύτης της προσηγορίας• ου γάρ εστίν 
ευδαίμων ίππος οΰδ' όρνις ουδ' ιχθύς ούδ άλλο 
τών όντων ούθέν ο μη κατά την επωνυμιαν εν 
τη φύσει )Μ€Τ6χ€ΐ θείου τιΐ'ό?, άλλα κατ' άλλτ^ν 

^ Rac. : τό μέν, * πρώτων <τών> ? Ric. 

' ίττειτα Ras. : ίπΐ τό {<.irpoi4vai> eVt ro ? Ric). 

* Rac. : ruv μ^ν. 

" § 1 above. 

" i.e. a proposition that logically follows from premisses 

220 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, I. vi. 5— vii. 3 

education-^for in respect of each subject inability 
to distinguish arguments germane to the subject 
6 from those foreign to it is lack of education. And 
it is also well to judge separately the statement of 
the cause and the demonstrated fact, both for the 
reason stated just now," that it is not proper in 
regard to all things to attend to theoretical argu- 
ments, but often rather to the facts of observation 
(whereas now when men are unable to refute an 
argument they are forced to believe what has been 
said), and also because often, although the result 
that seems to have been proved by the arguments is 
true, it is not true because of the cause asserted in 
the argument. For it is possible to prove truth by 
falsehood, as is clear from Analytics.^ 

1 VTI. These prefatory remarks having also been Happiness 
made, let us proceed by starting first from the first good^attakT- 
statements, which, as has been said,*' are not clearly ^^e by 
expressed, afterwards seeking to discover clearly 

2 the essential nature of happiness. Now it is agreed 
that happiness is the greatest and best of human 
goods (and we say ' human ' because there might 
very likely also be a happiness belonging to some 

3 higher being, for instance a god) ; since none of the 
other animals, which are inferior in nature to men, 
share in the designation ' happy,' for a horse is not 
happy, nor is a bird nor a fish nor any other existing 
thing whose designation does not indicate that it 
possesses in its nature a share of something divine, 
but it is by some other mode of participating in things 

that are false may be a true one : see Anal. Pr. ii., 53 b 26 if.. 
Anal. Post, i., 88 a 20 if. Aristotle's simplest example is 
the syllogism ' A man is a stone, but a stone is an animal, 
therefore a man is an animal.' 
" 1216 b32 ff. 

221 



ARISTOTLE 

1217 a,^,^ 

Tiva των aya^cul•" μ^τοχην το μ€ν β4λτίον ζγι το 

δβ χ€Ϊρον αυτώΐ'. 

30 'Αλλ' OTL τούτον €χ€ΐ τον τρόπον ύστερον 4 
επίσκ€πτ€ον. νυν 8e Χέγωμ^ν^ οτι των aya^oir 
τα. μβν iariv άνθρώπω πρακτά τά δ' ου πρακτα. 
τοΰτο δε Χεγομ€ν οΰτω διότι evia των όντων ούθεν 
μ€Τ€χ€ί κινήσεως, ωστ ουδέ των^ ayaQdv, koj? 
ταΰτ' Ισως άριστα την φύσιν εστίν, eVia δε ττρακτα 

3/) μεν, άλλα πρακτα κρείττοσιν ημών. επειδή δε 5 
Βιχώς λέγεται το πρακτόν [και γαρ ων ένεκα 
ττράττομεν και α τούτων ένεκα /χετε'χει πράζεως, 
οίον και την υγιειαν και τον πλοΰτον τίθεμεν των 
πρακτών και τά τούτων πραττόμενα χάριν, τα 
^' ύytεt^'ά και τά χρηματιστικά) , SijXov οτι και 

40 την εύ8αιμονίαν των άνθρώπω πρακτών άριστον 
θετεον. 
1217 b VIII. Έκεπτεον τοίνυν τι το άριστον και ποσαχώς 1 
λεyεται/ εν τρισι δη μάλιστα φαίνεται δό^αι? 
ειΐ'αι τοΰτο. ^ασι yap άριστον μεν είναι πάντων 
αυτό το dya^ov, αυτό δ' εΓν'αι το o.ya^oi' ω υπάρχει 
5 τό τε πρώτω είναι τών αγαθών και το αίτιω τη 
παρουσία τοις άλλοις του άγαθοΐς^ είναι• ταύτα δ' ^ 
ύπάρχειν^ αμφότερα τη ιδε'α τοΰ άγαθοΰ {λέγω δε 
αμφότερα το τε πρώτον τών aya^cov και το τοΓ? 
άλλοι? αίτιον dya^ois• τη παρουσία τοΰ αγαθοΐς 

^ vulg. \^•/ομβν. * τώ»» Κ,πρακτών^ ? Ric. 

' ίίθ(<τοι> ? Ric. * Rac. : Xeyerai ττοσαχώ^. 

® Vic. : ά-γαθά. • Fr. : virapxei. 

" This promise is not kept. 

*" Ίδια is here used in its Platonic sense, as a synonym for 
elSos, class-form, to denote the permanent immaterial reality 
that underlies any group of things classed together in virtue 
of possessing a common quality. An ίδ^α is jjcrceptible 

i22 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, I. vii. 3— viii. 2 

good that one of them has a bettei• Hfe and another 
a worse. 

4 But the fact that this is so must be considered 
later.* At the present let us say that among things 
good some are within the range of action for a human 
being and others are not. And we make this dis- 
tinction for the reason that some existing things do 
not participate in change at all, and therefore some 
good things do not, and these are perhaps in their 
nature the best things ; and some things, though 
practicable, are only practicable for beings superior 

5 to us. And inasmuch as ' practicable ' has two 
meanings (for both the Ends for which we act and the 
actions that we do as m^eans to those Ends have to 
do with action — for example we class among things 
practicable both health and wealth and the pursuits 
that are followed for the sake of health and wealth, 
healthy exercise and lucrative business), it is clear 
that happiness must be set down as the best of the 
things practicable for a human being. 

1 VIII. We must consider, therefore, what the best piato's 
is, and in how many senses the term is used. The of q^^'j 
answer seems to be principally contained in three refuted. 
views. For it is said that the best of all things is the 
Absolute Good, and that the Absolute Good is that 
which has the attributes of being the first of goods and 

of being by its presence the cause to the other goods of 

2 their being good ; and both of these attributes, it is 
said, belong to the Form'' of good (I mean both being 
the first of goods and being by its presence the cause to 
the other goods of their being good), since it is of that 

only by the mind, but the word does not denote the content 
of a mental perception, as does the derivative ' idea ' in 
ordinary English. 

223 



ARISTOTLE 

1217 b 

eivai)• μάλιστα re γαρ τάγαθον XeyeaOaL κατ 

10 €Κ€ίνης αληθώς {κατά μ€τογΎ]ν γάρ καΐ ομοιότητα 
τάλλα αγαθά εκείνης βΐναή, καΐ ττρώτον των 
ά)/α^ώΐ', αναιρουμένου γάρ του μετεχομενου άν- 
αιρβΐσθαι και τά μετέχοντα της ί8εας (ά λέγεται 
τω jLtexe^etr εκείνης), το δε πρώτον^ τούτον εχειν 3 
τον τρόπον προς το ύστερον ώστ eti^at αυτό το 

15 αγαθόν την ιδεαν» του άγαθοΰ' και γάρ χωριστην 
ett'ttt των μετεχόντων, ώσπερ και τάς άλλα? Ι^εας. 

' Εστί μεν ουν το Βιασκοπεΐν περί ταύτης της 4 
8όζης ετέρας τε διατριβής και τά πολλά λογικω- 
τερας εζ ανάγκης• οΐ γάρ άμα αναιρετικοί τε και 
κοινοί λόγοι κατ* ούΒεμίαν είσιν άλλην επιστήμην. 

20 61 δε δει συντόμως ειπείν περί αυτών, λεγομεν^ 5 
ΟΤΙ πρώτον μεν το eirat ιδεαι^ μη μόνον άγαθοΰ 
άλλα και άλλου ότονοΰν λέγεται λογικώς και 
κενώς {επεσκεπται δε πολΧοΐς περί αύτοϋ τρόποις 
και εν τοις εζωτερικοις λόγοις και εν τοις κατά 
φιλοσοφίαν)• εττειτ' ει και οτι /χάλιστ' είσιν at 6 

25 ιδε'αι και άγαθοΰ ιδε'α, μη ποτ* ούδε χρήσιμος 
προς ζωην άγαθην ουδέ προς τάς πράζεις. 

Πολλαχώ? γάρ λέγεται καΐ ίσαχώς τω οντι το 7 
aya^ov. τό τε γάρ 6ν, ώσπερ εν άλλοι? ^ιηρηται, 
σΐ7/Ααινει τό μεν τι εστί το δε ποιόν τό δε ποσόν 
τό δε ττότε και προς τούτοις τό μεν εν τω 

30 κινεΐσθαι τό δε εν τω κινεΐν και τό άγαθόι/ εν 
εκάστη τών πτώσεων εστί τούτων, εν ουσία μεν 

^ ττρύτΐρον Sp. ^ Χ^-^ωμβν ? Rac. 

" The use of this phrase by Aristotle elsewhere seems to 
show that it denotes doctrines, recorded in books or familiar 
invdebate, that were not peculiar to the Peripatetic school. 

224. 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, I. viii. 2-7 

Form that goodness is most truly predicated (inas- 
much as the other goods are good by participation 
in and resemblance to the Form of good) and also 
it is the first of goods, for the destruction of that 
which is participated in involves the destruction of 
the things participating in the Form (which get 

3 their designation by participating in it), and that is 
the relation existing between what is primary and 
what is subsequent ; so that the Form of good is 
the Absolute Good, inasmuch as the Form of good 
is separable from the things that participate in it, 
as are the other Porms also. 

4 Now a thorough examination of this opinion belongs a. The idea 
to another course of study, and one that for the most does not 
part necessarily lies more in the field of Loeic, for «"'^t, 
that is the only science dealing with arguments that 

5 are at the same time destructive and general. But 
if we are to speak about it concisely, we say that in 
the first place to assert the existence of a Form not 
only of good but of anything else is an expression of 
logic and a mere abstraction (but this has been con- 
sidered in various ways both in extraneous discourses ** 

6 and in those on philosophical lines) ; next, even 
granting that Forms and the Form of good exist in the 
fullest sense, surely this is of no practical value for 
the good life or for conduct. 

7 For ' good ' has many senses, in fact as many as i. 'good' 

' being.' For the term ' is,' as it has been analysed in several' '^^ 
other works, signifies now substance, now quality, now categories ; 
quantity, now time, and in addition to these meanings 
it consists now in undergoing change and now in caus- 
ing it ; and the good is found in each of these cases ^ — 

* i.e. categories. The last two specified are elsewhere 
designated Kiveiv and κιν€Ϊσθαι, Action and Passion. 

Q 225 



ARISTOTLE 

1217 b 

ό νους και 6 deos, iv 8e τω ττοιω το Βικαιον, ev 

8e τω ττοσω το μετρίον, iv 8e τω πότβ ό καιρός, 
το δε ^ώάσκον καΐ το Βώασκόμ€νον rrepl κίνησιν. 
ώστΓ€ρ οΰν ovSe το ον ev τι εστί Trepl^ τα. είρημβνα, 8 

35 όντως ovSe το aya^ov, ovSe €7Τίστημη εστί ju.ia 
οντ€ τον οντος οντ€ τον αγαθόν, αλλ' ουδέ τα 
όμοίοσχημόνως λ€γόμ€να αγαθά /χια? εστί θβωρησαι, 
οίον τον καιρόν η το μ4τριον, αλλ' έτερα eTepov 
καιρόν Oewpei και έτερα eTepov μάτριον, οίον nepl 
τροφην μev τον καιρόν και το μ€τριον ιατρική και 

40 γνμναστικη, Trepi δε τάς πολ€μικας 7τράζ€ΐς 
στρατηγία, και όντως έτερα ττερι ίτίραν ιτραζιν, 

1218 a ώστε σχολί^ αντό ye το aya^oi^ θeωpησaι ρ,ια?. 

"Έιτι ev οσοις υττάρχει το rrpoTepov και ύστερον, 9 
ονκ εστί κοινον τι παρά ταντα και τοντο^ χωριστόν 
ειι^ y'^P <^*^ '^'' '^^^ ττρώτον πρότ€ρον, npoTepov γαρ 10 
5 το /cotrov /cat χωριστόν δια το άναιρονμ4νον τον 
κοινον avaipelaOai το ττρώτον. οΐον ει το διττλάσιον 
•πρώτον τών πολλαπλασίων, ονκ evhe^eTai το 
πολλαπλάσιον το Koivfj κaτηγopovμevov ειΐ'αι 
χωριστόν εσται γαρ τον Βιπλασίον πpότepov^ ει 
σvμβaίveL το κοινον είναι την ιδε'αν, οίον ει 
χωριστόν πoιησeι€ τις το κοινον ει ycip εστί 
10 δικαιοσιίνι^ aya^ov και ανδρεία, έ'στι τοίνυν, φασίν, 
αντό τι aya^ov το ονν αυτό πρόσκζίται προς τον 11 
λόγον τον κοινον. τοΰτο δε τι αν eϊη πλην ότι 
άι'διον και χωριστόν ; αλλ' ούδεν ρ,αλλον λevκόv 



τταρά Vic. * τούτων Sp. 

' lacunam hie Sus. 



226 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, I. viii. 7-11 

in essence, as mind and God, in quality justice, in 
quantity moderation, in time opportunity, and as 
instances of change, the teacher and the taught. 

8 Therefore,] ust as being is not some one thing in respect 
of the categories mentioned, so neither is the good, and 
there is no one science either of the real or of the good. 

But also even the goods predicated in the same u. even in 
category, for example opportunity or moderation, do ftTfg'th^e^"'^^ 
not fall within the province of a single science to study, subject of 
but different sorts of opportunity and of moderation ββΓβ'ηοββ ; 
are studied by different sciences, for instance oppor- 
tunity and moderation in respect of food are studied 
by medicine and gymnastics, in respect of military 
operations by strategics, and similarly in respect of 
another pursuit by another science ; so that it can 
hardly be the case that the Absolute Good is the 
subject of only one science. 

9 Again, wherever there is a sequence of factors, a prior iii. aseries 
and a subsequent, there is not some common element ^^^;^°° 

beside these factors and that element separable ; for separately 
then there would be something prior to the first in ^^^^ '"^ ' 
the series, for the common and separable term would 

be prior because when the common element was de- 
stroyed the first factor Avould be destroyed. For ex- 
ample, if double is the first of the multiples, the 
multiplicity predicated of them in common cannot 
exist as a separable thing, for then it will be prior to 
double, if it is the case that the common element is 
the Form, as it would be if one were to make the 
common element sepai-able : for if justice is a good, 
and courage, there is then, they say, a Good-in-itself, 

1 so the term ' in itself ' is added to the common defini- 
tion. But what could this denote except that the 
good is eternal and separable ? Yet a thing that is 

227 



ARISTOTLE 

1218 a ^ Ν , , ^ ^ , f / 

TO ττοΧλας ημέρας XevKov rod /Ltiav rj^epav ωστ' 

ovSe (to ά)/αθόι^ μάλλον αγαθόν τω aiSiov elvai• 

15 oi5Se>^ Srj TO kolvov aya^ol•» ταύτό ttj ιδέα* ττάσι 
γαρ νπάρχ€ί κοινόν. 

Άνάτταλιν δε και SeiKTeov η ώς νυν SeiKvvovaL ] 
το αγαθόν αυτό. νυν μεν γαρ €Κ των μη'^ ομο- 
λογουμένων εχειν το αγαθόν, e^ εκείνων τα 
όμολογούμενα είναι αγαθά Βεικνύουσίν οΐον^ εζ 
αριθμών οτι η δικαιοσύνη και ή uyteta αγαθόν, 
τάζεις γαρ και αριθμοί, ώς τοις άριθμοΐς και 

20 ταΐς μονάσιν aya^or υπάρχον δια το είναι το εν 
αυτό τάγαθόν.*^ δει δ' εκ των όμολογουμενων οίον ] 
i5yieta§• ισ-χύος σωφροσύνης οτι και εν τοις άκινή- 
τοις μάλλον το καλόν ττάντα γάρ τάδε τάζις και 
■ηρεμία• ει άρα, εκείνα μάλλον, εκείνοις γάρ υπ- 
άρχει ταύτα μδίλλον. — παράβολος δε και η από- 1 

25 δει^ι? οτι το εν αύτο το αγαθόν ότι οι αριθμοί 
εφίενται αύτοΰ^• οϋτε γάρ ώς εφίενται λεγουσι^ 
φανερώς άλλα λι'αι^ απλώς τοϋτό φασι, και ορεζιν 
είναι πώς αν τις ύπολάβοι εν οΐς ζωη μη υπάρχει; 
δει δε ττερι τούτου πραγματευθηναι, και μη άζιοΰν 1 
μηθεν άλόγως ο' και μετά λόγου πιστεΰσαι ου 

30 ρά8ιον. — τό τε φάναι πάντα τά όντα εφίεσθαι ενός 

τίνος άγαθοΰ ουκ αληθές' εκαστον γάρ ίδιου αγαθού 

ορέγεται, οφθαλμός οφεως, σώμα ύyιειαs■, οϋτως 

άλλο άλλου. 

^ <τό ά7α^ό»' . . . οΰδβ> Ras, 

* μη add. Zeller, ^ οϊον add. Ilac. 

* Fr. : άΎαθόν. 

* αυτοί' add. ? Ric. (supra post dirt Fr.). 

' Sp. : \iyovTa.i. ' Sp. ζ Λ. 

" The words rendered ' the good is . . . eternal' are a con- 
jectural insertion. 

228 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, I. viii. 11-15 

white for many days is no more white than a thing Ι,^ρ-ρ^*^™'*'^ 
that is white for one day, so that the good is no more afiect 
good by being eternal « ; nor yet therefore is the 1"»''^^ : 
common good the same as the Form, for it is the 
common property of all the goods. 

2 Also the proper method of proving the Absolute v. general 
Good is the contrary of the method now adopted. At p,.ovVd from 
present it is from things not admitted to possess ^^H^!^}^^^^' 
goodness that they prove the things admitted to be versa-, 
good, for instance, they prove from numbers that 
justice and health are good, because they are arrange- 
ments and numbers — on the assumption that good- 
ness is a property of numbers and monads because 

3 the Absolute Good is unity. But the proper method 
is to start from things admitted to be good, for in- 
stance health, strength, sobriety of mind, and prove 
that beauty is present even more in the unchanging ; 
for all these admitted goods consist in order and rest, 
and therefore, if that is so, the things unchanging are 
good in an even greater degree, for they possess order 

4 and rest in a greater degree. — And it is a hazardous vi. unity of 
way of proving that the Absolute Good is unity to say „ηρ^νβ(ΐ, 
that numbers aim at unity ; for it is not clearly stated 

how they aim at it, but the expression is used in too 
unq.ualified a manner ; and how can one suppose that 

5 things not possessing life can have appetition ? One 
ought to study this matter carefully, and not make 
an unreasoned assumption about something as to 
which it is not easy to attain certainty even with the 

aid of reason. — And the statement that all existing vil. and not 
things desire some one good is not true ; each thing ^-^^ '" ^*'^^• 
seeks its own particular good, the eye sight, the 
body health, and similarly another thing another 
good. 

229 



ARISTOTLE 

1218 a 

"Ort μ€ν οΰν ουκ eariv αυτό tl^ αγαθόν, e^et 1 
απορίας τοιαύτας, και οτι ου χρησιμον ttj πολιτικ-η, 
35 αλλ' (,'διοΓ τι aya^ov, ωσπ€ρ και ταΓ? αλλαι?, οίον 
γυμναστιΚΎ\ eve^ia. 

^'Έιτι και το ev τω λόγω γβγραμμβνον η γαρ ] 
ουδε/χια χρησιμον αυτό το του αγαθού ειδο? η 
ττάσαις ομοίως. 
"Ετι ου ττρακτόν. 

Ομοίως δ' ουδέ το κοινον αγαθόν οντ€ αυτό' ] 
1218 b aya^oi' eWiv (/cat γαρ αν μικρω ύττάρζαι άγαθω) 
ούτ€ ττρακτόν• ου γαρ οττως ύττάρζζΐ το οτωοϋν υπ- 
άρχον η ιατρική πραγματεύεται αλλ' όπως ύγι'εια, 
ομοίως δε και των άλλων τεχνών εκάστη, άλλα 1 
> 7Γθλλα;(α)$• τό aya^oi^, και έ'στι τι αύτου καλόν','' 
και το μεν πρακτόν τό δ' ου πρακτόν. πρακτόν δε τό 
τοιούτον aya^ov, τό oi5 ένεκα, ουκ έ'στι δε τό εν» 
τοΓ? άκιντ^τοις•. 

Φανερον OW* οτι οϋτε η ιδέα τάγαθοϋ τό 
ζητούμενον αυτό τό aya^ol•» εστίν οϋτε τό κοινόν 
(το /χεν yap άκίνητον και ου πρακτόν, τό δε κινητόν 
10 ρ,εΓ αλλ ου πρακτόν). τό δ' ου ένεκα ώς τέλος 
άριστον και αίτιον των ύφ* αυτό και πρώτον 
πάντων ώστε τοΰτ αν ειη αυτό τό aya^oi', τό 2 
τέλος τών άνθρώπω πρακτών. τοΰτο δ' εστί τό 
υτΓΟ την κυρίαν πασών, αϋτη δ' εστί πολιτική και 
οικονομική και φρόνησις• Βιαφερουσι γαρ αύται 
15 αι ε^ει? 77ρό? τα? άλλα? τω τοιαΰται είΐ'αι {προς δ' 

^ τό ? Rac. ' ίτι . . . πρακτόν seel. Wilson. 

* αυτό τό ? Rac. * καΐ . . . κα\6ι> secl. Sus. 

^ οΰν add. Brandis. 

° This sentence reads like a mere note. The reference 
seems to be to 1217 b 16-1218 a 32, especially 1217 a 19-25. 
230 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, I. viii. 16-20 

16 Such then are the difficulties indicating that b. The idea 
the Absolute Good does not exist, — and that it is no practical 
of no use for political science, but that this has a "»? i^. ^'' "^'"^ 
special good of its own, as have the other sciences ' 
also — for instance the good of gymnastics is good 

bodily condition. 

17 "* Further there is also what has been written in the 
discourse : either the Class-form of the good is in 
itself useful to no science, or it is useful to all alike. 

Further it is not practicable. 

18 And similarly the good as universal also is not an nor is the 
Absolute Good (for universality might be an attribute f,n°verLi. 
of even a small good), and also it is not practicable ; 

for medical science does not study how to pro- 
cure an attribute that belongs to anything, but how 
to procure health, and similarly also each of the other 

19 practical sciences. But ' good ' has many meanings, 
and there is a part of it that is beautiful, and one 
form of it is practicable but another is not. The sort 
of good that is practicable is that which is an obj ect 
aimed at, but the good in things unchangeable is not 
practicable. 

It is manifest, therefore, that the Absolute Good we For practice] 
are looking for is not the Form of good, nor yet the Man's aim 
ffood as universal, for the Form is unchangeable and ^"^^ '^J}^. 

■ ■ Λ Λ 11 . 1 Till constitutes 

impracticable, and the universal good though change- his Absolute 
able is not practicable. But the object aimed at as ^°°''• 
End is the chief good, and is the cause of the subordi- 

20 nate goods and first of all ; so that the Absolute Good 
would be this — the End of the goods practicable for 
man. And this is the good that comes under the 
supreme of all the practical sciences, which is Politics 
and Economics and Wisdom ; for these states of 
character differ from the others in the fact that they 

231 



ARISTOTLE 

1218 b 

άλΧηλας e'i τι ^ιαφ^ρουσιν varepov XeKTCov). on 21 

δ' αίτιον το TeXos των νφ' αυτό δτ^λοΓ η διδασκαλία* 
ορισάμενοι γαρ το τ€λος ταλλα SeiKvvovoLv otl 
€καστον αυτών aya^oi', αϊτιον γαρ το οΰ evcKa• 
οίον €Tr€L8ri το ύγιαίν^ιν τοδι, ανάγκη τοδι* eti^ai 

20 το συμφέρον προς αύτην, το δ ύγίζίνον της ύγιβιας 
αίτιον ώς κίνησαν, καίτοι^ του eii^at αλλ' ου του 
αγαθόν elvai την uytetav. έτι oi)hk Ββίκνυσιν ούθζΐς 22 
ΟΤΙ a.ya^oi' η uyieia {άν μη σοφιστής η και μη 
ιατρός, ούτοι γαρ τοις αλλότριοι? λόyoιί σοφίζονται) , 
ώσττ€ρ οΰδ' άλλην άρχην ού^^μίαν. 

25 Το δ ώς τέΧος^ αγαθόν άνθρώπω καΐ το άριστον 
των ττρακτών σκ€7ττ€ον ττοσαχώς το άριστον πάν- 
των,* €7T€iSrj τοΰτο άριστον, μετά ταΰτα άλλην 
λαβοΰσιν άρχην .^ 

^ τοδί ? Sp. : τύδε. 

^ καίτοι Ross: καΐ τύτε (και τόδε ? Ric). 

^ τό δέ TeXos ώί vel ώί δε το τ4λοί Ric. 

* ττάντων Κ.λέ'γΐταΙ'^ ? Rac. 

* έπειδη . . . αρχήν secl. ? Rac. (μΐτά . . . αρχήν seel. Sus.). 

« See 1141 b 21-1 142 a 11 (E.E. ν. = Λ^.£'. vi. viii. init.). 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, I. viii. 20-22 

are supreme (whether they differ at all from one 
!1 another must be discussed later on "). And that the 
End stands in a causal relation to the means sub- 
ordinate to it is shown by the method of teachers ; 
they prove that the various means are each good by 
first defining the End, because the End aimed at is 
a cause : for example, since to be in health is so-and- 
so, what contributes to health must necessarily be 
so-and-so ; the wholesome is the efficient cause of 
health, though only the cause of its existing — it is 
12 not the cause of health's being a good. Furthermore 
nobody proves that health is a good (unless he is a 
sophist and not a physician — -it is sophists that 
juggle with irrelevant arguments), any more than he 
proves any other first principle. 

After this we must take a fresh starting-point ^ and 
consider, in regard to the good as End for man and 
in regard to the best of practicable goods, how many 
senses there are of the term ' best of all,' since this 
is best. 

" This clause and the last clause of the sentence render 
words that look like an interpolation patched into the text 
from the opening sentence of Book II. 



233 



1218 b 

30 Ο 



I. Μετά δε ταΰτ* αλλην λαβοΰσιν άρχην πβρί τών J 
ίπομένων XcKreov. 

Πάντα 817 τάγα^ά τ} €κτ6ς η iv^ Φ^ΧΤ]} '^^^^ 
τούτων αίρ£τώτ€ρα τά iv τ -fj φνχτ], καθάπβρ Si- 
αιρούμβθα καΐ iv τοις €ζωτ€ρίκοΐς λόγοις. φρόνη- 
35 σις γαρ καΐ άρ^τη καΐ η^ονη iv φνχτ], ων -η evta η 
ττάντα τβλος etvai δοκει ττασιν. τών δε iv φνχτ] 
τά μβν έ'^ει? η Βυνάμ€ΐς elaL, τά δ' ivipyeiai καΙ 
κινήσεις. 

Ταύτα Srj όντως ύποκβίσθω, και πβρι αρετής \ 
ΟΤΙ iaTiv η βέλτιστη διάθεσι? η ^ζις η δυι^α^υ-ΐ? 
i2\9 Λ εκάστων όσων iστί τις χρησις η έργον. SrjXov δ' 
εκ της iπaγωγης• εττι πάντων γαρ οϋτω τίθεμεν 
οίον ιματίου αρετή εστίν, και γαρ έργον τι και 
χρησίς εστίν, και ή βέλτιστη εζις του ιματίου 
αρετή εστίν ομοίως δε και πλοίου και οικίας και 
5 τών άλλων, ώστε και φυχής, εστί γάρ τι έργον 
αύτης. και της βελτίονος Βή εζεως έστω βελτιον [ 
το έργον, και ως εχουσιν at εζεις προς άλλήλας, 
οϋτω και τά έργα τά από τούτων προς άλληλα 
εχετω. και τέλος εκάστου το έργον φανερον 4 

^ iv add. Camot : ή <.iv σώματι ή ei'> Sus. (et infra αίρ^τώτατα 
Rac). 

234 



BOOK II 

1 I. After this Ave must take a fresh starting-point Ethical 
and discuss the subjects that follow. (^^Ο^νΧΓγΙ 

Now all goods are either external or within the ofHappiness 
spirit, and of these two kinds the latter are prefer- from'fnnc- 
able, as we class them even in the extraneous dis- **°'* °^ ™*°• 
courses." For Wisdom and Goodness and Pleasure 
are in the spirit, and either some or all of these are 
thought by everybody to be an End. And the 
contents of the spirit are in two groups, one states or 
faculties, the other activities and processes. 

2 Let these assumptions, then, be made, and let it be Goodness 
assumed as to Goodness that it is the best disposition ^p®g^"foi?*' 
or state or faculty of each class of things that have function 
some use or work. This is clear from induction, for 

we posit this in all cases : for instance, there is a 
goodness that belongs to a coat, for a coat has a par- 
ticular function and use, and the best state of a 
coat is its goodness ; and similarly with a ship and 
a house and the rest. So that the same is true also 

3 of the spirit, for it has a work of its own. And there- 
fore let us assume that the better the state is the 
better is the work of that state, and that as states 
stand in relation to one another so do the works 

4 that result from them. And the work of each thing 

« See note on 1217 b 23. 

23.5 



ARISTOTLE 

1219 a 

τοίνυν €Κ τούτων otl βίλτιον το βργον της βξεως' 

10 το γαρ τέλος άριστον ώς τβλος, υπόκειται, γαρ 
τέλος το βελτιστον καΐ το εσχατον ου ένεκα τάλλα 
πάντα' δτι μεν τοίνυν το έργον βελτιον της εζεως 
και της διαθέσεως, 8ηλον. 

Αλλά το έργον λέγεται 8ιχώς' των μεν γάρ 5 
εστίν έτερον τι το έργον πάρα την χρησιν, οΐον 
οικοδομικής οικία αλλ' ουκ οικο^όμησις και Ια- 

15 τρικης ύγίεια αλλ' ούχ ύγιαι^σι? οΰδ' ιάτρευσις , 
των δ' η χρησις έργον, οΐον οφεως δρασις και μαθη- 
ματικής επιστήμης θεωρία, ωστ ανάγκη ων έργον 
η χρησις την χρησιν βελτιον eivat της εζεως. 

Ύούτων δε τούτον τον τρόπον Βιωρισμενων, 6 
λεγομεν δτι το αύτο^ έργον του πράγματος και 

20 της αρετής (αλλ' ούχ ωσαύτως), οΐον σκυτοτομικης 
και σκυτεύσεως υπόδημα' ει Βή τις εστίν αρετή 
σκυτική' και σπουδαίος σκυτεύς,^ το έργον εστί 
σπου^αΐον ύπόΒημα• τον αυτόν δε τρόπον και επι 
των άλλων. 

Ετι έστω φυχής έργον το ζην ποιεΐν, τοΰτο* η 

25 δε χρήσις και εγρήγορσις (ό γάρ ύπνος αργία τις 
και ησυχία) • ωστ επεί το έργον ανάγκη εν καΐ 
ταύτό είναι της φυχής και της αρετής, έργον αν 
εΐη τής αρετής ζωή σπουδαία, τοΰτ αρ' ε'στι το 

^ αυτό add. Rac, (ταύτό ante τό ίρ-γον Cas.). 

* Rac. : σκ\τικΎΐ$. ^ Sp. : σιτου^αίου σκύτίωί. 

* Wilsons τοΰ. 

2S6 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, II. i. 4-7 

is its End; from this, therefore, it is plain that the 
work is a greater good than the state, for the End 
is the best as being an End, since the greatest good 
is assumed as an End and as the ultimate object for 
the sake of which all the other things exist. It is 
clear, therefore, that the work is a greater good than 
the state and disposition. 

But the term ' work ' has two meanings ; for (which is not 
some things have a work that is something diiFerent ^productive 
from the employment of them, for instance the work Process), 
of architecture is a house, not the act of building, 
that of medicine health, not the process of healing 
or curing, whereas with other things their work 
is the process of using them, for instance the work 
of sight is the act of seeing, that of mathematical 
science the contemplation of mathematical truths. 
So it follows that with the things whose work is the 
employment of them, the act of employing them must 
be of more value than the state of possessing them. 

And these points having been decided in this way, 
we say that the same work belongs to a thing and to 
its goodness (although not in the same way) : for 
example, a shoe is the work of the art of shoemaking 
and of the act of shoemaking ; so if there is such 
a thing as shoemaking goodness and a good shoe- 
maker, their work is a good shoe ; and in the same 
way in the case of the other arts also. 

Again, let us grant that the work of the spirit is to and its 
cause life, and that being alive is employment and actioTcon- 
beine awake (for sleep is a kind of inactivity and «titutes 

X .ιΛ .1.• .1 1/• Happmeas. 

rest) ; with the consequence that smce the work oi 
the spirit and that of its goodness are necessarily 
one and the same, the work of goodness would be 
good life. Therefore this is the perfect good, which 

237 



ARISTOTLE 

1219 a 

reXeov αγαθόν , δπβρ ην η ^ύ^αιμονία. ^rjXov δε 8 

e/c των ύποκ€ΐμ€νων {ην μέν γαρ η ^ν^αιμονία το 

30 άριστον, τα 8e τβλη iv φνχη καΐ τα άριστα των 
aya^col•', τα iv αντη^ δβ η βζις η €ν€ργ€ΐα), inel 
βέΧτιον η €ν€ργ€ία της Βίαθ€σ€ως καΐ της ββλτίστης 
€^€ω$• ή βέλτιστη eVepyeta η δ' άρβτη βέλτιστη 
^ζ^^} την^ της αρετής ενεργειαν' της φνχης άριστον 
etvai. ην δε καΐ η ευδαιμονία το άριστον εστίν 9 

35 άρα η ευδαιμονία φυχής άγα^η?* ενέργεια, επει 
δε ην η ευδαιμονία τελεόν τι, και εστί ζωη καΐ 
τελεα και ατελής, και αρετή ώσαυτω? (τ^ μεν γαρ 
ολη, η δε μόριον), ή δε των ατελών ενέργεια 
άτελτ^9, ε'ίη άν ή ευδαιμονία ζωής τελείας ενέργεια 
κατ' άρετήν τελείαν. 

Οτι δε το γένος και τον δρον αυτής λεγομεν 10 

40 καλώ?, μαρτύρια τα Βοκοΰντα πάσιν ήμΐν. τό τε 
1219 b yap βΰ ττράττειν και το ευ ζην τό αυτό τω εν- 
^αιμονεΐν, ων εκάτερον^ χρήσίς εστί και ενέργεια, 
και ή ζωή και ή ττράξις• καΐ γαρ ή πρακτική 
χρηστική εστίν, 6 μεν γαρ χαλκεύς ποιεΐ χαλινον 
χρήται δ ο ιππικός. και τό μήτε μίαν ήμεραν 

5 είμαι* εύΒαίμονα μήτε τταΓδα μήθ^ ήλικίαν πάσαν 
(διό και τό Υίόλωνος έχει καλώς, τό μή ζώντ* 
εύΒαιμονίζειν αλλ' όταν λά^τ^ τέλος)• ούθεν γαρ 
ατελές• εϋ8αιμον, ου γαρ δλον. έτι δ' οί έπαινοι 11 

^ τά eV avry Sus. : αύτη aut αντη. 

* τψ add. ? Ric. ^ Βζ. : ivepyda ή aut ή, 

* ά-γαθτι Sp. 

* ΐκάτΐρον ? Kic. : ΐκαστον. 

• ■ημέρα.ν <,€ϋδαίρί.ονα ποκΐν μήτ'> elvai Fr. 

« Cf. 1218 b 7-12. 
238 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, II. i. 8-11 

8 as we saw is happiness. And it is clear from the 
assumptions laid down (for we said that happiness is 
the greatest good and that the Ends or the greatest 
of goods are in the spirit, but things in the spirit 
are either a state or an activity) that, since an ac- 
tivity is a better thing than a disposition and the 
best activity than the best state, and since goodness 
is the best state, the activity of goodness is the 

9 spirit's greatest good. But also we saw that the 
greatest good is happiness. Therefore happiness 
is the activity of a good spirit. And since we saw " 
that happiness is something perfect, and life is 
either perfect or imperfect, and the same with good- 
ness (for some goodness is a whole and some a part), 
but the activity of imperfect things is imperfect, it 

would follow that happiness is an activity of perfect Definition of 
life in accordance with perfect goodness. Happiness. 

And that our classification and definition of it are Definition 
correct is evidenced by opinions that we all hold, by^^common 
For we think that to do well and live well are the same Sense. 

as to be happy ; but each of these, both life and 
action, is employment and activity, inasmuch as active 
life involves employing things — the coppersmith 
makes a bridle, but the horseman uses it. There is 
also the evidence of the opinion that a person is not 
happy for one day only,^ and that a child is not happy, 
nor any period of life " (hence also Solon's advice holds 
good, not to call a man happy while he is alive, but 
only when he has reached the end), for nothing incom- 

1 plete is happy, since it is not a whole. And again, 

* A single happy day does not make one a happy {i.e. 
fortunate) man. 

* It is a mistake to say that youth (or maturity, or old age) 
is the happy time of life. 

239 



ARISTOTLE 

1219 b 

της άρ€τ-ης δια τα epya, καΐ τά εγκώμια των 

10 έργων (και στεφανοννται οι νικώντες, αλλ ονχ ol 
Βννάμενοί νικαν μη νικώντες hi), και το κριναν 
€Κ των έργων οττοϊός τις εστίν. έτι δια τι η ] 
ευδαιμονία ουκ επαινείται ; οτι δια ταυτην τάλλα, 
η τω εις ταυτην αναφερεσθαι η τω μόρια eiP'ai 
αύτης. διό έτερον ευδαιμονισμός και ετταινος και 

15 εγκώμιον το μεν γαρ εγκώμιον λόγος τοΰ καθ 
εκαστον έργου, 6 δ' έπαινος τοΰ^ τοιούτον eiv'ai 
καθόλου, 6 δ' εύΒαιμονισμός τέλους.^ και το ] 
απ ορούμενον δ' ενίοτε 8ηλον εκ τούτων δια τι 
77θτ' ούθεν βελτίους οΐ σπουδαίοι των φαύλων τον 
ημισυν τοΰ βίου, όμοιοι γαρ καθεύ8οντες πάντες. 

20 αίτιον δ' ΟΤΙ αργία φνχης 6 ύπνος αλλ ουκ ενέργεια. 
διό και άλλο ει τι μόριόν εστί φυχης, οΐον το ] 
θρεπτικόν, η τούτου άρετη ουκ εστί μόριον της 
δλης αρετής, ώσπερ ούδ' η του σώματος• εν τω 
ύπνω γαρ μάλλον ενεργεί το θρεπτικόν, το δ 
αισθητικόν και τό* όρεκτικον ατελή εν τω ύπνω. 
όσον δε τοΰ πη* κινεΐσθαι μετεχουσι, και αι φαν- 

25 τασίαι βελτίους αί των σπουδαίων, εάν μη διά 
νόσον ή πήρωσιν. 

Μέτά ταύτα περί φνχής θεωρητεον ή γάρ αρετή ] 
φυχής, ου κατά συμβεβηκός. επεί δ' άνθρωπίνην 
άρετήν ζητοΰμεν, ύποκείσθω δυο μ^ρη φνχής τά 
λόγου μετέχοντα, ου τον αυτόν 8ε τρόπον μετεχειν 

90 λόγου άμφω, άλλα τω μεν το επιτάττειν τω δε 

1 τοΰ add. Βζ, ^ Βζ. : τέ\ο%. » τό add. Rac. 

* πχ, ? (cf. Ν. Ε. 1029 b 9) Cas. : μτ?. 

240 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, II. i. 11-15 

there are the praises given to goodness on account 
of its deeds, and panegyrics describing deeds (and it 
is the victorious who are given Avreaths, not those 
who are capable of winning but do not win) ; and 
there is the fact that we judge a man's character 

12 from his actions. Also why is happiness not praised ? 
It is because it is on account of it that the other things 
are praised, either by being placed in relation to it 
or as being parts of it. Hence felicitation, praise 
and panegyric are different things : panegyric is a 
recital of a particular exploit, praise a statement of a 
man's general distinction, felicitation is bestowed on 

13 an end achieved. From these considerations light 
is also thrown on the question sometimes raised — 
what is the precise reason why the virtuous are for 
half their lives no better than the base, since all men 
are alike when asleep ? The reason is that sleep is 

14 inaction of the spirit, not an activity. Hence the 
goodness of any other part of the spirit, for instance 
the nutritive, is not a portion of goodness as a whole, 
just as also goodness of the body is not ; for the 
nutritive part functions more actively in sleep, where- 
as the sensory and appetitive parts are ineffective in 
sleep. But even the imaginations of the virtuous, so 
far as the imaginative faculty participates in any mode 
of motion, are better than those of the base, provided 
they are not perverted by disease or mutilation. 

L5 Next we must study the spirit ; for goodness is a Psychology 
property of the spirit, it is not accidental. And since ^θίηΐ"^"'*^ 
it is human goodness that we are investigating, let us 
begin by positing that the spirit has two parts that 
partake of reason, but that they do not both partake 
of reason in the same manner, but one of them by 
having by nature the capacity to give orders, and the 

R 241 



ARISTOTLE 

1219 b 

τό^ ττζίθ^σθαί καΐ άκον€ΐν ττ^φυκάναι (et he τι 
iarlv irepws άλογον, άφ^σθω τούτο το μοριον) . 
διαφέρει δ' ovdev οντ el /χερισττ^ τ) φνχη οϋτ et 16 
a^eprjs, e^et μεντοι hvva^ei,g διαφόρους και τα? 
eLpημevaς, ώσττερ ev τω καμπύλω το κοίλον και 

35 το κνρτον ά^ίαχώριστον, και το ev9v καΐ το Xev- 
κόν, καίτοι το evdv ου XevKov αλλ ή^ κατά σνμ- 
β€βηκ6ς και ουκ ουσία ttj αύτοϋ.^ άφ-ηρηται* 17 
δ€ και e'i τι άλλο εστί μ€.ρος φνχης, οίον το 
φυτικόν.^ ανθρωπινής yo-p^ Φ^Χΐ^ '''^ βιρημ€να 
μόρια Ί'δια, διό ο?3δ' αί άρ€ται αί τοΰ θρεπτικού 

40 και αύζητικοΰ^ ανθρώπου• Sei yap, el fj άνθρωπος, 
λoyισμόv et'eivai προς^ '^PXV^ '<^<^^ ττραζιν, άρχει 

1220 a δ' ό λογισμός ου λογισμού αλλ' ορέξεως και 

παθημάτων ανάγκη αρα ταυτ' εχειν τα μ^ρη- 18 
και ώσπερ η ευεξία σύγκειται εκ των κατά μόριον 
αρετών, ούτω και η της φυχης άρετη η τέλος. 

^Αρετής δ' €ΐδτ7 δυο, η μεν ηθική η 8ε διανοητική- IS 
5 επαινοΰμεν γάρ ου μόνον τους δικαίους αλλά και 
τους συνετούς και τους σοφούς. επαινετον γαρ 
ύπεκειτο η* άρετη η το έργον, ταύτα δ ουκ 
ενεργεί αλλ' είσιν αυτών ενεργειαι. επει δ αί 2C 
διανοητικαι μετά λόγου, αί μεν τοιαΰται τοΰ λογον 
έχοντος ο επιτακτικόν εστί της φυχης ^ λόγον 

^ τψ μ^ν . . , τ6 . . . τφ δέ . . . τό Ric. : το μέν . . . τφ 
. . . τό δέ . . , τφ. 
2 άλλ' 7) Ric. : άλλα. 
^ Ric. ; ουσία τον αντοΰ [ουσία τό αυτό Βζ.). 

* άφ-ηρήσθω Fr. : άφίίσθω Βζ. * Vict. : φυσικόν. 

* Γ : δέ. ' Βζ. : όρΐκτικοΰ. 

* Ric. : καΐ (ώ$ Sus.). * ή Sol. : -η. 

" i.e. the part ' connected with nutrition and growth,' 
man's animal life, which is irrational absolutely, and not 

242 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, 11. i. 15-20 

other to obey and listen (let us leave out any part 

6 that is irrational in another way "). And it makes 
no difference whether the spirit is divisible or is un- 
divided yet possessed of different capacities, namely 
those mentioned, just as the concave and convex 
sides in a curve are inseparable, and the straight- 
ness and whiteness in a straight white line, although 
a straight thing is not white except accidentally and 

7 not by its own essence. And we have also abstracted 
any other part of the spirit that there may be, for 
instance the factor of growth ; for the parts that we 
have mentioned are the special properties of the 
human spirit, and hence the excellences of the part 
dealing with nutrition and growth are not the special 
property of a man, for necessarily, if considered as a 
man, he must possess a reasoning faculty for a prin- 
ciple and with a view to conduct, and the reasoning 
faculty is a principle controlling not reasoning but 

8 appetite and passions ; therefore he must necessarily 
possess those parts. And just as a good constitution 
consists of the separate excellences of the parts of the 
body, so also the goodness of the spirit, as being an 
End, is composed of the separate virtues. 

9 And goodness has two forms, moral virtue and Moral and 
intellectual excellence ; for we praise not only the ooo^dnessl^ 
just but also the intelligent and the wise. For we 
assumed ** that what is praiseworthy is either good- 
ness or its work, and these are not activities but possess 

activities. And since the intellectual excellences 
involve reason, these forms of goodness belong to the 
rational part, which as having reason is in command 

merely in the sense of not possessing reason but being capable 
of obedience to it. 

" Cf. 1218 a 37 if., 1219 b 8 ff., 15 £F. 

243 



ARISTOTLE 

1220 a 

10 e^et, at δ ηθίκαΐ του αλόγου μ€ν άκολουθητίκοΰ 
δε κατά φύσιν τω Χόγον βχοντί' ου γαρ Χάγομβν 
ποίος τι? το ήθος, οτι σοφός η Β^ινός, αλλ' otl 
πράος ύ] θρασυς. 

Mera ταΰτα σκ€πτ€ον πρώτον π^ρΐ άρζτης ηθι- 2 
κης τι €στι καΐ ποία μόρια αυττ^? (et? τοϋτο γάρ 

15 ανηκται) και γίνεται δια τίνων, hel Βη ζητίΐν ωσ- 
πβρ iv τοις άλλοις €χοντ€ς τι ζητοΰσι πάντβς, 
ώστβ δει δια των αληθώς μέν λ&γομ€νων ου σαφώς 
δε πβιράσθαι λαβείν το καΐ^ αληθώς και σαφώς, 
νυν γάρ ομοίως εχομεν ώσπερ αν €ΐ εΙΒείημεν' και 2! 
uytetal•' οτι η άριστη διαθεσι? του σώματος και 

ϋΟ Κορισκον^ οτι* ο τών iv τη αγορά μελάντατος• τι 
μεν γαρ εκατερον τούτων ουκ ΐσμεν, προς μεντοι 
το ειδει^αι τί εκάτερον αύτοΖν^ προ έργου το ούτως 
εχειν. — ύποκείσθω hrj πρώτον η βέλτιστη διά^εσι? 2! 
ύπο τών βέλτιστων γίγνεσθαι και πράττεσθαι τα* 
άριστα περί εκαστον απο της εκάστου αρετής, 

25 οίον πόνοι τε άριστοι και τροφή άφ^ ων γίνεται 
ευεξία, και από της ευεξίας πονονσιν άριστα' ετι 2^ 
πάσαν διάθεσίΓ υπό τών αύτώι^ γίγνεσθαι τε"" και 
φθείρεσθαι πώς προσφερομένων, ώσπερ ι5')/ιεια υπό 
τροφής και πόνων και ώρας• ταΰτα δε δτ^λα εκ 
της επαγωγής, και η άρετη άρα η τοιαύτη διά- 

30 θεσίς εστίν η γινεταί τε ύπό τών άριστων περί 
φυχην κινήσεων /cat άφ^ ^ς πράττεται τα άριστα 
της φυχής έργα καΐ πάθη' και ύπό τών αυτών 2ί 

^ το και Ric. : και τό. 
* ΐΐδ€ίημ(ΐ' add. Sp. ^ Rac. : Κορίσκο^, 

* ότι add. Sp. * rec. Μ*": αύτη^. 

* τά add. Rac. ' re add. Rac. 

» Cf. 1240 b 25 n. 
244 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, II. i. 20-2δ 

of the spirit ; whereas the moral virtues belong to 
the part that is irrational but by nature capable of 
following the rational — for in stating a man's moral 
qualities we do not say that he is wise or clever but 
that he is gentle or rash. 

}1 After this we must first consider Moral Goodness — Moral 
its essence and the nature of its divisions (for that is Jh virtue 
the subject ηοΛν arrived at), and the means by which (Bk. ii. fin.) 
it is produced. Our method of inquiry then must be and genesis. 
that employed by all people in other matters when 
they have something in hand to start with — we must 
endeavour by means of statements that are true but 
not clearly expressed to arrive at a result that is both 

52 true and clear. For our present state is as if we 
kncAv that health is the best disposition of the body and 
that Coriscus " is the darkest man in the market-place ; 
for that is not to know what health is and who Coriscus 
is, but nevertheless to be in that state is a help to- 

13 wards knowing each of these things. — Then let it first 
be taken as granted that the best disposition is pro- 
duced by the best means, and that the best actions 
in each department of conduct result from the excel- 
lences belonging to each department — for example, 
it is the best exercises and food that produce a good 
condition of body, and a good condition of body en- 

24 ables men to do the best work ; further, that every 
disposition is both produced and destroyed by the 
same things applied in a certain manner, for example 
health by food and exercises and climate ; these points 
are clear from induction. Therefore goodness too is a fuller de- 
the sort of disposition that is created by the best virtue" °^ 
movements in the spirit and is also the source of the 
production of the spirit's best actions and emotions ; 

ί5 and it is in one way produced and in another way 

245 



ARISTOTLE 

1220 a 

ττώς /xer ytVerat πώς δε φθείρΐταί, καΐ ττρος ταΰτα 

Ύ] χρησις αντης νφ^ ών καΐ αϋζβται καΐ φθβίρβται 

ττρος ά ββλτίστα Βιατίθησίν. σημβΐον δ δτι, ττερι 

35 η^βα καΐ λυπηρά καΐ η άρ€τη και η κακία• at 
γαρ κολάσει? Ιατρζΐαι ονσαι. καΐ γινόμΐναι δια των 
evavTicov, καθάπβρ βπΐ των άλλων, δια τούτων 
elaiv. 

II. "Οτι μ€.ν τοίνυν η ηθική άρ€τη π€ρΙ rjSea ] 
καΐ λυπηρά εστί, ^ηλον. εττει δ εστί το ήθος — 
1220 b ώσπ€ρ καΐ το όνομα σημαίνει δτι άπό εθους έχει 
την επίΒοσιν, εθίζεται δε ύττ' αγωγής το μη 
εμφυτον^ τω πολλάκις κινεΐσθαί πως ούτως η^η^ 
ενεργητικόν (ο εν τοις άφύχοις ούχ όρώμεν, ουδέ 
γάρ αν μυριάκις ρίφης άνω τον λίθον ουδέποτε 
Γ) ποιήσει τοΰτο μη βία)- — διό έστω το^ ήθος τοΰτο, 
φυχής κατά επιτακτικόν λόγον δυνάμενη* άκολουθεΐν 
τω λόγω ποιότης. λεκτεον Βή κατά τί της φυχής i 
ποι αττα^ ήθη. εσται δε κατά τε τάς δυν-α/χει? ί 
των παθημάτων καθ^ ας πώς^ παθητικοί λέγονται 
και κατά τάς εζεις καθ^ άς προς τα πάθη τοιούτοι^ 

10 λέγονται τω πάσχειν πως ή απαθείς ειρ'αι. 

Μετά ταΰτα ή ^ιαίρεσις εν τοις Βιειλεγμενοις^ 4 
των παθημάτων και των 8υνάμεων και των έξεων. 

^ Fr. : εθίζεται δέ το ύττ' ά-γω-γηί μη έμφυτου. 

" ήδη Rac. : ^077 το. * τό add. llac. 

* Sp. (cf. Stob. Eel. eth. p. 36) : δυναμένου δ'. 

* ΤΓΟί' ά,ττα Sol. {τΓοι άττα τα ? Rac, ΊΓθώτη$ τα Sp.) : ττοΓ' &ττα. 

* Rac. : ώϊ. ' τοιούτοι Ric. : ταΰτα. 

* Ras. : άιτη\\α•γμένοι^. 

" e.g. fever, which is caused by heat, is cured by cold 
(the contrary doctrine to homoeopathy, shnilia similibus 
curantnr). 

^ ηθοί derived from ίθο$ by lengthening of e to ?; : cf. N.E. 

246 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, II. i. 25— ii. 4> 

destroyed by the same things, and its employment 
of the things that cause both its increase and its de- 
struction is directed towards the things towards which 
it creates the best disposition. And this is indicated The hedon- 
by the fact that both goodness and badness have to '^^^'^ factor. 
do with things pleasant and painful ; for punishments, 
which are medicines, and which as is the case with 
other cures " operate by means of opposites, operate 
by means of pleasures and pains. 

1 II. It is clear, therefore, that Moral Goodness has 
to do with pleasures and pains. And since moral 
character is, as even its name implies that it has its 
growth from habit, ** and by our often moving in a 
certain way a habit not innate in us is finally trained 
to be operative in that way (which we do not observe 
in inanimate objects, for not even if you throw a stone 
upwards ten thousand times will it ever rise upward 
unless under the operation of force) — let moral char- The moral 
acter then be defined as a quality of the spirit in accord- character. 
ance with governing reason that is capable of following 

2 the reason. We have then to say what is the part 
of the spirit in respect of which our moral characters 

3 are of a certain quality. And it will be in respect of 
our faculties for emotions according"to which people 
are termed liable to some emotion, and also of the 
states of character according to which people receive 
certain designations in respect of the emotions, be- 
cause of their experiencing or being exempt from 
some form of emotion. 

4 After this comes the classification, made in previous 
discussions," of the modes of emotion, the faculties 

II, ill. 4. This clause and the one following interrupt the 
construction of the sentence. 

" Perhaps a reference to N.E. 1105 b 20, inserted in the 
belief that the Eudemian Ethics is the later work. 

247 



ARISTOTLE 

1220 b 

Aeyo» δε πάθη μ€ν τά τοιαύτα, θνμον φόβον αιδώ 
βπιθυμίαν, δλως οΐς έ'ττβται ώς βπΐ το πολύ η 
αισθητική η^ονη η λύπη καθ^ αυτά• και κατά μβν 5 

15 ταύτα ουκ έ'στι ποιότης [αλλά πάσχ€ΐΥ, κατά δε 
τάς Βυνάμ^ις ποιότης- λέγω δε^ Βυνάμας καθ^ ας 
λέγονται κατά τά πάθη οι ενεργούντες, οίον άργιλος 
ανάλγητος ερωτικός αισχυντηλός αναίσχυντος, 
εζεις Se elaiv οσαι α'ίτιαί είσι του ταύτα η κατά 
λόγον ύπάρχειν η εναντίως, οίον ανδρεία σωφροσύνη 

20 δείλια ακολασία. 

III. Αιωρισμενων δε τούτων ληπτεον δτι εν 1 
ατταντι συνέχει και διαιρετοί εστίν υπέροχη και 
ελλειφις και μέσον, και ταύτα η προς άλληλα η 
προς ημάς, οίον εν γυμναστική, εν ιατρική, εν 

25 οικοδομική, εν κυβερνητική, και εν οποιαοϋν πράξει 
και επιστημονική και αν επιστημονική και τεχνική 
και ατεχνω- η μεν γάρ κίνησις συνεχές, ή 8ε 2 
πράξις κίνησις. εν πάσι δε το μέσον το προς 
ημάς βελτιστον τοΰτο γάρ εστίν ώς η επιστήμη 
κελεύει και 6 λόγος. πανταχού δε τοΰτο καΐ 

30 ποιεί την βελτίστην εξιν. και τοΰτο Βηλον δια 
της επαγωγής^και τοΰ λόγου• τά γάρ εΥαντια 
φθείρει άλληλα• τά δ' άκρα και άλλτ^λοι? και τω 
μέσω ει^αι^τια, το γάρ μέσον εκάτερον προς 
εκατερον εστίν, οΐον το ίσον τοΰ μεν ελάττονος 
μείζον τοΰ μείζονος δε ελαττον. ώστ ανάγκη 3 
την ηθικην άρετην περί μεσ' άττα εΓι/αι και 

35 μεσοτητα τίνα. ληπτεον άρα η ποία μεσάτης 

^ pravum glossema Rac. 
^ δ€ Sus. : δέ ras. 

" This interpolation was made by an editor who derived 
ΐΓοιότη^ from TTou'iv, 

248 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, II. ii. 4— m. 3 

and the states of character. By emotions I mean 
such things as anger, fear, shame, desire, and gener- 
ally those experiences that are in themselves usually 
5 accompanied by sensory pleasure or pain. And to 
these there is no quality corresponding [but they are 
passive]." But quality corresponds to the faculties : 
by faculties I mean the properties acting by which 
persons are designated by the names of the various 
emotions, for instance choleric, insensitive, erotic, 
bashful, shameless. States of character are the states 
that cause the emotions to be present either rationally 
or the opposite : for example courage, sobriety of 
mind, cowardice, profligacy. 

1 III. These distinctions having been established, it Virtue and 
must be grasped that in every continuum that is divis- ^eaif In*^'^*^ 
Ible there is excess and deficiency and a mean, and conduct. 
these either in relation to one another or in relation to 

us, for instance in gymnastics or medicine or archi- 
tecture or navigation, and in any practical pursuit of 
whatever sort, both scientific and unscientific, both 

2 technical and untechnical ; for motion is a continuum, 
and conduct is a motion. And in all things the mean 
in relation to us is the best, for that is as knowledge 
and reason bid. And everywhere this also produces 
the best state. This is proved by induction and 
reason : contraries are mutually destructive, and ex- 
tremes are contrary both to each other and to the 
mean, as the mean is either extreme in relation to the 
other — for example the equal is greater than the less 

3 and less than the greater. Hence moral goodness 
must be concerned with certain means and must be 
a middle state. We must, therefore, ascertain what 
sort of middle state is goodness and with what sort of 

249 



1220 b 



ARISTOTLE 

αρ€τη καΐ Ttepl ποία μβσα. είληφθω Sr) τταρα- '■. 
Βείγματος χάριν, και θεωρβίσθω 'ίκαστον €κ της 
υπογραφής' 



1221 a 



10 



οργιλότης 

θρασντης 

αναισχυντία 

ακολασία 

φθόνος 

KepSos 

ασωτία 

αλαζονεία 

κολακβία 

αρέσκεια 

τρνφερότης 

χαυνότης 

Βαπανηρία 

πανουργία 



αοργησια 

δβιλια 

καταπληζις 

αναισθησία 

άνώνυμ,ον 

ζημία 

άνελευθερία 

ειρωνεία 

απέχθεια 

αύθάδεια 

κακοπάθεια 

μικροφυχία 

μικροπρέπεια 



πραοτης. 

άν8ρεία. 

αιδώ?. 

σωφροσύνη. 

νεμεσις. 

Βίκαιον. 

ελευθεριοτης. 

φιλία, 
σεμνότης . 
καρτέρια . 
μεγαλοφυχία. 
μεγαλοπρέπεια . 
φρόνησις. 



τα μεν πάθη ταύτα και τοιαύτα συμβαίνει ταΐς δ 
φυχαΐς, πάντα hk λέγεται τα μεν τω ύπερβάλλειν 

15 τα οε τω ελλειπειν . όργίλος μεν γάρ εστίν ο 
μάλλον η 8εΐ όργιζόμενος και θάττον και πλείοσιν 
η οις δει, άόργητος^ 8ε ο ελλείπων και οΐς και 
οτε και ως• και θρασύς μεν ο μήτε ά χρη φοβούμενος 
μηθ^ οτε μήθ^ ως, 8ειλ6ς 8ε 6 και ά μη 8ει και 
Ότ ου 8ει και ως ου 8ει. ομοίως 8ε και ακόλαστος β 

20 και^ ο επιθυμητικος και 6* υπερβάλλων πάσιν δσοις 

1 Rac. (cf. Ν.Ε. 1108 a 7 et 1100 b 33): afaXyrjaia. 
^ Rac, : άι>άλyηros. ' [καί] Bz. * [καΐ ό] Vict, 

" This place is filled in N.E. 1108 a 7 by άοίκγησία, 
Spiritlessness, lack of irascibility, and perhaps the Greek 
should be altered to that here, 
250 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, II. iii. 4-6 



4 means it is concerned. Let each then be taken by 
way of illustration and studied with the help of the 
schedule : 



Irascibility 

Rashness 

Shamelessness 

Profligacy 

Envy 

Profit 

Prodigality 

Boastfulness 

Flattery 

Subservience 

Luxuriousness 

Vanity 

Extravagance 

Rascality 



Spiritlessness " 

Cowardice 

Diffidence 

Insensitiveness 

(nameless *) 

Loss 

Meanness 

Self-depreciation 

Surliness 

Stubbornness 

Endurance ** 

Smallness of Spirit 

Siiabbiness 

Simpleness 



Gentleness 

Courage 

Modesty 

Temperance 

Righteous Indignation 

The Just 

Liberality 

Sincerity " 

Friendliness 

Dignity 

Hardiness 

Greatness of Spirit 

Magnificence 

Wisdom. 



5 These and such as these are the emotions that the The Vices oi 
spirit experiences, and they are all designated from Jjeflct.*" 
being either excessive or defective. The man that 

gets angry more and more quickly and with more 
people than he ought is irascible, he that in respect 
of persons and occasions and manner is deficient in 
anger is insensitive ; the man that is not afraid of 
things of which he ought to be afraid, nor when nor as 

6 he ought, is rash, he that is afraid of things of which he 
ought not to be afraid, and when and as he ought not 
to be, is cowardly.^ Similarly also one that is a prey 
to his desires and that exceeds in everything possible 

* In JV.E. 1108 b 2 έπιχαιρ^κακία. Malice, rejoicing in 
another's misfortune. 

" N.E. IV. vii. shows that sincerity in asserting one's own 
merits is meant. 

** ' Submission to evils ' (Solomon) : not in N.E. 

' The shameless and diffident are omitted here; see the 
table above. 

251 



ARISTOTLE 

1221a 

εν84χ€ται, αναίσθητος 8e 6 ελλείπων /cat μη^^ όσον 
βελτίον καΐ κατά την φνσι.ν ετηθυμών, αλλ' άττα^η? 

β ωσπερ λίθος. κερΒαλεος δε ο ττανταχόθεν ττλεον- 7 

εκτικός, ζημίώ8ης 8e 6 εΐ μη^ μη^αμόθεν αλλ' 
όλιγαχόθεν. άλαζών 8e ο πλείω των υπαρχόντων 

3 25 προσποιούμενος, ε'ίρων 8e ο ελάττω. καΐ κόλαζ 8 
μεν ο πλείω συνεπαινών η καλώς έχει, άπεχθητίκός 

'^ δε ο ελάττω. καΐ το μεν λίαν προς ηΒονην 

αρέσκεια, το δ ολΐ)/α και μόγις αυ^άδεια. ert δ' 9 
6 μεν μη^εμίαν υπομένων λυπην, μηΒ^ ει βελτιον, 
30 τρυφερός, 6 8ε πάσαν ομοίως ως μεν απλώς ειπείν 
ανώνυμος, μεταφορά δε λέγεται σκληρός και 
ταλαίπωρος και κακοπαθητικός . χαΰνος δ' 6 Κ 
μειζόνων άζιών αυτόν, μικρόφυχος δ' ο ελαττόνων. 
ετι δ' άσωτος μεν 6 προς άπασαν- 8απάνην 
υπερβάλλων, ανελεύθερος δε ό προς αττασαν» 

(■- 35 ελΧείπων. ομοίως δε και ό μικροπρεπης και 6 11 
σαλάκων, 6 μεν γαρ υπερβάλλει το πρέπον, 6 δ' 

ΐί\ ελλείπει του πρέποντος. και 6 μεν πανούργος 

πάντως και πάντοθεν πλεονεκτικός, ό δ' εύήθης 

5 ούδ' όθεν δει. φθονερός δε τω λυπεΐσθαι επΙ 12 

πλείοσιν εύπραγίαις η δει, και ya/a οΐ άζιοι ευ 

40 πράττειν λυποΰσι τους φθονερούς ευ πράττοντες • 

ο δ' ενάντιος άνωνυμώτερος , εστί δ' ό υπερβάλλων 

1221 b τώ" /χή λυπεΐσθαι μη8' επΙ τοις άναζίοις ευ 

πράττουσιν, αλλ' ευχερής ώσπερ οι γαστρίμαργοι 

προς τροφην, ο δε 8υσχερης κατά τον φθόνον 

εστίν. — το δε προς εκαστον μη κατά συμβεβηκός 13 

^ (ί μη add. Fr. (άλλ' <e!' 7e> Bussemaker). 

'^ τφ Sp. : iwi τφ. 



" Envy in § 12 comes here in the schedule. 



252 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, II. iii. 6-13 

is profligate, and one that is deficient and does not 
desire even to a proper degree and in a natural way, 
but is as devoid of feeling as a stone, is insensitive." 

7 The man that seeks gain from every source is a 
profiteer, and he that seeks gain if not from no source, 
yet from few, is a waster.^ He that pretends to have 
more possessions than he really has is a boaster, and 
he that pretends to have fewer is a self-depreciator. 

8 One that joins in approval more than is fitting is a 
flatterer, one that does so less than is fitting is surly. 
To be too complaisant is subservience ; to be com- 
plaisant seldom and reluctantly is stubbornness. 

9 Again, the man that endures no pain, not even if it is 
good for him, is luxurious; one that can endure all pain 
alike is strictly speaking nameless, but by metaphor 

10 he is called hard, patient or enduring. He that rates 
himself too high is vain, he that rates himself too low, 
small-spirited. Again, he that exceeds in all ex- 
penditure is prodigal, he that falls short in all, mean. 

11 Similarly the shabby man and the swaggerer — the 
• latter exceeds what is fitting and the former falls 

below it. The rascal grasps profit by every means 
and from every source, the simpleton does not make 

12 profit even from the proper sources. Envy consists 
in being annoyed at prosperity more often than one 
ought to be, for the envious are annoyed by the pros- 
perity even of those who deserve to prosper ; the 
opposite character is less definitely named, but it is 
the man that goes too far in not being annoyed even 
at the prosperity of the undeserving, and is easy- 
going, as gluttons are in regard to food, whereas his 
opposite is difficult-tempered in respect of jealousy, — 

13 It is superfluous to state in the definition that the 

'' The prodigal and mean in § 10 comes here in the schedule. 

253 



ARISTOTLE 

1221 b 

δ ούτως e^eiv πβρίίργον διορι'ζειν^• ού^^μία γαρ 
επιστήμη οϋτ€ θεωρητική ούτε ποιητική οντ€ 
λέγει οντε πράττει τοΰτο προσΒιοριζουσα, άλλα 
τοΰτ εστί προς τάς συκοφαντίας των τεχνών τάς 
λογικάς. απλώς μεν οΰν Βιωρίσθω τον τρόπον 14 
τούτον, άκριβεστερον δ' δταν περί τών εζεων 
λέγω μεν τών αντικείμενων. 

10 Αυτών Βε τούτων τών παθημάτων εΐ8η κατ- 
ονομάζεται τώ Βιαφερειν κατά την υπερβολην η 
χρόνου η του μάλλον η προς τι τών ποιουντων 
τά πάθη. λέγω δ' οΐον όζΰθυμος μεν τω θάττον 15 
πάσχειν η δβι, χαλεπός δε και θυμώΒης τω 
μάλλον, πικρός δβ τω φυλακτικός etvat της όργης, 

15 πληκτης δε καΐ λοώορητικός ταΐς κολάσεσι ταΙς 
άπό της όργης. όφοφάγοι δε και γαστρίμαργοι 16 
και οίνόφλυγες τω προς όποτερας τροφής άπολαυσιν 
€χειν την διίρ'α/χιν' παθητικην παρά τον λογον. 

Ου δει δ' άγνοεΐν Οτι IVta τών λεγομένων ουκ 17 
εστίν εν τω πώς λαμβάνειν , αν πώς λαμβανηται 

20 τό^ μάλλον πάσχειν. οΐον μοιχός ου τω μάλλον 
η δει προς τάς γαμετάς πλησιάζειν {ου γάρ εστι^), 
άλλα μοχθηρία τις αύτη ηΒη^ εστίν, συνειλημμενον 
γάρ τό τε πάθος λέγεται και τό τοιόν^ε εΓι^αι• 
ομοίως δε και η ύβρις. διό και άμφισβητοΰσι, 18 
συγγενεσθαι μεν φάσκοντες αλλ' ου μοιχ^νσαι, 

25 άγνοοϋντες γάρ η άναγκαζόμενοι, και πατάζαι 
μεν αλλ' ούχ ύβρίσαι• ομοίως δε και επι τά άλλα 
τά τοιαύτα. 

1 ττροσδωρίζΐΐν ? (ut De Interpr. 17 a 36, Met. hi., 1005 
b21) Rac. 

2 Ric. τφ. * Rac. : δή. 

"In Book III. * roiofde— μοχθ-ηρόν. 

254 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, 11. in. 13-18 

specified relation to each thing must not be accidental ; 
no science whether theoretical or productive makes 
this addition to the definition either in discourse or in 
practice, but this addition is aimed against the logical 
L4 quibbling of the sciences. Let us then accept these 
simple definitions, and let us make them more precise 
when we are speaking about the opposite dispositions.** 

But these modes of emotion themselves are divided Sub-species 
into species designated according to their difference ° "'*^' 
in respect of time or intensity or in regard to one 
15 of the objects that cause the emotions. I mean for 
instance that a man is called quick-tempered from 
feeling the emotion of anger sooner than he ought, 
harsh and passionate from feeling it more than he 
ought, bitter from having a tendency to cherish his 
anger, violent and abusive owing to the acts of retalia- 
te tion to which his anger gives rise. Men are called 
gourmands or gluttons and drunkards from having an 
irrational liability to indulgence in one or the other 
sort of nutriment. 

17 But it must not be ignored that some of the vices Some Vices 
mentioned cannot be classed under the heading of '^ ^°'"*^" 
manner, if manner is taken to be feeling the emotion 

to excess. For example, a man is not an adulterer 
because he exceeds in intercourse with married 
women, for ' excess ' does not apply here, but 
adultery merely in itself is a vice, since the term 
denoting the passion implicitly denotes that the man 

18 is vicious '' ; and similarly with outrage. Hence men 
dispute the charge, and admit intercourse but deny 
adultery on the ground of having acted in ignor- 
ance or under compulsion, or admit striking a blow 
but deny committing an outrage ; and similarly in 
meeting the other charges of the same kind. 

255 



ARISTOTLE 

1221 b 

IV. Έ>ι,λημμ€νων 8e τούτων, μβτά ταΰτα XcKTeov 1 
OTL ineiSr) Svo μ4ρη της φυχης καΐ αϊ άρ€ταΙ κατά 
ταΰτα Βιτ^ρηνται, και αϊ /xev του λόγον €χοντος 

30 Βιανοητικαί,^ ών epyov άλτ^^εια, η πβρί του πώς 
€χ€ΐ η TrepL γβν^σβως, αϊ δε του αλόγου βχοντος 
δ ορ^ξιν [ου γαρ οτιοΰν μίρος €χ€ΐ της φυχης 2 
ορβξιν el μζριστη βστιν), ανάγκη 8η φαΰλον το 
ήθος και σττου^αΐον eivai τω Βιώκβιν και φεύγβιν 
ήΒονάς τίνα? και λύττας. SrjXov Se τοϋτο e/c των 

35 διαιρέσεων των rrepi τα πάθη και τάς 8ννάμ€ΐς 
και τάς Ίξ^ις. αι μ^ν γαρ 3υνάμ€ΐς και αϊ ^ξβις 
τών^ παθημάτων , τα δε πάθη λύπη και ηΒονη 
Βιώρισταΐ' ώστε δια τε ταΰτα και δια τάς 3 
€μπροσθ€ν θέσεις συμβαίνει πάσαν ηθικην άρβτην 
πβρι η8ονάς είναι και λύπας. πάσα γαρ φυχη' 

40 ύφ οίων πεφυκε γινεσ^αι χειρών και βελτίων, 

1222 Λ προς ταΰτα και περί ταΰτά εστίν ή έξις.* δι' 4 

η8ονάς δε και λύπας φαύλους φαμεν είναι, τω 
διώκειν και φεύγειν η ώς μη δει η ας μη δει. 
διο και διορίζονται πάντες^ προχείρως άττά^ειαν 
και ηρεμίαν περί ήΒονάς και λύπας είναι τα? 
5 αρετας, τάς δε κακίας εκ των εναντίων. 

V. Επει δ υ770κ:ειται άρετη είναι η τοιαύτη \ 
εζις άφ* ης πρακτικοί των βελτίστων και καθ^ ην 
άριστα διάκεινται περί το βελτιστον, βελτιστον δε 
και άριστον το κατά τον ορθόν λόγον, τούτο δ' 

^ [διανοηηκαί] ? Ilac. * <amai> των Bus. 

^ ττάσηί yap ψνχηί Βζ. 

* Βζ. : ηδονή. 6 [ττάι/τίί] Spengel : rtvey ? Sus. 

" Cf. 1220 b 7-20. " See 1218 b 37 ff. 

2.56 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, II. iv. 1— v. 1 

1 IV. These points having been taken, we must The hedon- 
next say that since the spirit has two parts, and the anaiysed'!*"^ 
virtues are divided between them, one set being 

those of the rational part, intellectual virtues, whose 
work is truth, whether about the nature of a thing or 
about its mode of production, while the other set 
belongs to the part that is irrational but possesses 

2 appetition (for if the spirit is divided into parts, 
not any and every part possesses appetition), it 
therefore follows that the moral character is vicious 
or virtuous by reason of pursuing or avoiding certain 
pleasures and pains. This is clear from the classifica- 
tion " of the emotions, faculties and states of char- 
acter. For the faculties and the states are con- 
cerned with the modes of emotion, and the emotions 

3 are distinguished by pain and pleasure ; so that it 
follows from these considerations as well as from the 
positions already laid down that all moral goodness 

4 is concerned with pleasures and pains. For our 
state of character is related to and concerned with 
such things as have the property of making every 
person's spirit worse and better. But we say that 
men are wicked owing to pleasures and pains, 
through pursuing and avoiding the wrong ones or 
in the wTong way. Hence all men readily define the 
virtues as insensitiveness or tranquillity in regard to 
pleasures and pains, and the vices by the opposite 
qualities. 

1 V. But since it has been assumed ^ that goodness 
is a state of character of a sort that causes men to be 
capable of doing the best actions and gives them the 
best disposition in regard to the greatest good, and 
the best and greatest good is that which is in accord- 
ance with right principle, and this is the mean be- 

s 257 



ARISTOTLE 

1222 a , , , , , ^ 

10 ean το μίσον υπερβολής και eXXeiijiews της προς 

ημάς, άναγκαΐον αν €Ϊη την ηθικην άρ€την κατ' αύτην 

ίκάστην^ μεσότητα elvai καΐ^ π€ρΙ μ^σ" άττα iv 

ηοοναΐς και λυτται? και rjSeai και λνττηροΐς. έ'σται 2 

δ η μεσάτης oTe μεν ev ηΒοναΐς {και γαρ ύπβρβολη 

και ζλλβιφις), ore δ' iv λντταις, 6τβ δ' iv άμφοτ€ραις . 

1". ο γαρ ύττβρβάλλων τω χαίρ€ΐν τω -qSei ύπβρβάλλβι 
και ο τω λυπεΐσθαι τω ivavTico, και ταντα η 
απλώς η προς τίνα ορον, οΐον όταν μάλλον η* ως 
οι πολλοί• 6 δ' αγαθός ως δβι. — evret δ' €στί τις 3 
ζζις αφ ης τοιούτος βσται 6 βχων αύτην ώστε 
του αυτού πράγματος 6* μ€ν άπο8€χ€σθαι την 

20 νπβρβολην ό* δε την ελλβιφιν, ανάγκη ώς ταύτ 
άλληλοις ivavTia και τω μ€σω, οϋτω και τάς 
εζ^ις άλλ-^λαι? ivavτίaς elvai και τη άρ€τη. 

Σινμβαίν€ΐ μέντοι τα? άι/τι^εσει? evda μέν 4 
φανερωτερας eWt πάσας, 'ένθα δε τάς επι την 
νπερβολήν, ένιαχού δε τάς iπι την ζλλβιφιν. 

25 αίτιον δε της ivavτιώσεως δτι ουκ aei iπι ταύτα' fi 
της άνισοτητος η όμοιότης^ προς το μέσον, αλλ' 
ότέ μβν θάττον αν μεταβαίη άπο της υπερβολής 
ετΓΐ την μ4σην e^iv, ότε δ' από της ε'λλει'^εω?, ης 
ος^ πλέον ά77ε';ι^ε(.* οΰτος δοκτει ivavτιώτεpoς 
elvai, οίον και περί το σώμα iv μεν τοις πόνοις 
νγιεινότερον η υπερβολή της iλλείφεως και 

30 €γγύτερον τού μέσου, iv δε τη τροφή ή ελλειφις 

*• Ric. : καθ' αυτόν ΐκαστον. ^ καΐ Sus. : ί}. 

' μάλλον ή lac. : μη. * ό (bis) Βζ. : ου. 

^ ταντα <^ρχ€ταί> vel <ήκει^ Ric, 

' Βζ. : ^ ομοώτητο$. ' 5s add. Sus. 

* απέχων Μ•». 

258 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, 11. v. 1-6 

tween excess and deficiency relative to ourselves, it 
would necessarily follow that moral goodness corre- 
sponds with each particular middle state and is 
concerned with certain mean points in pleasures 

2 and pains and pleasant and painful things. And 
this middle state will sometimes be in pleasures (for 
even in these there is excess and deficiency), sometimes 
in pains, sometimes in both. For he that exceeds 
in feeling delight exceeds in the pleasant, and he that 
exceeds in feeling pain exceeds in the opposite — and 
this whether his feelings are excessive absolutely 
or excessive in relation to some standard, for in- 
stance are felt more than ordinary men feel them ; 
whereas the good man feels in the proper way. — 

3 And since there is a certain state of character which 
results in its possessor's being in one instance such 
as to accept an excess and in another such as to 
accept a deficiency of the same thing, it follows that 
as these actions are contrary to each other and to the 
mean, so also the states of character that cause them 
are contrary to each other and to virtue. 

4 It comes about, however, that sometimes all the one of 
oppositions are more evident, sometimes those on the extremes 
side of excess, in some cases those on the side of maybe mor 

5 deficiency. The cause of this contrariety is that the the virtue" 
resemblance does not always reach the same point than the 
of inequality in regard to the middle, but sometimes 

it may pass over more quickly from the excess, 
sometimes from the deficiency, to the middle state, 
the person farther removed from which seems to 
be more contrary : for instance, with regard to the 
body excess is more healthy and nearer the middle 
than deficiency in the case of exercises but deficiency 

6 than excess in the case of food. Consequently the 

259 



ARISTOTLE 

1222 a 

νπ€ρβολης• ώστ€ καΐ αϊ ττροαψζτικαΐ e^etg at 6 
φίλογυμναστικαΐ φίλοϋγί€Ϊς μάλλον eaovrat καθ^ 
€κατ€ραν την atpeaiv, €νθα μ€ν οι ττολνττονώτβροι^ 
βνθα δ OL ΰποσταηκώτζροι,^ καΐ ivavrios τω 

35 μ€τριω και τω ώς ο λόγος ένθα μ€ν 6 άπονος 
καΐ ουκ άμφω, evda Se^ ο απολαυστικός καΐ 
ούχ ο πβίνητίκός. συμβαίνει δε τοϋτο διότι "η 7 
φύσις ευθύς ού προς άπαντα ομοίως άφεστηκε του 
μέσου, αλλ' ^ττον μεν φιλόπονοι εσμεν μάλλον δ' 
απολαυστικοί• ομοίως δε ταυτ' e^ei και περί 

40 φυχης. εναντιαν δε τίθεμεν την εζιν εφ^ ην τε 8 
αμαρτάνομεν μάλλον και εφ' ην οι πολλοί, η δ' 
έτερα ώσπερ ουκ ούσα λανθάνει, δια γαρ το ολίγον 
αναίσθητος εστίν, οίον όργην πραότητι και τον 9 
1222 b opyAor τω πράω' καίτοι εστίν υπερβολή και επι 
το ΐλεων ειν-αι και το* καταλλακτικόν είναι και 
μη όργίζεσθαι ραπιζόμενον, αλλ' ολίγοι οΐ τοι- 
ούτοι, επ* εκείνο δε πάντες ρεπουσι μάλλον διό 
και ού κολακικον^ ό θυμός. 

5 Έττει δ' εΐληπται η Βιαλογη των εζεων καθ' 10 
έκαστα τα πάθη fj και* ύπερβολαι και ελλείφεις, 
και των εναντίων εζεων καθ' ας εχουσι κατά τον 
ορθόν λόγον [τις δ' ό ορθός λόγος και προς τίνα 
δει ορον αποβλέποντας λέγειν τό μέσον ύστερον 
επισκεπτεον) , φανερόν οτι πάσαι αϊ ηθικαΐ άρεταΐ 

^ αΐ πολνπονώτβραί Βζ. * αί ύττοστατικώτΐραι Βζ. 

' Βζ. : δέ και. * τό , . . τ6 Βζ. : τφ . . , τψ. 

' καταλλακτίκόν Fr., ΐΰκ6\αστον ? Ric. 

• 17 "fti Ras. : καϊ αί. 

"In respect of amount of exercise. 
* In respect of amount of food. 

' A probable alteration of the Greek gives ' is not ready 
to make up a quarrel.' ■* See 1249 a 21 if. 

£60 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, II. v. 6-10 

states of will favourable to athletic training will be 
variously favourable to health according to the two 
different fields of choice — in the one case '^ the 
over-energetic men (will be nearer the mean than 
the slack ones) , in the other ^ the too hardy <will 
be nearer the mean than the self-indulgent ones) ; 
and also the character contrary to the moderate and 
rational will be in the one case the slack and not 
both the slack and the over-energetic, and in the 
other case the self-indulgent and not the man who 

7 goes hungry. And this comes about because from the 
start our nature does not diverge from the mean in the 
same way as regards everything, but in energy we are 
deficient and in self-indulgence excessive ; and this is 

8 also the same with regard to the spirit. And we class 
as contrary to the mean the disposition to which we, 
and most men, are more liable to err ; whereas the 
other passes unnoticed as if non-existent, because its 

9 rarity makes it not observed. For instance we count 
anger the contrary of gentleness and the passionate 
man the contrary of the gentle ; yet there is also 
excess in the direction of being gentle and placable 
and not being angry when struck, but men of that 
sort are fe\^, and everyone is more prone to the other 
extreme ; on which account moreover a passionate 
temper is not a characteristic of a toady." 

10 And since we have dealt with the scheme of RecapituU- 
states of character in respect of the various emotions *^'"°' 
in which there are excesses and deficiencies, and of 
the opposite states in accordance with which men 
are disposed in accordance with right principle 
(though the question what is the right principle 
and what rule is to guide us in defining the mean 
must be considered later '^, it is evident that all the 

261 



ARISTOTLE 

1222 b 

10 καΐ κακίαι Trepl ηΒονών καΐ λυπών νττζρβολάς καΐ 
eAAeti/iets" etat, /cat rjSoval /cat λΰπαι άπο των 
€ΐρημ€νων βζ^ων /cat παθημάτων γίνονται, άλλα 11 
μην η γ€ βζΧτίστη e^t? η περί έκαστα μίση iaTLV. 
Βηλον τοίννν ΟΤΙ at aperat η ττασαι η τούτων τινίς 
€σονται των μ^σοτητων. 

15 VI. Αάβωμ€ν ονν αλλτ^ν άρχην της €πιούσης 1 
σκ€φ€ως. etat δτ^ ττασαι μέν αϊ ούσίαι κατά 
φνσιν TLveg άρχαί, διο /cat ίκάστη ττολλά δύνα- 
ται τοιαύτα yevvav, οίον άνθρωπος ανθρώπους /cat 
ζωον^ δλως ζώα καΐ φυτόν φυτά. προς 8e τούτοις 2 
ο y' άνθρωπος /cat πράζ^ών τινών ioTiv άρχη 

20 μόνον τών ζώων τών γαρ άλλων ούθβν ύποιμ^ν 
αν πράττ€ΐν. τών δ' αρχών οσαι τοιαϋται, δθ€ν 3 
πρώτον αϊ κινησ€ΐς, κύριαι λέγονται, μάλιστα δε 
δt/cαtωs■ άφ^ ων μη evhi^eTai άλλως, ην Ισως 6 
θεός άρχει, iv δε rat? άκινήτοις άρχαΐς, οίον iv 4 
ταΐς μαθηματικαΐς, ουκ εστί το κυριον καίτοι 

25 λέγεται γ€ καθ^ ομοιότητα• και γαρ βνταΰθα 
κινούμενης της άρχης πάντα μάλιστ* αν τα δει- 
κννμενα μεταβάλλοι, αυτά δε δι'^ αυτά ου μετα- 
βάλλει άναιρούμενον θάτερον^ ύπο θατερου αν μη τώ 
την ύπόθεσιν άι^ελεΐι^ και hi εκείνης δεΓ^αι. ο δ 5 
άνθρωπος άρχη κινήσεως τίνος' η γαρ πραζις 

30 κίνησις. επει δ' ώσπερ εν τοις άλΧοις η άρχη 

^ Sus. : ζψον bv. 

* 5k δι' ? Ric. ^ Rieckher : αναιρουμένου θατέρου, 

" The writer proceeds to distinguish the strict sense of 
^PXVt ' origin or cause of change ' (which applies to man as 
capable of volition and action) from its secondary sense, 
'cause or explanation of an unchanging state of things' 
(which a))plies to the ' first principles ' of mathematics). 

* e.g. if αρχή A led to Β and C, of which C was absurd. 

262 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, 11. v. 10— vi. 5 

forms of moral goodness and badness have to do with 
excesses and deficiencies of pleasures and pains, 
and that pleasures and pains result from the states 
11 of character and modes of emotion mentioned. But 
then the best state in relation to each class of thing 
is the middle state. It is clear, therefore, that the 
virtues will be either all or some of these middle 
states. 

1 VI. Let us, therefore, take another starting-point Freedom of 
for the ensuing inquiry." Now all essences are by iuiman con- 
nature first principles of a certain kind, owing to which f^uct is con- 
each is able to generate many things of the same sort necessary. 
as itself, for example a man engenders men, and in 

2 general an animal animals, and a plant plants. And 
in addition to this, obviously man alone among 
animals initiates certain conduct — for we should not 

3 ascribe conduct to any of the others. And the first 
principles of that sort, which are the first source of 
motions, are called first principles in the strict sense, 
and most rightly those that have necessary results ; 
doubtless God is a ruling principle that acts in this 

4 way. But the strict sense of ' first principle ' is not 
found in first principles incapable of movement, for 
example those of mathematics, although the term is 
indeed used of them by analogy, for in mathematics 
if the first principle were changed virtually all the 
things proved froiti it would change, though they 
do not change owing to themselves, one being 
destroyed by the other, except by destroying the 

5 assumption and thereby establishing a proof. ** But 
man is a first principle of a certain motion, for 
action is motion. And since as in other matters 

then C by refuting A would refute the other consequence Β 
(Solomon). 

263 



ARISTOTLE 

1222 b 

aiTta €στί των δι' αύτην όντων η γινομένων , 

Set νοησαί καθάπ^ρ €πΙ των άποΒ€ίζ€ων. el γαρ 6 

ζχοντος τον τριγώνου δυο όρθάς ανάγκη το τ€τρά- 

γωνον €χ€ΐν τ€τταρας όρθάς, φανβρον ώς αίτιον 

τούτου το δυο όρθάς €χ€ίν το τρίγωνον el δε ye 

3& μβταβάλλοι^ το τρίγωνον, ανάγκη καΐ το τ€τρά- 

γωνον μβταβάλλζίν, οίον el τρ€Ϊς, e^, el Be τέτ- 

ταρας,^ οκτώ' καν el μη μeτaβάλλei^ τοιούτον δ' 

eoTL, κάκ€Ϊνο τοιούτον άναγκαΐον eii^ai. 

ΔηλοΓ δ ο eπιχeιpoΰμev οτι άναγκαΐον €κ των 7 

αναλυτικών νυν δ' ovTe μη Xeγeιv οντ€ Xeγeιv 

ακριβώς οΐόν τ€ πλην τοσούτον. el γαρ μηθ€ν 

40 άλλο αίτιον του το τρίγωνον ούτως e^eiv, αρχή 

τι? O.V eΊη τοΰτο και αίτιον τών ύστ€ρον. ωστ 8 

eXnep εστιι/ eVia τών όντων €vSeχόμ€va έναντίως 

exeiv, ανάγκη και τάς αρχάς αυτών etvai τοιαύτας' 

1223 a €κ γάρ τών e^ ανάγκης άναγκαΐον το συμβαίνον 

εστί, τα he γe evτeΰθev evheχeτaι yev'eo^ai εττι* 

τάναντία. και ά* e(^' αύτοΐς εστί τοις άνθρώττοις, 

ΤΓολλά τών τοιούτων, και άρχαι τών τοιούτων 

eloiv αυτοί. ώστε όσων πpάζeωv 6 άνθρωπος 9 

5 εστίν αρχή και κύριος, φavep6v οτι evheχeτaι και 

^ινεσ^αι και μή, και οτι ε(^' αύτώ ταϋτ εστί 

yι^'eσ^αι και μή, ων γe κύριος ε'στι του είναι και 

^ μ€ταβάλ\(ΐ Ilic. 

* Sp. : τέττηρίί. ' Ric. : μ€ταβάλ\θί, 

* έττΐ add. Βζ. » Fr. : δ. 

» C/. ^ηαί. Ροίί. Ι. i. 
264 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, 11. vi. 5-9 

the first principle is a cause of the things that exist 
or come into existence because of it, we must think 

6 as we do in the case of demonstrations. For example, 
if as the angles of a triangle are together equal to 
two right angles the angles of a quadrilateral are 
necessarily equal to four right angles, that the angles 
of a triangle are equal to two right angles is clearly 
the cause of that fact; and supposing a triangle 
were to change, a quadrilateral would necessarily 
change too — for example if the angles of a triangle 
became equal to three right angles, the angles of a 
quadrilateral would become equal to six right angles, 
or if four, eight ; also if a triangle does not change 
but is as described, a quadrilateral too must of 
necessity be as described. 

7 The necessity of Avhat we are arguing is clear from 
Analytics " ; at present we cannot either deny or 
affirm anything definitely except just this. Sup- 
posing there were no further cause of the triangle's 
having the property stated, then the triangle would 
be a sort of first principle or cause of the later stages. 

8 Hence if in fact there are among existing things some 
that admit of the opposite state, their first principles 
also must necessarily have the same quality ; for of 
things that are of necessity the result is necessary, 
albeit the subsequent stages may possibly happen 
in the opposite way. And the things that depend on 
men themselves in many cases belong to this class 
of variables, and men are themselves the first prin- 

9 ciple of things of this sort. Hence it is clear that Therefore 
all the actions of which a man is the first principle vlce^are"*^ 
and controller may either happen or not happen, voluntary. 
and that it depends on himself for them to happen 

or not, as he controls their existence or non-existence. 

265 



ARISTOTLE 

1223 a 

τοΰ μη elvaL. δσα δ βφ αντώ ear ι ποί€Ϊν τη μη 

TTOLciv, αίτιο? τούτων αντος^ εστίν, και όσων αίτιο?, 
€^' αι5τω. €7Γ6ΐ δ' η τ€ αρετή καΐ η κακία και τα 10 

10 άττ' αυτών έργα τα μεν επαινετά τά δε φεκτα 
{φεγεται γαρ καΐ επαινείται ου τά} εξ ανάγκης η 
τύχη? η φύσεως υπάρχοντα αλλ' όσων αύτοι "αί- 
τιοι εσμεν, όσων γαρ αλλάς αίτιος εκείνος και τον 
φόγον και τον επαινον €χει), 8ηλον οτι και η αρετή 

15 και η κακία περί ταΰτ εστίν ων αύτος αίτιος και 
άρχη πράζεων. ληπτεον άρα ποιων αύτος αίτιο? 1 1 
Λταί άρχη πράζεων. πάντες μεν Srj όμολογοΰμεν, 
οσα μεν εκούσια και κατά προαίρεσιν την έκαστου, 
εκείνων'^ αίτιον eivai, οσα δ' ακουσία, ουκ αυτόν 
αίτιον, πάντα δ' οσα προελόμενος, και εκών Βηλον 
οτι. 8ηλον τοίνυν οτι και η αρετή και η κακία τών 

20 εκουσίων αν εΐησαν. 

VII. Αηπτεον άρα τι το εκούσιον και τι το 1 
άκούσιον, και τι εστίν η προαίρεσις, επεώη η 
άρετη και η κακία ορίζεται τούτοις• και* πρώτον 
σκεπτεον το εκούσιον και το άκούσιον. τριών 8η 2 
τούτων εν τι 8όζειεν άν^ eivai, ήτοι κατ ορεζιν η 

•2ό κτατά προαίρεσιν η κατά Siavoiav, το μεν εκούσιον 
κατά τούτων τι, το δ ακούσιοι^ πάρα τούτων τι. 
αλλά μην ή ορεζις εις τρία διαι/3€Γται, ei? βούλησιν 3 

^ Βζ. : oiVoj. ^ Fr. : διά τά. 

' Fr. : ίκ€Ϊνοι>. * καΐ add. Fr. * Άν add. Sp. 

266 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, II. vi. 9— vii. 3 

But of things which it depends on him to do or not 
to do he is himself the cause, and what he is the 

10 cause of depends on himself. And since goodness 
and badness and the actions that spring from them 
are in some cases praiseworthy and in other cases 
blameworthy (for praise and blame are not given 
to things that we possess from necessity or fortune 
or nature but to things of which we ourselves are 
the cause, since for things of which another person 
is the cause, that person has the blame and the 
praise), it is clear that both goodness and badness 
have to do with things where a man is himself the 

11 cause and origin of his actions. We must, then, ascer- 
tain what is the kind of actions of which a man is 
himself the cause and origin. Now we all agree 
that each man is the cause of all those acts that are 
voluntary and purposive for him individually, and 
that he is not himself the cause of those that are 
involuntary. And clearly he commits voluntarily 
all the acts that he commits purposely. It is clear, 
then, that both goodness and badness will be in the 
class of things voluntary. 

1 VII. We must, therefore, ascertain what voluntary the 

, . 1 τ 1 , . • l• • VOLUNTAItY 

and mvoluntary mean, and what is purposive choice, (cc. vii ix). 
since they enter into the definition of goodness and acung°by 
badness. And first we must consider the meaning of impulse, 

xTl• ijj. whether in 

2 voluntary and mvoluntary. Now they would seem to the form of 
refer to one of three things — conformity with appe- appetite 
tition, or with purposive choice, or with thought : 
voluntary is Avhat conforms with one of these and in- 

3 voluntary is what contravenes one of them. But 
moreover there are three subdivisions of appetition — 

267 



ARISTOTLE 

1223 a 

/cat θνμον /cat έττιθυμίαν , ώστε ταύτα hLaiperiov• 
/cat πρώτον τό^ κατ ίτηθυμίαν. 

lS,o^eLe δ' αν παν το κατ €πίθνμίαν ίκούσιον 4 
eti^at. το γαρ ακονσιον παν hoKel elvai βίαιον, 
30 το 8e βίαιον λυπηρόν, /cat παν δ άναγκαζόμβνοι 
ποιονσιν η πάσχονσιν , ωσπβρ /cat Ένηνός φησί' 

παν γαρ άναγκαΐον πραγμ άνιαρον ζφν 

ώστ' et Tt λυπηρον βίαίον /cat et Tt* βιαιον λύπη- 5 

ρόν το δε παρά την €πίθυμίαν παν λνπηρόν {η 

35 γαρ επιθυμία τον rjheos), ώστε βίαιον /cat άκονσίον. 

το άρα κατ βπιθνμίαν ίκονσιον ει^αντ/α γαρ ταϋτ 

άλληλοι?. έτι 1^ μοχθηρία ά8ικώτ€ρον πάσα 7ΓOtεt, 6 

■jj δ' άκρασία μοχθηρία δo/cεt εtvαt• ό δ άκρατης 

οίος κατά' Ti^f βπιθυμίαν παρά τον λογισμόν 

πράτταν, ά/cpατευεταt δ' όταν Ινβργη κατ αύττ^ν'• 

1223 b ώσ^' 6 άκρατης άδt/C7^σεt τω πραττ€ΐν κατ 

€πιθυμίαν . το δ' α,δt/cεt^' Ικούσιον*• €κών άρα 

πράζ^ι, και ίκούσιον το κατ €πιθυμιαν. και γαρ 

άτοπον €1 hiKaioTepoi έσονται οι άκρατ€Ϊς γινό- 

/xε^Όt/ — ε /c μβν τοίννν τούτων δό^ειει/ αν το κατ 7 

5 επιθυμίαν ίκούσιον elvai• e/c δε τώι^δε τουναντίον , 

άπαν γάρ ο ίκών τις πράττει βουλόμενος πράττει, 

^ τό add. Cas. ^ ei τι rec. Ρ•' : d. 

' olos κατά Sp. : δ κατά. et oios infra ante ττράττΐΐν. 

* τό δ' . . . ΐκούσιον hie Rac. : supra ante ώσθ' ό άκρατψ. 

* /cat 7άρ • • . -/ιν&μ^νοι Supra post τφ πράττ€ΐν κατ έιτιθνμίαν 
tr. ? Rac. 

" Quoted also Met. 1015 a 28 and (without author's name) 
Rhet. 1370 a 10, and = Theognidea 472 (but that has χρημ 
άνιαρόν); probably by the elder Evenus of Paros,^. 460 b.c. 
(Bowra, CI. Rev. xlviii. 2). 

* In the Mss. this sentence precedes the one before. 

268 



I EUDEMIAN ETHICS, II. vii. 3-7 

' wish, passion and desire ; so that we have to dis- 

: tinguish these. And first we must consider con- 

;' formity with desire. 

ΐ: It would seem that everything that conforms with (to yield to 

: J. . 1, 1-.•^ ii,• • Λ Λ. which can 

desire is voluntary, tor everything involuntary bs shown 

(seems to be forced, and what is forced and everything as both 
that people do or suffer under necessity is painful, and in- 
as indeed Evenus says : voluntary), 

For all necessity doth cause distress — <* 

so that if a thing is painful it is forced and if a thing 
is forced it is painful ; but everything contrary to 

t desire is painful (for desire is for what is pleasant), 
so that it is forced and involuntary. Therefore what 
conforms with desire is voluntary, for things con- 
trary to and things in conformity with desire are 
opposite to one another. Again, all wickedness 
makes a man more unrighteous, and lack of self- 
control seems to be wickedness ; and the uncontrolled 
I man is the sort of man to act in conformity with desire 
contrary to calculation, and he shows his lack of 
control when his conduct is guided by desire ; so 
that the uncontrolled man will act unrighteously by 
acting in conformity with desire. But unrighteous 
action is voluntary. ** Therefore he will be acting 
voluntarily, and action guided by desire is voluntary. 
Indeed it would be strange if those who become 

ί uncontrolled will be more righteous." — From these or of anger 
considerations, then, it would appear that what is in sa°me^^ 
conformity with desire is voluntary ; and from this the reason), 
opposite ** follows, for all that a man does voluntarily 



ί 



<^ This sentence would come in better above, after ' acting 
in conformity with desire.' 

"* Viz. that what is against desire is involuntary. 

269 



ARISTOTLE i 

/cat δ jSouAerat ίκών, βουλίται δ ονθ^Ις ο oterat 
elvai κακόν, άλλα /χι^ι^ ο άκρατβυόμ^νος ονχ α 
βονΧζταί TTOLel, το yap τταρ' δ οΓεται βΙΧηστον 
elvai ττράτταν δι' Ιττιθυμίαν άκρατ€ύ€σθαί ioTLV 

10 ώστε α/χα σνμβησβταί τον αυτόν εκόντα και άκοντα 
πράττ€ΐ,ν. τοΰτο δ' αδύνατον, έτι δ ό εγκρατής 8 
hiKaioTTpayqaei,, καΐ μάλλον της άκρασίας' η γαρ 
€γκράτ€ΐα άρβτή, ή δ' άρβτη δικαιοτέρου? ποιεί. 
€γκρατ€ν€ται δ' δταν ττράτττ] τταρα την βτηθυμίαν 
κατά τον λογισμόν. ώστ ει το ρ-έν δικαΐ07Γρα•)/εΓν 

15 €κούσίον, ώσττερ και το άδικειν {αμφω γαρ δοκει 
ταύτα εκούσια είναι, και ανάγκη ει θατ^ρον 
ίκούσιον και θάτβρον), το δε παρά την βτηθυμίαν 
άκονσιον, άμα άρα 6 αύτος το αυτό ττράζα εκών 
και άκων. 

Ό δ' αυτό? λόγο? και ττερι θυμοΰ• άκρασία γάρ 9 
και εγκράτεια και θυμοΰ δοκει είναι ώσττερ και 

20 ζττιθυμίας, και το παρά τον θυμον λνπηρόν και 
βίαιον η κάθίζίς, ώστ' ει το βίαιον άκουσιον, το 
κατά τον θυμον ίκούσιον αν eh] πάν. €θΐκ€ δε 
και 'Ηράκλειτο? λε'γειν ει? τήν Ισχύν του θυμοΰ 
βλίφας ΟΤΙ λυπηρά η κώλυσις αυτού• " χαλεττόν 
yap " ^τ^σι " θυμώ μάχεσθαι, φυχης γάρ ώνεΐται." 

25 ει δ' αδύνατον το αύτό^ εκόντα και άκοντα πράττουν 1 
άρ,α και'' κατά το αυτό τοΰ πράγματος, μάλλον 
ίκούσιον το κατά βούλησιν τοΰ κατ ^πιθυμίαν 

^ Ρ*>: τό αυτόν Μ*»: rbv αντόρ edd. ** και Βζ. : το. 

" The natural philosopher of Ephesus,yi. c. 513 b.c. His 
sentence ended δ τι yap olv XPvtv yivfcdai, ψνχψ uvehai, 
lamblichus, Protrepticus, p. 140. 

270 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, II. vii. 7-10 

he wishes to do, and what he wishes to do he does 
voluntarily, but nobody wishes what he thinks to be 
bad. But yet the uncontrolled man does not do 
what he wishes, for being uncontrolled means acting 
against what one thinks to be best owing to desire ; 
hence it will come about that the same person is 
acting voluntarily and involuntarily at the same 

8 time. But this is impossible. And further, the 
self-controlled man will act righteously, or more 
righteously than lack of control will ; for self-control 
is goodness, and goodness makes men more righteous. 
And a man exercises self-control when he acts against 
his desire in conformity with rational calculation. 
So that if righteous action is voluntary, as also un- 
righteous action (for both of these seem to be volun- 
tary, and if one of them is voluntary it follows of 
necessity that the other is also), whereas what is 
contrary to desire is involuntary, it therefore follows 
that the same person will do the same action volun- 
tarily and involuntarily at the same time. 

9 The same argument applies also in the case of or of wish 
passion ; for there appear to be control and lack of in^oives^**" 
control of passion as well as of desire and what is contra- 
contrary to passion is painful and restraint is a '''*^*''°°)• 
matter of force, so that if what is forced is involun- 
tary, what is in accordance with passion Λνΐΐΐ always 

be voluntary. Even Heracleitus " seems to have in 
view the strength of passion when he remarks that 
the checking of passion is painful ; for ' It is difficult 
(he says) to do battle with passion, for it buys its wish 
10 at the price of life.' And if it is impossible to do the 
same act voluntarily a,nd involuntarily at the same 
time and in respect of the same part of the act, 
action guided by one's wish is more voluntary than 

271 



ARISTOTLE 

1228 b 

καΐ θυμόν. τ€κμηρίον δε'• ττολλά γαρ πράττομ€ν 

βκόντζς avev οργής καΐ €ττιθυμίας. 

AetVerat άρα el το βουλόμενον καΐ ίκούσιον 11 

30 ταύτο σκβφασθαί. φαίν€ταί δε καΐ τοΰτο aSvvarov. 
ύττόκβίταί γαρ ημΐν καΐ ^οκ€Ϊ η μοχθηρία άδικω- 
ripovg TTOieZv, rj δ' άκρασία μοχθηρία τι? φαίνεται. 
σνμβήσ€ται δε τουναντίον βούλ^ται μβν γαρ ονθίΐς 
α o'leTat eivai κακά, ττράττΐΐ δ όταν γίνηται^ 
άκρατης' ει ουν το μβν aSiKelv €Κούσιον, το δ' 

35 eKovoLOv το κατά βούλησιν, όταν άκρατης •)/εν7^ται, 
ovK€TL άδικτ^σει, αλλ' εσται δικαιότερο? η πριν 
γενέσθαι άκρατης, τοΰτο δ' άδυνατοΓ. οτι μεν 
τοίνυν ουκ εστί το εκούσιον το κατά ορεζιν ττράτ- 
τειν οι)δ' άκουσιον το παρά την ορεζιν φανερόν. 

VIII, "Οτι δ' ού8έ κατά ττροαίρεσιν, ττάλιν εκ 1 
τώνδε δτ^λον. το μεν γάρ κατά βουλησιν ώς ουκ 
άκουσιον^ απεδείχθη, άλλα μάλλον^ παν ο βου- 
1224 a λεται και εκούσιον άλλ οτι κ:αι μη βουλομενον 
εν^εχεταί πράττειν εκόντα, τοΰτο δε'δεικται μόνον.* 
πολλά δε βουλόμενοι πράττομεν εζαίφνης, προαιρεί- 
ται δ' ουδει? ουδει^ εξαίφνης. 
5 Ει δε ανάγκη μεν ην τριών τούτων εν τι είναι 2 
το εκούσιον, η κατ* ορεζιν η κατά προαίρεσιν η 

^ So]. : "γίνηται. 

* οΰχ ώϊ (κούσων ? Rac. {ούχ ώ? ά.κ. Ras. : ojs ά /c. ουκ. Βζ.). 

* μάλλον <δτι> ? RaC. * [μόνον] Sol. 



" Or, altering the text, ' It was proved not that acting in 
accordance with one's wishes is the same as acting volun- 
tarily, but rather that all one wishes is also voluntary although 
it is possible to act voluntarily without wishing — this is all 
that has been proved ; but many things that we wish — — ' 

" Cf. 1223 a 23 ff. 

272 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, II. vn. 10— viii. 2 

action guided by desire or passion. And a proof of 
this is that we do many things voluntarily without 
anger or desire. 

It remains, therefore, to consider whether acting 
as we wish and acting voluntarily are the same. 
This also seems impossible. For it is a fundamental 
assumption with us, and a general opinion, that 
wickedness makes men more unrighteous ; and lack 
of self-control seems to be a sort of wickedness. 
But from the hypothesis that acting as we wish and 
acting voluntarily are the same the opposite will 
result ; for nobody wishes things that he thinks to 
be bad, yet he does them when he has become un- 
controlled, so if to do injustice is voluntary and the 
voluntary is what is in accordance with one's wish, 
then when a man has become uncontrolled he will no 
longer be acting unjustly but will be more just than 
he was before he lost control of himself. But this is 
impossible. Therefore it is clear that acting volun- 
tarily does not mean acting in accordance with 
appetition nor acting involuntarily acting in op- 
position to appetition. 

VIII. Also it is clear from the following considera- nor is it 
tions that voluntary action does not mean acting in p„^polive. 
accordance with purposive choice. It was proved <* 
that acting in accordance with one's wish is not 
acting involuntarily, but rather everything that one 
wishes is also voluntary — it has only been proved that 
it is possible to do a thing voluntarily without wish- 
ing ; but many things that we wish we do suddenly, 
whereas nobody makes a purposive choice suddenly. 

But if as we said ^ the voluntary must necessarily Therefore 
be one of three things — what is in conformity with ap- gx^jygiQn 
petition, or with purposive choice, or with thought — , 

τ 273 



ARISTOTLE 

1224 a 

Kara SidvoLav, τούτων δε τα δυο μτ] εστί, λείττεται 

ev τω Βιανοονμενόν πως πράττ€ΐ,ν elvai το ίκούσιον. 

€TL Be μΛκρόν προαγαγόντ€ς τον λόγον ^τηθώμ^ν 3 

τέΧος τω ττβρί τον βκουσίου καΐ ακουσίου Βιορισμω, 

10 hoKei γαρ το βία καΐ μτ) βία τι TTOLeiv οΙκεΐα τοις 
€ίρ'ημ€νοίς elvai• τό re γαρ βίαιον άκούσιον και 
το άκούσιον τταν βίαιον elvat φαμέν. ώστβ Trepl 
του βία σκ€7ττ€ον πρώτον τι εστί και πώς €χ€ΐ 
προς το ίκούσιον /cat άκούσιον. Sofcei δη τό 4 
βίαιον καΙ τό άναγκαΐον άντίΚ€Ϊσθαι, καΐ η βία 

15 καΐ ή ανάγκη, τω €κουσίω και ttj πβιθοΐ €πι 
των πραττομάνων. καθόλου he τό βίαιον και την 
ανάγκην και €.πι τών άφύχων Xeγoμev• και γαρ 
τον λίθον άνω και το πυρ κάτω βία και άναγκαζό- 
μeva φ4ρ€σθαι φaμev, ταΰτα^ δ όταν κατά την 
φύσ€ΐ^ και την καθ* αυτά ορμην φ€ρηται, ου βία 
— ου μην οι)δ' εκούσια λέγεται, αλλ ανώνυμος 

20 η άντίθεσις, όταν δε παρά ταύτην, βία φαμεν. 
ομοίως δε και επι εμφνχων και επι τών ζώων 5 
όρώμεν βία πολλά και πάσχοντα και ποιοΰντα, 
όταν παρά την εν αύτώ ορμην έξωθεν τι κινη. ev 
μεν τοις άφύχοις άπλη η άρχη, ev δε τοις εμφύχοις 
πλεονάζει• ου γάρ άει η όρεζις και ό λόγος συμ- 

25 φωνεΐ. ώστ επι μεν τών άλλων ζώων απλούν 6 
τό βίαιον, ώσπερ επι τών άφύχων {ου γαρ έχει 

^ Fr, : τοΰτο, * ν.1. φνσιν. 

274 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, II. viii. 2-6 

and if it is not the two former, it remains that volun- «f. i323 a 21) 
tariness consists in acting with some kind of thought, voluntary 

3 Moreover, let us put a conclusion to our delimitation ^^^^"jjj °" 
of the voluntary and involuntary by carrying the 
argument a little further. Acting under compulsion Compulsion 

Ο ^ is irom 

and not under compulsion seem to be terms akin without; 
to the ones mentioned ; for we say that everything 
forced is involuntary and everything involuntary is 
forced. So we must first consider the exact meaning 
of ' forced,' and how what is forced is related to the 

4 voluntary and involuntary. It seems, then, that in 
the sphere of conduct ' forced ' or ' necessary,' and 
force or necessity, are the opposite of ' voluntary,' 
and of persuasion. And we employ the terms force 
and necessity in a general sense even in the case of 
inanimate objects : we say that a stone travels up- 
wards and fire downwards by force and under neces- 
sity, whereas when they travel according to their 
natural and intrinsic impulse we say that they do 
not move under force — although nevertheless they 
are not spoken of as moving voluntarily : the state 
opposite to forced motion has no name, but when 
they travel contrary to their natural impulse we say 

5 that they move by force. Similarly also in the case 
of living things and of animals, we see many being 
acted on by force, and also acting under force when 
something moves them from outside, contrary to the 
impulse within the thing itself. In inanimate things 
the moving principle is simple, but in living things it 

is multiple, for appetition and rational principle are whereas the 

6 not always in harmony. Hence whereas in the case fmpu!se°by 
of the other animals the factor of force is simple, yeason is 
as it is in the case of inanimate objects, for animals and ' 
do not possess rational principle and appetition in ^ο^^^^^^^ν 

275 



ARISTOTLE 

1224 a 

λόγον καΐ ope^Lv Ιναντίαν, άλλα τ^ ope^et ζτ^)' ev 

ο ανθρώττω eveariv αμφω, καΐ ev tlvl -ηλίκία, "^ 
και το πράττ€ΐν άττοΒίΒομ^ν {ου γαρ φαμ€ν το 
παιΒίον 7τράττ€ίν, ovSe το θηρίον, άλλα, τόν^ η8η 

30 δια λογισμόν πράττοντα) . δο /cet δή το βίαιον 7 
άτταν λυπηρον eivai, καΐ ούθ€ΐς βία μίν ίτοιεΙ 
"χαίρων he. διό ττβρι τον Ιγκραττ] καΐ τον άκρατη 
πλείστη άμφισβητησίς εστίν. Ιναντίας γαρ ορμάς 
€χων αύτος ίκάτ^ρος^ αύτω πράττ€ί, ώσθ^ ο τ' 
€γκρατΎ]ς βίΟ-, φασίν, άφελκων^ αντον άττό των 

35 rjSewv Ιτηθυμών^ [αλγβΐ γαρ άφέλκων ττρος αντι- 
τ€ΐνονσαν την ορεζιν), 6 τ άκρατης βία παρά τον 
λογισμόν. 'ήττον Se δο /cet λνπβΐσθαι, η γάρ eVt- 8 
θνμία του η^βος, fj άκολουθβΐ χαίρων ωσ&* 6 
άκρατης μάλλον €κών καΐ ου βία, οτι ου λυπηρώς. 
η δε τταθώ τη βία και ανάγκη άντιτίθ€ται, 6 δ' 
1224 b εγκρατής βφ α ττεττεισται ά'γεται/ καΐ πορ€υ€ται 
ου βία άλλ' βκών η δ' Ιτηθυμία ου ττεισασα ayet, 
ου γαρ /χετεχει λόγου, οτι μ€ν ουν SokoOgcv ούτοι 9 
μόνον* βία και άκοντες notelv, και δια tiV αΐτίαν, 
ότι κα^ ομοιότητα τίνα του βία, καθ* ην και επι 
5 των αφυχων λ^γομεν, (ϊρηται. ου μην άλλ' ei ίο 
τι? προσθειη^ το iv τω 8ιορισμω ηροσκείμενον 

^ lac. : άλλ' 6ταν. * Sp. : ?«αστο5. 

' Sp. : άφέλκβι. 

* Bek. : έττιθυμιών {των ζ,των^ ήδ^ων επιθυμιών Fr.)• 

* &^ΐται ? Sol. {όρμψ ? Ric): Λγβι. 

• Rac. : μόνοι. ' Sp. : ιτροσθτϊ. 

" Or ' conduct.' 
276 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, II. viii. 6-10 

opposition to it, but live by their appetition, in man 
both forms of force are present — that is, at a certain 
age, the age to which we attribute action ** in the 
proper sense ; for we do not speak of a child as 
acting, any more than a wild animal, but only a person 
who has attained to acting by rational calculation. 

7 So what is forced always seems to be painful, and no 
one acting under force acts gladly. Consequently there 
is a great deal of dispute about the self-controlled 
man and the uncontrolled. For each of them acts 
under a conflict of impulses within him, so that the 
self-controlled man, they say, acts under force in 
dragging himself away from the pleasures that he 
covets (for he feels pain in dragging himself away 
against the resistance of appetition), while the un.- 
controlled man acts under force in going contrary 

8 to his rational faculty. But he seems to feel less 
pain, because desire is for what is pleasant, and he 
follows his desire ; so that the uncontrolled man 
rather acts voluntarily and not under force, because 
not painfully. On the other hand persuasion is 
thought to be the opposite of force and necessity ; 
and the self-controlled man is led towards things 
that he has been persuaded to pursue, and proceeds 
not under force but voluntarily ; whereas desire 
leads a man on without employing persuasion, since 

9 it possesses no element of rational principle. It has, 
then, been stated that these men only seem to act 
under force and involuntarily ; and we have shown 
the reason — it is because their action has a certain 
resemblance to forced action, just as we speak of 
forced action even in the case of inanimate objects 

10 too. Yet nevertheless if one added there also the 
addition made in our definition, the statement is 

277 



ARISTOTLE 

1224 b 

κακ€Ϊ, λύεται το λ^χθβν. όταν μβν γάρ τι των 

ζξωθζν τταρά την ev αντω όρμην Kivfj η Ύ]ρ€μίζ'η, 

βία φαμβν, όταν 8e μη, ου βία• iv δε τω ΙγκρατέΙ 

10 /cat ακρατ€Ϊ η καθ αύτον ορμή ivovaa ayei {αμφω 
γαρ €χ€ΐ), ωστ ου βία ού^έτ€ρος αλλ' ίκών δια 
ye ταύτα πράττοί αν ουδ' άναγκαζόμ€νος, την 11 
γάρ έξωθεν άρχην την παρά την όρμην η €μποΒί- 
ζουσαν η κινούσαν ανάγκην λ4γομ€ν, ώσπβρ et τις 
λαβών την χ^ΐρα τύπτοι τινά άντιτβίνοντος και 

16 τω βούλβσθαι και τω €πιθυμ€Ϊν• όταν δ' €σωθ€ν 
η αρχή, ου βία. eVt^ και ή8ονή και λύπη iv 
άμφοτ€ροις eveoTiv και γάρ 6 €γκρατ€υόμ€νος 1 2 
λυπβΐται παρά την επιθυμίαν πράττων ή8η και 
χαίρει την am ελπίΒος η^ονήν δτι ύστερον ώφελη- 
θήσεται η και ή8η ωφελείται ύγιαίνων, και ό 

20 άκρατης χαίρει μεν τυγχάνων άκρατευόμενος ου 
επιθυμεί λυπεΐται 8έ την άττ' ελπίδος λύπην, οΐεται 
γαρ κακόν πράττειν. ώστε τό μεν βία εκάτερον 13 
φάναι ποιεΐν έχει λόγον, και δια την όρεζιν και 
δια τον λογισμόν εκάτερον άκοντα ποτέ πράττειν 
κεχωρισμενα γάρ όντα εκάτερα εκκρουεται υπ* 

25 άλλτ^λωι^. όθεν και επι την όλην μεταφερουσι 
φυχήν, ότι επι^ των εν φυχη τι τοιούτον όρώσιν. 
επι μεν ουν των μορίων ενδερ^βται τοϋτο λέγειν, η 14 
δ όλη εκοΰσα φυχη και του άκρατους και του 
1 Sus.: 6τι. 2 δτ-ί f πι Sol. : δτι. 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, II. viii. 10-14 

refuted. For we speak of a thing as being forced 
to act when something external moves it or brings 
it to rest, acting against the impulse within the thing 
itself — when there is no external motive, we do not 
say that it acts under force ; and in the uncontrolled 
man and the self-controlled it is the impulse present 
in the man himself that drives him (for he has both 
impulses), so that as far as these considerations go 
neither of them Avould be acting under force, but 

11 voluntarily ; nor yet are they acting of necessity, 
for by necessity we mean an external principle that 
either checks or moves a man in opposition to his 
impulse — as if A were to take hold of B's hand and 
with it strike C, B's will and desire both resisting ; 
whereas when the source of action is from within, we 

12 do not speak of the act as done under force./ Again, 
both pleasure and pain are present in both cases ; for 
a man exercising self-control both feels pain when he 
finally acts in opposition to his desire and enjoys the 
pleasure of hoping that he will be benefited later on, 
or is even being benefited already, by being in good 
health ; and the uncontrolled man enjoys getting 
what he desires owing to his lack of self-control, 
but feels prospective pain because he thinks he is 

13 doing a bad thing. Hence it is reasonable to say 
that each does what he does under compulsion, and 
that each is at one point acting involuntarily, from 
motives both of appetition and of rational calculation 
— for calculation and appetition are things quite 
separate, and each is pushed aside by the other. 
Hence men transfer this to the spirit as a whole, 
because they see something of this sort in the ex- 

14 periences of the spirit. Now it is admissible to say 
this in the case of the parts, but the spirit as a whole 

279 



ARISTOTLE 

1224 b 

€γκρατοΰς πράττ€ί, βία δ' ovBerepog,^ άλλα των 

ev βκΐίνοίς τι., evret /cat φύσ^ι αμφότερα εχομεν 
30 καΐ γαρ 6 λόγος φύσει υπάρχει" οτί εωμενης της 
γενέσεως και μη πηρωθείσης ei'eWat, και ή επι- 
θυμία ΟΤΙ ευθύς εκ γενετής ακολουθεί και eVeaTti^• 
σχεΒον 8ε τούτοις δυσι το φύσει 8ιορίζομεν, τω τε 15 
δσα ευθύς γινομενοις ακολουθεί πάσι, και δσα 
εωμενης της γενέσεως εύθυπορεΐν yiVerat ημΐν, 
35 οίον πολιά, και γήρας και ταλλα τα τοιαύτα, ώστε 
μη κατά φύσιν εκάτερος πράττει πώς,^ απλώς Be 
κατά φύσιν εκατερος, ου την αύτην. αΐ μεν οΰν 16 
περί τον εγκρατή και άκρατη άπορίαι αύται,* περί 
του βία πράττειν η αμφότερους η τον έτερον, 
ώστε η μη εκόντας η άμα βία και εκόντας,^ εΐ 
hk το βία άκούσιον,^ άμα εκόντας και άκοντας 

1225 a πράττειν σχεδόν 8ε εκ των είρημενων 8ηλον ημΐν 

ως άπαντητεον. 

Αεγονται δε κατ' αλλοΓ τρόπον βία και άναγκα• 17 
σθεντες πραζαι ού διαφωνούντος του λόγου και 
της όρεζεως, όταν πράττωσιν ο και λυπηρόν και 
5 φαΰλον ύπολαμβάνουσιν άλλα' μη τούτο πράτ- 
τονσιν^ 7Γλΐ7}/αι η Βεσμοι η θάνατοι ώσιν ταύτα 
γάρ φασιν άναγκασθεντες πράξαι. η ού, αλλά 18 
πάντες εκόντες ποιοΰσιν αυτά ταύτα,' εζεστι γάρ 

^ ούδίτέρον ? Rac. * υπάρχει Ras. : άρχων. 

» ττώ? add. ante μη Sus., hie Sol. (cf. 1225 a 12 ed.). 

* αύται add. Bus. * Sp. : άκοντα!. 

• Bz. : έκούσιον. ' Rac. : άλλ' &v. 

* Sp. : νράττωσι. * Sp. : atVo τούτο. 

280 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, II. viii. 14-18 

both in the uncontrolled and in the self-controlled 
man acts voluntarily, and in neither case does the 
man act under compulsion, but one of the parts in 
them so acts — for we possess by nature both parts ; 
since rational principle is a natural property, because 
it will be present in us if our growth is allowed and 
not stunted, and also desire is natural, because it 

15 accompanies and is present in us from birth ; and 
these are pretty nearly the two things by which we 
define the natural — it is what accompanies every- 
body as soon as he is born, or else what comes to 
us if development is allowed to go on regularly, for 
example grey hair, old age, etc. Therefore each of 
the two persons in a way acts not in accordance with 
nature, but absolutely each does act according to 
nature, though not according to the same nature. 

16 The difficulties, then, raised about the uncontrolled 
and the self-controlled man are these : do both, or 
does one of them, act under compulsion, so that 
they either act not voluntarily or else voluntarily 
and under compulsion at the same time — and if what 
is done under compulsion is involuntary, act volun- 
tarily and involuntarily at the same time ? And it 
is fairly clear from what has been said how these 
difficulties are to be met. 

17 But there is another way in which people are said Mixed acts 
to act under compulsion and of necessity without Voluntary 
disagreement between rational principle and appe- s^^^caufed 
tition, when they do something that they consider iay over- 
actually painful and bad but they are faced by nwtfvesf 
flogging or imprisonment or. execution if they do not 

do it ; for in these cases they say that they are acting 

18 under necessity. Possibly, however, this is not the 
case, but they all do the actual deeds willingly, since 

281 



ARISTOTLE 

1225 a 

μη ποί€Ϊν αλλ' eKcluo νττομ^Ιναι το πάθος. έ'τι 19 

LOWS τούτων τά μ€ν φαίη τις άν τά δ' ου. δσα 

10 μβν γαρ εφ' αύτω των τοιούτων μη ύττάρζαι η 
νπαρξαι,^ καΐ^ οσα πράττβι α μη βούλ€ταί ίκών 
πραττ€ΐ και ου βία• οσα 8e μη βφ* αύτώ των 
τοιούτων, ^ια πως, ου μεντοι y απλώς οτι ουκ 
αύτο τοΰτο προαιρείται ο πράττει αλλ' ου eve- 
κα• €π€ΐ και iv τούτοις εστί τι? Βιαφορά. el γαρ 20 

15 iv-a μη λάβη φηλαφών άποκτείνη, γελοίος άν εϊη 
ει λεγοι οτι βία και άναγκαζόμενος, άλλα 8εΐ 
μείζον κακόν και λυπηρότερον είναι δ πείσεται 
μη ποιιησας. ούτω γαρ άναγκαζόμενος και η^ βία 
πράξει η ου φύσει όταν κακόν άγαθοΰ ένεκα η 
μείζονος κακοΰ απολύσεως πράττη, και άκων ye• 

20 ου γαρ εφ αύτω ταύτα. διό και τόν έρωτα 21 
πολλοί άκούσιον τιθεασιν και θυμούς ενίους και 
τα φυσικά, ότι ισχυρά και ύπερ την φύσιν και 
συγγνώμην εχομεν ως πεφυκότα ^ιάζβσ^αι την 
φύσιν. και μάλλον άν 8όζειε βία και άκων 
πραττειν ίνα μη άλγη ισχυρώς η ίνα μη ήρεμα, 

2•'' και όλως ϊνα μη άλγη η Ινα χαίρη. τό γαρ εφ^ 

1 μη πραξαι ή πραξαι Sp. ^ καΐ (vel άύ) Βζ, : Μ. 

' Βζ. : μη. 

' Or ' for in those of such acts which it rests with himself 
to do or not.' 

* i.e. in blind-man's-l>uff, μνΐνδα or χα\κη μυΐα. 
283 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, II. viii. 18-21 

it is open to them not to do them but to endure 

19 the penalty threatened. Moreover, perhaps someone 
might say that in some cases these actions are done 
of necessity and in others not. For in cases where 
the presence or absence of such circumstances de- 
pends on the agent himself," even the actions that he 
does without wishing to do them he does willingly 
and not under compulsion ; but where in such cases 
the circumstances do not rest with himself, he acts 
under compulsion in a sense, though not indeed 
under compulsion absolutely, because he does not 
definitely choose the actual thing that he does but 
the object for which he does it ; since even in the 

20 objects of action there is a certain difference. For 
if someone were to kill a man to prevent his catching 
him by groping for him,** it would be ridiculous for 
him to say that he had done it under compulsion 
and of necessity — there must be some greater and 
more painful evil that he will suffer if he does not 
do it. It is when a man does something evil for 
the sake of something good, or for deliverance from 
another evil, that he will be acting under necessity 
and by compulsion, or at all events not by nature ; 
and then he will really be acting unwillingly, for 

21 these actions do not rest with himself. On this 
account many reckon even love as involuntary, and 
some forms of anger, and natural impulses, because 
their power is even" beyond nature ; and we pardon 
them as naturally capable of constraining nature. 
And it would be thought that a man is acting more 
under compulsion and involuntarily when his object 
is to avoid violent pain than when it is to avoid mild 
pain, and in general more when his object is the 
avoidance of pain than when it is to gain enjoyment. 

283 



ARISTOTLE 

1225 a 

αύτω, els ο avayerat όλον, τοντ iarlv δ ή αύτον 
φύσις οία re φ€ρ€ίν• δ δε μη οία re μη8' iarl 
της ξκβίνου φύσει ορέξεως η λογισμού, ουκ εφ^ 
αντώ. διό και τους ενθουσιώντας και προλέγοντας, 22 
καιττερ οιανοιας έργον ττοιονντας, δμως ου φαμεν 

30 εφ^ αύτοΐς eii^at οϋτ^ ειπείν α εΐπον ούτε ττραξαι 
α έπραξαν, αλλά μην ούΒε δι' επιθυμίαν ώστε 23 
ψ Siavoiai τίνες και πάθη ουκ εφ" ήμΐν είσΐν 
η πράξεις αϊ κατά τάς τοιαύτας 8ιανοίας καΐ 
λογισμούς, αλλ' ωσπερ Φιλόλαο? εφη εΐναί τινας 
λόγους κρείττους ημών. 

Ώστ ei το εκούσιον και άκούσιον και προς το 

3ό ρια έ'δβι σκεφασθαι, τοΰτο μεν ούτω 8ιηρησθω (οι 
γαρ /χάλιστ' εμπο^ίζοντες το εκούσιον . . .* ώ? ^ια 
πράττοντες, αλλ' εκόντες). 

IX. Εττει δε τοϋτ" έχει τέλος, και ούτε τη ι 
ορεξει ούτε τη προαιρεσει το εκούσιον ώρισται, 
\ZZbh λοιπόν 8η όρίσασθαι τό^ κατά την 8ιάνοιαν. ho κει 2 
οη εναντίον eit-ai το εκούσιον τω άκουσίω, και το 
εώότα η δν η ω η ου ένεκα {ενίοτε γάρ οι8ε μεν 
ΟΤΙ πατήρ αλλ ούχ ίνα άποκτείνη αλλ' ίνα σώση, 
ωσπερ αί Πελιάδε?, ήτοι ώς το8ι* μεν πόμα αλλ' 

5 ώς φίλτρον και οΐνον, το δ' ην κώνειον) τώ 
αγνοοΰντα^ και ον και ω και δ δι' άγνοιαν, μη 

^ ^ ? Ric. : και. " lacunam edd. 

» το e Μ. Μ. 1188 b 26 Sp. : τα. 
* τοδί Fr. : δτι. ^ Ricckher : ayvoovpri. 

" Pythagorean philosopher contemporary with Socrates. 

* Some words seem to have been lost here (αλλά suggests 
that they contained a negative). 

" The daughters of Pelias, King of lolchus, cut him up 
and boiled him, having been told by Medea (who wanted 
Jason to leave his throne) that this would restore his youth. 
284 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, II. viii. 21— ix. 2 

• For what rests with himself — and it wholly turns. on 
this — means what his nature is able to bear ; what 
his nature is not able to bear and what is not a 
matter of his own natural appetition or calculation 

22 does not rest with himself. On this account also 
in the case of persons who are inspired and utter 
prophecies, although they perform an act of thought, 
nevertheless we do not say that saying what they 
said and doing what they did rested with themselves. 

23 Nor yet do we say that what men do because of 
desire rests with themselves ; so that some thoughts 
and emotions, or the actions that are guided by such 
thoughts and calculations, do not rest with ourselves, 
but it is as Philolaus " said — ' some arguments are 
too strong for us.' 

Hence if it was necessary to consider the voluntary 
and involuntary with reference also to acting under 
compulsion, let this be our decision of the matter 
(for those who cause most hindrance . . . the volun- 
tary . . .** as acting under compulsion, but voluntarily). 

1 IX. Now that this is concluded, and as the volun- Definition of 
tary has been found not to be defined by appetition, andTn^^'^^ 
nor yet by purposive choice, it therefore remains to voluntary. 
define it as that which is in accordance with thought, in ignorance 

2 Now the voluntary seems to be the opposite of '^^l^f i^ 
the involuntary ; and acting with knowledge of involuntary. 
either the person acted on or the instrument or 

the result (for sometimes the agent knows that it is 
his father but does not intend to kill him but to save 
him — as the Peliads " did — or knows that what he 
is oiFering is a drink but oifers it as a love-charm or 
wine, when really it is hemlock) seems to be the 
opposite of acting without knowing the person acted 
on, the instrument and the nature of the act, through 

285 



ARISTOTLE 

1225 b 

κατά συμβββηκός. το 8e δι' άγνοιαν /cat ο και ω 

και ον ακονσιον. το evavTiov άρ ίκούσιον. οσα 3 

μεν ονν e^' iavTW ον μη πράτταν ττράττα μη 

αγνοών /cat 8t' αυτόν, ίκούσια ταϋτ ανάγκη elvai, 

10 /cat το εκουσιον τοΰτ eoTLv οσα δ αγνοών και 
δια το άγνοξίν, άκων. inci he το €πιστασθαι και 4 
το βιδεναι Sittov, ev μβν το €χ€ΐν, ev be το χρησθαι 
τη επιστήμη, 6 έχων μη χρώμενος he εστί μεν 
ώς hiKatws αν^ αγνοών Χεγοιτο, εστί δ' ώς ου 
hiKaiwg, οίον ει δι' a/ieAeiai' μη εχρητο. ομοίως 

15 hε και μη έχων τις φεγοιτο άν, ει δ pdhiov η 
αναγκαΐον ην μη εχει^ δι' a/xeAeial•' η ήhovηv η 
λύττην. ταυτ' οΰν TrpoohiopiOTiov. 

Υ\ερι μεν οΰν του εκουσίου και ακουσίου hi- 
ωρισθω^ τοϋτον τον τρόπον. 

Χ. ΐίερί hε προαιρέσεως μετά τοΰτο λεγωμεν, ΐ 
hιaπopησavτες πρώτον τω λόγω περί αύτης. 

20 hιστάσειε γαρ άν τις εν τω γένει πεφυκε και εν 
ποίω ^εΓρ'αι αύτην χρή, και πότερον ου ταύτόν 
το εκούσιον και το προαιρετόν η ταύτόν εστίν, 
μάλιστα δε Aeyerat παρά Ttt'OiP' και ζητοΰντι 2 
hόζειεv* άν hυoΐv etvat θάτερον η προαίρεσις, ήτοι 
δό^α η ορεζις' αμφότερα γάρ φαίνεται παρακολου- 

25 θοΰντα. ΟΤΙ μεν οΰν ουκ εστίν ορεζις, φανερόν. 3 

' ac add. Ras. ^ et -η μη ίχοι ? Ric. 

' δίτιρήσθω ? Rac. * Fr. : δόξΐΐΐ δ'. 

" Perhaps the Greek should be altered to give ' Let this 
be our decision.' 

* The term denotes not the deliberate choice of an object 
but the selection of means to attain an object : see § 7. 

286 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, II. ix. 2— x. 3 

ignorance and not by accident. But to act through 
ignorance of the act, the means and the person acted 

3 on is involuntary action. Therefore the opposite is 
voluntary. It follows then that all the things that 
a man does not in ignorance, and through his own 
agency, when it is in his power not to do them, are 
voluntary acts, and it is in this that the voluntary 
consists ; and all the things that he does in ignorance, 
and through being in ignorance, he does involun- 

4 tarily. But since to understand or know has two 
meanings, one being to have the knowledge and the 
other to use it, a man who has knowledge but is not 
using it would in one case be justly described as 
acting in ignorance but in another case unjustly — 
namely, if his non-employment of the knowledge 
were due to carelessness. And similarly one would 
be blamed for not having the knowledge, if it were 
something that was easy or necessary and his not 
having it is due to carelessness or pleasure or pain. 
These points therefore must be added to our defini- 
tion. 

Let this, then, be our mode of definition " about the 
voluntary and involuntary. 

1 X. Next let us speak about purposive choice, *' Purpose. 
first raising various diflliculties about it. For one 
might doubt to which class it naturally belongs 

and in what class it ought to be put, and whether 
the voluntary and the purposely chosen are diiferent 

2 things or the same thing. And a view specially 
put forward from some quarters, which on inquiry 
may seem correct, is that purposive choice is one 
of two things, either opinion or appetition ; for 

3 both are seen to accompany it. Now it is eVi- it is not 
dent that it is not appetition ; for in that case it X^e It i*"' 

287 



ARISTOTLE 

1225 b ^^ 

η γαρ βούλησις αν ^ίη η βπι,θνμία η θυμός- ονθ- 
ei? γαρ opeyerat μηθβν ττζττονθώς τούτων, θυμός 
μ€ν ούν και Ιτηθυμία και τοις θηρίοις υπάρχει, 
ττροαιρεσίς δ ου. ert 8e καΐ οΐς ύττάρχ^ι αμφω 
ταΰτα, πολλά καΐ ανβυ θυμοΰ καΐ επιθυμίας προ- 
αιρούνται- και €v τοις πάθβσιν 6ντ€ς ου προ- 

30 αιροϋνται άλλα καρτβροΰσιν. έτι Ιπιθυμία μεν και 
θυμός del μετά λύπης, προαιρούμβθα he ττολλά 
και άνευ λύπης. άλλα μην ovSe βούλησις και 4 
προαίρβσις ταύτόν βούλονται μέν γαρ evia και 
των αδυνάτων ζΐΒότζς, οΐον ^ασιλευειι^ τ€ πάντων 
ανθρώπων και αθάνατοι eivai, προαιρείται δ' ούθ- 

35 €ΐς μη άγνοών ότι άhύvaτov, ούδ' όλως ο 8υνα- 
τον μεν, μη εφ* αύτω δ' οϊεται πράξαι η μη 
πράζαι. ώστε τοντο μεν φανερόν, ότι ανάγκη^ 
το προαιρετον των εφ* αύτω τι eii^ai. ομοίως 8ε 5 

1226 a δτ^λοϊ^ ΟΤΙ ού8έ 8όξα, ουδ' απλώς ει τις οϊεταί τι- 

των γαρ εφ* αύτω τι ην^ το προαιρετον, 8οξάζομεν 
δε πολλά και των ούκ όντων εφ* ημιν, οίον την 
οιάμετρον άσύμμετρον^- ετι ούκ εστί προαίρεσις 
5 αληθής η φευΒής. ούΒε 8ή ή των εφ* αύτω όν- 6 
των πρακτών 8όζα fj τυγχάνομεν οΐόμενοι 8εΙν τι 
πραττειν ή ού πραττειν κοινόν hk περί Βόζης 
τούτο και βουλήσεως . ούθεις γαρ τέλος ούθεν 7 
προαιρείται, αλλά τά προς το τέλος, λέγω δ' οίον 

^ Ρ** : ava-yKT) μ(ν Μ •>, ίνά-γκΎ) Tjv Fr. 
^ Βζ. : ehai. * Rac. : σύμμΐτρον. 

•" 1223 a 16-19. 

* The Mss. give ' commensurable,' but there is no point in 
specifying an untrue opinion. C/. N.E. 1112 a 22 irepl δή 

288 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, II. χ. 3-7 

would be either wish or desire or passion, since nobody not passion 
wants to get a thing without having experienced 
one of those feelings. Now even animals possess 
passion and desire, but they do not have purposive 
choice. And again, beings that possess both of 
these often make choices even without passion and 
desire ; and while they are experiencing these feel- 
ings do not make a choice but hold out. Again, 
desire and passion are always accompanied by pain, 

4 but we often make a choice even without pain. But nor '** '* 

■L • • J. _li. • i_ wish, nor 

moreover purposive choice is not the same as wish opinion, 
either ; for men wish for some things that they know 
to be impossible, for instance to be king of all man- 
kind and to be immortal, but nobody purposively 
chooses a thing knowing it to be impossible, nor in 
general a thing that, though possible, he does not 
think in his own power to do or not to do. So that 
this much is clear — a thing purposively chosen must 
necessarily be something that rests with oneself. 

5 And similarly it is manifest that purposive choice is 
not opinion either, nor something that one simply 
thinks ; for we saw " that a thing chosen is something 
in one's own power, but we have opinions as to many 
things that do not depend on us, for instance that 
the diagonal of a square is incommensurable ^ with 

6 the side ; and again, choice is not true or false. Nor since it| 
yet is purposive choice an opinion about practicable means only, 
things within one's own power that makes us think not to Ends; 
that we ought to do or not to do something ; but 

this characteristic is common to opinion and to wish. 

7 For no one purposively chooses any End, but the 
means to his End — I mean for instance no one 

των άϊδίων ούδύ^ βουλεύβται, οίον irepi του κόσμου, ή τηί διαμέτρου 
καΐ τηί wXevpds δτι άσύμμ€τροι (where Κ*" has σύμμετροι). 

υ 289 



ARISTOTLE 

1226 a 

ovdeis ύγιαίν€ΐν προαψ€Ϊταί, αλλά περιττατ^Ιν "η 

10 καθησθαι του vyiaiveLV eveKcv, ουδ' €ύΒαίμον€Ϊν, 
αλλά χρηματίζ^σθαι η KLvSvveveiv του eu8at/Aovetv 
eve/ca, και όλως 8ηλοΐ aet ό^ ττροαιρούμβνος τι τ€ 
καΐ τίνος eVe/ca προαιρβΐται, έ'στι 8e το jLtel•» τίνο?^ 
ου eVe/ca προαιρείται άλλο, το 8e τι, ο ττροαιρύται 
€V€Ka άλλου, βουλβται he ye μάλιστα το τίλος, 8 

15 /cat δοξάζει* Selv καΐ ύγιαίνζίν καΐ eu πράττ€ΐν. 
ώστ£ φαν€ρ6ν διά τούτων οτι άλλο καί Βόζης καΐ 
βουλησβως. βούλ^σθαι μεν γαρ* καΐ Βοξάζξΐν^ 
μάλιστα του τέλους, προαίρεσις δ' ουκ εστίν. 

"Οτι μεν ουν ουκ έ'στιν ουτ€ βούλησις ούτε Βόζα 9 
οϋθ^ ύπόληφις απλώς ή ττροαίρεσις, ^ηλον τι hk 
διαφέρει τούτων; και ττώς έχει προς το εκούσιον ; 
άμα hk Βηλον έ'σται και τι εστί προαίρεσις. εστί 10 

20 δτ) των δυνατών και είναι «:αι μ-η τά μεν τοιαύτα 
ώστε ενΒεχεσθαι βουλεύσασθαι περί αυτών, περί 
ενίων δ' ουκ ενδέχεται, τά μεν γαρ δυνατά μεν 
εστί και eivai και μη είναι, αλλ' ουκ εφ* ημΐν 
αυτών η γενεσις εστίν αλλά τά ρ.εν διά φύσιν τά 

25 δε δι' άλλα? αίτια? γίνεται• περί ων ουδει? αν 
ουδ' εγχειρησειε βουλευεσθαι μη άγνοών. περί 11 
ενίων'' δ' ενδέχεται μη μόνον το είναι και μη, αλλά 
κται το' βουλεύσασθαι τοις άνθρώποις' ταύτα δ' 
εστίν οσα εφ^ ημΐν εστί πράζαι η μη πράζαι. διό 
ου βουλευόμεθα περί τών εν ΊνδοΓ?, ούδε πώς αν 

30 ό κύκλος τετραγωνισθείη • τά μkv γάρ ουκ εφ' 

^ 6 add. Fr. ^ rlvos <?j'e/ca> ? Rac. * Vic. : δοξάί^ίΐν. 

* yap add. Sp. * Sp. : δόξα. 

' sic Sol. : ων. "> lacunam hie edd. 

" See p. 199, note c. 
290 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, 11. χ. 7-11 

chooses to be healthy, but to take a walk or sit down 
for the sake of being healthy, no one chooses to be 
well off," but to go into business or to speculate for 
the sake of being well off ; and generally, one who 
makes a choice always makes it clear both what his 
choice is and what its object is, ' object ' meaning 
that for the sake of which he chooses something else 
and ' choice ' meaning that which he chooses for the 

8 sake of something else. Whereas clearly it is speci- 
ally an End that a man wishes, and the feeling that 
he ought to be healthy and prosperous is an opinion. 
So these considerations make it clear that purposive 
choice is diff"erent from both opinion and wish. 
Forming wishes and forming opinions apply specially 
to one's End ; purposive choice is not of Ends. 

9 It is clear, then, that purposive choice is not either but it arisei 
wish or opinion or judgement simply ; but in what deliberate 
does it differ from them ? and how is it related to «pinion 
the voluntary ? To answer these questions will make by wish^ 

10 it clear what purposive choice is. Now of things 
that can both be and not be, some are such that it is 
possible to deliberate about them, but about others 
it is not possible. Some things can either be or not 
be but their coming into being does not rest with us, 
but in some cases is due to the operation of nature 
and in others to other causes ; and about these 
things nobody would deliberate unless in ignorance 

11 of the facts. But with some things not only their 
existence or non-existence is possible, but also for 
human beings to deliberate about them ; and these 
are all the things that it rests with us to do or not 
to do. Hence we do not deliberate about affairs in 
India, or about how to square the circle ; for affairs 
in India do not rest with us, whereas the objects of 

291 



ARISTOTLE 

1226 a , ; , _, 

ημΐν,^ τα oe npoaipera /cat πρακτά των e^' ημΐν 
όντων εστί, το δ' δλως ου πρακτόν {fj και SrjXov 
δτι ovSe 8όξα απλώς η ττροαίρζσίς ioTLv). αλλ' 12 
ovSe των' ήμΐν πρακτών πβρί άττάντων. διο καΐ 13 
άπορήσβιεν αν τις, τι 8ή ποθ' οΐ μεν Ιατροί βου- 
35 λενονταί περί ων εχονσι την ετηστήμην οΐ δε 
γραμματικοί ου; αΐτιον δ' δτι Βιχτ] γινομένης 
της αμαρτίας {η γαρ λογιζόμενοι άμαρτάνομεν, η 
κατά. την αϊσθησιν αυτό Βρώντες) εν μεν τη ια- 
τρική άμφοτερως ενδέχεται άμαρτεΐν, εν δε τη 

1226 b γραμματική κατά την αΐ'σ^τ^σιι^ και ττραζιν, περί 
■ής αν σκοπώσιν, εις άπειρον^ ηξουσιν. επεώη 14 
ούν ούτε 8όζα ούτε βούλησις η* προαίρεσίς εστίν 
ως εκατερον, ουδ άμφω {εξαίφνης γαρ προαιρείται 
μεν ούθείς, Βοκεΐ δε Βεΐν^ πράττειν και βούλονται) , 
s ώ?* εξ άμφοΐν άρα• άμφω γαρ υπάρχει τω προ- 
αιρουμενω ταύτα. άλλα πώς εκ τούτων σκε- 
τττεον ^ηλοΖ δε πως και τό όνομα αυτό. η γάρ Ι5 
προαίρεσις αΐρεσις μεν εστίν, ούχ απλώς 8ε, αλλ' 
έτερον πρό έτερου• τοΰτο δε ούχ οΐόν τε αΐ'ει» 
σκεφεως και βουλής, διό εκ Βόξης βουλευτικής 
εστίν η προαίρεσις. 
10 ΙΙερΙ μεν 8η του τέλους ού8εις βουλεύεται, άλλα 16 
τούτο κείται πάσι, περί δε τών εις τοΰτο τεινόν- 
των, ποτερον τόδε η τόδε συντείνει, ή 8ε8ογμενον 
τοΰτο πώς εσται. βουλευόμεθα δε πάντες'' τοΰτο 

* 11. 30-33 traiecit Βζ. : mif, το δ' δ\ω$ ού πρακτόν• άλλ' ουδέ 
nepi των έν ήμΐν ττρακτών nepl άττάντων y και δηλον οτι ουδέ δόξα 
άττλώϊ ή ττροαίρΐσίί έστι• τα δ( προαιρετά και πρακτά τών iv ήμΐν 
όντων 4στίν, δώ κτλ. 

^ τών Rac. : wepi τών έν, 

' (is άκρψη πεϊραν Bus. * ή Βζ. : έστι. 

* δ(ϊν add. ? Sus, « [ώ$] aut <δη\ον> ών Sp. 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, II. χ. 11-16 

choice and things practicable are among things rest- 
ing with us, and squaring the circle is entirely im- 
practicable (and thus it is clear that purposive choice 

12 is not simply opinion either). But purposive choice 
does not deal with all the practicable things resting 

13 with us either. Hence one might also raise the 
question, why is it exactly that, whereas doctors de- 
liberate about things in their field of science, scholars 
do not ? The reason is that since error occurs in two 
ways (for we err either in reasoning, or in perception 
when actually doing the thing), in medicine it is 
possible to err in both ways, but in grammar error 
only occurs in our perception and action, to investi- 
gate which would be an endless undertaking. 

14 Since then purposive choice is not either opinion 
nor wish separately, nor yet both (for no one makes 
a deliberate choice suddenly, but men do suddenly 
think they ought to act and wish to act), therefore 
it arises as from both, for both of them are present 

15 with a person choosing. But how purposive choice 
arises out of opinion and wish must be considered. 
And indeed in a manner the actual term * choice ' 
makes this clear. ' Choice ' is ' taking,' but not 
taking simply — it is taking one thing in preference to 
another ; but this cannot be done without considera- 
tion and deliberation ; hence purposive choice arises 
out of deliberative opinion. 

16 Now nobody deliberates about his End — this 
everybody has fixed ; but men deliberate about the 
means leading to their End— does this contribute to 
it, or does this ? or when a means has been decided 
on, how will that be procured ? and this deliberation 

7 M": πάντωί pn (sed cf. N.E. 1113 a 5 ΐκα.στο%). 

2.93 



ARISTOTLE 

1226 b 

€ως αν et? ημάς άναγάγωμ€ν της γ^νέσ^ως την 
αρχήν, el δή προαιρείται μβν μηθίΐς μη πάρα- Γ 

15 σκ€υασαμ€νος μη^€ βονλβυσάμβνος ei^ χείρον η 
βελτιον, βουλευβται^ δ' όσα e^' ήμΐν earl των 
ουνατών καΐ eivai καΐ μη των προς το τβλος, 
Βηλον ΟΤΙ ή προαίρ^σις μίν βστιν ορ^ζις των Ιφ' 
αύτω βουλβυτίκή. άπαντα^ γαρ βονλ^υόμβθα α 
και προαιρούμ^θα, ου μέντοι γε α βουλΐυόμεθα 
πάντα προαιρονμβθα. λέγω δε βουλευτικήν ης 

20 αρχή και αίτια βονλ^υσίς ε'στι, και ορέγεται δια 
το βουλενσασθαι . διό οντε εν τοις άλλοις ζωοις U 
εστίν η προαιρεσις οϋτε εν πάση ηλικία ούτε 
πάντως* έχοντος ανθρώπου• ουδέ γαρ το βουλεύ- 
σασ^αι, οι5δ' ύπόληφις του δια τι, αλλά ^οξάσαι 
μεν ει ποιητεον ή μή ποιητεον ούθεν κωλύει πολ- 

25 λοΐς ύπάρχειν το 8ε δια λογισμού ούκετι. εστί γαρ π 
τ6^ βουλευτικον της φυχής το θεωρητικον αίτια? 
τινός• η γαρ οΰ ένεκα μία των αίτιων εστίν 
το μεν γαρ δια τι αίτια, οΰ δ' ένεκα εστίν ή 
γίγνεταί τι, τοϋτ αίτιοι^ φαμεν efvai, οΓον του 
)3αδιζ€ΐι^ ή κομώή των χρημάτων, ει τούτου ένεκα 

30^3αδιζ€ΐ. διό οι? μηθεις κείται σκοπός, ου 
βουλευτικοί, ώστ επει το μεν εφ* αύτω ον ή 2( 
ττράττειν ή μή πράττειν εάν τις πράττη ή άπρακτη 
δι' αύτον και μή δι' άγνοιαν, εκών πράττει ή 

1 Fr. : ή. 2 ^_ι_ βoύ\fτaι. 

' Βζ, : άττοιτί S. 

* Βζ. : παντόί (τταιτόι <.\oyoi>> Sp.). * τό add. Sus. 

294 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, II. χ. 16-20 

as to means we all pursue until we have carried the 
starting-point in the process of producing the End 

17 back to ourselves. If, then, nobody chooses without 
first preparing, and deliberating as to the comparative 
merits of the alternatives, and a man deliberates as 
to those among the means to the End capable of 
existing or not existing that are within our power. 

it is clear that purposive choice is deliberative Definition of 
appetition of things within one's power. For we chofce!' '^ 
deliberate about everything that we choose, although 
of course we do not choose everything that we de- 
liberate about. I call appetition deliberative when 
its origin or cause is deliberation, and when a man 

18 desires because of having deliberated. Therefore 
the faculty of purposive choice is not present in 
the other animals, nor in man at every age nor in 
every condition, for no more is the act of deliberation, 
nor yet the concept of cause : it is quite possible 
that many men may possess the faculty of forming 
an opinion whether to do or not to do a thing without 
also having the power of forming this opinion by 

19 process of reasoning. For the deliberative faculty is peiibera- 
the spirit's power of contemplating a kind of cause — ^"'"' 
for one sort of cause is the final cause, as although 
cause means anything because of which a thing 
comes about, it is the object of a thing's existence or 
production that we specially designate as its cause : 

for instance, if a man walks in order to fetch things, 
fetching things is the cause of his walking. Con- 
sequently people who have no fixed aim are not 

20 given to deliberation. Hence inasmuch as if a man 
of his own accord and not through ignorance does or 
refrains from doing something resting with himself 
either to do or not to do, he acts or refrains from 

295 



ARISTOTLE 

1226 b , 

απρακτβΐ, πολλά 8e των τοιούτων ■πράττομ€ν ου 

βουλ€νσάμ€νοι ovSe προνοησαντ€ς, ανάγκη το μ€ν 
προαιρβτον ατταν» €κούσιον elvai, το δ' 4κούσιον 
35 μτ]^ προαψβτόν, καΐ τά μεν κατά ττροαίρεσίν πάντα 
€κουσια et^at, τά δ' Ικονσια μη πάντα κατά 
προαίρεσιν. άμα δ' e/c τούτων φανερον καΐ οτι 21 
καλώς διορίζονται ot των α^ικημάτων^ τά μεν 
ακούσια τά δ' εκούσια^ τά δ' e/c προνοίας 

1227 Λ νομό θ βτοΰσ IV ' el γάρ και μη Βιακριβοΰσιν, αλλ' 

άπτονται ye πη της αληθείας. άλλα περί μεν 22 
τούτων εροϋμεν εν τη περί των 8ικαίων επισκεφεί' 
η 8ε προαίρεσις δτι ούτε απλώς βούλησις ούτε 
8όζα εστί, 8ηλον, άλλα δό^α τε και ορεζις όταν 
ό εκ τον βουλεύσασθαι συμπερανθώσιν. 

Έιπει 8ε βουλεύεται άει 6 βονλενόμενος ενεκά 
τίνος, και εστί σκοπός τις άει τω βουλευομενω 
προς ον σκοπεί το συμφέρον, περί μεν του τέλους 
ούθεις βουλεύεται, άλλα τοΰτ' εστίν άρχη και 
ύποθεσις, ώσπερ εν ταΐς θεωρητικαΐς επιστημαις 23 

10 υποθέσεις {εΐρηται 8έ περί αυτώΐ' εν μεν τοις εν 
ο-ρχη βραχεως, εν 8ε τοις άναλυτικοΐς δι' ακρί- 
βειας)• περί 8ε τών προς το τέλος φερόντων η 
σκέφις και μετά τέχνης και άνευ τέχνης πάσίν 
εστίν, οίον ει πολεμώσιν η μη πολεμώσι τούτω* 
βουλευομένοις . εκ προτέρου 8ε μάλλον ecrrai το 24 
8ι' δ, τοϋτ εστί το ου ένεκα, οίον πλούτος η 

1Γ) η8ονη η τι άλλο τοιούτον δ τυγχάνει ου ένεκα. 

^ μη ζ,&ΤΓαρ^ ? Sus. ^ Βζ. : παθημάτων. 

' Rac. : τα μίν εκούσια τά δ' ακούσια. 

* τούτφ Fr. {TovT<f)l ? Rac.) : τοντο. 

' Not in E.E., but cf. N.E. 1135 a 16 fF. 
296 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, II. χ. 20-24 

acting voluntarily, but yet we do many such things 
without deliberation or previous thought, it neces- 
sarily follows that, although all that has been pur- 
posively chosen is voluntary, ' voluntary ' is not the 
same as ' chosen,' and, although all things done 
by purposive choice are voluntary, not all things 

21 voluntary are done by purposive choice. And at the 
same time it is clear from these considerations that 
the classification of offences made by legislators as in- 
voluntary, voluntary and premeditated is a good one ; 
for even if it is not precisely accurate, yet at all events 

22 it approximates to the truth in a way. But we will 
speak about this in our examination of justice." As 
to purposive choice, it is clear that it is not absolutely 
identical with wish nor with opinion, but is opinion 
plus appetition when these follow as a conclusion 
from deliberation. 

But since one who deliberates always deliberates Deliberation 
for the sake of some object, and a man deliberating considers 
always has some aim in view with reference to which Ends! 
he considers what is expedient, nobody deliberates 
about his End, but this is a starting-point or assump- 

23 tion, like the postulates in the theoretic sciences 
(we have spoken about this briefly at the beginning 
of this discourse, and in detail in Analytics ^) ; 
whereas with all men deliberation whether technical 
or untechnical is about the means that lead to their 
End, e.g. when they deliberate about whether to go 

24 to war or not to go to war with a given person. And 
the question of. means will depend rather on a prior 
question, that is, the question of object, for instance 
wealth or pleasure or something else of that kind which 
happens to be our object. For one who deliberates 

" See 1214 b 6 ff., and Anal. Post, i., 72 a 20 and context. 

297 



ARISTOTLE 

1227 a 

povXeveraL γαρ 6 βουλξυόμζνος el^ άττό του τέλους 
έσκετΓται r)^ on e/cetae^ συντείνει οττως εΙς αυτόν 
αναγάγγ)* η τ^* ατ3τό§• δυι^αται teVai* προς το τέλος, 
το 8ε τέλος εστί φύσει μεν άεΐ αγαθόν καΐ περί 25 
ού κατά μέρος βουλεύονται {οΐον ιατρός βουλεύσαιτο 

20 άν ει δω' φάρμακον , και στρατηγός που στρατό - 
πε8εύσηται) οϊς αγαθόν το τέλος το απλώς άριστον 
εστίν παρά φύσιν δε και κατά* ^ιαστροφην ού το 26 
αγαθόν άλλα το φαινόμενον aya^ov. α'ίτιον δ' οτι 
των όντων τοΐς^ μεν ουκ εστίν εττ' άλλω χρησασθαι 
η προς α πεφυκεν, οΐον 6φει• ού γάρ οΐόν τ' ι8εΐν 

25 ού μη εστίν όφις, οΰδ' άκοΰσαι ού μη εστίν άκοη' 
αλλ' άπο επιστήμης ποιησαι και ού μη εστίν η 
επιστήμη. ού γάρ ομοίως της uytetas• η αύτη 
επιστήμη και νόσου, αλλά της μεν κατά φύσιν 
της δε παρά φύσιν. ομοίως δε και ή βούλησις 27 
φύσει μεν του αγαθού εστί, παρά φύσιν δε και 

30 του κακού, και βούλεται φύσει μεν το αγαθόν, 
παρά φύσιν δε και κατά^" 8ιαστροφήν και τό 
κακόν. 

Άλλα μην εκάστου γε φθορά και διαστροφή 
ούκ εις τό τυχόν αλλ' εις τά εναντία και τά μεταζύ. 
ού γάρ εστίν εκβήναι εκ τούτων, επει και η 
απάτη ούκ εις τά τυχόντα γίνεται, αλλ' εις τα 

35 εναντία οσοις εστίν εναΐ'τια, και εΙς ταύτα των 
εναντίων α κατά την επιστήμην εν'αν'τια εστίν. 

1 Mb^. 2 ^add. Fr. ^ » Rac: ΐκΰ. 

* Ric. : ayayrj. ^ 7] add. Rac. 
* Uvai add. Rac. ' Sp. : δφ-η. 

* κατά add. Syl. : δια στροφην lac, διαστροφή Fr. 
" Ric. : τά. " κατά add. Syl. 

2.98 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, II. χ. 24-27 

deliberates if he has considered, from the standpoint 
of the End, either what tends to enable him to bring 
the End to himself or how he can himself go to the 

25 End." And by nature the End is always a good and wish for 
a thing about which men deliberate step by step (for ^'"^^ 
example a doctor may deliberate whether he shall 

give a drug, and a general where he shall pitch his 
camp) when their End is the good that is the absolute 

26 best ; but in contravention of nature and by perver- 
sion not the good but the apparent good is the End. 
The reason is that there are some things that cannot 
be employed for something other than their natural 
objects, for instance sight — it is not possible to see a 
thing that is not visible, or to hear a thing that is not 
audible ; but a science does enable us to do a thing 
that is not the object of the science. For health 
and disease are not the objects of the same science 
in the same way : health is its object in accordance 
with nature, and disease in contravention of nature. 

27 And similarly, by nature good is the object of wish, 
but evil is also its object in contravention of nature ; 
by nature one wishes good, against nature and by 
perversion one even wishes evil. 

But moreover with everything its corruption and 
perversion are not in any chance direction, but leads 
to the contrary and intermediate states. For it is 
not possible to go outside these, since even error 
does not lead to any chance thing, but, in the case 
of things that have contraries, to the contraries, and 
to those contraries that are contrary according to 

" i.e. he works back in thought from his intended End 
to some means to its attainment that is already within his 
power. 

299 



ARISTOTLE 

1227 a ^ ^ 

ανάγκη άρα καΐ την άττάτην και την προαίρ€σιν 2ί 
ατΓΟ του jxeaov €πΙ τα ev'avTta γίν^σθαι (ei^av'Tta 
8e τω μέσω το πλέον καΐ το ελαττον). — αίτιον δε 
το -qhv καΐ το λνττηρόν οντω γαρ εχ€ΐ ωστ€ τη 

<ο φνχη φαίνεσθαί το μεν η^ύ aya^or καΐ το η^ιον 
άμεινον, καΐ το λνττηρόν κακόν και το λυπηρότερον 
1227 b χείρον, ώστε και εκ τούτων Βηλον οτι ττερί ή^ονάς 2ί 
και λυττας η άρετη και η κακία' περί μεν γαρ 
τα προαιρετά τυγχάνονσιν ονσαι, η Βε προαίρεσις 
περί το αγαθόν και κακόν και τα φαινόμενα, 
:> τοιαύτα δβ φύσει ήΒονη και λύπη. 

Ανάγκη τοίνυν, επεώη η άρετη μεν ή ηθική 30 
αύτη τε μεσάτης τίς εστί και περί η^ονάς και 
λύπας πάσα, η δε κακία εν υπερβολή και ελλείφει 
και περί ταύτα τη άρετη, την άρετην eii /αι την 
ηθικην εζιν προαιρετικην μεσότητος της προς ημάς 

10 εν η8εσι και λυπηροΐς καθ^ οσα ποιος τις λέγεται 
το ήθος η χαίρων η λυπούμενος [6 γαρ φιλόγλυκυς 
η φιλόπικρος ού λέγεται ποιος τι? το ήθος). 

XI. Ύούτων δε Βιωρισμενων λεγωμεν πότερον 1 
η άρετη άναμάρτητον ποιεί την προαίρεσιν καΐ το 
τέλος ορθόν ούτως ώστε ου ένεκα δει προαιρεΐσθαι, 

15 17» ώσπερ δοκεΐ τισί, τον λόγον. έστι δε τούτο 
εγκράτεια, αύτη γαρ ού διαφθείρει τόν λόγον έστι 
δ άρετη και εγκράτεια έτερον, λεκτέον δ' ύστερον 2 

" This division of contraries is unusual : elsewhere {e.g. 
Met. K, 1061 a 18) Aristotle merely states that contraries 
are the objects of the same science. 

* The connexion of pleasure and pain with virtue is here 
clearer than in N.E., and forms part of the definition (Stocks). 
300 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, 11. χ. 28— χι. 2 

28 their science." It therefore necessarily follows that perverted by 
both error and purposive choice take place from pain. 

the middle point to the contraries (the contraries 
of the middle being the more and the less). — And 
the cause is pleasure and pain ; for things are so 
constituted that the pleasant appears to the spirit 
good and the more pleasant better, the painful bad 

29 and the more painful worse. So from these things 
also it is clear that goodness and badness have to do 
with pleasures and pains ; for they occur in con- 
nexion with the objects of purposive choice, and this 
has to do with good and bad and what appears to be 
good and bad, and pleasure and pain are by nature 
things of that kind. 

30 It therefore follows that since moral goodness is Definition of 
itself a middle state and is entirely concerned with q °^ness or 
pleasures and pains, and badness consists in excess Virtue. 
and defect and is concerned with the same things as 
goodness, moral goodness or virtue is a state of 
purposively choosing the mean in relation to ourselves 

in all those pleasant and painful things in regard to 
which according as a person feels pleasure or pain 
he is described as having some particular moral qual- 
ity ^ (for a person is not said to have a particular 
moral character merely for being fond of sweets or 
savouries). 

1 XI. These things having been settled, let us say Virtue and 
whether goodness makes the purposive choice correct vo'iuntary, 
and the End right in the sense of making the agent moral 
choose for the sake of the proper End, or whether appties to 
(as some hold) it makes the rational principle right. ^^^1^°*^^® 
But what does this is self-control — for that saves the Λvhich'dβ- 
rational principle from being corrupted ; and good- Character, 

2 ness and self-control are different. But we must 

301 



ARISTOTLE 

1227 b 

π€ρΙ αυτών, inel οσοις ye δοκίΐ τον λόγον ορθόν 
παρ€χ€ίν rj άρβτη, τοΰτο αίτιον η μβν €γκράτ€ία 
τοιούτον, των €παίν€τών δ' η εγκράταα. λβγωμ,βν 3 

20 Se προαπορησαντ€ς . έ'στι γαρ τον μβν σκοττον 
ορθόν €Lvat, iv δε τοις ττρος τον σκοττον δια- 
μαρτάν€ΐ.ν• εστί δε τον μβν σκοττον ημαρτησθαι, 
τά δε TTpos eKelvov ττβραίνοντα ορθώς εχειν»• /cat 
μ-ηΒβτζρον. ττοτίρον δ τ] άρβτη ττοιεΓ τον σκοττον^ 4 
η τα προς τον σκοττον; τίθέμβθα hrj οτι τον 
σκοττον, διότι τούτου ουκ έ'στι συΧΚογισμος ούδε 

25 Χόγος, άλλα δτ] ώσττ€.ρ άρχη τοΰτο υττοκ^ίσθω. 
οϋτ€ γαρ ιατρός σκοττβΐ ει δει ύγιαίν^ιν ύ] μη, 
αλλ' ει ττ€ριττατ€Ϊν η μη, οϋτ€ 6 γυμναστικός ει 
δει ει5 εχειν» τ) μη, αλλ' ει τταλαισαι ■^ μή. ομοίως 5 

ουο αΛΛτ^ ουθ€μία ττερι του τεΛου?. ωσττ^ρ 
γαρ ταΐς θζ,ωρητικαις αι ύποθεσας αρχαί, οΰτω 

30 και ταΐς• ττοιητίκαΐς το τέλος άρχη και ύπόθεσις- 
επβώη δεΓ τοϊ'δι^ ύγιαίνειν, ανάγκη τοδι ύττάρξαι 
ει εσται εκείνο, ωσττερ εκτει, ει έστι το τριγωνον 
δυο όρθαί, ανάγκη τοδι είναι, τη? /χει» our νοησεω? 6 
αρχή το τε'λο?, τη? δε ττράζεως η της νοήσεως 
τελευτη. ει ουν ττάσης ορθότητας η ό λόγος η η 

35 άρετη αίτια, ει μη 6 λόγος, δια την άρετην αν 

^ σκοπόν <όρ^όΐ'> ? Rac. 
* άλλί; <Ηχρη> ? Rac. ^ Sp. : τόδ(. 

" Or, altering the text, * makes the aim right.' 

802 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, II. xi. 2-6 

speak about this later, since all who do hold that good- and not to 
ness makes the rational principle right think so on which may 
the ground that that is the nature of self-control be done 

ο . 11. TT • under com- 

3 and self-control is a praiseworthy thing. Having pulsion. 
raised this preliminary question let us continue. It 

is possible to have one's aim right but to be entirely 
wrong in one's means to the end aimed at ; and it is 
possible for the aim to have been wrongly chosen 
but the means conducing to it to be right ; and for 

4 neither to be right. But does goodness decide the 
aim " or the means to it ? Well, our position is that 
it decides the aim, because this is not a matter of 
logical inference or rational principle, but in fact this 
must be assumed as a starting-point. For a doctor 
does not consider whether his patient ought to be 
healthy or not, but whether he ought to take walking 
exercise or not, and the gymnastic trainer does not 
consider whether his pupil ought to be in good 
condition or not, but whether he ought to go in for 

5 wrestling or not ; and similarly no other science 
either deliberates about its End. For as in the 
theoretic sciences the assumptions are first principles, 
so in the productive sciences the End is a starting- 
point and assumption : since it is required that so- 
and-so is to be in good health, if that is to be secured 
it is necessary for such-and-such a thing to be pro- 
vided — ^just as in mathematics, if the angles of a 
triangle are together equal to two right angles, 
such-and-such a consequence necessarily follows. 

6 Therefore the End is the starting-point of the pro- 
cess of thought, but the conclusion of the process of 
thought is the starting-point of action. If, then, of 
all Tightness either rational principle or goodness is 
the cause, if rational principle is not the cause of 

303 



ARISTOTLE 

1227 ^ , , „ 

όρθον elrj το reXos, αλλ' ου τα ττρος το τέλος, 
τέλος δ' εστί το ου ένεκα• εστί γαρ ττασα προαίρεσις 7 
Τίνος καΐ ενεκά τίνος, ου μεν οΰν ένεκα το μέσον 
εστίν, ου αίτια η άρετη τώ^ ττροαιρείσθαϊ^' εστί 
μεντοι η προαίρεσις ου τούτου, άλλα των τούτου 
40 ένεκα, το μεν ούν τυγχάνειν τούτων άλλης Βυ- 8 

1228 a νάμεως οσα ένεκα του τέλους δει ττράττειν, του 

hk το τέλος ορθόν εΐναί της προαιρέσεως -rf άρετη 
αίτια, καΐ δια τοΰτο εκ της ττροαψεσεως κρίνομεν 9 
ποΐός τις, τοΰτο δ' εστί το τίνος ένεκα ττράττεί 
αλλ' ου τι ττράττει. ομοίως δε και η κακία των εν- Κ 
ό αντίων ένεκα ττοιεί την προαιρεσιν. ει* Βή τις, εφ^ 
αύτω ον πράττειν μεν τα καλά άπρακτεΐν δε τα 
αισχρά, τουναντίον ττοιεΓ, Βηλον otl ου σττουΒαΙός 
εστίν ούτος 6 άνθρωπος. ωστ ανάγκη την τε 
κακίαν εκούσιον εΐναί καΐ την άρετην ούΒεμία 
γάρ ανάγκη τα μοχθηρά ττράττειν. δια ταύτα 11 

10 καΐ φεκτον η κακία καΐ η άρετη επαινετόν τά 
γάρ ακούσια αισχρά και κακά ου φεγεται^ ούΒε 
τά αγαθά επαινείται,'^ άλλα τά εκούσια. ετι 
πάντας επαινοΰμεν και φεγομεν εις την προαίρεσιν 
βλέποντες μάλλον η εις τά έργα {καίτοι αιρετώτερον 
η ενέργεια της αρετής), otC πράττουσι μεν φαΰλα 

15 και άναγκαζομενοι, προαιρείται δ ούΒείς. ετι διά 12 
το μη ράΒιον eirat ιΒεΐν την προαίρεσιν όποια τις, 

^ Ft. : τό. * Ric. : νροαιρίΐσθαι οδ iVesa. 

* ή Fr. : ον ή. * νροαίρίσιν <eZi'at>. «/ ? Rac. 

» Ρ»»: ψΐκτα Mb. « Pb; έτταΐί-ίτά Μ^. 

' ^Tt Aid. 

304 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, II. xi. 6-12 

the Tightness of the End, then the End (though not 
the means to the End) will be right owing to goodness. 

7 But the End is the object for which one acts ; for 
every purposive choice is a choice of something and 
for some object. The End is therefore the object 
for which the thing chosen is the mean, of which 
End goodness is the cause " by its act of choice — 
though the choice is not of the End but of the means 

8 adopted for the sake of the End. Therefore though 
it belongs to another faculty to hit on the things that 
must be done for the sake of the End, goodness is 
the cause of the End aimed at by choice being right. 

9 And owing to this it is by a man's purposive choice 
that we judge his character — that is, not by what he 

10 does but what he does it for. Similarly also badness 
causes purposive choice to be made from the op- 
posite motives. If therefore, when a man has it in 
his power to do what is honourable and refrain from 
doing what is base, he does the opposite, it is clear 
that this man is not virtuous. Hence it necessarily 
follows that both badness and goodness are volun- 
tary ; for there is no necessity to do wicked things. 

11 For this reason badness is a blameworthy thing and 
goodness praiseworthy ; for involuntary baseness and 
evil are not blamed nor involuntary good things 
praised, but voluntary ones are. Moreover we praise 
and blame all men with regard to their purpose 
rather than with regard to their actions (although 
activity is a more desirable thing than goodness), 
because men may do bad acts under compulsion, 

12 but no one is compelled to choose to do them. More- 
over because it is not easy to see the quality of 

<» Virtue by choosing the right means to achieve the End 
causes the End to be realized. 

X 805 



ARISTOTLE 

1228 a 

ια ταύτα e/c των epywv αναγκαζόμεθα κρίνειν 
οττοΐός τις• α'φ€τώτ€ρον μ€ν ονν η ivepyeia, 13 
€παίν€τώτ€ρον δ' η ττροαίρζσις. €κ τ€ των κ^ιμβνων 
ονν συμβαίνει ταύτα καΐ ctl ομολογςΐται τοΐς^ 
φαινομένοις. 

^ όμολοΎΐΐ Tois Sp. 



306 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, Π. χι. 12-13 

a man's purpose we are forced to judge his char- 
13 acter from his actions ; therefore activity is more 
desirable, but purpose more praiseworthy. And this 
not only follows from our assumptions but also is 
admitted by reason of observed facts." 

" Or, emending the text, ' agrees with observation.' 



307 



1228 a 

. Utl μεν ovv μεσοτητες τ eiai ev rats 1 
aperdis καΐ aurat ττροαιρετικαί, καΐ αί ei^avrtai 

-'J κακίαι καΐ rives elalv αύται, καθόλου εΐρηται- 
καθ €κάστην 8e λαμβάνοντας λέγωμαν εφεζης, 
και πρώτον €Ϊ7τωμ€ν Ttepl ανδρεία?. 

Σχεδόν δΐ7 hoKei πασιν δ τ avhpeios etvat ττερί 2 
φόβους καΐ η ανδρεία μία των αρετών, διείλομεν 
δ' ev Trj ^ίαγραφ-η ττρότερον^ θράσος και φόβον^ 

30 εναντία• καΐ γάρ εστί πως αντικείμενα άλλτ^λοι?. 
8ηλον ουν δτι και οΐ κατά τάς εζεις ταύτας 3 
λεγόμενοι ομοίως άντικείσονται σφίσιν αύτοΐς, 
οίον ό δειλό? {οδτος γάρ λέγεται κατά το φοβεΐσθαι 
μάλλον η δει και θαρρεΐν ^ττον ύ] δει) και 6 θρασύς 
{και γάρ οΰτος κατά το τοιούτος είναι οιο? 

85 φοβεΐσθαι μεν -ήττον η δει θαρρεΐν δε μάλλον η 
δει• διό και παρωνυμιάζεται, ό γάρ θρασύς παρά 
το θράσος λε'^εται παρωνύμως) . ώστ επει ύ) 4 
ανδρεία εστίν η βέλτιστη εζις περί φόβους και 
θάρρη, δει δε μηθ^ ούτως ώς οι θρασεΐς (τα μεν 
γαρ ελλείπουσι τά δ' ύπερβάλλουσι) μηθ' ούτως 
1228 b α>? οΐ δειλοί (και yap ούτοι ταύτο ποιοΰσι, πλην 

* τ' ΐΐσΐ Rac. : etVi re. ^ Βζ. : irOTepov. 

» Βζ. : φ6βο$. 

» 1220 b 39, 1221 a 17-19. 
808 



/ 



BOOK III 

1 I. It has then been stated in general terms that the mohal 
there are middle states in the virtues and that these Virtues. 
are purposive, and also that the opposite dispositions 

are vices and vv^hat these are. But let us take them 
separately and discuss them seriatim. And first let 
us speak about Courage. 

2 Now almost everybody holds that the brave man cooeaoe, : 
is concerned with fears, and that courage is one of ^^^^^^^" 
the virtues. And in our schedule <* previously we rashness 
distinguished daring and fear as contraries, for they cowardice. 
are indeed in a manner opposed to one another. 

3 It is clear, therefore, that the persons named after 
these states of character will also be similarly 
opposed to each other — that is, the coward (for that 
is the term that denotes being more afraid than 
is proper and less daring than is proper) and 
the daring man (for that denotes the character- 
istic of being less afraid than is proper and more 
daring than is proper — and from this the name is 
derived, as the word ' daring ' is cognate with the 

4 word ' dare '). So that since courage is the best 
state of character in relation to feelings of fear and 
daring, and the proper character is neither that of the 
daring (for they fall short in one respect and exceed 
in another) nor that of the cowardly (for they also 
do the same, only not as regards the same things 

309 



ARISTOTLE 

1228 b 

ov TTepl ταύτα αλλ' e^ εναντίας, τω μ€ν γαρ Oappeiv 

ελλειτΓουσι τω δε φοββΐσθαι νπ€ρβάλλονσί) , hrjXov 

ώς ή μβση biadeaig θρασύτητας καΐ δείλια? €στΙν 

ανδρεία• αντη γαρ β€λτίστη. 

Αοκ€Ϊ δ' 6 avSpcLos άφοβος είναι ώς εττι το 5 

5 πολυ, 6 δε δειλό? φοβητικός, καΐ 6 μβν και ττολλά 

και ολίγα και μ€γάλα και μικρά φοβ€Ϊσθαι και 

σφόΒρα και ταχύ, ό δε το εναντίον η ου φοβεΐσθαι 

τ) ηρβμα και μόλις και ολι-^άκι? και μεγάλα' και 

ό /χεν υπομένει τα φοβερά σφόδρα, 6 δε ούδε τα 

ήρεμα, ποία οΰν υπομένει 6 άνΒρεΐος; πρώτον, 6 

10 πότερον τά αύτώ φοβερά η τά ετερω; ει μεν Srj 
τά ετερω φοβερά, ούθεν σεμνόν φαίη αν τις είναι• 
ει δε τά αύτω, ειτ^ αν αύτώ μεγάλα και ττολλά^ 
φοβερά• τά δε φοβερά^ φόβου ποιητικά εκάστω ω 
φοβερά, οίον ει μεν σφόδρα φοβερά, εΐη αν ισχυρός 
ό φόβος, ει δ' ήρεμα, ασθενής• ώστε συμβαίνει 

15 τον άνδρειον μεγάλους φόβους και πολλούς φο- 
βεΐσθαι.^ εδόκει δε τουναντίον η ανδρεία άφοβον 
παρασκευάζειν, τοΰτο δ' είναι ε'ν τω η μηθεν η 
ολίγα φοβεΐσθαι και ήρεμα και μόλις, αλλ' ισω? 7 
το φοβερόν λέγεται, ώσπερ και το η^ύ και τάγα^όν, 
Βιχώς. τά μεν γάρ απλώς, τά δε τινι μεν και η8εα 

^ πολλά cm. Μ^. 

* τά δ( φοβΐρα add. Βζ, (τά δ^ φοβΐρα τοιούτον add. ? Rac). 

' v.l. τΓοιεΐσθαι vulg. 



" Or, emending the text, ' of corresponding fear.' 
310 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, III. i. 4-7 

but inversely — they fall short in daring and exceed 
in being afraid), it is clear that the middle state of 
character between daring and cowardice is courage, 
for this is the best state. 

5 And it seems that the brave man is in general What 
fearless, and the coward liable to fear ; and that the th"brave*'^ 
latter fears things Avhen they are few in number and ^^^ endure? 
small in size as well as when numerous and great, 

and fears violently, and gets frightened quickly, 
whereas the former on the contrary either never 
feels fear at all or only slightly and reluctantly and 
seldom, and in regard to things of magnitude ; 
and he endures things that are extremely formidable, 
whereas the other does not endure even those that 

6 are slightly formidable. What sort of things, then, 
does the brave man endure ? First, is it the things 
that are formidable to himself or formidable to 
somebody else ? If the things formidable to some- 
body else, one >vould not indeed call it anything 
remarkable ; but if it is those that are formidable 
to himself, what is formidable to him must be things 
of great magnitude and number. But formidable 
things are productive of fear " in the particular 
person to whom they are formidable — that is, if 
they are very formidable, the fear they produce will 
be violent, if slightly formidable, it will be weak ; 
so it follows that the brave man's fears are great 
and many. Yet on the contrary it appeared that 
courage makes a man fearless, and that fearlessness 
consists in fearing nothing, or else few things, and 

7 those slightly and reluctantly. But perhaps ' for- 
midable ' is an ambiguous term, like ' pleasant ' 
and ' good.' Some things are pleasant and good 
absolutely, whereas others are so to a particular 

311 



ARISTOTLE 

1228 b ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ , „ , Ν V V , / 

20 «rat aya^a iariv, απλώς δ ov, άλλα τουναντίον 

φαΰλα καΐ ονχ rjhea, οσα τοις ττονηροΐς ωφέλιμα, 

και δσα rjhea τοις τταώίοίς τ^ παώία. ομοίως 8e 8 

και τα φοββρα τα μ€.ν άττλώς εστί, τα δε τινι* α 

μ€ν δη ό^ δειλό? φοβείται fj δειλό?, τα μ€ν ovhevi 

25 βστι φοβ€ρά, τα δ' •ηρέμα• τα δε τοι? ττλε ιστοί? 
φοββρά, και ό'σα ττ^ άνθρωπίντ) φνσ€ί, ταϋθ 
απλώς φοβέρα λβγομζν. 6 δ' ανδρείο? ττρο? ταΰτ 9 
έχει αφόβως, και νπομενβι τα τοιαύτα φοβερά, 
α έ'στι /χέν ώ? φοβ€ρα αντώ εστί δ ώ? ου, ^ μ^ν 
άνθρωπος φοβερά, fj δ' ανδρείο? ου φοβ€ρά αλλ 

30 η ηρβμα, η ούΒαμώς. έ'στι μβντοι φοββρα ταΰτα• 
τοις γαρ πλείστοι? φοββρά. διό /cat επαινείται η 10 
'έ'^ι?• ώσττερ yap ό ισχυρός και υγιεινό? έ';)(ει. και 
yap ούτοι ου τω ύπο μηθενος ο μεν πόνου τριβεσθαι 
ό δ' υπό /χτ7δερ,ια? υπερβολής τοιούτοι εισιν, άλλα 
τω υπό τούτων απαθείς είναι η άττλώ? -η -ήρεμα 

35 υ0' ων οι πολλοί και* οί ττλεΓστοι. οι ρ.έν οΰν 11 
νοσοϋδει? και ασθενεί? και δειλοί και υπό τών 
κοινών παθημάτων πάσχουσί τι, πλι^ν θαττόν τε 
και μάλλον η οι πολλοί, . . . ' και έτι ύφ* ων οί 
πολλοί πάσχουσιν , υπό τούτων απαθείς -η όλως η 
ήρεμα. 

ΆτΓορεΐται δ' ει τω άνΒρείω ούθεν ε'στι φοβερόν, 12 

^ ό add. Fr, ^ οΐ πολλοί <^> καΐ vel οί Αλλοι και ? Ric. 

^ <οί δ' vyieivol καΐ Ισχυροί καΐ άνδρύοι ύιτό των μΐ-γίστων 
πάσχονσιν, άλλα βραδύτΐρόν re και iJTTov ή οΊ πολλοίς Βζ. (aut 
seel, και ίτι . . . ηρέμ,α ut prave e 11. 34 seq. repetita). 

° The words ' the healthy, strong and brave . . . mass of 
men' are a conjectural addition to the ms. text. 

312 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, III. i. 7-12 

person but absolutely are not so, but on the contrary 
are bad and unpleasant — all the things that are 
beneficial for the base, and all those that are pleasant 

8 to children qua children. And similarly some things Analogy 
are formidable absolutely and others to a particular and^" 
person : thus the things that the coward qua coward 'Strength. 
fears are some of them not formidable to anybody 

and others only slightly formidable, but things that 
are formidable to most men, and all that are formid- 
able to human nature, we pronounce to be for- 

9 midable absolutely. But the brave man is fearless 
in regard to them, and endures formidable things 
of this sort, which are formidable to him in one way 
but in another way are not- — they are formidable to 
him qua human being, but qua brave not formid- 
able except slightly, or not at all. Yet such things 
really are formidable, for they are formidable to 

10 most men. Owing to this the brave man's state 
of character is praised, because it resembles that of 
the strong and the healthy. These have those char- 
acters not because no labour in the one case or 
extreme of temperature in the other can crush them, 
but because they are not affected at all, or only 
affected slightly, by the things that affect the many 

11 or the majority. Therefore whereas the sickly and 
weak and cowardly are affected also by the afflictions 
commonly felt, only more quickly and to a greater 
extent than the mass of men, the healthy, strong and 
brave, although affected by the very great afflictions, 
are affected by them more slowly and less than the 
mass of men," and moreover they are entirely un- 
affected or only slightly affected by things that affect 
the mass. 

12 But the question is raised whether to the brave 

313 



ARISTOTLE 

1228 b 

ov8 av φοβηθίίη. η ovdkv κωλύει τον €ίρημ€νον 

i229& τρόπον; η γαρ avSpeia άκολονθησις^ τω λόγω 
eoTLV, ο 8e λόγος το καλόν αίρζΐσθαι /ceAeuei. διό 
και ο μη δια τούτον^ ύττομ^νων αυτά, ούτος ήτοι 
€ζ€στηκ€ν η θρασνς• 6 δε δια το καλόν άφοβος ΐ; 
5 και αν8ρ€Ϊος μόνος, ό μέν ονν δειλό? και α μη 
δει φοβ€Ϊται, ό δε θρασύς και α μη δει dappei• ό 
δ ανδρείο? άμφω α δει, και ταύτη μέσος εστίν, 
α γαρ αν 6 λόγος κελεύι^, ταντα και θαρρβΐ και 
φοβζίται• 6 δε λόγος τα μ€γάλα λυπηρά και 
φθαρτικά ου κελειίει ύπομβνβιν, αν μη καλά η. 6 U 
10 μ€ν οΰν θρασύς, και ει μη κελεύει, ταϋτα θαρρεί, 
Ο οε οείΛο? ουο αν κεΛευτ^' ο ο ανορ€ΐος μονός 
iav κελεύη. 

' Εστί δ' εί'δτ^ αι^δρεια? πέντε λεγόμενα καθ* It 
ομοιότητα- τά αυτά γάρ ύπομενουσιν , αλλ' ου δια 
τα αυτά. /χια μεν πολιτική• αύτη δ' εστίν η δι' 
αιδώ ούσα. δευτέρα η στρατιωτική• αύτη δε δι' 
Ιό εμπειριαν και το ειδε'ναι, οΰχ ωσπερ Έωκράτης 
€φη, τά δεινά, άλλα* τάς βοηθείας των Βεινών. 
τρίτη δ η δι' άπειρίαν και άγνοιαν, δι' ην τά 16 
τταιδια και οι μαινόμενοι οι μεν ύπομενουσι τά 
φερόμενα^ οΐ δε λαμβάνουσι τους οφεις. άλλη δ' 
η κατ ελ-ττιδα, κα^' ην οι τε κατευτυχηκότες 
20 ΤΓολλακι? ύπομενουσι τους κινδύνους και οι 
μεθύοντες• εύελπώας γάρ ποιεί 6 οίνος, άλλη δε 17 

* άκολονθητικη Bus. * V.l. τοΰτο: τούτων Cas. 

' Rac. : μύνοί'. * Syl. (άλλα το lac.) : άλλ' δτι. 

* ένιφΐρίιμΐνα ? (cf. b 27) Rac. 

i 

" Plato, Protagoras 360 d. 
314 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, III. i. 12-16 

man nothing is formidable, and whether he would The brave 
be insensible to fear. Or is it not possible that he when^^'^^ 
may feel fear in the way described ? For courage is reasonable. 
folloAving reason, and reason bids us choose what is 
fine. Hence he who endures formidable things not on 
account of reason is either out of his mind or daring, 

13 but only he who does so from motives of honour 
is fearless and brave. The coward, therefore, fears 
even things that he ought not to fear, and the daring 
man is bold even about things about which he ought 
not to be bold, but the brave man alone does both 
as he ought, and is intermediate in this respect, 
for he feels both confidence and fear about what- 
ever things reason bids ; but reason does not bid 
him endure things that are extremely painful and 

14 destructive, unless they are fine. The daring man, 
therefore, faces such things with confidence even if 
reason does not bid him face them, and the coward 
does not face them even if it does, but only the brave 
man faces them if reason bids. 

15 There are five kinds of courage so called by analogy, pive 
because brave men of these kinds endure the same unreal 
things as the really courageous but not for the same courage. 
reasons. One is civic courage ; this is courage due 

to a sense of shame. Second is military courage ; 
this is due to experience and to knowledge, not of 
what is formidable, as Socrates said,** but of ways 

16 of encountering what is formidable. Third is the 
courage due to inexperience and ignorance, that 
makes children and madmen face things rushing on 
them, or grasp snakes. Another is the courage 
caused by hope, which often makes those who have 
had a stroke of luck endure dangers, and those who 
are intoxicated — for wine makes men sanguine. 

315 



ARISTOTLE 

1229 a 

δια ττάθος άλόγιστον, οϊον δι' €ρωτα καΐ θυμόν. 

αν τ€ γαρ ipa, θρασνς μάλλον η δειλό?, καΐ 

υπομένει ττολΧούς KLvhvvovs, ωσττερ 6 iv Mera- 

ττοντίω τον τνραννον άττοκτβίνας καΐ ό iv Κρτ^ττ^ 

2ό μνθολογονμενος• καΐ δι' οργην καΐ θυμον ωσ- 
αύτως' €κστατικ6ν γαρ 6 θυμός, διό και οι άγριοι 
σύες^ ανδρείοι Βοκοΰσιν eirai, ουκ 6ντ€ς• όταν γαρ 
€κστώσι, τοιούτοι eiaiv, ei Be μτ^, ανώμαλοι, 
ώσπερ οι θρασ€Ϊς. όμως δε μάλιστα φυσική η 1 
του θυμοΰ• άήττητον γαρ ό θυμός, διό και οΐ 
τταϊδε? άριστα μάχονται, δια, νόμον δε η ττολιτικη 1 

30 ανδρεία, κατ' άλτ^^ειαν δε ούΒβμία τούτων, άλλα 
ττρό? τα? τταρακελευσει? τάς iv τοις κίνδυνοι? χρή- 
σιμα ταύτα ττάντα. 

Περί δε των φοβερών νυν μεν απλώς είρηκαμεν, 2 
βελτιον δε Βιορίσασθαι μόίλλον. δλως μεν οΰν 
φοβερά λέγεται τα ποιητικά φόβου, τοιαύτα δ' 

35 εστίν οσα φαίνεται ποιητικά λύπης φθαρτικης• 
τοις γάρ άλλην τινά προσΒεχομενοις λύπην έτερα 
μεν αν τις Ισως λύπη γένοιτο και πάθος έτερον, 
φόβος δ' ουκ εσται, οΐον ει τις προορώτο οτι 
λυτΓτ^σεται λύπην ην οι φθονοΰντες λυπούνται, η 
τοιαύτην οΐαν οί ζηλοΰντες η οι αίσχυνόμενοι. 

40 άλλ' ε77ΐ ρ,όναι? ταΓ? τοιαυται? φαινομεναις εσεσ^αι 2 
λυτται? φόβος γίνεται όσων η φύσις αναιρετική του 
1229 b ζτ^ ν. διό και σφόδρα τίνες οντες μαλακοί περί 
ενια ανδρείοι εισι, και ενιοι σκληροί και' καρτερικοί 
και δειλοί. και 8η και δοκει σ;^εδόν ίδιον της 2 

" Unknown. 
316 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, III. i. 17-22 

17 Another is due to some irrational emotion, for 
example love or passion. For if a man is in love he 
is more daring than cowardly, and endures many 
dangers, like the man " who murdered the tyrant at 
Metapontium and the person in Crete in the story * ; 
and similarly if a man is under the influence of anger 
and passion, for passion is a thing that makes him 
beside himself. Hence wild boars are thought to 
be brave, though they are not really, for they are 
so when they are beside themselves, but otherwise 

18 they are variable, like daring men. But neverthe- 
less the courage of passion is in the highest degree 
natural ; passion is a thing that does not know defeat, 
owing to which the young are the best fighters. 

19 Civic courage is due to law. But none of these is 
truly courage, though they are all useful for encour- 
agement in dangers. 

20 Up to this point we have spoken about things Only 
formidable in general terms, but it will be better terror are 
to define them more precisely. As a general term the sphere 
' formidable ' denotes what causes fear, and that is ° ourage. 
a property of things that appear capable of causing 

pain of a destructive kind : for persons expecting 
some other pain might perhaps experience a different 
sort of pain and a different feeling, but will not have 
fear — for example if a man foresaw that he was going 
to feel the pain felt by the jealous, or the sort of 
pain felt by the envious or by those who are ashamed. 

21 But fear only occurs in the case of pains that seem 
likely to be of the kind whose nature it is to destroy 
life. Hence some people who are even very soft 
about certain things are brave, and some who are 

22 hard and enduring are also cowardly. Moreover it 
is thought to be almost a special property of courage 

817 



ARISTOTLE 

1229 b 

avSpeias etvat το nepi τον θάνατον καΐ την τούτου 

δ λύπην €χ€ΐν πώς' et γάρ τι? €'ίη τοιούτος οίος προς 
άλβα? καΐ φνχη καΐ τάς τοιαύτας λνπας ύπομβνζ- 
τίκός^ ώς ό λόγος, ακίνδυνους ούσας, προς δε τον 
θάνατον καΐ μαλακός καΐ π€ρίφοβος, μη δι' άλλο 
τι πάθος άλλα δι' αύτην την φθοράν, άλλο? δε 
προς μ€ν e/ceiVa? μαλακός, προς δε τον θάνατον 

10 άπα^τ^?, €Κ€Ϊνος μβν αν ειρ'αι δο^ειε δειλό?, ούτος 
δ' άι^δρεΓο?. καΐ γάρ κίνδυνος εττι rot? τοιούτοι? 21 
λε)/εται μόνοις των φοβερών όταν πλησίον η το 
της τοιαύτης φθοράς ποιητικόν, φαίνεται δε 
Λτινδυνο? όταν πλησίον φαίνηται} 

Τά μ^ν ούν φοβζρά π€ρι όσα φαμ€ν είναι τον 
avSpeiov ε'ίρηται 8η ότι τά φαινόμενα ποιητικά 

V) λύπης της φθαρτικης, ταΰτα μβντοι πλησίον τε 
φαινόμενα και μη πόρρω, και τοσαΰτα τω μεγΐθΐΐ 
όντα η φαινόμενα ώστ είναι σύμμ€τρα προς 
άνθρωπον έ'νια γάρ ανάγκη παντι φαίν^σθαι 2' 
άνθρώπω φοββρά και 8ιαταράττ€ΐν, ούθ^ν γάρ 
κωλύει, ώσιτερ θ€ρμά και φυχρά και των άλλων 

■ίο Βυνάμ€ων ενια? ύπερ τ^^ιά? είναι και τάς τοΰ 
ανθρωπίνου σώματος έ'^ει?, ούτω και των πβρι 
την φυχην παθημάτων. 

Οί μ€ν ουν* δειλοί και θρασβΐς διαψεύδονται δια 
τά? ε^ ει?, τω μ€ν γάρ δειλω τά τε μη φοβερά Βοκ€ΐ 
φοβ€ρά είναι και τά ηρβμα σφό8ρα, τω δε θρασίΐ 

25 τουναντίον τά τε φοβερά θαρραλέα και τά σφόδρα 
ηρ€μα• τω δ' άνδρειω τάληθη μάλιστα, διόττερ ούτ 2. 
ει τι? ϋΤΓΟ/χενει* τά φοβερά δι' άγνοιαν, ανδρείο?, 

^ ύπομίνετικόί <eZi'ai> ? Ric. 

^ Syl. : φαίνίται. ' οβι» add. Βζ. 

* ΰτΓομίνΐί Ρ•> : -χοι Μ*», Syl. 

318 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, III. i. 22-25 

to be of a certain disposition in regard to death and 
the pain of death ; for if a man were such as to be 
capable of rational endurance in respect of heat and 
cold and pains of that sort that are not dangerous, 
but at the same time soft and excessively timid about 
death, not because of any other feeling but just 
because it brings destruction, while another man was 
soft in regard to those pains but impassive as regards 
death, the former would be thought a coward and 

23 the latter brave. For we speak of danger only in 
the case of such formidable things as bring near to 
us what causes destruction of that sort, and when this 
appears near it appears to be danger. 

The formidable things, therefore, in relation to 
which we speak of a man as brave are, we have 
said, those that appear likely to cause pain of the 
destructive kind — provided that these appear close 
at hand and not far off, and are or appear to be of 

24 a magnitude proportionate to a human being ; for 
some things must necessarily appear fearful to every 
human being and throw everybody into alarm, since 
it is quite possible that, just as heat and cold and some 
of the other forces are above us and above the con- 
ditions of the human body, so also are some mental 
sufferings. 

Therefore whereas the cowardly and the daring The 
are mistaken owing to their characters, since the extremes, 
coward thinks things not formidable formidable 
and things slightly formidable extremely formidable, 
and the daring man on the contrary thinks formid- 
able things perfectly safe and extremely formidable 
things only slightly formidable, to the brave man on 
the other hand things seem exactly what they are. 

25 Hence a man is not brave if he endures formidable 

319 



ARISTOTLE 

1229 b 

οίον €1 Tts τους κεραυνούς ύπομβνοι^ φβρομ^νονς^ 
δια /xai'tat', ουτ el γινώσκων όσος 6 κίνδυνος, 
δια θνμόν, οΐον οι KeArot προς τά κύματα όπλα 

30 ατταντώσι λαβόντ€ς• καΐ όλως ή βαρβαρική avhpeia 
μ€τά θνμοΰ εστίν. eVtot δε /cat hi άλλα? η^ονας 2 
νπομβνουσιν και γαρ ο θυμός η^ονην '^χ^ι τινά, 
μ€τ ελτΓίδο? γάρ εστί τιμωρίας, αλλ' όμως ουτ^ 
€L δια ταύτην οϋτ^ el δι' άλλην η^ονην ύπομ€ν€ί 
τις τον θάνατον, η φυγην^ μ€ΐζόνων λυπών, ού8€ΐς 

35 δικαίως άν^ άνΒρβΐος λέγοιτο τούτων, et γάρ rfv 2 
τ^δυ το άποθνησκίΐν, πολλάκις άν δι' άκρασίαν 
απ€θνησκον οι ακόλαστοι, ωσπ€ρ και νΰν αύτοΰ 
μβν του άποθνησκβιν ουκ όντας τββος, των 
ποιητικών δ' αύτοΰ, πολλοί δι' άκρασίαν π^ρι- 
πίπτουσιν €ΐ8ότ€ς, ών ούδει? αν* ανδρείο? eivat 
8o^€iev, €1 και πάνυ Ιτοίμως^ άποθνησκίΐν.^ ουτ' 

40 ei φξύγοντες τό πονβΐν, όπ€ρ ττολλοι ποιοΰσιν, ού8€ 
τών τοιούτων ούθ€ΐς άν8ρ€Ϊος, καθάπερ και 
t230 a Αγάθων φησι 

φαύλοι βροτών γάρ του πονίΐν ησσώμίνοι 
θαν€Ϊν βρώσιν. 

ωσπβρ και τόν Xeipa>va μυθολογοΰσιν οι ποιηται 
δια την από του 'έλκους ό^ύνιην ευ^ασ^αι άποθαν^ιν 
άθάνατον όντα. παραπλησίως δε τούτοις και όσοι 2 
5 δι €μπ€ΐρίαν ύπομ4νουσι τους κιvhύvoυς , όνπ€ρ τρό- 

^ ΰτΓομένοι Syl. : υπομένει. 

* έΐΓΐφβρομένον$ ? (cf. a 17) Rac. 

* <διά> φυ-γψ ? Rac, 

* Siv bis add. Sp. ' v.l. (τοΙμο%. 

* άποθνΐ}σκΐί Vic. : -κοι ? Rac. 

" This appears to be loosely quoted from a verse passage : 
S20 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, III. i. 25-28 

things through ignorance (for instance, if owing to The motives 
madness he were to endure a flight of thunderbolts), courage. 
nor if he does so owing to passion when knowing 
the greatness of the danger, as the Celts ' take arms 
and march against the waves ' " ; and in general, 
the courage of barbarians has an element of passion, 

26 And some men endure terrors for the sake of other 
pleasures also — for even passion contains pleasure of 
a sort, since it is combined with hope of revenge. 
But nevertheless neither if a man endures death for 
the sake of this pleasure nor for another, nor for the 
sake of avoiding greater pains, would any of these 

27 persons justly be termed brave. For if dying were 
pleasant, profligates would be dying constantly, 
owing to lack of self-control, just as even as it is, 
when, although death itself is not pleasant, things 
that cause it are, many men through lack of self- 
control knowingly encounter it ; none of whom 
would be thought brave, even though he were thought 
to die quite readily. Nor yet are any of those brave 
who, as many men do, commit suicide to escape from 
trouble, as Agathon * says : 

-The base among mankind, by toil o'ercome. 
Conceive a love of death. 

As also Cheiron," in the legendary story of the poets, 
because of the pain from his wound prayed that 

28 though immortal he might die. And in like manner 
to these, all who face dangers because of experience 

cf. N.E. ill. 7. 7. An echo of the story survives in Shake- 
speare's metaphor, ' to take arms against a sea of troubles.' 

* Athenian tragic poet, friend of Plato. 

" The Centaur sage and physician, accidentally wounded 
by a poisoned arrow of Heracles, transferred his immortality 
to Prometheus, 

Υ 321 



ARISTOTLE 

1230 a 

πον σχ^Βόν οι ττλεΐστοι των στρατιωτικών ανθρώ- 
πων ύττομένουσιν. αντο γαρ τουναντίον €χ€ΐ η ως 
ωετο Έωκράτης, €πιστημην οίόμζνος ett-at την άν- 
8peiav. οϋτβ γαρ δια το eiSeVat τα φοβίρα θαρ- 
ρονσιν OL βπι τους ιστούς ai^a^att'eiv €7τιστάμ€νοι, 
10 αλλ ΟΤΙ Γσασι τα? βοηθίίας τών ^^ινών οντ€ δι' ο 
θαρραλεώτβρον αγωνίζονται, τοΰτο avSpeia, και γαρ 2 
al•' Ύ] ισχύς και ο πλοΰτος κατά θ€ογνιν avhpeia 

τ 

eiel•"• 

ττας γαρ άνηρ ττενίτ) Β€8μημ€νος. 

φαν€ρώς δ ^ evioi δβιλοι 6ντ€ς όμως υττομίνουσι 
δι €μπ€ΐριαν, τοΰτο δε οτι ουκ οϊονται κίνΒυνον 
15 eit'ai, ίσασι γαρ τας βοηθείας, σημζΐον δε'• οταΐ' 
γαρ μη €χ€ΐν οΐωνται βοήθβιαν αλλ' η8η πλησίον 
fi το heivov, ούχ ύπομίνουσιν. άλλα πάντων τών 3 
τοιούτων αίτιων^ οι δια την αιδώ υπομένοντας 
/Μάλιστα φαν€ΐ€ν αν" avSpeloi, καθάπβρ και "Ομηρος 
τον "Έικτορά φησιν ύπομέιναι τον κίνΒυνον τον 
προς τον 'Α;(ΐλλ€α• 

20 "Έικτορα δ' αιδώ? eiXe- 



ΐΙουλυΒάμας μοι πρώτος βλαγχξίην άναθήσαι. 

και εστιΐ' η πολιτική avSpeia αϋτη. η δ' αληθής ii 
οϋτ€ αϋτη οΰ'τ' ςκαίνων ού^αμία, αλλ' όμοια μέν, 
ωσπβρ και ή τών θηρίων, α δια τον θυμόν όμόσ€ 
τη πληγή φάρβται. οϋτβ γαρ οτι ά8οζήσ€ΐ Sei 

* δ' add. Rieckher. » [αΙτΙων] ? Ric. : dvdpeiwv Sp. 

* άν add. Sus. « και add. Fr. 

322 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, III. i. 28-31 

are not brave ; this is how perhaps most of the mili- 
tary class face dangers. For the fact is the exact 
opposite of the view of Socrates, who thought that 
bravery was knowledge : sailors who know how to 
go aloft are not daring through knowing what things 
are formidable, but because they know how to pro- 
tect themselves against the dangers ; also courage 
is not merely what makes men more daring fighters, 

29 for in that case strength and wealth would be courage 
— as Theognis puts it : 

For every man by poverty subdued." 

But manifestly some men do face emergencies in 
spite of being cowards, owing to experience, and 
they do so because they do not think that there is 
any danger, as they know how to protect themselves. 
A proof of this is that when they think that they 
have no protection and that the cause of alarm is now 

30 close at hand, they turn tail. But among all such 
causes, it is when shame makes men face what is 
alarming that they would appear to be bravest, as 
Homer says Hector faced the danger of encountering 
Achilles : 

And shame on Hector seized '' 

and 

Polydamas will be the first to taunt me." » 

31 Civic courage is this kind. But true courage is neither 
this nor any of the others, though it resembles 
them, as does the courage of wild animals, which 
are led by passion to rush to meet the blow. For 
it is not -from fear that he will incur disgrace that a 



" Theognis 177. '' Not in our Homer. 

' Iliad xxii. 100. 



323 



ARISTOTLE 

1230 a ^ ^ ,^ , , / „ 

μ€.ν€ίν φοβούμβνον,^ ovre δι όργήν, ovre δια. το 

25 μη νομίζβιν άττοθανεΐσθαι η δια το 8υνάμ€ΐς €χ€ίν 
φυλακτικάς• ovSe γαρ οίησ^ται ούτω ye φοβζρόν 
eirai ούθβν. αλλ' inetSri πασά y'^ άρβτη προαψ€- 3: 
τικϊ^ (τοΰτο δε ττώ? λ€γομ€ν, εϊρηταί ττρότ^ρον, 
OTL eVe/cct τινο? πάντα αίρ^ΐσθαι ττοιεΓ, /cai τοΰτό 
εστί το ου eVe/ca το «ταλοΓ), δτ^λορ» οτι και τ^ 

30 avSpeia άρ€τη τι? ούσα €νβκά tlvos ποιησίί τά 
φοβίρά ύττομ€ν€ΐν, ώστ οϋτ€ δι ayvoial•' {ορθώς 
γαρ μάλλον TTOiet Kpiveiv) οϋτ€ δι' τ^δοΓτ^ν, αλλ' 
οτι καλόν', €7Γ€ΐ, αν ye jlit) καλοΓ fj άλλα μανικόν, 
ούχ ύττομ€ν€Ζ^' αίσχρόν γάρ. 

ΏερΙ ΤΓοΐα μ€ν οΰν €στΙν η avSpeia μζσότης καΐ 3ί 

35 τίνων καΐ δια τι, και τά φοβ€ρά τίνα Βυναμιν 
€χ€ΐ, σχ€86ν βΐριηται κατά την παρονσαν €φο8ον 
Ικανώς. 

II. riepi δε σωφροσύνης και ακολασίας μ€τά 1 
ταύτα διελε'σ^αι π€ίρατ€ον. λeyeται δ' ο ακόλαστο? 
77θλλα;^ώ?. ο τε yap /u,-)^ Κ€κολασμ€νος πως* μηΒ^ 
1230 Ιατρζύμβνος^ ωσπβρ άτμητος 6 μη τ^τμημένος• 
και τούτων 6 μ€ν 8υνατ6ς 6 δ' ά8ύνατος• άτμητον 
γάρ τό Te μη 8υνάμ€νον τμηθηναί και το 8υνατόν 
μ(.ν μη τ€τμημ€νον δε, τον αύτον δε τρόπον και 
τό ακόλαστοι^• και yap τό ρ,ι) πζφυκός Βζχβσθαι 2 

5 κόλασιΐ', και τό πΐφυκύς μέν μη Κ€Κολασμ€νον δε 

' Cas. : φοβονμίΐΌνί. * 7 add. Μ•". 

* Ric. : ΰπομένα, * ττω \'ict. 

' Sp. : ϊατιχυάμίΐΌί, 

324, 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, III. i. 31— ii. 2 

man ought to stand his ground, nor from motives of 
anger, nor because he does not think that he will be 
killed or because he has forces to protect him, for in 
that case he will not think that there is really any- 

32 thing to be afraid of. But, since indeed all goodness 
involves purposive choice (it has been said before 
what we mean by this — goodness makes a man 
choose everything for the sake of some object, and 
that object is what is fine), it is clear that courage 
being a form of goodness will make a man face for- 
midable things for some object, so that he does not 
do it through ignorance (for it rather makes him 
judge correctly), nor yet for pleasure, but because 
it is fine, since in a case where it is not fine but insane 
he will not face them, for then it would be base to 

,_^do so. 

33 i We have now given an account that is fairly ade- 
quate for our present procedure of the kind of things 
in relation to which Courage is a middle state, and 
between what vices and for what reason it is 
this, and what is the power that formidable things 
exercise. 

II. We must next attempt to decide about Tem- Temper- 
perance and Profligacy. The term ' profligate ' profligacy 
(unchaste) has a variety of meanings. It means its meaning. 
the man who has not been (as it were) ' chastized ' 
or cured, just as ' undivided ' means one that has 
not been divided ; and these terms include both one 
capable of the process and one not capable of it : 
' undivided ' means both that which cannot be 
divided and that which though it can be has not been ; 
2 and similarly with ' unchaste ' — it denotes both that 
which is by nature incapable of chastening and that 
which, though capable, has not actually been chast- 

325 



ARISTOTLE 

1230 b ^ ^ 

TTepl αμαρτίας rrepl a? όρθοπραγ^ΐ 6 σώφρων, 
cooTTep ol τταΓδε?" κατά ταντην γαρ ακόλαστοι 
λέγονται την άκολασίαν , eVt δ' αλλοι^ τρόπον οΐ 3 
8υσίατοι καΐ οι ανίατοι πάμτταν δια. κολάσ€ως. 
πλ€οναχώς δε λεγομένης της ακολασίας , οτι μ^ν 

10 τΓ€ρι ήΒονάς τινας και λνπας ίίσί, φαν^ρόν, και 
ΟΤΙ ev τω Trepi ταύτας 8ιακ€Ϊσθαί πως και άλΑτ^λω^ 
Βιαφέρουσι και των άλλων 8ΐ€γράφαμ€ν δέ πρότ€- 
ρον πώς την άκολασίαν 6νομάζοντ€ς μ€ταφ€ρομ€ν. 
τους δε^ άκινητως έχοντας δι' άΐ'αισ^τ^σιαι^ προς 4 
ταύτας τάς^ η^ονάς οι μ€ν καλονσιν αναίσθητους, 

15 οι δ άλλοι? ονομασι τοιούτοις προσαγορ€υουσιν^ ' 
εστί δ' ου πάνυ γνώριμον το πάθος ούδ' επιπόλαιον 5 
δια το πάντας €πι θάτερον άμαρτάν€ΐν μάλλον και 
πάσιν eivai σνμφυτον την τών τοιούτων η^έων ■ήτ- 
ταν και αϊσθησιν. μάλιστα δ' eioi τοιούτοι οίους 
οΐ κωμω8ο8ώάσκαλοι παράγουσιν άγροίκους, οι 

20 ουδέ* τά μέτρια και τα αναγκαία πλησιάζουσι τοις 
ηΒέσιν. 

ΈτΓβι δ' ο σώφρων εστί π€ρι ηΒονάς, άναγκη & 
και π€ρι επιθυμίας τινάς αύτον elvai. δει δή λα- 
βείν περί τ ίνας. ου γαρ περί πάσας ουδέ περί 
άπαντα τά rjSea 6 σώφρων σώφρων εστίν, άλλα 
τη μ€ν 8όζη π€ρι δυο τών αισθητών, π€ρι τ€ το 

J5 γβυστόν και το άπτόν, τη δ αλτ^^εια περί το 

* Sus. : -yap. 

^ ταύταί ras Sp. : ras αύτά,^. 

' irpoaayopeuovaiv Κοϊον . . . > S^s. (cf. 1231 b 1). 

* ούδ' e<i> vel ούδ' i<s> ? Rac. 

" ακόλαστα (lit. ' incorrigible ') often means no more than 
' naughty ' (Solomon). 

326 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, III. ii. 2-6 

ened in respect of the errors as regards which the 
temperate man acts rightly, as is the case with 
children ; for of them it is in this sense that the 

3 term ' unchaste ' ^ is used, whereas another use of 
it again refers to persons hard to cure or entirely in- 
curable by chastisement. But though ' profligacy ' 
has more than one sense, it is clear that the profligate 
are concerned with certain pleasures and pains and 
that they differ from one another and from the other 
vicious characters in being disposed in a certain 
manner towards these ; and we described previously 
the way in which we apply the term ' profligacy ' 

4 by analogy.^ Persons on the other hand who owing it» oppo- 
to insensitiveness are uninfluenced by these pleas- sltfvenesT 
ures are called by some people ' insensitive ' and by ^^'^^• 
others are designated by other names of the same 

5 sort ; but the state is not a very familiar one nor of 
common occurrence, because all men err more in the 
other direction, and susceptibility and sensitiveness 
to pleasures of this sort are natural to everybody. It 
specially attaches to persons like the boors who are 
a stock character in comedy — people who steer clear 
of pleasures even in moderate and necessary indul- 
gences. 

6 And since the temperate character is shown in Only some 
connexion with pleasures, it follows that it is also the*sphere 
related to certain desires. We must, therefore, ascer- of Tem- 
tain what these are. For the temperate man is not P®''*"*'®• 
temperate about all pleasures nor about everything 
pleasant, but apparently about the objects of two 

of the senses, taste and touch, and in reality about 

*■ This seems to refer to words which must have been lost 
at 1221 a 20 (Solomon). 

327 



ARISTOTLE 

1280b ^ ^ 

ατΓτόν 7T€pl γαρ την δια της οφ^ως ηΒονην των 7 

καλών {avev βπιθνιχίας αφροδισίων) η λνττην των 
αισχρών, καΐ π€ρί την δια της άκοης τών ev- 
αρμόστων η ανάρμοστων, eVt δ€ ττρος τάς δι 
οσφρήσεως , τάς τ€ άπο ευωχίας καΐ τάς άπο δυσ- 

30 ωΒίας, ουκ εστίν 6 σώφρων ουδέ γαρ ακόλαστος 
ουδείς λέγεται τω πάσχειν (ύπο τούτωνΥ η μη 
πασχειν ει γοΰν τις η καλόν άνΒριάντα θεώμενος 8 
η ιπττον η άνθρωπον, η άκροώμενος αΒοντος, μη 
βονλοιτο μήτε εσθίειν μήτε ττίνειν μήτε άφροΒισιά- 
ζειν, άλλα τά μεν καλά θεωρεΐν τών δ' αγόντων 

35 ακονειν, ουκ αν Βόζειεν ακόλαστος efp'ai, ώσπερ 
οι5δ' οι κηλούμενοι παρά ταΐς Έ^ειρήσιν. αλλά 9 
περί τα δυο τών αισθητών ταΰτα περί άπερ και 
τάλλα θηρία μόνα τυγχάνει αισθητικώς έχοντα και 
χαίροντα και λυπούμενα, περί τά γευστά και 
απτά, περί Βε τά τών άλλων αισθήσεων' ήΒεα 1C 
1231 a σχεδόν ομοίως άπαντα φαίνεται άναισθήτως δια- 
κείμενα, οίον περί εύαρμοστίαν ή κάλλος' ούθεν 
γαρ ο τι και άζιον λόγου φαίνεται πάσχοντα αύτη 
τη θεωρία τών καλών ή τη άκροάσει τών εύαρ- 
μοστων, ει μή τί που συμβεβηκε τερατώδες, αλλ* 

5 ούΒε προς τά εύώΒη ή 8υσώ8η• καίτοι τάς γε 
αισ^ησ6ΐ? όξυτερας εχουσι πάσας, αλλά και τών 11 
οσμών ταυται? χαίρουσιν οσαι κατά συμβεβηκός 
εύφραίνουσιν , αλλά μή καθ' αύτάς• λέγω δε μή^ 
καθ αύτάς αΐς ή* ελπίζοντες χαίρομεν ή μεμνημε- 

» Fr. 2 pb; αισθητών Μ". 

' μη add. Fr. * Fr. : μη. 

328 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, III. ii. 7-11 

7 the objects of touch. For the temperate man is 
not concerned with the pleasure of beautiful things 
(apart from sexual desire) or pain caused by ugly 
things, the medium of which is sight, nor with the 
pleasure of harmonious sounds or pain of discords 
conveyed through the medium of hearing, nor yet 
with the pleasures and pains of smell, derived from 
good and bad scents ; for neither is anyone termed 
profligate because of being sensitive or not sensitive 

8 to sensations of that sort — for example, a man would 
not be considered profligate if when looking at a 
beautiful statue or horse or person, or listening to 
someone singing, he did not wish for food or drink 
or sexual indulgence but only wished to look at the 
beautiful objects or listen to the music, — any more 
than the persons held spell-bound in the abode of the 

9 Sirens. Temperance and profligacy have to do with 
those two sorts of sensory objects in relation to which 
alone the lower animals also happen to be sensitive 
and to feel pleasure and pain— the objects of taste 

10 and of touch, whereas about virtually all the pleasures 
of the other senses alike animals are clearly so con- 
stituted as to be insensitive — e.g. harmonious sound, 
or beauty ; for clearly they are not affected in any 
degree worth speaking of by the mere sight of 
beautiful objects or by listening to musical sounds, 
except possibly in the case of some miraculous occur- 
rences. Nor yet are they sensitive to good or bad 
smells, although it is true that all their senses are 

11 keener than man's ; but even the smells they enjoy 
are those that have agreeable associations, and are 
not intrinsically agreeable. By smells not intrinsic- 
ally agreeable I mean those that we enjoy because 
of either anticipation or recollection, for example the 

329 



ARISTOTLE 

1231 a ^ ^^ 

vol, οίον οφων καΐ ποτών, δι' irepav γαρ rjSovrjv 

ίΟ ταύταις χαίρομεν, την τον φαγ^ΐν η metv καθ^ 
αυτά? 8e otat at των ανθών elaiv (διο ΙμμβΧώς 
ζφη Ίίτρατόνικος τα} μέν καλόν οζαν, τα} δβ rjSv). 
€7761 καΐ τών πβρί το γ€νστ6ν ου rrepl πασαν 12 
TjSovTjv €πτόηται τα θηρία, ουδ' όσων τώ άκρω 
της γΧώττης η αΐσθησις, αλλ' όσων τω φάρυγγι, 

1Γ) καΐ eoLKev αφη μάλλον η γβυσβί το ττάθος• διο οΐ 
οφοφάγοί ουκ βϋχονται την '}'λώτταν ^χ^ιν μακράν 
άλλα τον φάρυγγα γβράνον, ώσττ€ρ Φιλόζ€νος 6 
Ερυ^ιδο?.^ ωστ€ irepl τα άπτόμβνα ως άττλώς 13 
eLTTelv θ^τέον την άκολασιαν , ομοίως δε και ο 
ακόλαστο? mepl τας τοιαύτας €στίν• οίνοφλυγ ια 

20 γαρ και γαστριμαργια και λα^ΐ'εια και οφοφαγια^ 
και πάντα τα τοιαύτα περί τάς €ίρημ4νας βστιν 
αίσθησης, €ίς άπβρ μόρια η ακολασία διαιρείται. 
π€ρι δε τα? δι' οφεως η άκοης η όσφρησ€ως 14 
ηΒονάς ούθβις λέγεται ακόλαστο? eav ύπβρβάλλη, 
αλλ' άν€υ όι/ειδου? τα? αμαρτίας φ€γομ€ν ταύτα?, 

25 και όλως πβρί όσα μη λέγονται €γκρατ€Ϊς• οι δ 
άκρατει? ουκ ει'σιν ακόλαστοι ουδέ σώφρονβς. 

'Αναίσθητος μ^ν ουν, η όπως δει όνομάζ^ιν, ο U 
οϋτως €χων ώστε και ελλείπει^ όσων ανάγκη 
κοινωνύν ως €πΙ το πολύ τται^τα? και χαιρβιν ο 
δ' υπερβάλλων ακόλαστος . πάντες γαρ τούτοις \{ 

:io φύσει τε -χαίρουσι και επιθυμίας λαμβάνονσι, και 

^ τά , . . τά Cas. : ras . . . ras. 
* Syl. : έρύξίΟί, έξ ϋριδο^. ' όψοφα^ία καΐ \ayvtia Ric. 

" Α contemporary musician, a number of whose smart 
sayings are recorded by Athenaeus viii. 347 f-352 d. 

330 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, ΠΙ. π. 11-16 

smell of things to eat or drink, for we enjoy these 
scents on account of a different pleasure, that of 
eating or drinking ; by intrinsically agreeable I mean 
scents such as those of flowers (this is the reason of 
Stratonicus's* neat remark that the scent of flowers is 
beautiful but that of things to eat and drink sweet). 

12 For even the pleasures of taste are not all attractive 
to animals, nor are those perceived with the tip of 
the tongue, but those perceived by the throat, the 
sensation of which seems more like touch than 
taste ; so that gourmands do not pray that they may 
have a long tongue but a crane's gullet, like Philo- 

13 xenussonof Eryxis.^ It follows that broadly speaking Profligacy 
profligacy must be considered to be related to the t/neuished 
objects of touch, and likewise it is with pleasures of from incon- 
that sort that the profligate is concerned ; for tip- *'°^"'^®• 
pling and gluttony and lechery and gormandizing 

and the like all have to do with the sensations speci- 
fied, and these are the departments into which pro- 

14 fligacy is divided. But nobody is called profligate 
if he exceeds in regard to the pleasures of sight or 
hearing or smell ; those errors we criticize without 
severe rebuke, and generally all the things in- 
cluded under the term ' lack of self-control ' : the 
uncontrolled are not profligate, yet they are not 
temperate. 

15 Therefore the person of such a character as to 
be deficient in all the enjoyments which practically 
everybody must share and must enjoy, is insensitive 
(or whatever the proper term is), and he that ex- 

16 ceeds in them is profligate. For all people by nature 
enjoy these things, and conceive desires for them, 

" Mr. Hospitable, son of Mistress Belch — presumably a 
character in comedy. 

331 



ARISTOTLE 

1231 a ^ 

ovK eiGLV ov8e Xeyovrai ακόλαστοι, ου γαρ VTrep- 
βαλλονσι τω χαίρ^ιν μάλλον η δβι τνγχάνοντ€ς 
και λυττ^ίσθαι μάλλον -η δει μη τνγχάνοντ€ς• οι5δ' 
ανάλγητοι, ου γαρ ελλειττουσι τω χαίρ€ΐν η λυ 
π€Ϊσθαί, αλλά μά?^ον νττβρβάλλουσιν . 
35 Ettci δ' eoTLV ύπβρβολη καΐ ζλλαφι,ς ττ€ρΙ αυτά, 17 
8ηλον OTL καΐ μεσάτης, καΐ βέλτιστη αϋτη η e^is, 
και αμφοΐν Ιναντία. ωστ' et^ σωφροσύνη η 
β€λτίστη βξις πβρί α ο ακόλαστος, η 7Τ€ρΙ τά 
ηοβα τα αρημζνα των αισθητών μ^σότης σωφροσύνη 
αν €ίη, μ€σοτης ούσα ακολασίας καΐ άι^αισ^τ^σια?• 
1231 h η δ' υπερβολή ακολασία, η δ' ελλειφις ήτοι 
ανώνυμος η τοις είρημένοις όνόμασι προσαγορβυο- 
μ€νη. ακρφβστερον δε π€ρΙ του γένους των 18 
ηδονών έσται 8ίαιρ€Τ€ον iv τοις λεγομενοις ύστερον 
περί εγκράτειας καΐ άκρασίας. 
5 III. Ύον αυτόν Βε τρόπον ληπτεον καΐ περί 1 
πραότητας καΐ χαλεπότητος. καΐ γαρ τον πράον 
περί λύπην την από θυμοΰ γιγνομενην όρώμεν 
οντά, τω προς ταύτην εχειν πώς. Βιεγράφαμεν 
οε καΐ άντεθήκαμεν τω όργίλω καΐ χαλεπώ καΐ 
αγριω (πάντα γαρ τά τοιαύτα της αυττ]? eWt 
10 διαθέσεως) τόν άν8ραπο8ώ8η και τόν άνόργητον^• 
σχε8όν γάρ ταύτα μάλιστα καλοΰσι τους μη8^ εφ^ 2 
οσοις 8εΐ κινούμενους τόν θυμόν, αλλά προπηλακι- 
ζομενους ευχερώς και ταπεινούς προς τάς ολι- 
γωρίας' εστί γάρ άντικείμενον τω μεν ταχύ τό 

1 Sp.: ώστ€. 2 Rac. (cf. 1220 b 38, 1221 a 17): άνόητον. 

" άνά\•γητοι is thrown in as a possible synonym for 
αναίσθητοι. See § 15. 

* Perhaps in a sentence lost at 1230 b 15. 
« See 1220 b 38, 1221 b 12-15. 

S32 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, III. n. 16— iii. 2 

without being or being called profligate, for they 
do not exceed by feeling more joy than they ought 
when they get them nor more pain than they ought 
when they do not get them ; nor yet are they 
unfeeling," for they do not fall short in feeling joy 
or pain, but rather exceed. 

17 And since there are excess and deficiency in re- 
gard to these things, it is clear that there is also a 
middle state, and that this state of character is the 
best one, and is the opposite of both the others. 
Hence if temperance is the best state of character 
in relation to the things with which the profligate 
is concerned, the middle state in regard to the pleas- 
ant objects of sense mentioned will be Temperance, 
being a middle state between profligacy and in- 
sensitiveness : the excess will be Profligacy, and the 
deficiency will either be nameless or will be denoted 

18 by the terms mentioned. ** We shall have to define 
the class of pleasures concerned more exactly in our 
discussion of Self-control and Lack of Control later on. 

1 III. And also the nature of Gentleness and Harsh- gentlk- 
ness must be ascertained in the same way. For we r^semuneur 
see that the term ' gentle ' is concerned with the of insult. 
pain that arises from passion — a man is gentle by 

being disposed in a certain way towards that pain. 
And in our diagram '^ we opposed to the irascible 
and harsh and fierce man (for all such traits belong 
to the same disposition) the slavish and spiritless ^ 

2 man ; for these are perhaps the most usual words 
to denote those whose passion is not aroused even at 
all the things at which it ought to be, but who undergo 
insulting treatment readily and meet slights with 
humility ; since as opposed to feeling the pain that 

■^ The Mss. give ' slavish and senseless.' 

333 



ARISTOTLE 

1231b ^ ο, , , 

μολίς, τω ο ηρβμα το σφό8ρα, τω δβ ττολύν 

15 χ^ρόνον το ολίγον λνπ€Ϊσθαί ταύτην την λνττην rjv 
καλοΰμβν θυμόν. εττει δ' ωστηρ καΧ ΙττΧ των 3 
αΚΚων β'ίπομζν, και €ντανθ^ €στΙν ύττβρβολή καΐ 
ζλλξίφίς (ο μ€ν γαρ χαλξπος τοιούτος βστιν, 6 και 
θαττον και μάλλον ττάσχων^ καΐ ττλ^ίω χρόνον καΐ 
οτ ου δεΓ καΐ οποίοις ου 8et και €πΙ ττολλοΐς, 

20 ο δ ανδρατΓοδώδτ^? τουναντίον) , Βηλον οτι έ'στι 
τις και ο^ μ€σος της άνισότητος. irrei ουν ημαρτη- 4 
//.evat αμφότβραι at e^et? €Κ€Ϊναι, φαν^ρον οτι €πι- 
€ΐκης η μέση τούτων βξις- οϋτ€ γαρ TrpoTcpei 
ούθ ύστ€ρίζ€ΐ, οϋτ€ οΐς ου δει οργίζεται οϋτ( 
οΐς 8ei ουκ όργίζ€ται. ωοτ inei και ττραότης η 

25 βέλτιστη €ξις ττβρι ταύτα τα πάθη εστίν, €Ϊη αν 
και ή ττραότης μεσάτης τις, και ο πράος μέσος του 
χαλβποϋ και του άν8ραπο8ώ8ους . 

IV. Έστι Se και η μ€γαλοφυχία και η μ€γα- 1 
λοπρ€π€ΐα και η Ιλ^υθίριότης μ€σότητ€ς, η μεν 
ΐλευθεριότης περί χρημάτων κτήσιν και άποβολην. 

30 ο μβν γαρ κτήσει μ^ν πάση μάλλον χαίρων η δει 
αποβολή he πάση λυπούμενος μάλλον η Sel 
ανελεύθερος, ο δ' αμφότερα ήττον η 8εΐ άσωτος, 
ο ο άμφω ώς Βεΐ ελευθέριος [τοΰτο 8έ λέγω το 
ως οεΐ, και επι τούτων και επι των άλλων, το 
ως ο λόγος 6 ορθός), επει δ' εκείνοι μεν είσιν εν 2 

3'i υπερβολή και ελλείφει, οπού hk εσχατά εισι, και 
μέσον, και τοΰτο βελτιστον, εν 8έ περί εκαστον 
τω εΊ8ει το βελτιστον , ανάγκη και την ελευθεριότητα 

* ό καΐ . . , πάσχων : olos και . . . ττάσχίΐν Sp. 
2 [ό] ? Rac. 

" i.e. half-way between excess and defect. 
334 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, III. iii. 2— iv. 2 

we call passion quickly, extremely or for a long time 
there is feeling it slowly, slightly, or for a short time. 

3 And since, as we said in the other cases, so here also 
there is excess and deficiency (for the harsh man is 
the sort of man that feels this emotion too quickly, 
too long, at the wrong time, with the wrong kind of 
people, and with many people, while the slavish 
man is the opposite), it is clear that there is also some- 
body who is at the middle point in the inequality." 

4 Since, therefore, both those states of character are 
wrong, it is clear that the state midway betAveen them 
is right, for it is neither too hasty nor too slow- 
tempered, nor does it get angry with the people with 
whom it ought not nor fail to get angry with those 
with whom it ought. So that since the best state of 
character in regard to those feelings is gentleness. 
Gentleness also would be a middle state, and the 
gentle man Avould be midway between the harsh man 

Wand the slavish man. 

ί 1 J IV. Greatness of Spirit and Magnificence and f^iberal- 
j Liberality are also middle states. Liberality is the ,η^άη be- 
mean in regard to the acquisition and expenditure tweenMean- 
of wealth. The man who is more pleased than he prciisaiity 
ought to be by all acquisition and more pained than '"F;f^g"|. 
he ought to be by all expenditure is mean, he that ing. 
feels both feelings less than he ought is prodigal, 
and he that feels both as he ought is liberal (what I 
mean bv ' as he ought,' both in this and in the other 
2 cases, is ' as right principle directs '). And since the 
two former characters consist in excess and de- 
ficiency, and where there are extremes there is also 
a mean, and that mean is best, there being a single 
best for each kind of action, a single thing, it neces- 
sarily follows that liberality is a middle state between 

335 



ARISTOTLE 

1231 b 

μ€σοτητα elvat ασωτία? καΐ aveXevdepias Trepl 
χρημάτων κτησιν καΐ άποβολην. Βυχώς δε τα 3 
χρήματα λέγομ^ν καί την χρηματιστικην η μ€ν 

1232 a γαρ καθ^ αυτό χρήσις του κτήματος €στιν, οίον 

υποδήματος ή ιματίου, ή δε κατά συμβζβηκος 
μβν, ου μύντοι οϋτως ώς αν ει τις σταθμω 
χρησαίτο τω ύπο8ήματί, αλλ' οίον ή πώλησις και 
ή μίσθωσις- χρήται γαρ fi υπόδημα} 6 δε ^ιλ- 4 
r. άργυρος 6 πβρι το νόμισμα ioTiv €σπου8ακώς, το 
δε νό/χισ/χα της κτήσβως άντι της κατά συμβίβηκος 
χρήσβώς Ιστιν. 6 δ' άνζλ^ύθζρος ^ΐη αν' και 5 
άσωτο? περί τον κατά συμβββηκος τρόπον τοΰ 
χρηματισμού• και γάρ ε'ττι τοΰ κατά φύσιν χρη- 
ματισμού την αϋ^τ^σιΐ' διώκει. 6 δ' άσωτος 

10 ελλείπει των αναγκαίων, 6 δ' ελευθέριο? την 
7Τ€ριουσιαν 8ώωσιν. αυτών δε τούτων €ΐ8η Γ» 
λέγονται Βιαφίροντα τω μάλλον και ήττον π^ρΐ 
μόρια• οίον άν^λ^ύθ^ρος φβώωλός και κίμβιξ και 
αίσχροκ€ρ8ής, φειδωλό? μέν iv τω μη προΪ€σΟαι, 
αισχροκερδής δ' iv τω ότιοΰν προσίεσθαι, κίμβιξ 

15 δε 6 σφό8ρα π€ρΙ μικρά 8ιατ€ΐνόμ€νος, παραλογισ- 
της δε και άποστερητής ο άδικο? κατ' άνΐλευθζρίαν 
και τοΰ ασώτου ωσαύτως λαφύκτης μεν 6 iv τώ 7 
ατακτω? άΐ'αλισκειρ', άλoyιστos■ δε ό iv τω μη 
υπομ€ν€ΐν τήν από λογισμού λύπην. 

V. Yiepi δε μεγαλοψυχίας ε'κ τών τοις μεγάλο- Ι 

■Λ) φύχοις άποΒώομενων δει 8ιορίσαι τό ΐ8ιον. ώσπερ' 

* <g> υπόδημα Rac. {νηοδήματι V^ic, ύποδήματι <rj ΰπ6δημα> 
Sus.) : ΰτΓοδήματοί aut -τα. * ν.1. &ν (Ιη. ^ Βζ. : αίτιον. 

" Cf. Pol. I., 1257 a 14, where the use of a shoe for sale is 
included with its use for wear under xpfjffit καθ' αί'τό, but dis- 
336 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, III. iv. 2— v. 1 

prodigality and meanness as regards getting and 

3 parting with wealth. But the terms ' wealth ' and 
' art of wealth ' we use in two senses, since one 
way of using an article of property, for example 
a shoe or a cloak, is proper to the article itself," 
another is accidental, though not as using a shoe for 
a weight would be an accidental use of it, but for 
example selling it or letting it on hire, for these uses 

4 do employ it as a shoe. The covetous man is the 
party whose interest centres on money, and money 
is a thing of ownership instead of accidental use. 

5 But the mean man might be even prodigal in 
regard to the accidental mode of getting wealth, 
inasmuch as it is in the natural acquisition of wealth 
that he pursues increase. The prodigal man lacks 
necessities, but the liberal man gives his super- 

6 fluity. And of these classes themselves there are 
species designated as exceeding or deficient in 
respect of parts of the matter concerned : for 
example, the stingy man, the skinflint and the profit- 
eer are mean — the stingy in not parting with 
money, the profiteer in accepting anything, the skin- 
flint is he who is very excited about small sums ; 
also the man who offends by way of meanness is a 

7 false reckoner and a cheat. Similarly ' prodigal ' 
includes the spendthrift who is prodigal in un- 
regulated spending and the reckless man who is 
prodigal in not being able to endure the pain of 

^calculation. 

1 J V. On the subject of Greatness of Spirit we must Μαονλνι- 
"^define its characteristic from the attributes of the it implies 

-^ all the 

' 11/.• ' : ' . < u • virtues. 

tinguished from it as ούχ o/xoiws καθ avro, because not its 

οικεία χρησιν, ού yap αλλαγή? 'ένΐκα yayovev. The term χρήματα 

itself denotes to the Greek ear ' useful things.' 

ζ 337 



ARISTOTLE 

1232 a ^ 

γαρ και τα άλλα {ά)^ κατά την γξίτνίασιν καΐ 
ομοιότητα μ-^χρι τον λανθάνει^ (βιαφ4ρονταΥ 
■πόρρω προϊόντα, και vrept την μεγαλοφυχίαν ταντο 
συμβ€βηκ€ν. διό ivioTe οι ivavTLOi τον αντοΰ 2 
αντιποιούνται, οίον 6 άσωτος τω eXevOepito και 6 

25 ανθάΒης τω σ€μνω και ο θρασνς τω avSpeio)• eiVt 
γαρ και ττβρι ταύτα και όμοροι μ^χρι τινός, ώσπ^ρ 
ο αν8ρ€Ϊος υπομονετικός κιν8ννων και ό θρασνς, 
αλλ ο μεν ίοδε ό δ' ώδε* ταντα δε διάφοροι 
πλείστον, λόγομεν Se τον μογαλόφνχον κατά την 3 
τοΰ ονόματος προσηγορίαν, ώσπορ iv μεγέθοι τινι 

30 φνχης και Βννάμει.* ωστ€ και τω σβμνω και τω 
μεγαλόπρεποι όμοιος eij^at δο /cet, ότι^ και ττάσαι? 
ται? άρεταΐς άκολονθεΐν φαίνεται. και γάρ το 4 
ορθώς κρΐναι τά μεγάλα και μικρά των αγαθών 
επαινετόν 8οκ€Ϊ 8ε ταΰτ' eii'at μεγάλα ά 8ιώκει 
6 την κρατίστην έχων εξιν περί τά τοιαύτα* ή8εα, 

35 η 8ε μεγαλοφνχία κρατίστη. κρίνει δ' η περί 5 
εκαστον άρετη το μείζον και το ελαττον ορθώς, 
άπερ^ ο φρόνιμος αν κελενσειε και η άρετη, ^ ώστε 
εττεσθαι αυττ^ πάσας τάς άρετάς, η αντην επεσθαι 
ττασαι?. 

' Ετι 8οκεΐ μεγαλοφύχον eii^ai το καταφρονητικόν 6 

efi^ai. εκάστη δ' άρετη καταφρονητικονς ποιεί τών 

1232 b πάρα τον λόγον μεγάλων, οΐον άν8ρεία^ κιν8ννων 

{μέγα γάρ ήγεΐσθαι^'^ οιεται «Γναι τών αισχρών 

και πλήθος ού πάν φοβερόν), και σώφρων 'η8ονών 

' Γγ. 2 Cas_ . ^Qj5 χανθάνειν. » Rac. 

* Γ : δvvάμ(ωs. * Sus. : Sre. 

• τοιαντα Ric. : τοιαντ εΐναι (e priore linea). 

' κάθατΓ(ρ ? Sp. 
* ή <τοιαι)τ77> άρΐΤΎ) vel ή φρόνησίί ? Rac, 
» ay8pe:os Sp. ιβ τ,^ύσθαι (cf. 1233 a 31) add. Sol. 

338 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, III. v. 1-6 

great-spirited man. For just as in the other cases 
of things that, owing to their affinity and similarity 
up to a point, are not noticed to differ Avhen they 
advance further, the same has happened about great- 

2 ness of spirit. Hence sometimes the opposite char- 
acters claim the same quality, for instance the ex- 
travagant man claims to be the same as the liberal, 
the self-willed as the proud, the daring as the brave ; 
for they are concerned with the same things, and 
also are neighbours up to a point, as the brave man 
can endure dangers and so can the daring man, but 
the former in one way and the latter in another, and 

3 that makes a very great difference. And we use the 
term ' great-spirited ' according to the designation 
of the word, as consisting in a certain greatness or 
power of spirit. So that the great-spirited man 
seems to resemble both the proud man and the 
magnificent, because greatness of spirit seems to go 

4 with all the virtues also. For it is praiseworthy to 
judge great and small goods rightly ; and those 
goods seem great which a man pursues who possesses 
the best state of character in relation to such pleas- 

5 ures, and greatness of spirit is the best. And the 
virtue concerned with each thing judges rightly the 
greater and the smaller good, just as the wise man 
and virtue would bid, so that all the virtues go with 
it, or it goes with all the virtues. 

6 Again, it is thought characteristic of the great- indifferent 
spirited man to be disdainful. Each virtue makes iarfty^"' 
men disdainful of things irrationally deemed great : 

for example, courage makes a man disdainful of 
dangers, for he thinks that to consider danger a great 
matter is a disgraceful thing, and that numbers are not 
always formidable ; and the sober-minded man dis- 

339 



ARISTOTLE 

1332 b 

μεγάλων καΐ ττολλών, καΐ iXevdepLog χρημάτων, 
μβγαλοφνχου δε τοΰτο δο /cet etvai^ δια το rrepl 7 
5 ολίγα σττουΒάζζΐν καΐ ταύτα μεγάλα, και ονχ 
ό τι^ δο /cet €Τ€ρω τινί. καΐ μάλλον άν φροντίσ€ΐ€ν 
ανηρ μεγαλόψυχος τι δο /cet ivl σπονΒαίω η πολ- 
λοίς τοις τυγχάνουσιν,^ ώσττερ ^Αντιφών '4φη 
προς Αγάθωνα καταψηφισμένος* την άπολογίαν 
επαινεσαντα. καΐ το ολίγωρον του μεγαλοφυχου 

10 μάλιστ είναι πάθος ΐ8ιον. πάλιν περί Tt/Lt^9 και 8 
του ζην και πλούτου, περί ων σπου8άζειν Βοκοΰσιν 
οι άνθρωποι, ονθέν φροντίζειν^ περί των άλλων πλην 
περί τιμής• και λυποΐτ^ άν^ άτιμαζόμενος και αρχό- 
μενος υπό αναξίου, και χαίρει μάλιστα τυγχάνων. 
Ούτω μεν ουν ^όζειεν άν eVavrta»? e'xeti', το 9 

lii γαρ είναι τε /ActAtCTTa περί τιμήν και καταφρονη- 
τικον eti^ai των πολλών /cat Βό^ης^ ούχ όμολογεΐσθαι. 
οεΐ οε τοΰτο 8ιορίσαντας ειπείν, εστί γαρ τιμή ίο 
και μικρά και μεγάλη 8ιχώς• η γαρ τω υπό πολλών 
τών τυχόντων η /cat* ύπό^ τών άξιων λόγου, και 

20 πάλιν τω επι τίνι η τιμή 8ιαφερει• μεγάλη γάρ 
ου τω πληθει τών τιμώντων ούΒε τω ποιώ μόνον, 
αλλά και τω τιμία^" ett-af τη άληθεία 8ε και at 
αρχαι και ταλλα aya^a τίμια και afta σπου8ης 
ταΰτα όσα μεγάλα αληθώς εστίν, ώστε και άρετη 

^ ehai add. Rac. : τοΰτο δοκ(ΐ ant δοκΰ τοΰτο. 

* Rac. : δη edd. ^ τυχοΰσιν Cas. 

* ν.Ι. κατΐψΐυσμένωί. * φροντίζΐί Cas. 

' Ric. (vel Χυττηθησΐταί) : λνπηθήσοιτ &ι>. 

' fhai TTjs τών ττολλων δόξηί ? (λαϊ cm. Γ) Rac, 

* Ric. : 1j. » ί/7ΓΟ ? Ric. : τφ ύιτδ. 

" Sol. (τίμια ? Ric.) : ημίαν. 

' Λ variant reading gives 'as Λ. said to A. when he in- 
340 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, III. v. 6-10 

dains great and numerous pleasures, and the liberal 

7 man wealth. But the reason why this is thought 
characteristic of the great-spirited man is because of 
his caring about fcAV things and those great ones, 
and not about Λvhatever somebody else thinks. 
And a great-spirited man would consider more what 
one virtuous man thinks than what many ordinary 
people think, as Antiphon after his condemnation 
said to Agathon when he praised his speech for his 
defence.'* And a feeling thought to be specially 
characteristic of the great-spirited man is disdain. 

8 On the other hand, as to the accepted objects of but loves 
human interest, honour, life, wealth, he is thought to i^ono"•" 
care nothing about any of them except honour ; it 
would grieve him to be dishonoured and ruled by 
someone unworthy, and his greatest joy is to obtain 
honour. 

9 Thus he might therefore be thought inconsistent, 
on the ground that to be specially concerned about 
honour and to be disdainful of the multitude and of 

10 reputation do not go together. But in saying this ot the nobi. 
we must distinguish. Honour is small or great in '^""^• 
two ways : it differs in being conferred either by 
many ordinary people or by persons of consideration, 
and again it differs in what it is conferred for, since 
its greatness does not depend only on the number or 
the quality of those who confer it, but also on its 
being honourable ; and in reality those offices and 
other good things are honourable and worthy of 
serious pursuit that are truly great, so that there is 

sincerely praised his defence.' For Antiphon's indictment 
as a leader in the revolution of the Four Hundred at Athens 
see Thuc. viii. 68. Agathon is presumably the tragic poet, 
see Plato's Symposium. The anecdote is not recorded else- 
where. 

341 



ARISTOTLE 

1232 b ^ 

ovSe^ia av€v μζγέθους' διό hoKovai μ.€γαλοφύχους 
25 not€iv ζκαστη ττβρι ο εστίν εκάστη αύτώι^, ωσπερ 
απομβν. αλλ' όμως εστί τίς τταρά τάς άλλας 11 
αρετας μια μεγαλοφνχία, ωστε^ καΐ ίδια μεγαλό- 
φνχον τούτον λεκτεον τον έχοντα ταυτην. επεί 
δ εστίν ενια των aya^cul•- τά μεν τίμια τα. δ' ου/ 
ως οίωρισθτη ττρότερον, των τοιούτων δ' aya^ojl•' 
βστι τά juev μεγάλα κατ αληθειαν τά δε μικρά, 
30 'cat τούτων eVtot α^ιοι /cat ά^ιοΰσιν αύτοιί?, εν 
τούτοις ζητητεος 6 μεγαλόφυχος. τετραχώς δ' 12 
ανάγκη διαφερειν εστί μεν γαρ άζιον είναι 
μεγάλων και άζιοϋν εαυτόν τούτων, εστί hk μικρά 
και άζιον eti^at" τηλικοντων και άζιοΰν εαυτόν 
τούτων, έστι δ άνάτταλιΐ' προς εκάτερα αυτών ό 
35 μ^ν γάρ αν εΐη τοιούτος οίος άζιος ων μικρών 
μεγάλων* άζιοΰν εαυτόν τών εντίμων άγα^ώι^, ο 
8ε άζιος ων μεγάλων άζιοίη αν μικρών εαυτόν, 
ό μεν οΰν άξιος μικρών, μεγάλων δ' ά^ιώΐ' εαυτόν, 13 
φεκτός• άνόητον γάρ και ου καλόν τό παρά την 
aftW* τιη/χάνειν. φεκτός δε fcat οστι? a^tos" ώι^ 

1233 a υπαρχόντων αύτώ τών τοιούτων μετεχειν μη άζιοΐ 

εαυτόν. λείπεται 8ε ενταύθα ενάντιος τούτοις 14 
αμφοτεροις όστις ων άζιος μεγάλων άξιοι αυτός 
εαυτόν τούτων, και τοιούτος εστίν οίος άζιοΰν^ 

^ Γ : (cawep. ^ ου add. Sol. 

^ elvat (vel eluai τι^α) Ric. : riva. 

* [μεγάλων] ? liac 

* άξίαν ζ.άξιοΰντα vel ο'ώμ^ρον vel χαννούμ^νον'^ Ric. 

• οίον άξιοι Ric. (οΓοϊ άξιοι Sp.). 

• See a 39. » i.e. 11. 17 ff. 

* Perhaps the lecturer points to a diagram (Solomon). 
342. 



EUDEMIAN ELTHICS, III. v. io-l4 

no goodness without greatness ; owing to which each 
of the virtues seems to make men great-spirited in 
regard to the things Avith which that virtue is con- 

11 cerned, as we said.* But nevertheless there is a 
single virtue of greatness of spirit side by side with 
the other virtues, so that the possessor of this virtue 
must be termed great-spirited in a special sense. 
And since there are certain goods which are in some 
cases honourable and in others not, according to 
the distinction made before,'' and of goods of this 
sort some are truly great and others small, and some 
men deserve and claim the former, it is among 
these men that the great-spirited man must be 

12 looked for. And there are necessarily four varieties Four 
of claim : it is possible to deserve great things and towardr 
to claim them as one's desert ; and there are small iionoiu•. 
things and a man may deserve and claim things of . 
that size ; and as regards each of these ΐΛνο classes 

of things the reverse is possible — one man may be 
of such a character that although deserving small 
things he claims great ones — the goods held in high 
honour, and another man though deserving great 

13 things may claim small ones. Now the man worthy 
of small things but claiming great ones is blame- 
worthy, for it is foolish and not fine to obtain what 
does not correspond to one's deserts. And he also 
is blameworthy who though worthy of such things 
does not deem himself worthy to partake of them 

14 although they are available for him. But there is Definition of 
left here " the man who is the opposite of both of nj^ty. 
these, who being worthy of great things claims them 

as his desert,** and is of such a character as to deem 

^ The Greek phrase combines the senses of rating one's 
deserts high and asserting one's claims. 

343 



ARISTOTLE 

1238 a , , „ , , Ν / / y y 

iavTov οΰτος €7ταιν€τος και μ€σος τούτων. €7Τ€ΐ 1ί 

5 οΰν π€ρΙ τιμής alpeaiv καΐ χρησιν καΐ των άλ- 
λων αγαθών των εντίμων αρίστη εστί δια^εσι? η 
μ€γαλοφνχία /cat ου ττερί τα χρήσιμα,^ και τοϋτ 
άτΓοδιδο/Λβν τω μβγαλόφυχω ,^ άμα 8e /cat η μβσοτης 
[αντη]^ ε7ταίν€τωτάτη , Βηλον otl /cat ή μ€γαλοφυχία 
μζσότης άν €Ϊη. των δ' εναντίων, ωσπ^ρ Steypa- U 

10 φαμ€ν, Ύ) μ€ν cttl το άζιοΰν ίαυτον αγαθών μβγάλων 
άνάζίον οντά χαυνότης {τους τοιούτους γαρ χαυ- 
νονς λέγομ^ν όσοι μίγάλων οΐονται άζιοι elvai ουκ 
οντές), η δε vrept το άζιον οντά μη άζιοΰν εαυτόν 
μεγάλων μικροφυχία {μικρόφυχος* γαρ eti^at 8οκ€Ϊ 
όστις υπαρχόντων δι' ά Βικαίως αν άζιοΐτο μη 

15 a^toi μηθΐνός μεγάλου εαυτόν), ωστ ανάγκη καΐ 
την μ€γαλοφυχίαν βΐναι μ^σότητα χαυνότητος και 
μικροφυχίας. ό δε τέταρτος των διορισθέντων γ 
οϋτ€ πάμπαν φ^κτος οϋτ€ μ€γαλόφυχος, ire/Jt 
ooSev ων €χον^ μέγεθος- οϋτ€ γαρ άζιος οϋτ€ άζιοΐ 
μεγάλων, διό ουκ ενάντιος• καίτοι ho^eiev αν 

20 εναντίον ett^at τω μεγάλων άζιον οντά μΕγάλων το 
μικρών οντά άζιον μικρών^ άζιοΰν εαυτόν, ουκ u 
εστί. δ ενάντιος ουδέ' τω μ^μτττος etvai, ως γαρ ό 

* ού vepl τα χρ-ήσιμα hic Ric. : post άνοδίδομεν. 

* Fr. : TOf μεΎο,λόφνχον. ' Rac. 

* Fr. : μικροψύχον. 

* ώΐ' έχον Rac. {ίχορ ών Sus.) : ίχων. 

• μικρών add. Sus. ' Sp. : οί!τ«. 

" Or, emending the text, ' and is as worthy as he claims 
to be.' 

344 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, III. v. 14-18 

himself worthy " : he is praiseworthy, and he is in 

15 the middle between the two. Since, therefore, great- 
ness of spirit is the best disposition in relation to the 
choice and the employment of honour and of the other 
good things that are esteemed, and not in relation 
to useful things, and since we assign this to the 
great-spirited man, and since also at the same time 
the middle state is most praiseworthy, it is clear that 
even greatness of spirit must be a middle state. 

16 And of the opposites as shown in our diagram, the Vanity. 
one in the direction of deeming oneself worthy of 
great goods when one is not worthy is vanity (for 

the sort of men that fancy themselves worthy of 
great things though they are not we call vain), and 
the one that is concerned with not deeming oneself 
worthy of great things when one is worthy of them 
is smallness of spirit (for if a man does not think 
himself worthy of anything great although he pos- 
sesses qualities which would justly make him con- 
sidered worthy of it, he is thought small-spirited) ; 
so that it follows that greatness of spirit is a middle 

17 state between vanity and smallness of spirit. But Modest Seif- 
the fourth of the persons in our classification is ^**^'"^'"• 
neither entirely reprehensible nor is he great- 
spirited, as he is concerned with nothing possessing 
greatness, for he neither is nor thinks himself worthy 

of great things ; owing to which he is not the op- 
posite of the man of great spirit. Yet thinking 
oneself worthy of small things when one is worthy 
of small things might be thought the opposite of 
thinking oneself worthy of great ones when one is 

18 Λvorthy of great ones ; but he is not opposite to the 
great-spirited man because he is not blameworthy 

34,5 



ARISTOTLE 

1233 a 

λόγος KeXevei €χβι• καΐ 6 αυτός iari rfj φυσ€ΐ τω 
μζγαλοφύχφ• ών γαρ αζιοι, τούτων άζιοΰσιν αυτούς 
άμφω. και ο μ^ν yerotr' αν μ€γαλόφυχος , αξιώσει 19 

25 γαρ ών βστίν άζίος• 6 8e μικρόφυχος, δς υπαρ- 
χόντων αύτω μβγαλων κατά τιμήν aya^cDt' ούκ 
άξιοι, τι αν €7toUl^ el μικρών αζιος rjv; η'^ γαρ 
άν^ μζγάλων άξιων χαΰνος ην,'^ η en €λαττόνων. 
ΟΙΟ και ούθβις άν (ϊποι μικρόφνχον et τις μέτοικος 20 
ών άρχ€ΐν μη άξιοι ίαυτον αλλ' ύττζίκ€ΐ, αλλ' et 

30 τις ^ύγβνης ών και -ηγούμενος μβγα elvai το άρχ€ΐν. 

VI. Έστι 8e και ό μ€γαλοπρ€ττης ού -nepi την Ι 

τυχοΰσαν πραξιν και ττροαίρβσιν, άλλα την δα- 

πάνην/' el μη που κατά μ€ταφοράν λέγομβν άν€υ 

8e Βαπάνης μεγαλοπρέπεια ούκ εστίν, το μεν γαρ 

35 πρέπον εν κόσμω εστίν, 6 8ε κόσμος ούκ εκ των 
τυχόντων άναλωμάτων, αλλ' εν υπερβολή των 
αναγκαίων εστίν. ό 8η εν μεγάλη δαπάνη του 2 
πρέποντος μεγέθους προαιρετικός, και της τοιαύτης 
μεσότητος και επι τη τοιαύτη rjSovfj^ ορεκτικός, 
μεγαλοπρεπής . ό δ' επι τό μείζον και παρά μέλος 3 
ί23Ζ\) ανώνυμος• ού μην αλλ' έχουσϊ' τινά γειτνίασιν 
ους καλοΰσί τίνες άπειροκάλους και σαλάκωνας. 

1 Γ: eiVoi. ''Mb; et Pb. 

^ αν οπα. ΜΙ^: ei yap μεγάλων αξίων ζαΰτόν άνάξιον'^ ών Sp. 

* post ^ν lacunam Sus. 

' άλλα την δαττάν-ην infra post λ^ομεν Ric. 

* δαπάντι ? Ric. ' Cas. : έχα. 

" The MS. reading hardly gives a sense. An emendation 
gives ' for if he conceitedly thought himself worthy of great 
things when unworthy,' and supposes a gap in the text before 
the following words. 

* A probable emendation substitutes ' expenditure ' for 
' pleasure.' 

* The MS. text gives ' he has a certain set of neighbours 
346 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, III. v. 18— vi. 3 

either, for his character is as reason bids, and in 
nature he is the same as the great-spirited man, for 
both claim as their desert the things that they are 

19 worthy of. And he might become great-spirited, Mean- 

for he will claim the things that he is worthy of ; ^P^^tedness. 
whereas the small-spirited man, who when great 
goods corresponding to his worth are available does 
not think himself worthy of them, — what would he 
have done if his deserts were small ? For either he 
woxild have conceitedly thought himself worthy of 

20 great things, or of still less.** Hence nobody would 
call a man small-spirited for not claiming to hold 
office and submitting to authority if he is a resident 
alien, but one would do so if he were of noble birth 

Viand attached great importance to office. 
l) VI. The Magnificent Man also (except in a case Magnifl- 
) when we are using the term metaphorically) is not ^''"°'^• 
concerned with any and every action and purposive 
choice, but with expenditure. Without expenditure 
there is no magnificence, for it is what is appro- 
priate in ornament, and ornament does not result 
from any chance expenditure, but consists in going 

2 beyond the merely necessary. Therefore the mag- 
nificent man is the man who purposively chooses 
the appropriate greatness in great expenditure, and 
who even on the occasion of a pleasure ^ of this 

3 nature aims at this sort of moderation. There is its excess 
no name denoting the man who likes spending to '"^ ^^^ ' 
excess and inappropriately ; however the persons 
whom some people call tasteless and swaggering 

have a certain affinity to him." For instance if a 

whom some people call . . .' : but -γειτρίασίί is abstract at 
1232 a 21 and Pol. i., 1257 a 2. Its concrete use in later Greek, 
' neighbourhood '='set of neighbours' (Plutarch, etc.) has 
led to corruption here. 

347 



ARISTOTLE 

1233 b 

οίον el els γάμον δαπανών τις του αγαπητού, 
πλούσιος cor, δο /cet ττρ4ττ€ΐν εαυτω τοιαύτην κατα- 
σκίυην οΐαν^ άγαθοΒαιμονιστας ίστιώντι, οντος 
5 μ^ν μικροττρβπης, 6 δε τοιοιίτους 8€χομ€νος €Κ€ΐνως 
μη 8όζης χάριν μη^€ δι' βζουσίαν όμοιος τω 
σαλάκωνι, 6 δε /car' άζίαν και ώς 6 λόγος μβγαλο- 
ττρζττης• το γαρ πρ€7τον κατ* άζίαν ίστίν ovdev 
γαρ πρ€π€ΐ των παρά την άζίαν. δει δε πρέπον 4 
(^καθ έκαστοι')^ είναι* και γαρ του πράττοντος^ 
κατ άζίαν, και περί ον^ και πβρι δ, οίον π^ρΐ οίκξτου 

10 γάμον eTepov το πρέπον και π€ρι ερωμένου• και 
αύτω, ειττερ εστί* τοσούτον η τοιούτον, οίον την 
θ^ωρίαν ουκ ωοντο^ Θε/χιστοκλεΓ πρέπ^ιν ην έποιη- 
σατο Όλυμπίαζΐ, δια την προϋπάρζασαν ταπεινό- 
τητα, άλλα Κι/χωΐΊ. ό δ' όπως έτυχαν έχων προς 5 
την άζίαν ούθΐΐς^ τούτων. 

15 Και ετΓ έλβυθβριότητος ωσαύτως' εστί γάρ τις 
οϋτ ελευθέριος ού'τ' ανελεύθερος.^ 

VII. Σ;^εδόρ' δε και των άλλων έκαστα των περί Ι 
το ήθος επαιί'ετώι^ κ:αι φεκτών τα μεν ύπερβολαί 
τα δ έλλείφεις τά δε μεσότητές εισι παθητικαί, 
οίον ο φθονερός και ό* επιχαιρέκακος. καθ* ας 

20 γάρ έξεις λέγονται, 6 μεν φθόνος το λνπεΐσθαι έπι 

^ Rac. : οίον. 2 lac. 

* Bus. : πρίίΓοντοί. * lac, : καΊ ιτρέττον. 

" έστϊ ? lac. : έηΐ, {βστϊ τοσοΰτα και toiovtos, ant ftwtp έστΙ 
τοσούτον κα.1 τοιούτον tr. supra post 9 wepi δ Ric.) 

* Sp. (vel ψΐτο . . . coinici nomine oniisso) : i^sto. 
' ούδύί Γ: δ oi'Seis. 

* Cas. : Tis J)s έλΐνθέριοί 6ταν (XtvOepos. 

* ό add. Rac. 

» i.e. persons who only drink the formal toast (' Here's to 
Good Luck '), with which dinner ended. 
348 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, III. vi. 3— vii. 1 

rich man spending money on the wedding of a 
favourite thinks it fitting for him to have the sort 
of arrangements that vt'ould be fitting when enter- 
taining abstainers," he is shabby, while one who 
entertains guests of that sort after the manner of 
a wedding feast, if he does not do it for the sake 
of reputation or to gain an office, resembles the 
swaggerer ; but he that entertains suitably and as 
reason directs is magnificent, for the fitting is the 
suitable, as nothing is fitting that is unsuitable. 

4 But it must be fitting in each particular, that is, 
in suitability to the agent and to the recipient and 
to the occasion — for example, what is fitting at the 
wedding of a servant is not what is fitting at that of 
a favourite ; and it is fitting for the agent himself, 
if it is of an amount or quality suitable to him— 
for example people thought that the mission that 
Themistocles conducted to Olympia was not fitting 
for him, because of his former low station, but would 

5 have been for Cimon.^ But he who is casual in 
regard to the question of suitability is not in any of 
these classes. 

Ο Similarly in regard to liberality : a man may be 
(J) neither liberal nor illiberal. 

1 1 VII. Generally speaking the other praiseworthy Moderate 
' and blameworthy states of character also are ex- tvorth™""'' 
cesses or deficiencies or middle states, but in respect states of 

/• . r. . .1 . J Feeling. 

of an emotion : for mstance, the envious man and 
the malicious. For — to take the states of character 
after which they are named — Envy means being 

* The story of Themistocles at the Olympic festival incur- 
ring disapproval by vying with Cimon in the splendour of 
his equipment and entertainments is told by. Plutarch, Vit. 
Them. 5. 

34.9 



ARISTOTLE 

1233 b 

τοις κατ άζίαν eu πράττουσίν Ιστιν, το δε του 
εττιχαιρζ κάκου ττάθος €στΙν^ αυτό άνώννμον, αλλ' 
6 €χων Βηλός eVri^ τω χαίρ^ιν^ ταΓ? παρά την 
άζίαν κακοττραγίαις' μέσος δε τούτων 6 ν€μ€ση- 2 
τίκος, και ο €κάλουν οΐ αρχαίοι την ν€μ€σίν, το 

25 ΑυττζΙσθαι μβν inl ταΐς παρά την άζίαν κακο- 
πραγίαις καΐ ^ύπραγίαις, χαίρβιν δ' eVt ται? ά^ιαι?• 
δί.0 καΐ deov οϊονται eivai την νάμ^σιν. 

Αιδώ? δε μ€σότης άναισχυντίας και καταπλήξεων • 3 
ο μβν γάρ μηΒβμιάς φροντίζων 8όξης αναίσχυντος, 
ο δε πάσης ομοίως καταπλήζ , ο δε της των 
φαινομένων επιεικών αΐ^ήμων. 

30 Φίλια δε μεσάτης έχθρας και κολακεία?• 6 μ€ν 4 
γαρ €ύχ€ρώς άπαντα προς τάς επιθυμίας ομιλών 
κόλαζ, ο δε προς άπάσας άντικρούων άπ€χθητικός , 
ο δε μη* προς αττασαν η8ονην μητ^ ακολουθών μητ^ 
αντιτβίνων, αλλά προς το φαινόμενον ββλτιστον, 
φίλος. 

Άί. Σίζμνότης δε μ€σότης αυ^αδεια? και αρέσκεια?• ό 
ό μ€ν γάρ μη^έν προς eTepov ζών αλλά^ κατα- 
φρονητικός αύθάΒης, 6 δε πάντα προς άλλον και" 
πάντων βλάττων άρεσκος, 6 δε τα μίν τα δε μη, 
και προς τους άζίους οϋτως €χων, σεμνός. 

Ο δ' αληθής και άπλοϋς, ον καλοΰσιν αύθέκαστον, ο 
μέσος του είρωνος και αλαζόνος• 6 μεν γάρ επι τά 

1234 a χείρω καθ^ αύτοϋ φευΒόμενος μη άγνοών είρων, ό 

δ 67Γΐ τά βελτίω άλαζών, 6 δ' ως βχει, αληθής 

^ ίστίν Sp. : ΐπΐ rb. * ίστι Cas, : iirl. 

' ό χαίρων Hie. ■• /:λ7) Sp. : μήτΐ. 

* άλλα Γ : οηι. codd. (nonnulli άκαταφρονητικό^). 

* καΐ Sp. : ^ καί. 

" The man who calls each thing itself, i.e. what it reall\ 
is, calls a spade a spade. 

350 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, III. vii. 1-6 

pained at people who are deservedly prosperous, 
while the emotion of the malicious man is itself 
nameless, but the possessor of it is shown by his 

2 feeling joy at undeserved adversities ; and midway 
between them is the righteously indignant man, 
and what the ancients called Righteous Indignation 
— feeling pain at undeserved adversities and pro- 
sperities and pleasure at those that are deserved ; 
hence the idea that Nemesis is a deity. 

3 Modesty is a middle state between Shamelessness 
and Bashfulness : the man who pays regard to 
nobody's opinion is shameless, he who regards 
everybody's is bashful, he who regards the opinion 
of those who appear good is modest. 

4 Friendliness is a middle state between Animosity 
and Flattery ; the man who accommodates himself 
readily to his associates' desires in everything is a 
flatterer, he who runs counter to them all shows 
animosity, he who neither falls in with nor resists 
every pleasure, but falls in with what seems to be the 
best, is friendly. 

5 Dignity is a middle state between Self-will and 
Obsequiousness. A man who in his conduct pays 
no regard at all to another but is contemptuous 
is self-willed ; he who regards another in everything 
and is inferior to everybody is obsequious ; he who 
regards another in some things biit not in others, 
and is regardful of persons worthy of regard, is 
dignified. 

6 The truthful and sincere man, called ' downright,'" 
is midway betΛveen the dissembler and the charlatan. 
He that wittingly makes a false statement against 
himself that is depreciatory is a dissembler, he that 
exaggerates his merits is a charlatan, he that speaks 

351 



ARISTOTLE 

1234 a ^ , „ / y "\ ' ^ 1 \ 

/cat καθ' "Ομηρον π€ττννμ€νος• και ολωζ ο μ€ν φιλ- 
αλήθης, οΐ δε φίλοφ€υΒ€Ϊς .^ 

"Εστί δε καΐ η ^ύτραττ^λία μ€σότης, και ο ev- 7 

•Ο τράπίλος μέσος του άγροίκον /cat δυστραπελου 
/cat τον βωμολόχου. ωσπερ γαρ περί τροφην ο 
σικχός του παμφάγου δtα0ε'pεt τω 6 μεν μηθεν η 
ολίγα /cat ;^αλε7Γώ9 ττροσίεσθαι, 6 δε πάντα ευχερώς, 
οϋτω /cat ό άγροικος έχει προς τον φορτικον και 
βωμολόχον 6 μεν γαρ ούθέν γελοΐον αλλ' η^ χαλε- 

10 πώς προσίεται, 6 δε πάντα ευχερώς /cat τ^δε'ω?. 
δει δ' ούΒετερον, άλλα τα μεν τα δε μή, και κατά 
λόγον ούτος δ' ό* ευτράπελος, η δ' ά77όδεtζ•tJ η 8 
αυτί]• τ^ '^^ yct/f' ευτραπελία η τοιαύτη, και μη ην 
μεταφέροντες λεγομεν, επιεικέστατη έξις, και η 
μεσάτης ε'7Γαt^'ετr^, τα δ' άκρα φεκτά. οΰσης δε 

1^ 8ιττης της ευτραπελίας [η μεν γαρ εν τώ χαιρειν 
εστί τώ γελοίω, και* τώ εις αυτόν εάν η τοιονΒί, 
ων εν και το σκώμμά εστt^', η δ' εν τώ Βυνασθαι 
τοιαύτα πορίζεσθαι) , ετεραι μεν είσιν άλλτ^λωΐ', α;α- 
φότεραι μεντοι μεσότητες• και γαρ 6 8υνάμενος^ 9 
τοιαύτα πορίζεσθαι εφ' οιοις^ ησθησεται ο' εύ 

^0 κρίνων καν εις αύτον fj το γελοΐον, μέσος εσται 
του φορτικού και του φυχροϋ. 6 δ ορός ούτος 
βελτίων η το μη^ λυπηρον εt^'αt το λεχθεν τω σκω- 
πτομενω οντι οποιωοΰν μάλλον γαρ δει τω εν 
μεσότητι οντι άρεσκειν ούτος γαρ κρίνει ευ. 

^ Rac. : ό &i φιλοψενδή^. 
» άλλ' ij Rac. {y Sp). : αλλά. * ό add. Fr. 

* καΐ <δη καΙ> ? Rac. ^ Syl. : τόν δυνάμενον. 

• Rac. : Sffots. ' ό add. Fr. * μη add, Cas. 

■ The term eorpaveXot means literally ' able to turn easily,' 
versatile ; it denotes both ' witty ' and ' easy-going.' 

352 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, III. vii. 6-9 

of himself as he is is truthful and in Homer's phrase 
' sagacious ' ; and in general the one is a lover of 
truth and the others lovers of falsehood. 

7 Wittiness " also is a middle state, and the witty 
man is midway between the boorish or stiff man and 
the buffoon. For just as in the matter of food the 
squeamish man differs from the omnivorous in that 
the former takes nothing or little, and that reluc- 
tantly, and the latter accepts everything readily, 
so the boor stands in relation to the vulgar man 
or buffoon — the former takes no joke except with 
difficulty, the latter accepts everything easily and 
with pleasure. Neither course is right : one should 
allow some things and not others, and on principle, 

8 — that constitutes the witty man. The proof of the 
formula is the same as in the other cases : wittiness 
of this kind (not the quality ^ to which we apply the 
term in a transferred sense) is a very becoming sort 
of character, and also a middle state is praiseworthy, 
whereas extremes are blameworthy. But as there 
are two kinds of wit (one consisting in liking a joke, 
even one that tells against oneself if it is funny, for 
instance a jeer, the other in the ability to produce 
things of this sort), these kinds of vnt differ from one 

9 another, but both are middle states ; for a man who 
can produce jokes of a sort that will give pleasure 
to a person of good judgement even though the 
laugh is against himself will be midway between the 
vulgar man and the frigid. This is a better definition 
than that the thing said must not be painful to the 
victim whatever sort of man he may be — rather, it 
must give pleasure to the man in the middle position, 
since his judgement is good. 

" Viz. βωμολοχία, ' bufToonery,' N.E. 1128 a 15. 

2 A 353 



ARISTOTLE 

1234» , -^ , , , , / 

Πασαι δ αύται αί μεσοτητβς ετταινβται μ€ν, 1 
25 ονκ elat δ' aperai, ού8' αί ivavTiat κακίαι, avev 
προαψ€σ£ως yap• ταΰτα δε ττάντ earlv iv ται? 
των παθημάτων SiaipeaeoLV, €καστον γαρ αυτών 
πάθος τι εστίν, δια δε το φυσικά klvai els τάς 1 
φυσικάς συμβάϊΧλεται άρβτάς' έ'στι γάρ, ωσπ^ρ 
λ€χθΎ}σ€ται iv τοις ύστερον, ίκάσττ) πως άρετη 
30 και φυσ€ΐ καΐ άλλως, μετά φρονησεως . 6 μεν ουν 1 
φθόνος εΙς ά8ικίαν συμβάλλεται {προς γάρ άλλον 
αί πράζεις αί άττ' αύτοΰ) καΐ η νεμεσις εΙς δίκαιο - 
συνην καΐ^ η αιδώ? εις σωφροσυνην (διο και ορί- 
ζονται iv τω γένει τούτω την σωφροσύνην), ο δ 
αληθής και φευ^ης ο μεν εμφρων ο δ' άφρων. 
1234 b "Εστί δ' ivavτιώτεpov τοις άκροις το μέσον η ] 
iκεΐva άλλι^λοι?, διότι το μεν μετ^ ούΒετερου yii'e- 
ται αυτών, τά Se ττολλά/ίΐ? μετ^ αλλήλων, και εισιν 
ivίoτε οι αύτοι θρασύδειλοι, και τά μεν άσωτοι τα 
δε ανελεύθεροι, και δλως ανώμαλοι κακώς• όταν μεν 1 
5 yap καλώς ανώμαλοι ωσιν, μέσοι γίνονται, εν τω 
μέσω γάρ iστί πως τά άκρα. 

Αί δ' ει^αντιώσει? ου Βοκοΰσιν ύπάρχειν τοις 
άκροις προς το μέσον ομοίως άμφότεραι, αλλ οτε 
μεν καθ^ ύπερβολην ότε δε κατ^ ελλειφιν. αίτια ] 
δε τά τε πρώτα ρηθεντα 8ύο, ολιγότης τε, οίον 
10 τών προς τά ηΒεα αναίσθητων , και δτι i^* ο άμαρ- 
τάνομεν μάλλον, τοΰτο ivavτιώτεpov ειι^αι ΒοκεΖ• το ] 

^ καΐ add. Rac. 

« Not in E.E., but cf. N.E. vi., 1144 b 1-17. 

* Truthfulness and mendacity contribute to wisdom and 
folly as ν^μεσα and φθόνοί do to δικαιοσύνη and αδικία, and 
α/δώ{ (and άΐ'αιδ(ία) to σωφροσύνη (and ακολασία). 

' Cf. 1229 a 22-b 4. 
854 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, III. vii. 10-16 

10 All these middle states, though praiseworthy, are Thesepraise- 
not virtues, nor are the opposite states vices, for they state7of 
do not involve purposive choice ; they are all in the Feeling pro- 
classification of the emotions, for each of them is an virtues. 

11 emotion. But because they are natural they con- 
tribute to the natural virtues ; for, as will be said 
in what follows," each virtue exists both naturally 
and otherwise, that is, in conjunction with thought. 

12 Therefore envy contributes to injustice (for the 
actions that spring from it affect another person), 
and righteous indignation to justice, and modesty to 
temperance (owing to which people even define tem- 
perance as a species of emotion), and the sincere and 
false are respectively wise and foolish.'' 

13 And the mean is more opposed to the extremes Extremes 
than the extremes are to one another, because the '^ ™®*' ' 
mean does not occur in combination with either ex- 
treme, whereas the extremes often do occur in 
combination with one another, and sometimes the 

same men are venturesome cowards, or extravagant 
in some things and illiberal in others, and in general 

14 not uniform in a bad way — for when men lack uni- 
formity in a good way, this results in men of the 
middle characters, since the mean contains both 
extremes. 

The opposition existing between the mean and Appendix to 
the extremes does not seem to be the same in the 
case of both the extremes, but sometimes the greater 
opposition is by way of excess, sometimes by way 

15 of deficiency. The causes of this are partly the two 
first mentioned,^ rarity (for example, the rarity of 
people insensitive to pleasant things) and the fact 
that the error to which we are more prone seems 

16 more opposite to the mean, and thirdly the fact that 

§55 



ARISTOTLE 

12S4 b 

8e τρίτον, OTL TO ομοιότβρον "ήττον εναντίον (jyaive- 

ται, οίον ττίττονθζ το θράσος προς το θάρσος^ και 

ασωτία προς ^λ^νΟβριότ-ητα. 

YVepl μ€ν ονν των άλλων αρετών των ετταινετων 

€'ίρηταί σχεδόν", π€ρΙ δε 8ικαίοσυνης -η8η XcKTeov. 

^ τό θάρσοί irpbs το θράσος Μ^ (sed cf. 1220 b 39) : τό θάρσοί 
(potius θράσοί Rac.) wpbs την άνδρΐίαν Βζ. 

" Or, ' confidence ' ; but perhaps the Greek should be 
altered to give ' courage.' 



356 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, III. vii. 15-16 

the extreme that more resembles the mean seems 
less opposite to it, as is the case with daring in 
relation to boldness " and extravagance in relation 
to liberality. 

We have therefore sufficiently discussed the other 
praiseworthy virtues, and must now speak about 
Justice. 

(Books IV, V, VI are omitted, as they are identical with 
Books V, VI, VII of the Nicomachean Ethics.) 



357 



Η 

1234 b 

I. YlepL φίλιας, τι iari καΐ ποιόν η, και τις 6 1 
φίλος, καΐ Trorepov η φίλια μ,οναχώς Aeyerat η 

20 ττλβοναχώς , καΐ el ττλβοναχώς, πόσα εστίν ^ ert 8e 
πώς χρηστεον τω φίλω καΐ τι το Βίκαίον το φιλικόν, 
επισκεπτβον ούθβνός ήττον των περί τα ηθη καλών 
καΐ αιρετών, της τ€ γαρ πολιτικής έργον είναι 2 
^οκεΐ ]θΐάλιστα ποιησαι φιλίαν, και την άρετην δια 
τοϋτό φασιν eti^ai χρησιμον ου γαρ ενΒεχεσθαι 

25 φίλους εαυτοΐς εΐναι τους αδικούμενους υπ* άλΑτ^- 
λων. ετι το Βίκαιον και το αδικον περί τους φίλους 3 
eti^ai /χάλιστα πάντες φαμεν, και ό αυτός 8οκεΐ 
άνηρ eti^at και aya^o? και φίλος, και φιλία ηθική 
τις eti^at έξις• και εάν τις βούληται ποιησαι^ ώστε 
μη άΒικεΙν, άλις^ φίλους ποιησαι, οι γαρ αληθινοί 

30 φίλοι ουκ άΒικοΰσιν. άλλα μην και εάν δίκαιοι 4 
ωσιν, ουκ ά8ικήσουσιν• ή ταυτόΐ' άρα ή εγγύς τι ή 
δικαιοσύνη και ή φιλία. 

Προ? 8έ τούτοις τών μεγίστων aya^cDr τον φίλον 5 
eit-ai ύπολαμβάνομεν, την 8ε άφιλίαν και την 
ερημιαν Βεινότατον, οτι ό βίος άπας και ή εκον- 
1285 a σιος ομιλία μετά τούτων μετ* οΙκείων γάρ η μετά 

^ πύσαι daiv Sp. : ποσαχω^ ? Rac. (ττοσαχώ? (στίν vel ττόσα 
έστϊν <ΐίδη> Βζ.). * πεΐσαι ? Ric. 

* &λΐί lac. : άλλ' είϊ. {dWovs, φί\ον$ ποιήσει Sp., dWovs φίλονί 
ΐΓοιησαι Se'iv Fr.) 

358 



BOOK VII 

1 I. Friendship— its nature and qualities, what con- pbiendshu 
stitutes a friend, and whether the term friendship its nature 
has one or several meanings, and if several, how *" 
many, and also what is our duty towards a friend 

and what are the just claims of friendship — is a 
matter that calls for investigation no less than any 
of the things that are fine and desirable in men's 

2 characters. For to promote friendship is thought to 
be the special task of political science ; and people 
say that it is on this account that goodness is a 
valuable thing, for persons wrongfully treated by 

3 one another cannot be each other's friends. Further- 
more we all say that justice and injustice are chiefly 
displayed towards friends ; it is thought that a 
good man is a friendly man, and that friendship is a 
state of the moral character ; and if one wishes to 
make men not act unjustly, it is enough to make them 
friends, for true friends do not wrong one another. 

4 But neither will men act unjustly if they are just ; ^.^ 
therefore justice and friendship are either the same " 

or nearly the same thing. 

5 In addition to this, we consider a friend to be one 
of the greatest goods, and friendlessness and solitude 
a very terrible thing, because the whole of hfe and 
voluntary association is with friends ; for we pass 

359 



ARISTOTLE 

1285 a 

συγγενών η μςθ" εταίρων συν^ιημβρευομίν , η τέκ- 
νων η γονέων η γυναι,κός. και τά ίδια δίκαια τα ι 
ττρος τους φίλους εστίν εφ' ημΐν μόνον, τά δε προς 
τους άλλους νενομοθετηται καΐ ουκ εφ^ ημΐν. 
5 Απορβΐταί 8ε ττολλα περί της φίλιας, πρώτον μεν ' 
ως οι εζωθεν περιλαμβάνοντες καΐ επΙ πλέον 
λέγοντες. 8οκεΐ γαρ τοις μεν το δμοίον τω όμοίω 
eit'at φίλον, όθεν εϊρηται 

ως αΐεΐ τον ομοιον άγει θεός ως τόν όμοιον 
και γαρ κολοιός πάρα κολοίόν . . . 
εγνω 8ε φώρ τε φώρα καΐ λύκος λύκον. 

10 OL 8ε φυσιολόγοι καΐ την όλην φΰσιν 8ιακοσμοΰσιν ί 
ο-ρχην λαβόντες τό τό ομοιον ίεναι προς τό όμοιον, 
8ιο Έιμπε8οκλης και την κυν^ εφη καθησθαι επΙ 
της κεραμί8ος δια τό εχειν πλείστον όμοιον. 

01 μεν οΰν οϋτω τόν^ φίλον λεγουσιν οι 8ε τό ί 
εναντίον τω εκαι^τιω φασιν etvat φίλον, τό μεν γαρ 

15 ερώμενον και επιθυμητόν ττασιν είναι φίλον, επι- 
θυμεΐν^ 8ε ου τό ζηρόν του ξηροΰ άλλα τοΰ^ ύγροΰ 
[ουεν ειρηται 

ερα μεν όμβρου γαία, 



μεταβολή πάντων γλυκύ' 

^ ν.1. τό. * Fr. : ένιθνμΐΐ. 

' του add, Μ•>. 

" Od. χνϋ. 218. 

* ' Birds of a feather flock together.' Sc. ll^avet, ' perches ' : 
an iambic verse quoted in full M.M. 1208 b 9, and in the 
form KoXoidl• ποτΐ κολοών N.E. viii., 1155 a 35, where the 
dialect suggests that it is from a Doric poet (unknown). 
360 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. i. 5-9 

our days with our family or relations or comrades, 

6 children, parents or wife. And our private rights 
in relation to our friends depend only on ourselves, 
whereas our rights in relation to the rest of men 
are established by law and do not depend on us. 

7 Many questions are raised about friendship — first, ^^Z'"'^"'^* 
on the line of those who take in wider considera- on\ikene8s 
tions and extend the term. For some hold that like 

is friend to like, whence the sayings : 

Mark how God ever brings like men together " ; 
For jackdaw by the side of jackdaw . . .* ; - 
And thief knows thief and wolf his fellow wolf." - 

8 And the natural philosophers even arrange the 
whole of nature in a system by assuming as a first 
principle that like goes to like, owing to which 
Empedocles '^ said that the dog sits on the tiling -; 
because it is most like him.* 

9 Some people then give this account of a friend ; or on con- 
but others say that opposite is dear to opposite, 

since it is what is loved and desired that is dear to 
everybody, and the dry does not desire the dry but 
the wet (whence the sayings — 

Earth loveth rain/ ' 
and 

In all things change is sweet — " 

'^ ' Set a thief to catch a thief.' The origin of the verse is 
unknown. 

^ Mystic philosopher, man of science and statesman of 
Agrigentum (Girgenti), fl. 490 b.c. 

* Presumably, like in colour ; true of Greek dogs to-day. 
Empedocles does not appear to have gone on to infer pro- 
tective mimicry. 

f Quoted as from Euripides, N.E. viii., 1 155 a 34 ; the play 
is not known. " Euripides, Orestes 234. 

361 



ARISTOTLE 

1235 a 

η δε μ€ταβολ'η eiV τουναντίον)' το δ' δμοίον εχθρον 
τω όμοίω, καΐ γαρ 

Κ€ραμ€νς Κ€ραμ€Ϊ κοτ€ζΐ, 

και τα αττό των αυτών τρεφόμενα ττολίμια άλλτ^λοι? 
20 ζώα. αύται μ^ν ουν αϊ ύποληφας τοσούτον δι- 10 
€στασιν• ol• μεν γαρ το ομοιον φίλον,^ το δ' ivavTLOV 
ττολβμιον — 

τω nXeovt δ' aiet πολβμων καθίσταται 
τουλασσον, βχθρας θ^ ημέρας κατάρχ^ται, 

€TL 06 και οί τόποι κ^χωρισμένοι των εναντίων, •η \\ 
25 he φιλία 8οκ€Ϊ συνάγ€ΐν• οι δε τα εναντία φίλα, και 
Ηρακλίΐτος επίτιμα τω ποιησαντι 

ως €ρις €Κ τ€ θβών κάξ^ ανθρώπων άπόλοιτο, 

ου γαρ αν eti^at άρμονίαν μη οντος 6ζ€ος και βαρ4ος, 
ουθ€ τα ςωα άνευ οηΛ€ος και άρρενος ενάντιων 
όντων. 

Δυο μεν οΰν^ αύται δο^αι περί φιλίας είσί, λίαν 12 

30 τε καθόλου κεχωρισμβναι^ τοσούτον, άλλαι δε η8η 
εγγυτίρω^ και οικβιότεραι' τών φαινομένων, τοις 
μεν γαρ ουκ εν^εχεσθαι 8οκεΐ τους φαύλους ειΐ'αι 
φίλους, άλλα μόνον τους αγαθούς• τοις δ' άτοπον 
ει μη φιλοΰσιν at μητέρες τα τέκνα {φαίνεται 13 
δ τ^δε* και εν τοις θηρίοις ενοΰσα φιλία• προαπο- 

35 θνησκειν γοΰν^ αίροΰνται τών τέκνων) . τοις δε το 14 
χρησιμον Βοκεΐ φίλον είναι μόνον σημεΐον δ' δτι 

^ Fr. : at. 2 φίλον <φασΙ> vel <οωΐ'ταί> Ric. 

* Rac. : καΐ {ξκ τ' II. xviii. 107). 

* ονν add. Sus. * καΐ Κΐχωρισμ,έναι Cas. 

• iyyvTtpaiM^. 7 οίκεώτίραί Rac.: oUdan. 

* δ* ^<5e Rac. : 6k (yap Γ), « Fr. : oiV. 
362 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. i. 9-14 

change being transition to the opposite), whereas 
hke hates Uke, for ^^ 

Potter 'gainst potter hath a grudge," τ^ 
and animals that hve on the same food are hostile 

10 to one another. These opinions, therefore, are thus 
widely variant. One party thinks that the like is 
friend and the opposite foe — 

The less is rooted enemy to the more 
For ever, and begins the day of hate,* ' 

11 and moreover adversaries are separated in locality, 
whereas friendship seems to bring men together. 
The other party say that opposites are friends, and 
Heracleitus " rebukes the poet who wrote — 

Would strife might perish out of heaven and earth,"* 
for, he says, there would be no harmony without 
high and low notes, and no animals without male 
and female, which are opposites. 

12 These, then, are two opinions about friendship, and or on 
being so widely separated they are too general * ; ^"^ "^ ' 
but there are others that are closer together and 
more akin to the facts of observation. Some persons 
think that it is not possible for bad men to be friends,' 

but only for the good. Others think it strange that 

13 mothers should not love their own children (and 
maternal affection we see existing even among 
animals — at least, animals choose to die for their 

14 young). Others hold that only what is useful is oio." 
a friend, the proof being that all men actually do 

*" Hesiod, Works and Days 25 (' Two of a trade never agree '). 

^ Euripides, Phoenissae 539 f. (έχθρας ήμ^ρα? = Ιχ^ρα?, cf. 
δούΧιον ^/χαρ = δουλίία, Paley). 

' The natural philosopher of Ephesus, β. end of 6th cent. 
B.C. ** Iliad xviii. 107. 

» i.e. being so absolutely opposite to one another, they are 
too sweeping, and do not really correspond with the facts. 

363 



ARISTOTLE 

1235 a ^ ^ ^ 

KaL οιώκουσι ταΰτα πάντες, τα δε άχρηστα και 
αντοί αύτών^ άττοβάΧλουσιν (ωσπερ Ίίωκράτης 6 
γέρων έλεγε τον πτνελον καΐ τάς τρίχας καΐ τους 
όνυχας παραβάλλων) , καΐ^ τά μόρια οτι ριπτοΰμεν 
1235 b τά άχρηστα, καΐ τέλος το σώμα, όταν άποθάντ], 
άχρηστος γαρ 6 νεκρός• οΐς δε χρησιμον, φνλάτ- 
τουσιν, ωσπερ εν Αίγύπτω . ταΰτα Srj πάντα δοκει ι 
μεν ύπεναντία άλληλοις εΐναι. τό τε γαρ ομοιον^ 
άχρηστον τω ομοίω καΐ εναντιότης ομοιότητας 
5 απέχει πλείστον , και το εναντίον άχρηστότατον τω 
εναντιω, φθαρτικόν γαρ του εναντίου τό εναντίον, 
ετι Βοκεΐ τοις μεν paSiov τό κτησασθαι φίλον, τοις ι 
δε σπανιώτατον ■^/ι^ών'αι, και ουκ εν8έχεσθαι άνευ 
ατυχίας*, τοις γαρ ευ πράττουσι βούλονται πάντες 
8οκεΐν φίλοι είναι- οι δ' ουδέ τοις συν^ιαμένουσιν ] 

10 εν ταΐ? ατυ^^ιαι? ά^ιοΰσι πιστευειν, ως εξαπα- 
τώντας και προσποιούμενους , ίνα κτήσωνται δια, 
της τών ατυχουντων ομιλία? πάλιν εύτυχούντων 
φιλίαν. 

II. Αηπτεος 8η λόγος^ όστις ημΐν άμα τά τε 1 
δοκτουι^τα περί τούτων μάλιστα αποδώσει και τάς 

15 απορίας λύσει και τάς εναντιώσεις. τοΰτο δ' εσται 
εάν ευλόγως φαίνηται τά εναντία 8οκοΰντα. μάλιστα 
γαρ όμολογούμενος ό τοιούτος εσται λόγος τοις 
φαινομενοις• συμβαίνει δε μενειν τάς εναντιώσεις 
εαν εστί μεν ως αληθές η τό λεγόμενον εστί δ' 
ως ου. 

Εχει δ άπορίαν και πότερον τό η8ύ η τό aya^ol•' 2 

^ ά</)' έαντων lac. * [και] ? Rac. 

' δμοιον add. Fr. * Vict. : ΐΰτνχίαί. 

' Cas. : λοίττόί. (λοιποί <λ070Γ> Sp., rpoiros Syl.) 

364 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. i. 14— ii. 2 

pursue the useful, and discard what is useless event 
in their own persons (as the old Socrates " used to I 
say, instancing spittle, hair and nails), and that wei 
throw away even parts of the body that are of no* 
use, and finally the body itself, when it dies, as a 
corpse is useless — but people that have a use for it 

15 keep it, as in Egypt. Now all these factors ^ seem 
to be somewhat opposed to one another. For like?i 

is of no use to like and opposition is farthest f » 
removed from likeness, and at the same time oppo-K*' - 
site is most useless to opposite, since opposite is 

16 destructive of opposite. Moreover some think that i» it 

to gain a friend is easy, but others that it is the '"®'i"®" ^ 
rarest thing to recognize a friend, and not possible 
without misfortune, as everybody wants to be thought 

17 a friend of the prosperous ; and others maintain 
that we must not trust even those who stay with us 
in our misfortunes, because they are deceiving us 
and pretending, in order that by associating with 
us when unfortunate they may gain our friendship 
when we are again prosperous. 

1 II. Accordingly a line of argument must be taken 
that will best explain to us the views held on these 
matters and at the same time solve the difficulties 
and contradictions. And this will be secured if the 
contradictory views are shown to be held with some 
reason. For such a line of argument will be most 
in agreement with the observed facts : and in the 
upshot, if what is said is true in one sense but not 
true in another, both the contradictory views stand 
good. 

2 There is also a question as to whether what is Friendship 

is based on 
" Cf. 1216 b 3. 
* i.e. likeness, contrariety, utility (Solomon). 

365 



ARISTOTLE 

1235 b ^ ^ ^ , X X « i- > 

20 iaTL TO φίλονμ€νον. el μ€ν γαρ φιΧοϋμ^ν ov εττι- 

θυμοΰμ€ν (/cat μάλιστα 6 βρως τοιούτον, ovBelg 

γαρ 

βραστής όστις ουκ aet φιλβΐ), 

Ύ) δ' eTn^fyLtia τον η^βος, τανττ) μ€ν το φιλουμβνον 
το rjBv, €1 8e ο βονλόμεθα, το aya^of εστί δ 
€Tepov το rjSv και το aya^or. 

Ilept 8rj^ τούτων και των άλλων των συγγενών 3 

25 τούτοι? 7Τ€ΐρατ€ον Siopioai, λαβοΰσιν άρχην τηνΒζ. 
το γαρ όρβκτον και βονλητόν η το αγαθόν η το 
φαινόμβνον aya^ov. διο και το ηΒν όρεκτόν, φαι- 
νόμ€νον γάρ τι aya^ot'• τοΓ? μβν γαρ Βοκβΐ, τοις 
δε φαίνεται καν μη SoKjj (ου γάρ ev ταύτω της 
φνχης η φαντασία και η δό^α). οτι μβντοι φίλον 

30 και το αγαθόν και το rjSv Βηλον. 

Τούτου δ€ 8ιωρισμ€νον λητττ4ον ύπόθεσιν CTcpav. 4 
των γάρ aya^cui' τά μεν απλώς εστίν aya^ci, τα δε 
τινί, απλώς δ' ον• και τά αυτά απλώς aya^a και 
απλώς rjSea. τά μεν γάρ τώ νγιαίνοντί φαμεν 
σώματι συμφέροντα απλώς efvat σώ/^ατι aya^ci, τα 

35 δε τώ κάμνοντι ου, οίον φαρμακείας και τομας' 
ομοίως δε και τ^δε'α απλώς σώματι τά τω ύγιαίνοντι 5 
και όλοκληρω, οίον το εν τώ φωτί ζην'' και ου το 
εν τω σκότει• καίτοι τω οφθαλμιώντι εναντίως. 
και οίνος τβίων ούχ 6 τω Βιεφθαρμενω την γλώτταν 
υπό οινοφλυγίας , επεί ενίοτε^ όζος παρεγχεουσιν , 

1 Sus. : δέ ν\ om. Mb. 

* lac. (cf. Hist. An. 488 a 26 τά μ^ ννκτ^ρόβια . . . τά δ' eu 
ΎψφωτΙζ^)'. όραν. ' Ric. : οϋτ€. 

, " Euripides, Troades 1051. 
* i.e. are different psychological experiences. 
366 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. ii. 2-5 

dear to us is the pleasant or the good. If we hold both good- 
dear what we desire (and that is specially character- pfeasant- 
istic of love, for "«ss 

(absolute or 
relative). 
None is a lover that holds not dear for aye "), 



and desire is for what is pleasant, on this showing 
it is the pleasant that is dear ; whereas if we hold 
dear what we wish, it is the good ; but the pleasant 
and the good are different things. 

3 We must therefore attempt to decide about these 
matters and others akin to them, taking as a starting- 
point the following. The thing desired and wished 
is either the good or the apparent good. Therefore 
also the pleasant is desired, for it is an apparent 
good, since some people think it good, and to others 
it appears good even though they do not think it so 
(as appearance and opinion are not in the same part 
of the spirit). ** Yet it is clear that both the good and 
the pleasant are dear. 

4 This being decided, we must make another as- 
sumption. Things good are some of them abso- 
lutely good, others good for someone but not good 
absolutely ; and the same things are absolutely good 
and absolutely pleasant. For things advantageous 
for a healthy body we pronounce good for the body 
absolutely, but things good for a sick body not — for 
example doses of medicine and surgical operations ; 

5 and likewise also the things pleasant for a healthy 
and perfect body are pleasant for the body absolutely, 
for example to live in the light and not in the dark, 
although the reverse is the case for a man with 
ophthalmia. And the pleasanter wine is not the 
wine pleasant to a man whose palate has been 
corrupted by tippling, since sometimes they pour 

set 



y 



ARISTOTLE 

1236 a άλλα τ-η ά^ίαφθόρω αΙσθησ€ΐ. ομοίως 8e /cat εττι 6 
φνχης, καΐ ούχ α τοις τταώίοις καΐ τοΐς θηρίοις, 
αλλ' α τοΐς καθ^στώσίν αμφοτέρων γοΰν μ€μνη- 
μ€νοι ταϋ^' αίρούμ€θα. ώς δ' €χ€ΐ τταώίον καΐ 7 
θηρίον προς ανθρωττον καθ€στώτα, όντως e^ei 6 
5 φαΰλος καΐ άφρων ττρος τον €ΤΓί€ΐκη καΐ φρόνιμον 
τούτοις δε ήΒβα τα κατά τάς ef et?, ταΰτα δ' εστί 
τα aya^a καΙ τα καλά. 

'Evret ουν το αγαθόν^ πλβοναχώς {το μβν γάρ τω 8 
TOLOvh^ elvai λίγομεν αγαθόν, το δε τω ωφβΧιμον 
καΐ χρησιμον), eVt δε^ το ή8ύ το μεν απλώς καΐ 

10 aya^ov άττλώ?, το δε τινί καί^ φαι,νόμενον aya^oi^, 
ώσπ€ρ καΐ €πΙ των άφύχων δι' €καστον τούτων 
ενδέχεται ημάς αίρεΐσθαί τι καΐ φιλείν, ούτω* καΐ 
άνθρωπον τον μεν γάρ οτι TOLOohe' /cat hi άρετην, 
τον δ' ΟΤΙ ωφέλιμος /cat χρήσιμος , τον δ' οτι ■ηΒύς 
και δι' Ύ)8ονήν. φίλος δε* yiVeTat όταν φιλούμενος 

15 άντιφιλτ] και τούτο μη λανθάνη πως αυτούς. 

^Ανάγκη άρα τρία φιλίας εϊΒη είναι, και μήτε 9 
καθ* εν άπάσας μη^*^ ώς ει'δη ει^ο? γένους μήτε 
πάμπαν λεγεσθαι ομωνύμως. προς μίαν γάρ τίνα 
λέγονται και πρώτην, ώσπερ το Ιατρικόν, /cat φυχην 

20 Ιατρικην και σώμα λεγομεν και όργανον και έργον, 

1 Sp. : τα ayaea. ^ ίτι δέ Βζ. : ίπύ δέ Ρ^, ^πβΐ Μ»•. 

^' καΐ Beier : ή (om. Γ), * οντω Βζ. : ώσπερ. 

* Ric. : rbf μέν yap τοιόνδε. • lac. : δή. 

» Sus.: μήθ'. 

368 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. π. 5-9 



in a dash of vinegar, but to the uncorrupted taste. 

6 And similarly also in the case of the spirit, the really 
pleasant things are not those pleasant to children 
and animals, but those pleasant to the adult ; at 
least it is these that we prefer when we remember 

7 both. And as a child or animal stands to an adult 
human being, so the bad and foolish man stands 
to the good and wise man ; and these take pleasure 
in things that correspond to their characters, and 
these are things good and fine. 

8 Since therefore good is a term of more than one 
meaning (for we call one thing good because that is^ ./ '^^^i^ 
its essential nature, but another because it is service-• 

able and useful), and furthermore pleasant includes 
both what is absolutely pleasant and absolutely 
good and what is pleasant for somebody and ap- 
parently good — , as in the case of inanimate objects 
we may choose a thing and love it for each of these 
reasons, so also in the case of a human being, one 
man we love because of his character, and for good- 
ness, another because he is serviceable and useful, -- 
another because he is pleasant, and for pleasure .^-^ 
And a man becomes a friend when while receiving Definition 
affection he returns it, and when he and the other °^ friend. 
are in some way aware of this. 

9 It follows, therefore, that there are three sorts of Three kinds 
friendship, and that they are not all so termed in °^jp"^°*^' 
respect of one thing or as species of one genus, nor 

yet have they the same name entirely by accident. 
For all these uses of the term are related to one 
particular sort of friendship which is primary, like 
the term ' surgical ' — and we speak of a surgical 
mind and a surgical hand and a surgical instrument 
and a surgical operation, but we apply the term 



2b 



3^ 



ARISTOTLE 

1286 a 

αλλά κυρίως το πρώτον, πρώτον δ' ου ό^ λόγος Κ 

iv πάσιν^ υπάρχει, οίον όργανον ιατρικον ω αν ο 

Ιατρός χρησαιτο, €V Se τώ του Ιατρού λόγω ουκ 

eoTtv ό του οργάνου. ζητ€Ϊται μβν ουν πανταχού 1 

το πρώτον, δια δε τό το καθόλου etvai^ πρώτον 

λαμβάνουσυ και τό* πρώτον καθόλου• τοΰτο ο 

25 ioTL φίΰ^ος. ώστ€ καΐ π^ρΐ της φιλίας ου δύνανται 
πάντ* άποΒώόναί τα φαινόμενα• ου γαρ^ εφ- 
αρμόττοντος €νός λόγου ουκ οΐονται τοίς^ άλλα? 
φιλίας elvai• at δ' eiat μεν, αλλ' ούχ ομοίως etatv. 
οΐ δ' όταν η πρώτη μη εφαρμόττη , ως οΰσαν 1' 
καθόλου αν etVep ην πρώτη, ουδ' etvai φιλίας τάς 

30 άλλα? φασίν. εστί δε πολλά εί,'δτ^ φιλίας• τών γάρ ^ 
ρηθίντων ην ηΒη, €π€ΐ8η Βιώρισται τριχώς λεγεσθαι 
την φιλίαν, η μβν γάρ Βιώρισται δι' άρετην η δε δια 
τό χρησιμον η δε δια τό ήΒύ. 

Ύουτων η μβν δια. τό χρησιμόν εστί νη Δια' τών 1• 
πλείστων φιλία• δια γάρ τό χρήσιμοι ειι^αι φιλοϋσιν 

35 αλλτίλου?, και μέχρι τούτου, ώσπερ ή παροιμία 

Τλαΰκ* , επίκουρος άνηρ τόσσον φίλος^ ες κτε* 
μάχηται, 
καΐ 

ούκετι γιγνώσκουσιν ^Αθηναίοι Μεγαρηας. 

η δε δι' ηΒονην τών νέων, τούτου γάρ αίσ^τ^σιν» 

εχουσιν διό εύμετάβολος φιλία η τών νέων, 1ί 

μεταβαλλόντων γάρ τα ηθη κατά τάς ηλικίας 

^ 6 add. Ric. * πάσιν Sus. : ήμΐν. 

* τό τό Λ'α^όλοί' elfai Sus. : τό καθόλου fivai τό. 

* τό add. Sp. ^ ούκ οΐιν ? Rac. 

• τάϊ add. Βζ. ' έση ντ) Αία lac. : ίστικ η. 

* τόσσον φίλοί Fr. : τόν σόφον φίΧον. * ίστε Sol. 

" 11. 7-17. " Α friend in need is a friend indeed. 

370 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. ii. 10-15 

10 properly to that which is primarily so called. The 
primary is that of which the definition is implicit 
in the definition of all, for example a surgical instru- 
ment is an instrument that a surgeon would use, 
whereas the definition of the instrument is not 

11 implicit in that of surgeon. Therefore in every case 
people seek the primary, and because the universal 
is primary they assume that also the primary is 
universal ; but this is untrue. Hence in the case 
of friendship, they cannot take account of all the 
observed facts. For as one definition does not fit, 
they think that the other kinds of friendship are 
not friendships at all ; but really they are, although 

12 not in the same way, but when they find that the 
primary friendship does not fit, assuming that it 
would be universal if it really were primary, they 

13 say that the others are not friendships at all. But 
in reality there are many kinds of friendships : ' 
this was among the things said already," as we have 
distinguished three senses of the term friendship — / jij^ ^ 
one sort has been defined as based on goodness, ' 
another on utility, another on pleasure. '^:TS.'^-i' ' 

14 Of these the one based on utility is assuredly theNsed on 
friendship of most people ; for they love one another^ieas^e, 
because they are useful, and in so far as thev areiP"'^^ 
SO, as says the proverb — 

Glaucus, an ally is a friend 

As long as he our battle fights,'' * 

and 

Athens no longer knoweth Megara. 

15 On the other hand friendship based on pleasure is ^ 
the friendship of the young, for they have a sense of / 
what is pleasant ; hence young people's friendship 
easily changes, for since their characters change as 

371 



ARISTOTLE 

1236 b μζταβάλλζΐ καΐ το ηΒν. η δε κατ' άρβτην των 
β€λτίστων . 

Φανίρον δ' €Κ τούτων δτι ή πρώτη φιλία, η των 1 
aya^cui^, βστίν άντιφιλία καΐ αντιττροαίρ^σις ττρός 
αλλήλους, φίλον μέν γαρ το φίλονμ€νον τω φι- 
λοΰντι, φίλος δε τω φιλονμ4νω καΐ αύτος 6 φιλών} 
5 αϋτη μ€ν οΰν iv άνθρώπω^ μόνον ύττάρχ^ι rf φιλία, 1 
μονός* γαρ αίσθάν€ται ττροαιρ€σ€ως• αϊ δ' άλλαι 
και €v τοις θηρίοις. και γαρ^ το χρησιμον iiri 
μικρόν τι φαίνεται €νυπάρχον και ττρος ανθρωττον 
τοις ημ€ροις και προς άλληλα, οΐον τόν^ τροχίλον 
10 φησιν 'Ηρόδοτο? τω κροκοΒβίλω, και ώς οι μάντεις 
τάς σννεΒρίας και διεδρια? λέγουσιν. και οι φαύλοι ^ 
αν elev φίλοι άλληλοις και δια το χρησιμον και 8ιά 
το η8ν• οι δ , δτι η πρώτη ονχ υπάρχει αύτοΐς, ου 1 
φασι φίλους etvai* αδικήσει γαρ δ γε φαύλος τον 
φαΰλον, οΐ δ' αδικούμενοι ου φιλοϋσι σφας αυτούς. 
15 οι δε φιλοϋσι μεν, αλλ' ου την πρώτην φιλίαν, επει 2 
τάς γε ετέρας ούθεν κωλύει• δι' τ^δοι^ΐ' γαρ 
ύπομενουσιν'' αλλτ^λου? βλαπτόμενοι, εως^ αν ώσιν 
ακρατείς, ου ^οκοΰσι δ' οι5δ' οι δι' ηΒονην φιλούν- 2 
τες αλλτ^λου? φίλοι eti^at, όταν κατ' άκρίβειαν 
ζητώσιν, δτι ούχ η πρώτη' εκείνη μεν γαρ βέβαιος, 

^ αύτοί 6 φίλων Ross : άνηφίλών. 

* άνθρώιτφ ? Sp. ; άνθρώττοΐί. 

' 7] add. Ric. * Sp. : μόνον. 

* yap add. Ric. • <n-pos> τόν ? Rac. 

' Bz. : νπονοοΰσιν. * lac. : ώ? {fjs Ric). 

" Herodotus, ii. 68, says that the trochilus picks leeches 
out of the crocodile's throat, Aristotle, Hist. An. ix. 6. 6, 
that it picks the crocodile's teeth. In reality it picks gnats 
from the crocodile's open mouth. 
372 



/gj 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. ii. 15-21 

they grow up, their taste in pleasure also changes. 
But the friendship in conformity with goodness is 
the friendship of the best men. 

16 It is clear from this that the primary friendship. The last 
that of the good, is mutual reciprgcity of affection vfrTuou^s*" 
and purpose, i'or the object of affection is dear to\men; the 
the giver of it, but also the giver of affection is him- 

17 self dear to the object. This friendship, therefore. 



two former 
occur 
among 
, . ^11 • lanimals, and 

only occurs in man, tor tie alone perceives purpose ;|badmen. 
but the other forms occur also in the lower animals. 



Indeed mutual utility manifestly exists to some small 
extent between the domestic animals and man, and 
between animals themselves, for instance Hero- 
dotus 's account of the friendship between the croco- 
dile and the sandpiper,** and the perching together 
and separating of birds of which soothsayers speak. 

18 The bad may be each other's friends from motives 

19 both of utility and of pleasure ; though some say 
that they are not really friends, because the prim- 
ary kind of friendship does not belong to them, 
since obviously a bad man will injure a bad man, 
and those who suffer injury from one another 

20 do not feel affection for one another. But as a 
matter of fact bad men do feel affection for one 
another, though not according to the primary 
form of friendship — because clearly nothing hinders! 
their being friends under the other forms, since for; 
the sake of pleasure they put up with one another! 
although they are being harmed, so long as they are 

21 lacking in self-restraint. The view is also held, 
when people look into the matter closely, that those 
who feel affection for each other on account of 
pleasure are not friends, because it is not the primary 
friendship, since that is reliable but this is unreliable. 

373 



ARISTOTLE 

1236 b 

"Ό αντη oe apepaios. η ο eart μ€ν, ωσπ€ρ ειρηται, 
φιλία, ουκ €Κ€ίνη Se αλλ' άττ' €Κ€ίνης, το /Aei' ουν 22 
€Κ€ίνως μόνον Xeyetv τον φίλον βιάζ^σθαι τά φαι- 
νόμενα βστί, καΐ 7ταρά8οζα Xeyeiv αναγκαΐον καθ* 
eva δε λόγον πάσας aSuvarov .^ λβιττεται τοίνυν 23 
οϋτως, otl έ'στι μεν ώς μόνη η ττρώτη φιλία, eari 

25 δ ώ$ ττασαι, οϋτ€ ώς ομώνυμοι /cat ώ? ετυχεν 
εχουσαι ττρός αύτάς, ούτε καθ* ev ειδο?, άλλα 
μάλλον ττρόζ ev. 

ΈτΓβι δ' απλώς aya^oi' /cat απλώς ηΒύ το αυτό 24 
/cat α/ζα αν μη τι^ εμποΒιζη, ο δ' άλτ^θιρ'ό? φίλος 
και απλώς ό πρώτος εστίν, εστί 8ε τοιούτος ό 

30 αυτό? δt' αύτόΐ' αιρετός {ανάγκη δ' etrat τοιούτον, ω* 
γαρ βονλεταί τις δι' αύτον είναι τάγαθά, ανάγκη 
και δι'* αυτόν αίρετόν^ efvat), ό* άλτ^^ιι^ό? φίλος 25 
/cat τ^δυ? εστίν απλώς• διό δο /cet /cat ό όπωσοΰν 
φίλος ή8ύς. ετι δε διοριστεον περί τούτου μάλλον 26 
e^et ya/) επίστασιν, πότερον'' το γ* αύτώ aya^ot' 

35 η το άττλώ? aya^oi' φίλον, και πότερον το κατ* 
ενεργειαν φιλεΐν μεθ* ηΒονης, ώστε και το φιλητόν 
ηΒυ,^ η ου. άμφω γαρ εις ταύτό συνακτεον τά τε 
γαρ μη απλώς αγαθά άλλα κακά αν πως^ '^^Χϊί 
φευκτά, και το μη αύτώ αγαθόν ούθεν προς αυτόν, 
άλλα τοΰτ εστίν ο ζητείται, τά απλώς αγαθά 
ί237 & οϋτως εΐναι aya^a. εστί γάρ αιρετον μεν^" το 21 
απλώς aya^of, αύτω 8ε το αύτώ αγαθόν α 8εΐ 

^ Βζ. : δυνατόν. * Γ : τ«. 

' Sp. : ώϊ. * δι' add. Sp. 

' Sp. : αίρΰσθαι. ' Sp. : ό δ'. 

' Erasmus : ίχει ίττίστασιν. nbrepov yap. 

* iaare το φιλητόν καΐ ηδύ ? Rac. 

• άν πω$ lac. : άττλώί (άττλώ? ζ,κΆν ήδία 6vTay Ric). 

10 μ(ν <άπλώϊ> ? Rac. 

374 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. π. 21-27 

But as a matter of fact it is friendship, as has been 
said, though not that sort of friendship but one 

22 derived from it. Therefore to confine the use of 
the term friend to that form of friendship alone is 
to do violence to observed facts, and compels one to 
talk paradoxes ; though it is not possible to bring 

23 all friendship under one definition. The only re- 1 
maining alternative, therefore, is, that in a sense the 
primary sort of friendship alone is friendship, but in 
a sense all sorts are, not as having a common name 
by accident and standing in a merely chance rela- 
tionship to one another, nor yet as falling under one 
species, but rather as related to one thing. 

24 And since the same thing is absolutely good and 'Pleasant• 
absolutely pleasant at the same time if nothing goodness. 
interferes, and the true friend and friend absolutely 

is the primary friend, and such is a friend chosen in \ 
and for himself (and he must necessarily be such, for 
he for whom one wishes good for his own sake must 

25 necessarily be desirable for his own sake), a true 
friend is also absolutely pleasant ; owing to which it 

26 is thought that a friend of any sort is pleasant. But 
we must define this still further, for it is debatable 
whether what is good merely for oneself is dear or 
what is absolutely good, and whether the actual 
exercise of affection is accompanied by pleasure, 
so that an object of affection is also pleasant, or not. 
Both questions must be brought to the same issue ; 
for things not absolutely good but possibly evil are 
to be avoided, and also a thing not good for oneself 
is no concern of oneself, but what is sought for is that 
things absolutely good shall be good for oneself. 

27 For the absolutely good is absolutely desirable, but 
what is good for oneself is desirable for oneself ; 

375 



ARISTOTLE 

1237 a 

σνμφωνησαι. /cat τοΰτο rj aperrj ttol€l• /cat rj 

πολιτική επΙ τοντω, δπως οΐς μηττω earl yeVT^rat. 

€ΰθ€τος^ δε /cat προ οΒοΰ ό^ άνθρωπος ων {φυσ€ΐ 

5 γαρ αντω aya^a τα απλώς aya^a), ομοίως he /cat 28 

ανηρ αντί γυναικός και βνφνης άφνονς^' δια τοΰ 

ηο€ος oe η οοος• ανάγκη etvat τα καλά ηο€α. όταν 

δε ταύτα* Βιαφωνη, ονπω σπον^αΐος^ τελε'ω?• εΐ'- 

δε'χεταt yap εyyεvε'σ^αt άκρασίαν τω* yap δια- 

φωνβΐν ταγαθόν τω τ^δεΓ ει^ τοΓ? πάθεσιν άκρασία 

εστίν. 

10 Ώστ €π€ΐ8η η πρώτη φιλία /cot' άρεττ^ΐ', 'έσον- 2ί1 
Tat /cat αύτοι άττλώ? αγαθοί, τοΰτο δ' ούχ οτι 
χρήσιμοι, αλλ' αλλοι^ τρόπον. 8ιχώς γαρ έχει το 3C 
τωδί aya^ol•" /cat το' άττλώ? a.ya^oi'• /cat ομοίως, 
ωσπ€ρ βπι τοΰ ωφελίμου, και εττι των' έ'^εωι/• 
άλλο yap το άττλώ? ώφέλιμον και το τοισδι (οι^ 

15 τρόπον^ το yu/x^'αζεσ^αt ττρό? το φαρμακ€ν€σθ jli) • 
ωστ€ και η ζζις, η ανθρώπου άρ€τή (έστω γαρ ό 31 
άνθρωπος των φύσ€ΐ σπουδαίων) • η άρα τοΰ φυσ€ΐ 
σπουδαίου άρ€τη απλώς aya^oi', η δε τοΰ μη 
ζΚζίνω. 

'Ομοίως Srj €χ€ΐ και το η8ύ. βνταΰθα γαρ 32 
ετΓίστατεον και σκεπτ^ον πότερόν εστίν avev ηΒονης 

20 φίλια, και τι δtα^εpεt, και iv ποτέρω ποτ^ εστί 

^ Rac. : 6νθ4τωί (ante quod lacunam Sp., initium protaseos 
cuius apodosis 1. 6 άνά-/κη). 

* ό add. lac. ' Bus. : άφυί)ί eύφυovs. 

* Bus, : TovTo. * sic versio Solomonis : στΓονδαϊοι>. 
« Mb TO. 7 TO add. Rac. 

* TO . . . τρόπον lac. (to add. Rac.) : τό καλόν τοιούτον. 
376 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. ii. 27-32 

and the two ought to come into agreement. This 
is effected by goodness ; and the purpose of pohtical 
science is to bring it about in cases where it does not 
yet exist. And one who is a human being is well 
adapted to this and on the way to it (for by nature 
things that are absolutely good are good to him), 

28 and similarly a man rather than a woman and a 
gifted man rather than a dull one ; but the road 
is through pleasure — it is necessary that fine things •' 
shall be pleasant. When there is discord between 
them, a man is not yet perfectly good ; for it is 
possible for unrestraint to be engendered in him, 
as unrestraint is caused by discord between the 
good and the pleasant in the emotions. 

29 Therefore since the primary sort of friendship is' Friendship 
in accordance with goodness, friends of this sort will vfrt„e°the 
be absolutely good in themselves also, and this not primary 
because of being useful, but in another manner.: 

30 For good for a given person and good absolutely arej 
twofold ; and the same is the case with states of' 
character as with profitableness — what is profitable 
absolutely and what is profitable for given persons 
are different things (just as taking exercise is a 
different thing from taking drugs). So the state of 
character called human goodness is of two kinds — 

31 for let us assume that man is one of the things that 
are excellent by nature : consequently the goodness 
of a thing excellent by nature is good absolutely, but 
that of a thing not excellent by nature is only good 
for that thing. 

32 The case of the pleasant also, therefore, is similar. Problems- 
For here we must pause and consider whether there fagtor^^of 
is any friendship without pleasure, and how such a pleasant- 
friendship differs from other friendship, and on which ^^^^' 

377 



ARISTOTLE 

1237 a ^ ^ ^ „ , , « , y c Ϊ / 

TO φιλ€Ϊν, TTOTepov^ on αγαθός καν et μη ηους, 
αλλ' ού^ δια τοΰτο; 8ιχώς δη λζγομίνου του 
φιΧζΙν, 7τότ€ρον OTL άγαθον το κατ' evepyeiav ουκ 
άν€υ TjSovrjs φαίνζται; hrjXov δ' οτι ωσπ€ρ εττι 3; 
της ετηστημης at πρόσφατοι θ^ωρίαι καΐ μαθήσεις 

25 αίσθηταΐ μάλιστα τω rjSei, οϋτω και at των 
συνήθων αναγνωρίσεις, και 6 λόγος ο αύτος βπ 
άμφοΐν. φυσ€ΐ γοΰν το απλώς aya^ov ηΒύ απλώς, 
και οΐς aya^dr, τούτοις η8ύ. διό ευθύς τα όμοια 34 
άλληλοις χαίρει, και άνθρώπω ήδιστον άνθρωπος' 
ώστ Ιπεί και άτελη, ^ηλον οτι και τελειωθεντα• 

30 ό Βέ σπουδαίος τέλειος, ει 6έ το κτατ' ενεργειαν 
φιλεΐν μεθ^ ηδονής άντιπροαίρεσις της άλλτ^λων 
γνωρίσεως, Βηλον οτι και όλως ή φιλία η πρώτη 
άντιπροαίρεσις τών απλώς aya^cDi/ και ηΒεων οτι 
aya^a και η8εα• eWt δ' αυττ7 η φιλία εζις αφ' 3ί 

35 •^s^ η τοιαύτη προαίρεσις . το γαρ έργον αύτης 
ενέργεια, αύτη δ' ουκ εζω αλλ' εν αύτώ τω 
φιλοϋντι• δυνάμεως δε πάσης^ ^ζω, η γαρ εν 
ετερω η fj* έτερον. Sio το φιλεΐν χαίρειν αλλ' 
ου το φιλεΐσθαί εστίν το μεν γαρ φιλεΐσθαι ου 3( 
τοΰ^ φιλητοΰ ενέργεια, το δε «rat φιλίας, και το 
μεν εν εμφύχω, το δε /cat εν άφύχω• φιλεΐται γαρ 

40 και τα άφυχα. επει δε το φιλεΐν το κατ' ενεργειαν 3' 

^ καΐ πότερον Μ•». ^ άλλ' ον] fj οϋ, άλλα Sp. 

' <,σωματικηί> πάσηί ? Ric. * rj add. Βζ. 

' ού τοΰ add. Rac. 

" Goodness and pleasantness. 

'' Perhaps the Greek should be altered to give ' or not, 
but because he is pleasant.' 

' Potential and actual (Solomon). 

'' Ross marks this clause as corrupted. 
378, 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. ii. 32-37 

exactly of the two things * the affection depends — 
do we love a man because he is good even if he 
is not pleasant, but not because he is pleasant ? '' 
Then, affection having two meanings,'' does actual! 
affection seem to involve pleasure because activity! 

33 is good ? It is clear that as in science recent studies! 
and acquirements are most fully apprehended, be- 
cause of their pleasantness,** so with the recognition 
of familiar things, and the principle is the same in 
both cases. By nature at all events the absolutely 
good is absolutely pleasant, and the relatively good 

34 is pleasant to those for whom it is good.^ Hence 
ipso facto like takes pleasure in like, and man is the 
thing most pleasant to man ; so that as this is so even 
with imperfect things, it is clearly so with things 
when perfected, and a good man is a perfect man. 
And if active affection is the reciprocal choice, ac- 
companied by pleasure, of one another's acquaint- 
ance, it is clear that friendship of the primary kind 
is in general the reciprocal choice of things absolutely 
good and pleasant because they are good and 

35 pleasant ; and friendship itself is a state from which 
such choice arises. For its function is an activity, 
but this not external but within the lover himself ; 
whereas the function of every faculty is external, 
for it is either in another or in oneself qua other. 

36 Hence to love is to feel pleasure but to be loved is 
not ; for being loved is not an activity of the thing 
loved, whereas loving is an activity — the activity of 
friendship ; and loving occurs only in an animate 
thing, whereas being loved occurs with an inanimate 
thing also, for even inanimate things are loved. 

37 And since to love actively is to treat the loved 

* 8c. (to TOLaSl ά7α^όΐ') oil ά-γαθόν, τούτοι% ηδύ. 

379 



ARISTOTLE 

1237 b τω φίλονμενω^ earl χρησθαι fj φίλονμβνον , 6 8e 
φίλθ9 φιλονμβνον τώ^ φίλω fj φίλος άλλα μη fj 
μουσικός η ιατρός, ηΒονη τοίνυν η άττ' αντοΰ 
fj αυτός, αϋτη φιλίκη• αυτόν γαρ φιλβΐ, ούχ οτι 
5 άλλο.^ ωστ' αν μη χο-ψη fj αγαθός, ούχ η ττρώτη 
φίλια. ούΒβ Set €μπο8ίζ€ίν ούθβν των συμβεβηκοτων 38 
μάλλον η τό aya^ov €ύφραίν€ΐ,*' τι γάρ; σφό8ρα 
ΒυσώΒης λειττεται^• άγαπητόν^ γαρ τό edvoeiv συζην'' 
δε μη. 

Αϋτη μεν ουν η ττρώτη φιλία, ην^ πάντες ομο- 
λογοΰσιν. αΐ δ' άλλαι δι' αύτην καΐ Βοκοϋσι καΐ 39 
10 αμφισβητούνται , βέβαιον γάρ τι SoKei η φιλία, 
μόνη δ' αϋτη βέβαιος' τό γάρ κεκριμενον βέβαιον, 
τα δε μη ταχύ ')/ιν'ό/χ€ν'α μηΒε ρα8ίως ποιεί" την 
κρίσιν όρθην. ουκ εστί δ' άνευ πίστεως φιλία 40 
βέβαιος, η δε πίστις ουκ άνευ χρόνου• δει γάρ 
πεΐραν λαβείν, ώσπερ λέγει και θεογνις' 

15 ού γαρ άν ειδειτ^? ανΒρος νόον ούδε γυναικός , 
πριν πειραθείης ώσπερ υποζυγίου. 

οι δ' άνευ χρόνου ού φίλοι^'* αλλά βοϋλονται είΐ'αι" 
φίλοι, και /ιιάλιστα λαΐ'^άι^ει η τοιαύτη εζις ώς 
φιλία• όταν γάρ προθύμως εχωσι φίλοι ett'ai, δια 41 
20 τό πάνθ* ύπηρετεΐν τά φιλικά άλλι^λοι? οΐονται ού 
βούλεσθαι ειναι^^ φίλοι αλλ' είναι φίλοι. τό δ' 
ώσπερ επΙ των άλλων συμβαίνει και επΙ της 

^ Fr. : τό φίΚούμΐνον 6, * Βζ. : και, 

' lac. : ά\λψ, * Rac. : (ύφραίν^ιν. 

* οίον d σφόδρα δνσωδηί yiverai Ric. 

β Ross : άγαταταί. ' Sol. : (Tv^'jj. 

* Fr. : η, • Βζ. : ού iroui. 

^^ ο£ δ' . . . φίλοι Fr. : ούδ' Afev γρονου φίλοί. 

^* elvai add. I"'r. ^* etVat add. Rac. 

380 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. π. 37-41 

object qua loved, and the friend is an object of love 
to the friend qua dear to him but not qua musician 
or medical man, the pleasure of friendship is the 
pleasure derived from the person himself qua him- 
self ; for the friend loves him as himself, not because 
he is something else. Consequently if he does not 
take pleasure in him qua good, it is not the primary 

38 friendship. Nor ought any accidental quality to 
cause more hindrance than the friend's goodness 
causes delight ; for surely, if a person is very evil- 
smelling, people cut him — he must be content with 
our goodwill, he must not expect our society ! 

This then is the primary friendship, which all people Permanence 

39 recognize. It is on account of it that the other sorts f/jendship. 
are considered to be friendship, and also that their 

claim is disputed — for friendship seems to be some- 
thing stable, and only this friendship is stable ; for 
a formed judgement is stable, and not doing things 

40 quickly or easily makes the judgement right. And 
there is no stable friendship without confidence, 
and confidence only comes with time ; for it is 
necessary to make trial, as Theognis says : 

Thou canst not know the mind of man nor woman 
E'er thou hast tried them as thou triest cattle. 

Those who become friends without the test of time 
are not real friends but only wish to be friends ; 
and such a character very readily passes for friend- 
^Y ship, because when eager to be friends they think 
that by rendering each other all friendly services 
they do not merely wish to be friends but actually 
are friends. But as a matter of fact it happens in 
friendship as in everything else ; people are not 

381 



ARISTOTLE 

1237 b 

φιλίας' ov γαρ el βούλονται uytaiVetv ύγιαίνουσιν, 

ώστ* ούδ' et elvaC^ φίλοι βονλονται ηΒη και φίλοι 

€ΐσίν. σημ€Ϊον Se• €ύΒιάβλητοι γαρ οι διακείμενοι 4* 

25 avev πείρας τούτον τον τρόπον περί ών μεν γαρ 
πεΐραν Βε^ώκασιν άλλτ^λοι?, ουκ εν^ιάβλητοι, περί 
ών 8e μη, πεισθεΐεν αν όταν σύμβολα λεγωσιν οι 
8ιαβάλλοντες . άμα 8e φανερον δτι οι)δ' εν τοις 4; 
φαυλοις αϋτιη η φιλία• άπιστος γαρ 6 φαύλος και 
κακοήθης προς πάντας• αύτώ γαρ μετρεΐ τους 

30 άλλου?. διό εύεζαπατητότεροί είσιν οΐ αγαθοί, 
αν μη δια πεΐραν άττιστώσιι^. οι δε φαΰλοι φ 
αιροΰνται τα φύσει aya^a άντι του φίλου, και ούθ- 
εις φιλεΐ μάλλον άνθρωπον η πράγματα, ώστ' 
ου φίλοι' ου γαρ γίνεται οϋτω κοινά τα φίλων, 
προσνεμεται γάρ 6 φίλος τοις πράγμασιν, ου τά 
πράγματα τοΐς φίλοις. 

35 Ου γίνεται αρ' η φιλία η πρώτη εν πολλοίς, ^, 
ότι χαλεπον πο?ίλών πεΐραν λαβείν εκάστω γάρ 
αν έδβι" συζτ^σαι. ούΒέ 8η αιρετεον ομοίως περί 
1/χ.ατιου και φίλου' καίτοι εν πάσι Βοκεΐ του νουν . 
έχοντος 8υοΐν το βελτιον αιρεΐσθαι, και ει μεν τω 
χείρονι πάλαι εχρητο, τω βελτίονι δε μη^επω, 

40 τοΰθ αιρετεον, αλλ' ουκ άντι του πάλαι φίλου 
1288 •τόΐ' tiyvcDTa ei βελτίων. ου γάρ εστίν άνευ πείρας 

^ elvai. add. Rac. » Bus. : hv δει (Set ? Rac). 

382 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. π. 41-46 

healthy merely if they wish to be healthy, so that 
even if people wish to be friends they are not actually 

42 friends already. A proof of this is that people who 
have come into this position without first testing 
one another are easily set at variance ; for though 
men are not set at variance easily about things in 
which they have allowed each other to test them, in 
cases where they have not, whenever those who are 
attempting to set them at variance produce evidence 

43 they may be convinced. At the same time it is 
manifest that this friendship does not occur between , 
base people either ; for the base and evil-natured ί 
man is distrustful towards everybody, because hei 
measures other people by himself. Hence good 
men are more easily cheated, unless as a result of 

44 trial they are distrustful. But the base prefer the 
goods of nature to a friend, and none of them love 
people more than things ; and so they are not 
friends, for the proverbial * common property as 
between friends ' is not realized in this way — the 
friend is made an appendage of the things, not the 
things of the friends. 

45 Therefore the first kind of friendship does not its rarity. 
occur between many men, because it is difficult to 

test many — one would have to go and live with each 
of them. Nor indeed should one exercise choice 
in the case of a friend in the same way as about a 

46 coat ; although in all matters it seems the mark 
of a sensible man to choose the better of two things, 
and if he had been wearing his worse coat for a 
long time and had not yet worn his better one, the 
better one ought to be chosen— but you ought not 
in place of an old friend to choose one whom you 
do not know to be a better man. For a friend is 

383 



ARISTOTLE 

1238 a 

oj)8e μιας ημ€ρας 6 φίλος, αλλά χρόνου Sel' διό 

ets" τταροιμίαν eX-qXvdev ο μβ^ιμνος των άλών. 

άμα δε δεΓ^ μη μόνον απλώς αγαθόν elvai άλλα 4' 

και σοι, 61 ό* φίλος εσται σοι φίλος' aya^o? juev 

5 yap άττλώ? εστί τω ά^α^ό? elvai, φίλος he τω 
άλλω aya^os" άττλώς re δ'^ aya^os• /^αι φίλος όταν 
συμφωνήστ) ταντα άμφω, ώστε ο eariv απλώς 
aya^ov, το αυτό* αλλω• -^ και μη απλώς μβν 
σπουδαίος ,^ άλλω δ' aya^o? οτι χρήσιμος. το 4ί 
δε τΓολλοΐ? άμα elvat φίλον^ καΐ το φίλ^ΐν κώλυα• 

10 ου γαρ οΐόν τε άμα προς πολλούς ivepyelv. 

Έ /c 8η τούτων φαν€ρόν οτι ορθώς λεyεται ότι 4! 
η φιλία τών βφαίων, ώσττερ η εύδαι/χοη'α τών 
αυταρκών . καΐ ορθώς ειρηται 

η γαρ φύσις βέβαιον, ου τα χρήματα — 

πολύ δε Λτάλλιον βιπβΐν οτι rf άρβτη της φύσεως. 5( 
15 και ο τ€ χρόνος λε'yεται δει/ίνυναι τόΐ' φίλον και 
αί άτυχίαι //,άλλον τών ευτυχιών, τότε γαρ δηλον 
ό'τι κτοιί'ά τα τών φίλων, ούτοι γαρ μόνοι άντι 
τών φύσει o.ya^cDl•' και φύσει κακών, περί ά αί 
εύτυχίαι και αί Βυστυχίαι, αίροΰνται μάλλον 
άνθρωπον η τούτων τα μεν ειι^αι τα δε μη είναι• 
20 η δ' ατυχία 8ηλοΐ τους μη όντως οντάς φίλους 5 
άλλα διά το χρησιμον τυχόν.^ 6 δε χρόνος 8ηλοΐ 
αμφότερους• ούδε yap ο χρήσιμος ταχύ 8ηλος, 

^ Βζ. : el, ^ el 6 Bus. : eicat {el δη et ίσται <καΙ> Ric). 

' re δ' add. Rac. (δ' add. Γ). * Ric. : τούτου, 

^ Fr. : σπονδαίφ, * Syl. : φίλον, 

' [17] Ric. * τνχύνταί V, 

' Euripides, Electra 941. 

' Or, emending the .ms. text, ' that friendship is goodness 
of nature.' 
384 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. n. 46-51 

not to be had without trial and is not a matter of a 
single day, but time is needed ; hence the ' peck 

47 of salt ' has come to be proverbial. At the same 
time if a friend is really to be your friend he must 
be not only good absolutely but also good to you ; 
for a man is good absolutely by being good, but 
he is a friend by being good to another, and he is 
both good absolutely and a friend when both these 
attributes harmonize together, so that what is good ' 
absolutely is also good for another person ; or also 
he may be not good absolutely yet good to another 

48 because useful. But being a friend of many people 
at once is prevented even by the factor of affection, 
for it is not possible for affection to be active in 
relation to many at once. 

49 These things, therefore, show the correctness of its trust- 
the saying that friendship is a thing to be relied on, ^o^^'^^'ness. 
just as happiness is a thing that is self-sufficing. And 

it has been rightly said ** : 

Nature is permanent, but wealth is not — 

although it would be much finer to say ' Friend- 

50 ship ' than 'Nature.'^ And it is proverbial that 
time shows a friend, and also misfortunes more 
than good fortune. For then the truth of the saying 
' friends' possessions are common property ' is clear, 
for only friends, instead of the natural goods and 
natural evils on which good and bad fortune turn, 
choose a human being rather than the presence of 

51 the former and the absence of the latter ; and 
misfortune shows those who are not friends really 
but only because of some casual utility. And both 
are shown by time ; for even the useful friend is 
not shown quickly, but rather the pleasant one — 

2 c 385 



ARISTOTLE 

αλλ' 6 η^νς μα?<λον, ττλην ούδ' ο απλώς ηονς 
ταχύς} όμοιοι γαρ οι άνθρωττοι τοις οΐνοις και 
β^βσμασιν εκείνων τ€ γαρ το μέν γλνκύ^ ταχύ 

2δ 8ηλοΐ, πλβίω 8e χρόνον γινόμενον άηδε? και ου 
γλυκύ, και inl των ανθρώπων ομοίως, έ'στι γαρ 
το απλώς ηΒύ τω τέλει όριστεον και τω χρόνω. 
όμολογησαι^ν δ' αν καΐ οι πολλοί, ουκ εκ τών δ'. 
άποβαινόντων μόνον, αλλ' ώσπβρ €πΙ του πόματος 
καλοΰσι γλύκιον τοΰτο γαρ ου* δια το άποβαΐνον 

30 ούχ η^ύ άλλα δια το μη συνεχές άλλα το πρώτον 
εζαπατάν. 

Ή μεν οδν πρώτη φιλία καΐ δι' ην αί αλλαι 5; 
λε^οι^ται η κατ' άρετήν εστί καΐ δι ηΒονην την 
άρετης, ώσπερ εΐρηται πρότερον. αί δ' αλλαι 
εγγίνονται φιλίαι και εν τταισι και θηρίοις και τοις 
φαυλοις• όθεν λέγεται " ηλιζ ηλικα τέρπει" και 

35 " κακός κακώ συντετηκεν ηΒονη." ενδέχεται δε 5- 

και η^εΐς άλληλοι? ε^ι^αι τους φαύλους, ούχ* fj 

φαύλοι η μη^ετεροι, αλλ' οίον ει* ωδικοί άμφω, 

η ό μεν φιλωΒός^ 6 δ' ωδικός εστίν, και τ^ πάντες 

εχουσί tC αγαθόν καΐ ταυττ^ συναρμόττουσιν άλλτ^- 

λοι?. έτι χρήσιμοι αν εΐεν άλλι^λοι? και ωφέλιμοι 6ι 

1238 b (ουχ απλώς αλλά προς την προαίρεσιν) ούχ fj 

φαύλοι^ η ουδέτεροι, ενδέχεται δε καί τω επι- 6ι 

εικεί* φαΰλον είναι φίλον και γαρ χρήσιμος αν 

είτ^ προς την προαίρεσιν ο μεν φαύλος προς την 

^ ταχύ Guil. ^ Ric. : ήδύ. 

8 ον add. Rac. * ούχ Γ : καΐ. 

" ft (vel f)) add. Ric. « Vict. : φειδωλοί. 

' ίχοιισΐ τι Fr. : ίχονσίν. 

* ούχ § φανλοι add. Rac. (<φαΰ\οι> Ric). 

• Γ : TOP έτΓΐΐίκη. 

S86 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. π. 51-56 

except that one who is absolutely pleasant is also 
not quick to show himself. For men are like wines 
and foods ; the sweetness of those is quickly evident, 
but when lasting longer it is unpleasant and not 
sweet, and similarly in the case of men. For ab- 
solute pleasantness is a thing to be defined by the 

52 End it effects and the time it lasts. And even the 
multitude would agree, not in consequence of results 
only, but in the same way as in the case of a drink 
they call it sweeter — for a drink fails to be pleasant 
not because of its result, but because its pleasantness 
is not continuous, although at first it quite takes 
one in. 

53 The primary form of friendship therefore, and the 
one that causes the narue to be given to the others, 
is friendship based on goodness and due to the 
pleasure of goodness, as has been said before. The The two 
other friendships occur even among children and o'fTri/nd""' 
animals and wicked people : whence the sayings — ship. 

Two of an age each other gladden »• 
and 

Pleasure welds the bad man to the bad." 

54 And also the bad may be pleasant to each other not 
as being bad or neutral, ** but if for instance both are 
musicians or one fond of music and the other a 
musician, and in the way in which all men have some 

55 good in them and so fit in with one another. Further j 

they might be mutually useful and beneficial (not ( ^^^ 

absolutely but for their purpose) not as being bad ^^, 

56 or neutral. It is also possible for a bad man to be ' ^ 
friends vnth a good man, for the bad man may be i^'^f 
useful to the good man for his purpose at the time -j;2i- 

" Euripides, Bellerophontes, fr. 298 (Nauck). 
'' i.e. neither good nor bad. 

387 



ARISTOTLE 

1288 b 

ύττάρχουσαν τω σττουδαιο), 6 δε τω μ^ν άκρατοι 
5 ττρος την ύττάρχουσαν τω 8e φανλω προς την 
κατά φύσιν και βουλησεται τά aya^ct, άττλώς μ^ν 
τά άττλα/ τά δ' €κβίνω βζ υποθέσεως, fj nevia 
συμφβρ€ΐ η νόσος — ταύτα των άττλών^ αγαθών 
evcKa, ώσττερ καΐ το φάρμακον τηεΖν ου γαρ αύτο^ 
βονλΐταο, άλλα τοΰδ' eveKa βονλβται. eVt καθ^ 5' 

10 ους τρόπους καΐ άλληλοις οι μη σπουδαίοι elev αν 
φιλοί' €'ί.η γαρ αν η8ύς ούχ η φαύλος, αλλ' ^ των 
κοινών τινός μβτίχβι, οΐον et μουσικός. έ'τι τ^ 
evi Tt ττασιρ- €πιβικ€ς (διό evioi ομιλητικοί elaiv^ 
αν και σπου^αΐοι^) , η fj προσαρμόττουσιν ίκάστω• 
€χουσι γάρ Tt πάντες του αγαθού. 

15 III. Ύρία μ€ν οΰν €Ϊ8η ταΰτα φιλίας• iv ττασι δε 1 
τούτοις κατ' ισότητα πως λίγεται η φιλία• και 
γάρ οι κατ' άρβτην φίλοι iv ίσότητί πως άρ€της 
€ΐσι φίλοι άλλτ^λοι?. 

"Αλλτ^ δε διαφορά τούτων η καθ* ύπ^ρβολην , 2 
ωσττερ θ€θΰ [άρετι^]* προς άνθρωπον, τοϋτο γάρ 

20 €Τ€ρον ειδο? φιλίας, και όλως άρχοντος και αρχο- 
μένου• καθάπ€ρ και το δίκαιον €Τ€ρον, κατ' 
άναλογιαν γάρ ίσον, κατ' αριθμόν δ' ουκ ίσον. iv 
τούτω τω γίν^ι πατήρ προς υιόν και ό €ύ€ργ€της 

^ άττλώί Rieckher, 

* αυτό hie Rac. : ante τό φάρμακον. 

' elev Aid. * Ρ^ : σπουδαία; Μ^, <^αή> σττουδαΐοι Βζ. 

* [άρβτή] Rac, (vel aperrj vel κατ' άρΐτηρ .subaudito φιλία), 

" i.e. ready to associate with all and sundry, regardless of 
moral inferiority. But perhaps the Greek should be altered 
to give ' some (bad men) might be worthy to associate with, 
even in the judgement of a good man,' or ' some might be 
worthy to associate with even though not good.' 

*" Between two unequal persons justice divides benefits in 
proportion to their deserts, so that the two shares are not 
388 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. ii. 56— iii. 2 

and the good man to the uncontrolled man for his 
purpose at the time and to the bad man for the pur- 
pose natural to him ; and he will wish his friend what 
is good — wish absolutely things absolutely good, and 
under a given condition things good for him, as 
poverty or disease may be beneficial : things good 
for him he will wish for the sake of the absolute 
goods, in the way in which he wishes his friend to 
drink medicine — he does not wish the action in 
57 itself but wishes it for the given purpose. Moreover 
a bad man may also be friends with a good one in 
the ways in which men not good may be friends 
with one another : he may be pleasant to him not as i^^' 
being bad but as sharing some common characteristic, 
for instance if he is musical. Again they may be 
friends in the way in which there is some good in 
everybody (owing to which some men are sociable " 
even though good), or in the way in which they suit 
each particular person, for all men have something 
of good. 

1 III. These then are three kinds of friendship ; Friendship 
and in all of these the term friendship in a manner between 

τ Λ• f 11 unequals. 

mdicates equality, tor even with those who are 
friends on the ground of goodness the friendship 
is in a manner based on equality of goodness. 

2 But another variety of these kinds is friendship 
on a basis of superiority, as in that of a god for a 
man, for that is a different kind of friendship, and 
generally of a ruler and subject ; just as the principle 
of justice between them is also different, being one 
of equality proportionally but not of equality numeric- 
ally.* The friendship of father for son is in this 

equal to each other but each equal to its recipient's merit. 
The word Ισον itself connotes ' fair,' just, reasonable. 

389 



ARISTOTLE 

1238 b ^ ^ ^ 

ττρος τον €ύ€ργ€τηθ€ντα. αυτών 8e τούτων 3 
οίαφοραι βίσιν άλλη^ πατρός προς νίον και άν8ρ6ς 

25 προς γυναίκα, αϋτη μ€ν ώς άρχοντος καΐ αρχο- 
μένου, η Se^ euepyeTou προς ζύεργετηθβντα. iv 
ταύταις δε η ουκ eveaTtv η ούχ ομοίως το άντι- 
φιλεΐσθαι. γελοΐον γαρ et τις εγκαλοίη τω θεώ 4 
OTt ούχ ομοίως άντιφίλεΐ^ ώς φιλεΐται, η τω 
άρχοντί 6 αρχόμενος*• φιλεΐσθαι γάρ, ου φίλεΐν, 

30 του άρχοντος, η φιλείν άλλον τρόπον. καΐ rf 5 
7]hovrj Βιαφβρει, ούδ' ev^ η re τοΰ αυτάρκους em 
τω αύτοΰ κτηματι η παώΐ καΐ rf τοΰ €ν^€θΰς 
€πί τω γι,νομενω . ώς δ' αϋτως και €πΙ τών δια 6 
την χρησιν φίλων καΐ €πΙ τών δι' rjSovqv, οι μ€ν 
κατ ισότητα είσίν, οι δε κα^' ύπεροχήν. διό και 
οι €Κ€ίνως οίόμενοι €γκαλοΰσιν εάν μη ομοίως 

35 ώσι' χρήσιμοι και ευ ποιώσιν και* επι της ηδο- 
νής. 8ηλον δ' iv τοις βρωτικοίς• τοϋτο γάρ αίτιον 7 
του /χά;!^εσ0αι άλλτ^λοι? πολλάκις, αγνοεί γάρ 6 
€ρών ΟΤΙ ούχ 6 αυτός λόγος εστί της προθυμίας.^ 
διό είρηκεν Αΐνικος^^' 

ερωμένος τοιαΰτ' άν, ούκ ερών λεγοι. 

οι δε νομίζουσι τον αυτόν είναι λόγον. 

1239 a IV. 'Ο,σπερ ούν εΐρηται τριών όντων ειδών 1 

1 Mb; άλλην Pb, &\\αι <καΙ> Sp. 
^ δέ <ws> Sp. * Γ : r<j? άντιφιΧβΐσθαι. 

* ό άρχόμβνοί Βζ. : και άρχομένφ. ^ ή add. lac. 

' οΰδ' iv lac. : ovbiv. 
' ώσί add. Cas. * και <όμοίωί> vel <ώ(Γαΐ'τώ5> ? Rac 

* Fr. : Xoyos riji έπ'ι την ιτροθνμίαν. 
^* lac. : διό ίΰρηκέναι vukos ο. 

" i.e. they complain if the pleasure or benefit they get 
from their friend is not equal (absolutely, not merely in pro- 
890 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. iii. 3— iv. i 

3 class, and that of benefactor for beneficiary. And of 
these sorts of friendship themselves there are varie- 
ties : the friendship of father for son is different from 
that of husband for wife — the former is friendship 
as between ruler and subject, the latter that of 
benefactor for beneficiary. And in these varieties 
either there is no return of affection or it is not 

4 returned in a similar way. For it would be ludicrous 
if one were to accuse God because he does not return 
love in the same way as he is loved, or for a subject 
to make this accusation against a ruler ; for it is the 
part of a ruler to be loved, not to love, or else to 

5 love in another way. And the pleasure differs ; the 
pleasure that a man of established position has in 
his own property or son and that which one who 
lacks them feels in an estate or a child coming to him 

6 are not one and the same. And in the same way 
also in the case of those who are friends for utility 
or for pleasure — some are on a footing of equality, 
others one of superiority. Owing to this those who 
think they are on the former footing complain if 
they are not useful and beneficial in a similar 

7 manner ; and also in the case of pleasure." This 
is clear in cases of passionate affection, for this is 
often a cause of combat between the lover and his 
beloved : the lover does not see that they have not 
the same reason for their affection. Hence Aenicus ^ 
has said : 

A loved one so would speak, but not a lover. 
But they think that the reason is the same. 
1 IV. There being then, as has been said," three 

portion to a supposed difference of merit) to that which they 
give to him. "* A dramatist of the Old Comedy. 

' See 1236 a 7—1237 b 15. 

391 



ARISTOTLE 

1289 a 

φιλίας, κατ άρ^την καΐ^ κατά το χρησιμον καΐ 

κατά το ηΒύ, αύται πάλιν Βι-ηρηνται et? δυο* at 

μβν γάρ κατά το ΐσον at 8e καθ^ νπβροχήν etVi;^. 

5 ^lAtat μβν ονν άμφότ€ραι, φίλοι δ' οι κατά την 2 

ισότητα• άτοπον γάρ άν ^ΐη el άνηρ τταιδιω φίλος, 

φιλίΐ δε ye και φιλίΐται. ενιαχον Be φιλ€Ϊσθαι 

μ€ν δε? τον νπ€ρ€χοντα, iav δε ^tA^, οι^ειδιζεται 

ώς άνάζιον φιλών τη γάρ άζία των φίλων^ 

μeτpeΐτaι καί τινι ΐσω. τά μίν ονν δι' ηλικίας 3 

10 €λλ€ΐφιν dvctfta ομοίως φιλeΐσθaι, τά δε κατ' ape- 
την η γ€νος η κατά άλλην τοιαντην ύπepoχήv• δει* 
δε τον vπepeχovτa η ήττον η μη φιλeιv άζιοΰν, 
και ev τω χρησιμω και ev τω rjSei και κατ' άρ€τήν. 
ev μev ούν ταΐ? μικραΐς vπepoχaΐς elκότως γίνονται 4 
aμφισβητησeις {το γάρ μικρόν βνιαχοΰ ovSev 

15 ίσχυβι, ώσπ€ρ ev ξύλου σταθμω, αλλ' iv χρυσίω*• 
αΛλα το μικρόν κακώς κρίνουσιν, ^αι^εται γάρ 
το μev oiKelov αγαθόν δια το €γγνς μ4γα το δ' 
αλλοτριον δια το πόρρω μικρόν) • οται» δε νπ€ρβολ'η 5 
η, ουδ' αυτοί €πιζητοΰσιν ώς δει η άvτιφιλeΐσθaι 
η ομοίως αντιφιλ€Ϊσθαι, οίον ει τι? ά^ιοΓ τον θβόν. 

20 φανερόν Srj δτι φίλοι /χεν οται^ ev τω ΐσω, το 6 

avτιφιλeΐv δ' εστίν avev τον φίλονς είναι. Βηλον 7 

δε και δια τι ζητοΰσι μάλλον οι άνθρωποι την καθ' 

νπζροχην φιλίαν της κατ' ισότητα• άμα γάρ 

^ καϊ add. Rac. 

* τφ φιλ(Ίν : τ6 φιλεΐν Βζ. 

' Wilson : del. * χρνσίον Sp. 

" i.e. proportional equality: see note on 1:338 b 21. 
* Or ' one ought to expect the superior to feel . . .' 
392 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. iv. 1-7 

/kinds of friendship, based on goodness, utility and friendship 
pleasantness, these are again divided in two, one unequars 
set' being on a foQting of equahty and the other on possible in 

2 one of superiority. Though both sets, therefore, are formsT*' 
friendships, only^vKen they are on an equahty are 

the parties friHmJs ; for it would" "be absurd'Tor' a 
man to be a friend of a child, though he does feel 
affection for him and receive it from him. In some 
cases, while the superior partner ought to receive 
affection, if he gives it he is reproached as loving an 
unworthy object ; for affection is measured by the 
worth of the friends and by one sort of equalityj* 

3 So in some cases there is properly a dissimilarity 
of affection because of inferiority of age, in others 
on the ground of goodness or birth or some other 
such superiority ; it is right for the superior to 
claim to feel ** either less affection or none, alike in 
a friendship of utility and in one of pleasure and 

4 one based on goodness. So in cases of small degrees 
of superiority disputes naturally occur (for a small 
amount is not of importance in some matters, as in 
weighing timber, though in gold plate it is ; but but these 
people judge smallness of amount badly, since one's frTends. ^'^"^ 
own good because of its nearness appears big and 

that of others because of its remoteness small) ; 

5 but when there is an excessive amount of difference, 
then even the parties themselves do not demand 
that they ought to be loved in return, or not loved 

alike — for example, if one were claiming a return ^ 

6 of love from God. It is manifest, therefore, that 
men are friends when they are on an equality, but 
that a return of affection is possible without their 

7 being friends. And it is clear why men seek friend- 
ship on a basis of superiority more than that on one 

393 



ARISTOTLE 

1239 a 

ύπαρχβι ούτως avrols τό re φίλ€Ϊσθαί και η 
νπβροχη. διό 6 κόΧαζ τταρ Ivlois €νημότ€ρος χοΰ 

25 φίλου • αμφω γαρ φαίνβσθαι 7Τοΐ€Ϊ ύπάρχαν τω 
κολακ€υομ€νω. μάλιστα δ' οι φιλότιμοι τοιούτοι' 
το γαρ ^αυ^αάζεσ^αι iv νπβροχγΙ. φύσ€ΐ be 8 
γίνονται οι μβν φιλητικοι οι Se φιλότιμοι' φιλητικος 
he 6 τω φιλΐΐν χαίρων μάλλον η τω φιλ€Ϊσθαι, 
€κβΐνος he φιλoυμevoς^ /χαλλον. 6 μ€ν ονν χαίρων 

30 τω θαυ/χάζεσ^αι και φιλζΐσθαι της vnepoxrjg φίλος, 
6 he της ev τω φιλ€Ϊν ηhovης^ ο φιλητικός . eveaTi 
γαρ άνάγκΎ} €ν€ργοΰντι^• το μ€ν γαρ φιλ€Ϊσθαι 
συμβ€βηκός, εστί γαρ λavθάveιv φιλονμ€νον, 
φιλονντα δ' ου. έ'στι he και κατά την φιλίαν τό 9 

3ϋ φιλ€Ϊν μάλλον η τό φιλeΐσθaι* τό he φιλ€Ϊσθαι 
κατά τό φιλητόν. σημeΐov he• eAotr' αι^ ό φίλος 
μά?^ον, ei μη evhe^oiT' άμφω, γιvώσκeιv η 
γιvώσκeσθaι, οίον ev ταΐς ύποβολαΐς^ αϊ γυναΐκ€ς 
ττοιοΰσι, και η *Avhpoμάχη η ^Αντιφώντος, και 
γάρ eoiKe τό μ€ν e^eAetl•- γινώσκ€σθαι αύτοΰ eveKa, 

40 και του Trdaxeiv τι aya^ov άλλα μη iroielv, τό he 

γιvώσκeιv του TToieXv και του φιλeΐv eveKa. διό 1 

1239 b και τους €μμ€νοντας τω φιλ€Ϊν προς τους τ€θν€ώτας 

€παινοΰμ€ν• γινώσκουσι γάρ, αλλ' ου γινώσκονται. 

"Οτι μ€.ν ουν 7τλeίoveς τρόποι φιλίας, καΐ πόσοι 

^ Rac. : φιλότιμοι. 

^ rfj . . . ήδον^ Sp. (et Ric. om. ό). 

' Ric. et Sol. : άνά-γκη ivepyovvra. 

* [^ TO φιΚΐΙσθαι] ? Rac. ^ Vict. : ΰν(ρβο\αΐί. 

" This poet lived at Syracuse at the court of Dionysius 
the elder (who came into power 406 b.c). He is said to have 
written tragedies in collaboration with the tyrant ; and he 
was sentenced by him to death by flogging {Khet, 1384 a 9). 
394 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. iv. 7-10 

of equality ; for in the former case they score both 
affection and a sense of superiority at the same time. 
Hence with some men the flatterer is more esteemed 
than the friend, for he makes the person flattered 
appear to score both advantages. And this most 
of all characterizes men ambitious of honours, since 

8 to be admired implies superiority. Some jpersons 
grow up by nature affectionate and others ambitious "; 

"^orie who enjoys loving more than being loved_ is. 

affectionate, whereas the other enjoys being loved 

"more. So the man who enjoys being admired and 

"loved is a lover of superiority, whereas the other, 

the affectionate man, loves the pleasure of loving. 

For this he necessarily possesses by the mere activity 

of loving ; for being loved is an accident, as one can 

be loved without knowing it, but one cannot love 

9 without knowing it. Loving depends, more than 
being loved, on the actual feeling, whereas being 

Joved corresponds with the nature of the object. 
A sign of this is that a friend, if both things were 
not possible, would choose to know the other person 
rather than to be known by him, as for example 
women do when they allow others to adopt their 
children, and Andromache in the tragedy of Anti- 
phon." Indeed the wish to be known seems to be 
selfish, and its motive a desire to receive and not 
to confer some benefit, whereas to wish to know 
a person is for the sake of conferring benefit and 
10 bestowdng affection. For this reason we praise 
those who remain constant in affection towards the 
dead ; for they know, but are not known. 

It has, then, been stated that there are several 
modes of friendship, and how many modes there 



395 



ARISTOTLE 

1239 b 

τροποί, OTL τρ€Ϊς, καΐ δτί το φίλίΐσθαί καΐ άντι- 
5 φΐΛ€Ϊσθαι καΐ οι φίλοι ^ιαφ^ρονσι,ν 61 τε κατ' 
ισότητα και οι καθ υπεροχην, ειρηται. 

V. ΕτΓβι δ€ το φίλον λέγεται και καθόλου ι 
μάλλον, ωσπερ και κατ' αρχάς ελέχθη, ύττο των 
εζωθεν συμπαραλαμβανόντων^ {οΐ μεν γαρ το 
όμοιον φασιν etv-at φίλον, οι 8ε το εναντίον), 
λεκτεον και ττερι τούτων ττώς είσι προς τάς 

10 ειρημενας φιλίας. ai^ayeTai δε το μεν δμοιον και 2 
εις το η8ύ και εΙς το aya^ov. το τε γαρ αγαθόν 
αττλοΰν το 8έ κακόν πολνμορφον και ό αγαθός 
μεν όμοιος άει και ου μεταβάλλεται το ήθος, ό 
δε φαύλος και 6 άφρων ονθεν εοικεν εωθεν και 

15 εσπέρας, διό εάν μη συμβάλλωσιν οι φαύλοι, ου 3 
φίλοι εαυτοΐς αλλά διίστανται• η δ' ου βέβαιος 
φίλια ου φιλία, ώστε οϋτω μεν το ομοιον φίλον, 
ΟΤΙ το* αγαθόν δμοιον. εστί 8ε ώς και κατά το 
η8ύ• τοις γάρ ομοίοις ταΰθ' ή8εα, και εκαστον 8ε 
φύσει αυτό αύτω η8ύ. 8ιό και φωναι και εζεις^ 4 

20 και συνημερευσεις τοις ομογενεσιν ηδισται άλλτ^λοι?, 
και τοΓ? άλλοι? ζωοις• και ταύτη εν8εχεται και 
τους φαύλους αλλήλους φιλεΐν 

κακός κακω 8ε συντετηκεν η8ονη. 

Το δ' εναντίον τω εναντίω φίλον κατά* το 5 
χρησιμον. αυτό γάρ αύτω το δμοιον άχρηστον, 
25 διό 8εσπότης 8ουλου 8εΐται και 8οΰλος 8εσπότου 
και γυνή και άνηρ άλλτ^λωΐ'• και η8ύ και επι- 

^ Sp. : συμΐΓ€ρί\αμβανόΐ'των. * τό add. Βζ. 

* ν.1. αϊ ^ξ«ϊ: νράξείί ? Rac. {diaXi^ets vel διάλεξα Ric, sed 
cf. 1. 20). * Rac. : ώί. 

" 1235 a 4 fF. * C/. 1238 a 34 note. 

396 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. iv. 10— v. 5 

are, namely three, and that receiving aiFection and 
having one's aiFection returned, and friends on an 
equaUty and those on a footing of superiority, are 
different. 

1 V. But as the term ' friend ' is used in a more Friendship 
universal sense as well, as was also said at the begin- "^^^of^'''^ 
ning," by those who take in wider considerations opposites 
(some saying that what is like is dear, others what is §§^7,%! 
opposite), we must also speak about these forms of 
friendship and their relation to the kinds that have 

2 been discussed. As for likeness, it connects with 
pleasantness and also with goodness. For the good 
is simple, whereas the bad is multiform ; and also 
the good man is always alike and does not change 
in character, whereas the wicked and the foolish are 
quite different in the evening from what they were 

3 in the morning. Hence if wicked men do not hit it 
off together, they are not friends with one another 
but they separate ; yet an insecure friendship is 
not friendship at all. So the like is dear to us in 
this way, because the good is like. But in a way 
it is also dear on the score of pleasantness ; for to 
those who are alike the same things are pleasant, 
and also everything is by nature pleasant to itself. 

4 Owing to this relations find one another's voices and 
characters and society pleasantest, and so with the 
lower animals ; and in this way it is possible even 
for bad men to feel affection for each other : 

But pleasure welds the bad man to the bad.*" 

5 But opposite is dear to opposite on the score ofy 
utility. For the like is useless to itself, and therefore I 
master needs slave and slave master, man and wife 
need one another ; and the opposite is pleasant 

397 



ARISTOTLE 

θνμητόν το εναντίον ώς χρήσιμον, και ούχ ώς ev 
τω^ re'Aei αλλ' ώς προς το τέλος- όταν γαρ τνχτ} 
ου επίθνμ,βΐ, εν τω τέλει μεν εστίν ουκ ορέγεται 
δε του εναντίου, οίον το θερμον του φυχροΰ και 
το ζτ]ρ6ν του ύγροΰ. 

30 "Εστί 8e ττως καΧ "η του εναντίου φίλια του 6 
άγαθοΰ. ορέγεται γαρ άλλτ^λω^ δια το μέσον ως 
σύμβολα γαρ ορέγεται άλλτ^λων, δια το ούτω^ 
ytVea^at εζ άμφοΐν εν μέσον, ώστε' κατά συ μ- η 
βεβηκός εστί τοΰ εναντίου, καθ^ αυτό δε της μεσο- 
τητος, ορέγονται γαρ ουκ αλλήλων τάναντία αλλά 

35 τοΰ μέσου, ύττερφυχθεντες γαρ εάν θερμανθώσιν εις 
το μέσον καθίστανται, και ύττερθερμανθεντες εάν 
φυχθώσιν, ομοίως δε και επΙ των άλλων ει δε μη, 
άει εν εττιθυμία, δτι* ουκ εν τοις μεσοις. άλλα 8 
χαίρει ό εν τω μέσω άνευ επιθυμίας τοις φύσει 
ήΒεσιν, οι δε ττασι τοις εζιστασι της φύσει εζεως. 

40 τοΰτο μεν οΰν το εΐ8ος και επι των άφύχων εστίν 9 
1240 a το φιλεΐν δε γίνεται όταν fj επι των εμφυχων. 
διό ενίοτε^ άνομοίοις χαίρουσιν, οΐον αυστηροί εύ- 
τραπελοις και οζεΐς ραθύμοις• εις το μέσον γαρ 
καθίστανται ι5π' αλλήλων, κατά συμβεβηκος ο^ν, κ 
ώσπερ ελέχθη, τα εναντία φίλα και δια το aya^oi^. 
5 Πόσα μεν οΰν εϊΒη φιλίας, και τίνες ^ιαφοραι 
καθ^ άς λέγονται οι τε φίλοι και οι φιλοΰντες και 

1 τφ add. Rac. (cf. 1333 a 10). 
^ Sp. : διό ού τφ. ' Sus. : ίτι. 

* δτι add. Sp. * ivioL rols Fr. 

" The two halves of a bone or coin broken in half by two 
contracting parties and one kept by each, to serve as a 
token of identification μ hen found to fit together. 

398 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. v. 5-10 ^ *^^ 

and desirable as useful, not as contained in the End j 
but as a means to the End — for when a thing has | 
got what it desires it has arrived at its End, and does ] 
not strive to get its opposite, for example the hot the 
cold and the wet the dry.^ 

6 But in a way love of the opposite is also love of the 
good. For opposites strive to reach one another i 
through the middle point, for they strive after each | 
other as tallies," because in that way one middle | 

7 thing results from the two. Hence accidentally love ', 
•of the good is love of the opposite, but essentially 

it is love of the middle, for opposites do not strive 
to reach one another but the middle. If when 
people have got too cold they are subjected to heat, 
and when they have got too hot to cold, they reach 
a mean temperature, and similarly in other matters ; 
but without such treatment they are always in a 
state of desire, because they are not at the middle 

8 points. But a man in the middle enjoys without 
passionate desire things by nature pleasant, whereas 
the others enjoy everything that takes them outside 

9 their natural state. This kind of relationship, then, 
exists even between inanimate things ; but when it 
occurs in the case of living things it becomes affec- 
tion. Hence sometimes people take delight in 
persons unlike themselves, the stiff for instance in 
the witty and the active in the lazy, for they are 
brought by one another into the middle state. 

10 Hence accidentally, as was said,^ opposites are dear 
to opposites also on account of the good. 

It has, then, been said how many kinds of friend- Seif-iove 
ship there are, and what are the different senses in 
which people are termed friends, and also givers 

" 1239 b 32. 

399 



ARISTOTLE 

1240 a 

ol φιλούμβνοι,, καί όντως toarc φίλοι elvai και 

avev τούτου, €Ϊρηται. 

VI. Ilept 8e του αντον αύτω φίΧον elvai -η μ,η 1 

ττολλην €χ€ΐ βπίσκβφιν. So/cet γαρ eviois μάλιστα 

10 'έκαστος αύτος αύτω φίλος eti^ai, και τούτω 
χρώμβνοι κανόνι κρίνουσι την προς τους άλλους 
φίλους φιλίαν. κατά δε τους λόγους και τα 
Βοκοΰνθ^ ύττάρχ^ειν τοις φίλοις τα μ€ν ΰττ€ναντιοϋται, 
τά δ' όμοια φαίνεται οντά. έ'στι γάρ πως κατ 2 
άναλογίαν αϋτη^ φιλία απλώς δ' ου. εν hυσι γαρ 

15 ΒΐΎ)ρημ€νοις το φιλεΐσθαι και φιλεΐν hi α μάλλον 
οϋτως^ αύτος αύτω φίλος ώς^ επι του άκρατους 
και εγκρατούς εϊρηται πώς εκών η άκων, τω τά 
μέρη εχειν πως προς άλληλα τά της φυχης. και 
ομοιον* τά τοιαύτα πάντα, ει φίλος αύτος αύτω 
και εχθρός, και ει ά^ικεΐ τις αυτός αυτόν πάντα 

20 γάρ εν δυσι ταύτα και Βιηρημενοις^• fj^ hrf δυο 3 
πως και η φυχη, υπάρχει πως ταύτα, ff δ' ου 
Βιηρημενα, ούχ υπάρχει. 

ΑτΓΟ δε της προς αυτόν εζεώς είσιν* οΐ λοιποί 
τρόποι του φιλον eivai ωρισμενοι καν ους εν 
τοις λογοις επισκοπεΐν είώθαμεν. Βοκεΐ γάρ φίλος 
etvai ό βουλόμενός τινι τάγα^ά, η οία ο'ίεται 

25 αγαθά, μη δι' αυτόν αλλ' εκείνου ένεκα• άλλον δε 4 

^ Ric. : αϋτη η. ^ oCros Μ*». 3 ώ? add. Γ. 

* όμοια Sp. ^ Βζ. : δίτιρημένωί. * Fr. : et Ρ*", ή Μ". 
' Sp. (enim Guil.): bi. * ή codd, ti Bk. 

• Sp. : ws {καϊ Ric). ^^ lac. : φιλβΐσθαι διωρισμίνοι. 

- Cf. 1223 a 36-b 17. Self-rostraint (or the lack of it) 
indicates that a man's personality has in a sense two parts, 
one of which may control the other; and similarly self-love 
implies that one part of the personality can ha\'e a certain 
feeling in regard to another part. 
400 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. v. 10— vi. 3 

and objects of afFection, both in a manner that makes 
them actually friends and without being friends. 

1 VI. The question whether one is one's own friend 
or not involves much consideration. Some think 
that every man is his own best friend, and they 
use this friendship as a standard by which to judge 
his friendship for his other friends. On theoretical 
grounds, and in view of the accepted attributes of 
friends, self-love and love of others are in some 
respects opposed but in others manifestly similar. 

2 For in a way self-love is friendship by analogy, but only met»• 
not absolutely. For being loved and loving involve friendahip ; 
two separate factors ; owing to which a man is his 

own friend rather in the way in which, in the case 
of the unrestrained and the self-restrained man, we 
have said ** how one has those qualities voluntarily 
or involuntarily — namely by the parts of one's spirit 
being related to each other in a certain way ; and 
all such matters are a similar thing, — whether a man 
can be his own friend or foe, and whether a man 
can treat himself unjustly. For all these relations 

3 involve two separate factors ; in so far then as the 
spirit is in a manner two, these relations do in a 
manner belong to it, but in so far as the two are not 
separate, they do not. 

From the state of friendship for oneself are de- but the 
termined the remaining modes of friendship under onrue° ^^ 
which we usually study it in our discourses.^ For friendship 
a man is thought to be a friend who wishes for some- 
body things that are good, or that he believes to be 
good, not on his own account but for the other's sake ; 

'' Cf. 1244 a 20. Perhaps a reference to Aristotle's 
lectures (Stock). 

2d 401 



ARISTOTLE 

1240 a 

τροττον ώ το etvaL βουλ^ται δι' €Κ€Ϊνον /cat μη δι' 
αυτόν, καν €l μη διανε/χωι^ τάγαθά, μητοι^ το 
€Ϊναι, τούτω αν So^eie μάλιστα φίλος βΐναι^• 
άλλον Se τρόπον ω σνζην αίρεΓται δι' αντην την 5 

30 ομιλίαν κάΙ μη δι' eTepov τι, οΐον οί πατέρες το 
μεν etvaL tols τέκνοις, συζώσι δ' €Τ€ροις. /χά;(6ται 6 
8e^ ταύτα πάντα προς άλληλα• οΐ μεν γαρ αν μη 
ι αυτοί?, οι ο€ αν μη το eii/ai, οι oe το σνζην, 
ουκ οιονται ^lAeiq^ai. έτι το τω* aAyowTi συν- 7 
αλγείν μη δι' eTepov τι ayaTrat' θησομεν — οΓοι^ οί 
δοΰλοι προς τους δέσποτας οτι χαλεποί άλγοΰντες , 

35 αλλ ου δι αυτού?, ωσπερ αι μητέρες τοις τέκνοις 
και οί συνωδίνοντες όρνιθες, βούλεται γαρ μάλιστα 8 
τε ου μόνον συλλυπεΐσθαι 6 φίλος τω φίλω άλλα 
και την αύτην λύπην {οίον 8ιφώντι συνΒιφην) ει 
ενε8εχετο, είτε μη, οτι* εγγύτατα. 6 δ' αυτό? 9 
λόγος και επι του χαίρειν το γαρ χαίρειν'' μη δι' 
1240 b έτερον τι άλλα δι' εκείνον οτι χαίρει φιλικόν. ετι 
τα τοιάΒε λέγεται περί φιλίας, ώς Ισότης φιλότης, 
και μίαν φυχην^ eivai τοΓ? άλτ^^ώ? φίλοις.^ άπαντα 1( 
ταύτα επαναφέρεται προς τον ενα• και γαρ βούλεται 

5 ταγαθά αυτω^" τούτον τον τρόπον, ούθεις γαρ 
αυτός αντον ευ ποιεί δια τι έτερον, ούΖε χάριν 
TOOovSi eu" λέγει, οτι εποίησεν fj εις• δοκεΐν^^ γαρ 

^ lac. : /ιη τφ. 

^ lac. : μάλιστα φιλ^ΐν. » Sp. δ»;. 

* lac. : μη τό eavroh. ^ τό τω Fr. : τφ. 

* eire μή, 6τί Rac, : δτι μη (etre μiJ lac). 

' τό yap xaLpetv add. Γ. 

* Cas, : καΐ μη μίαν φιλίαν. • Rac. : τούί . . . φίλους. 

^^ Bek. : αύτφ. 

^^ χάριν τοσουδί e5 Rac. : χάριτοί ονδέ {χάριν τοσοΰδΐ lac). 

^* lac. : δοκ€ΐ. 

402 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. vi. 4-10 

4 and in another way when a man wishes another's 
existence — even though not bestowing goods on 
him, let alone existence — for that other's sake and 
not for his own, he would be thought to be in a high 

5 degree the friend of that other ; and in another 
way a man is a friend of one whose society he desires 

, I merely for the sake of his company and not for some- 
thing else, as fathers desire their children's exist- 
ience, though they associate with other people. All 

6 these cases conflict with one another ; some men 
do not think they are loved unless the friend wishes 
them this or that particular good, others unless their 
existence is desired, others unless their society. 

7 Again we shall reckon it affection to grieve with 
one who grieves not for some ulterior motive — as 
for instance slaves in relation to their masters share 
their grief because when in grief they are harsh, and 
not for their masters' own sake, as mothers grieve 
with their children, and birds that share each other's 

8 pain. For a friend wishes most of all that he might 
not only feel pain when his friend is in pain but feel 
actually the same pain — for example when he is 
thirsty, share his thirst — if this were possible, and 

9 if not, as nearly the same as may be. The same 
principle applies also in the case of joy ; it is char- 
acteristic of a friend to rejoice for no other reason 
than because the other is rejoicing. Again there 
are sayings about friendship such as ' Amity is 

10 equality ' and ' True friends have one spirit.' All 
these sayings refer back to the single individual ; 
for that is the way in which the individual wishes 
good to himself, as nobody benefits himself for some 
ulterior motive, nor speaks well of himself for such 
and such a consideration, because he acted as an 

403 



ARISTOTLE 

φίλ^ΐν βουλ€ταί 6 SrjXov ποιών otl φιλίΐ, αλλ 
ου φιλβΐν} και το etvai βούλ^σθαι^ και ro συζ'ην \ 
καΐ το σνγχαίραν και το συναλγ€Ϊν, καΐ μια δη 

10 φνχη, κται το μ,η δυνασ^αι av€V αλλήλων μηΒε 
ζην, άλλα συναττοθνησκΐΐν — οντω γαρ βχ€ΐ ο €ΐς, 
και οντως^ 6μιλ€Ϊ αύτος αύτω — πάντα 8η* ταύτα 
τω άγαθώ νπάρχ€ΐ προς αυτόν, ev δε τω πονηρω 1! 
Βιαφωνβΐ, οίον ev τω άκρατ€Ϊ, καΐ δια τούτο δο /cet 
και βχθρον Ιν^έχεσθαι αυτόν αύτω είναι* ^ δ ει? 

15 και αδιαίρετο?, ορεκτος αντος αυτω. τοιούτο? ο ΐ; 
aya^o? και ό κατ' άρ€την φίλος Ιπα, 6 ye μοχθηρός 
ούχ €ΐς άλλα πολλοί, και τί^? αύτης ημέρας έτερος 
και εμπληκτος. ώστε και η αυτού προς αύτον 
φιλία ανάγεται προς την του αγαθού• οτι γαρ πη 

20 όμοιος^ και εις και αύτος αύτω αγαθός, ταύτη 
αύτος αύτω φίλος και όρεκτός. φύσει δε τοιούτος, 
αλλ' ό πονηρός παρά φύσιν. 6 δ'® dya^o? οϋθ 1• 
άμα λοώορεΐται εαυτω, ώσπερ 6 άκρατης, ούθ ο 
ύστερος τω πρότερον, ώσπερ 6 μεταμελητικος ^ 
ούτε 6 έμπροσθεν τω ύστερον, ώσπερ 6 φεύστης 
{όλως τε ει δει ώσπερ οι σοφισται διοριζουσιν, 1 

25 ώσπερ το Κορισκο? και Κορισκο? σττουδαιο?, 
8ηλον γαρ ώς το αύτο πόσον σπουΒαΐον αυτών*)• 
επει όταν εγκαλεσωσιν αύτοΓ?,' άττοκτιννυασιν 
αι5του?/** άλλα δοκει πας αυτός αύτω αγαθός. 

^ φιλί! ? Rac. ■^ Kac. : μάλιστα. 
' Rac. : ro-ws. * lac. : yap (δέ Γ). 

* Bk. : όμοιοι. * Syl. : ούδί. 

' Cas, : μΐταληπτικόί. * Fr. : αυτόν. 

• Fr. : avTois. ^'' Fr. : aurous. 

" Cf. 1. 3 : δτ) marks a quotation. 

^ See Sophistici Elenchi, 175 b 15 fF. 'Coriscus' is used 
for any imaginary person, cf. 1220 a 19 f. 
404 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. vi. 10-15 

individual ; for one who displays his affection wishes 

11 not to be but to be thought affectionate. And 
wishing for the other to exist, and associating 
together, and sharing joy and grief, and ' being 
one spirit ' " and being unable even to live without 
one another but dying together — for this is the case 
with the single individual, and he associates with 
himself in this way, — all these characteristics then aii apply to 
belong to the good man in relation to himself. man^s°iove 

12 In a wicked man on the other hand, for instance in of self. 
one who lacks self-control, there is discord, and be- 
cause of this it is thought to be possible for a man 
actually to be his own enemy ; but as being one and 

13 indivisible he is desirable to himself. This is the case 
with a good man and one whose friendship is based 
on goodness, because assuredly an evil man is not a 
single individual but many, and a different person 
in the same day, and full of caprice. Hence a man's 
affection for himself carries back to love of the good ; 
for because in a way a man is like himself and a 
single person and good to himself, in this way he is 
dear and desirable to himself. And a man is like 
that by nature, but a wicked man is contrary to 

14 nature. But a good man does not rebuke himself 
either at the time, like the uncontrolled, nor yet his 
former self his later, hke the penitent, nor his later 

15 self his former, like the liar — (and generally, if it is 
necessary to distinguish as the sophists do, he is 
related to himself as ' John Styles ' is related to 
' good John Styles ' ^ ; for it is clear that the same 
amount of ' John Styles ' is good as of ' good 
John Styles ') — because when men blame themselves 
they are murdering their own personalities, whereas 
everybody seems to himself good. And he who is 

405 



ARISTOTLE 

1240 b 

ζητ€Ϊ Se 6 άττλώς ών αγαθός elvai καΐ αύτος αύτω 
φίλος, ώσπ€ρ €ίρηται, οτί δυ' €χ€ΐ iv αύτώ α 

30 φυσ^ι βονλ€ται etvai φίλα καΐ διασττάσαι αδύνατον. 
διό €7γ' ανθρώπου μέν 8οκ€Ϊ έκαστος αύτος αντώ h 
φίλος, €7Γΐ δε των άλλων ζωών ον,^ οίον ΐτητος 
αύτος αύτω . . . ^ ούκ άρα φίλος, αλλ' ούδε τα 
τταιδια, αλλ όταν ηΒη έ'χτ^ προαίρζσιν η^η γαρ 
τοτβ Βιαφωνβΐ 6 νοΰς^ προς την Ιττιθυμίαν. eoiKe Γ 

35 δ Tj φίλια Ύ] προς αύτον* τη κατά σνγγ€ν€ίαν' 
ούθέτερον γαρ έφ' αύτοΐς λνσαι, άλλα καν δια- 
φίρωνταί όμως ούτοι μβν συγγενβΐς en,* ό δε 
€τι €ίς βως αν ί,η. 

ΐίοσαχώς μβν ονν το φιλζΐν λβγβταί, καΐ οτι 
77ασαι at φιλίαί ανάγονται προς την πρώτην, 8ηλον 
€Κ των βίρημ4νων . 
1241 a VII. Οίκεΐον δέ τη σκέφ€ΐ θεωρησαι καΐ π€ρΙ 1 
ομονοίας καΐ εύνοιας• Sokcl γάρ τοις μεν etvai 
ταυτό,* τοις δ' ούκ άνευ άλλι^λα;^. εστί δ' η εύ- 
νοια της φιλίας ούτε πάμπαν έτερον ούτε ταύτόν. 
Βιηρημενης γάρ της φιλίας κατά τρεις τρόπους, 2 

5 ού'τ' εν τη χρήσιμη οϋτ* εν τη καθ' ηΒονην εστιι^. 
εϊτε γάρ οτι χρήσιμος^ βούλεται αύτω τάγαθά, ού 
δι εκείνον αλλά δι' αύτον βούλοιτ αν, Βοκεΐ δ' 
ώσπερ . . .^ και η εύνοια ούκ αύτοϋ ένεκα* του 

^ ού add. Sp. * lacunam Sus. ' P>. : τταΐϊ. 

* Syl. : αυτόν. ^ είσί Sp. 

• Rac. : ταύτα. ' Sp. : χρ•/ισιμον. 

* lacunam edd. : <καΙ ή κατ' άρΐτην φιλία> Sus. 

* lac. : βϋνοια. 

" 11. 13-21. 
'' Some words seem to have been lost here. 
406 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. vi. 15— vii. 2 

absolutely good seeks to be dear even to himself, 
as has been said,* because he has two factors within 
him which by nature desire to be friendly and which 

16 it is impossible to draw asunder. Therefore in the 
case of man each individual seems dear to himself, 
although in the case of other animals it is not so, for 
example a horse to itself . . .'' so it is not dear to 
itself. But neither are children, but only when they 
have come to possess purposive choice ; for when 
that point is reached the mind is at variance with 

17 the appetite. And affection for oneself resembles 
the affection of relationship : neither connexion is 
in people's own power to dissolve, but even if the 
parties quarrel, nevertheless relatives are still rela- 
tives and the individual is still one as long as he lives. 

From what has been said, then, it is clear how 
many meanings there are of the term ' affection,' and 
that all the forms of friendship carry back to the 
first one. 

1 VII. It is relative to our inquiry to consider also Goodwin 
the subject of agreement of feeling and kindly Memuhlp*^ 
feeling ^ ; for some people think that they are the fo"nfiefi on 
same thing, and others that they cannot exist apart. 
Kindly feeling is neither entirely distinct from friend- 

2 ship nor yet identical with it. If friendship isj 
divided into three modes, kindly feeling is not 
found in the friendship of utility nor in friendshit 
for pleasure. If A wishes Β prosperity because he 
is useful, the motive of his wish would be not B's 
interest but his own, whereas it is thought that kindly 
feeling like . . . <* is not for the sake of the person 

" These are Solomon's versions of tlie terms usually 
rendered ' concord and goodwill.' 

<* Perhaps ' virtuous friendship ' should be supplied. 

407 



ARISTOTLE 

1241 a 

€ννοϊζο[Μ€νον eivat άλλα του ω evvoeZ' elr ^ ev rfj 

του rjbeos φιλία, καν τοις άφνχοις ηννόουν ώστ€ 

10 hrjXov OTL π€ρΙ την ηθίκην φιλίαν η evvoid εστίν, 
άλλα του μ€ν €ύνοοΰντος βουλ^σθαι μόνον εστί, του 3 
δε φίλου καΐ ττράττβιν α βούλ^ται• eoTL γαρ η 
εύνοια άρχη φιλίας, ό /χεν γαρ φίλος πας €ϋνους, ό 
δ' ΐϋνους ου ττας φίλος, άργομένω γαρ eoiKev 6 

15 ευνοών μόνον, διό άρχη φιλίας, αλλ' ου φιλία. 

Δοκουσι γαρ οι τε φίλοι 6μονο€Ϊν και οι ομονοοϋν- 
Τ€ς φίλοι είναι, εστί δ' ου περί πάντα η ομόνοια * 
η φιλική, άλλα ττερι τα πρακτά τοις όμονοοϋσι και 
δσα ει? το συζην συντείνει, ούδε** μόνον κατά διά- 
νοιαν η κατά ορζξιν εστί γάρ τάναντία νοεΐν κται* 

20 ζπιθυμβΐν, ωσττερ εν τω άκρατ€Ϊ δια0α>νεΓ τοΰτο* 
ουδ' ει* κατά τι^ν ττροαίρεσιν ό/χονοει/ και κατά 
την ετΓΐ^υ/χιαν. εττι δε των aya^cuv tJ ομόνοια' οι ^ 
γ€ φαύλοι ταύτα προαιρούμ€νοι και επιθυμοΰντβς 
βλαπτουσιν αλλήλους, εοικε δε και ή ομόνοια ούχ 6 
απλώς λέγβσθαι, ωσπ^ρ ούδ' ή φιλία, αλλ* ή μβν 

25 πρώτη και φύσ^ι σπουΒαία, διο ουκ εστί τους 
φαύλους ούτω?" όμονο€Ϊν, CTepa δε κα^' ην και οι 
φαύλοι όμονοοΰσιν, όταν των αυτών την προαίρεσιν 
και την ^πιθυμίαν εχωσιν. ούτω δε δει τών αυτών 7 
ορ€γ€σθαι ώστ' ivhi^eadai άμφοτ4ροις ύπάργ^ιν 

• Sp. : d δ' aut ei δη. « Sus. : οΰτί 

' «ΌεΣΊ» και Sol. : τό κινούν, * ου δ(ί Μ^ 

* όμονοεϊν Ρ>>. β <οβτω5> add. Rac. 

408 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. vii. 2-7 

who feels it himself but for the sake of him for 
whom he feels kindly ; and if kindly feeling were 
found in friendship for the pleasant, men would 
feel kindly even towards inanimate objects. So that 
it is clear that kindly feeling has to do with the 

3 friendship that is based on character. But it is 
the mark of one who feels kindly only to wish good, 
whereas it is the mark of the friend also to do the 
good that he wishes ; for kindly feeling is the begin- 
ning of friendship, as every friend feels kindly, but 
not everyone who feels kindly is a friend, since the 
kindly man is only as it were making a beginning. 
Therefore kindly feeling is the beginning of friend- 
ship, but it is not friendship. 

For it is thought that friends agree in feeling, Concord 

4 and that those who agree in feeling are friends. But c"nduc\ is 
the agreement of friendship is not in regard to every- °°""°^^ ^° 
thing, but to things practicable for the parties, and ^^°° ' 
to all that contributes to their association. Nor is 

it only agreement in thought or in appetition, for it 
is possible to think and to desire opposite things, as 
in the man lacking self-control this discord occurs ; 
if a man agrees with another in purposive choice he 
does not necessarily agree with him in desire also. 

5 Agreement occurs in the case of good men — at all 
events when bad men purpose and desire the same 

6 things they harm one another. And it appears that 
agreement, like friendship, is not a term of single 
meaning, but whereas the primary and natural form 
of it is good, so that it is not possible for bad men to 
agree in this way, there is another sort of agreement 
shown even by bad men when their purpose and 

7 desire are for the same objects. But it is only proper 
for them to aim at the same objects in cases when 

409 



ARISTOTLE 

1241 a ^ ^ 

ov ορίγονταΐ' αν yap τοιούτου ορίγωνται ο μη 

30 €ν^€χ€ται άμ,φοΐν, μαχοΰνται. οΐ όμονοοΰντ^ς δ' 
ου μάχονται} 

"Εστί δτ^^ ομόνοια όταν περί του άρχ€ΐν και 8 
άρχ€σθαι^ η αιϊτη προαίρ€σις ^, μη του ίκάτ^ρον, 
άλλα του τον αυτόν, και έ'στιι^ η ομόνοια φιλία 
πολιτική . 

Uepi μεν οΰν ομονοίας και ζύνοίαξ ειρήσθω 
τοσαΰτα. 
35 VIII. Άττορεΐται δέ δια τί μάλλον φιλοϋσιν οι 1 
ττοιησαντες ευ τους παθόντας η οι παθόντες ευ τους 
ποιησαντας• δο /cet δε δίκαιον etvat τουναντίον. 
τοΰτο δ' ύπολάβοι μεν αν τις δια το χρήσιμον 2 
και το αύτω ώφελιμον συμβαίνειν τω* μεν 
γαρ οφείλεται^ τον δ' άπο^οΰναι 8εΐ. ουκ εστί δε 
40 τοΰτο μόνον, άλλα και φυσικόν η γαρ ενέργεια 3 
1241 b αιρετώτερον, τον αυτόν δε* λόγον έχει το έργον και 
η ενέργεια, 6 δ' ευ παθών ώσπερ έργον του ευ 
ποιησαντος . διό και εν τοις ζωοις η περί τα τέκνα 
σπουδή εστί και του γει^νί^σαι και τοίΡ τα* γεννώ- 
μενα σώζειν. και φιλοϋσι 8η μάλλον οι πατέρες 4 
5 τα τέκνα {και at μητέρες των πάτερων)^ η φι- 
λοΰνται, και ούτοι πάλιν τά αύτώΐ' η τους γεννη- 
σαντας, δια το την ενεργειαν εΐναι το άριστον, και 
at μητέρες των πάτερων, οτι μάλλον οΐονται αυτών 
ε?ι/αι έργον τά τέκνα' το γάρ έργον τω χαλεπώ 5 

^ Κααμαχοΰΐ'ται. Sp. : δ' η. 

8 \καΙ άρχΐσθαι] ? Rac. 

* Fr. : τό (top edd.). ^ Fr. : ώφΐΧΰται. 

• Sp. : δη. ' τον add. Rac. 

* τα add. Sp. » [καΐ . . . πατέρων] Sp. 
4.10 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. vii. 7— vni. 5 

it is possible for both to have the things aimed at, 
since if they aim at a thing of a kind that it is not 
possible for both to have, they will quarrel ; but those 
who agree in mind do not quarrel. 
8 Therefore agreement exists when there is the 
same purposive choice as to ruling and being ruled — 
not each choosing himself to rule but both the same 
one. Agreement is civic friendship. 

So much for the subject of agreement in feeling 
and kindly feeling. 

1 VIII. The question is raised, why those who have \Love of 
conferred a benefit feel more affection for those who /fQ®°^g^^g*f '' 
have received it than those who have received it',ficiary. 
feel for those who have conferred it ; whereas justice . 

2 seems to require the opposite. One might conceive i 
that it occurs for reasons of utility and personal bene- 
fit ; for benefit is owing to one party and it is the 
other party's duty to repay it. But really it is not 

3 this alone ; it is also a law of nature — activity is a 
more desirable thing, and there is the same relation 
between effect and activity as between the parties 
here : the person benefited is as it were the product 
of the benefactor. This is why even animals have " 
the philoprogenitive instinct, which urges them to 
produce offspring and also to protect the offspring 

4 produced. And in fact fathers love their children 
more than they are loved by them (mothers more 
so than fathers) " and these in their turn love their 
children more than their parents, because activity 
is the greatest good. And mothers love their chil- 
dren more than fathers, because they think that the 

5 children are more their work ; for people estimate 

" This clause is probably an interpolation in the Greek. 

411 



ARISTOTLE 

Βίορίζουσιν, πλβίω δε λυττειται nepl την yeveatv 
rf μητηρ. 

10 Και π€ρΙ μεν φιλίας της προς αύτον καΐ της iv 
πλΐίοσι ^ίωρίσθω τον τρόπον τούτον. 

IX. Δο /cet δε τό τε δίκαιον elvat Ισον τι καΐ η 1 
φιλία iv Ισότητι, el μη μάτην Aeyerat Ισότης η 
φιλότης. αϊ δε ττολιτειαι ττασαι δίκαιου τι €Ϊ8ος• 

15 κοννωνίαϊ^ Ύ^Ρ» '''^ δε κοιι^όι^ παν δια του δικαίου 
συνβστηκβν, ώστε οσα ει'δτ^^ φιλίας, τοσαυτα* και 
δίκαιου και κοινωνίας, και πάντα ταντα σύνορα 
άλληλοις και εγγύς έχει τάς διαφοράς, ε'ττει δ'* 2 
ό^Μοιω? έχει φνχη προς σώμα και τεχνίτης προς 
όργανον και Ββσπότης προς Βοϋλον, τούτων μεν 

20 ουκ εστί κοινωνία' ου γαρ δυ' εστίν, άλλα το μεν 
εν, το δε του ενός ούδ' έν*• ουδέ διαιρετόν το 
aya^oj/ εκατερω, άλλα το αμφοτέρων του ενός ου 
ένεκα εστίν, το τε γαρ σώμα εστιΐ' όργανον σύμ- 
φυτον, και του οεσποτου ό Βοΰλος ώσπερ μόριον 
και όργανον'' άφαιρετόν, το δ' όργανον ώσπερ 
Βοΰλος άφυχος. 

25 Αι δ αλλαι κοινωνιαι εισιν»* μόριον τών της 3 
πόλεως κοινωνιών, οίον η τών φρατερων η τών 
όργεων^ η αϊ χρτ^/Αατιστικαι [έτι ττολιτειαι].'" αί 
δε ττολιτειαι ττασαι iv ταΐς οικίαις^^ συνυπάρχουσι, 
και αϊ ορθαι και αϊ παρεκβάσεις [εστί γαρ το 

^ ή add. Rac. (et olim Fr.). ^ Bz. : κοινωνία. 

* ώστ( δσα είδη Bz. : βστυ del δη (δια Μ*'). 

* τοσαΟτα add. llac. (cf. Μ. 31. 1211 a). 

* δ' <οι'χ> ? Rac. « lac. : ουδέν. 

' [καΐ 6pyavov] ? Rac. * Bz. : ΐΐσΐν ή. 

' Sol. (et ν, L. & S.) : όρ-γίων {όρ-γςώνων Dietsche). 

" Fr. 
11 <Tats> οίκίαΐ! (cf. N.E. 1160 b 24) Fr. : okeiois. 

412 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. viii. 5— ix. 3 

work by its difficulty, and in the production of a child 
the mother has more pain. 

Such may be our decision on the subject of friend- 
ship for oneself and of friendship among more than 
one. 

1 IX. It is thought that what is just is something Forms of 
that is equal, and also that friendship is based on ^fpg.^'^" 
equality, if there is truth in the saying ' Amity 

is equality.' And all constitutions are some species 
of justice ; for they are partnerships, and every 
partnership is founded on justice, so that there are 
as many species of justice and of partnership as there 
are of friendship, and all these species border on each 

2 other and have their diiferentia closely related. But 
since the relations of soul and body, craftsman and 
tool, and master and slave are similar," between 
the two terms of each of these pairs there is no 
partnership ; for they are not two, but the former is 
one and the latter a part of that one, not one itself ; 
nor is the good divisible between them, but that of 
both belongs to the one for whose sake they exist. 
For the body is the soul's tool born with it, a slave 
is as it were a member or tool of his master, a tool is 
a sort of inanimate slave. 

3 The other partnerships are a constituent part of Analogy of 
the partnerships of the state — for example that of fa"k)nsWp8 
the members of a brotherhood or a priesthood, or ^'''th con- 
business partnerships. All forms of constitution exist 
together in the household, both the correct forms 

and the deviations (for the same thing is found in 

" i.e. to one another. Perhaps the Greek should be 
emended to give ' not similar ' (to those just mentioned). 

413 



ARISTOTLE 

1241b 

avTo, ωσπ€ρ errl των αρμονιών, /cat iv^ ταΐς ττο- 

30 Aire tats•), βασιλική p,kv ή του yevvriaavros , άριστο- 4 
κρατική δ' ή avSpos και γυναικός, ττολιτβία δ' η των 
α^βλφών, 7ταρ€κβασις δε τούτων τυραννίς, ολιγαρχία, 
Βημος• και τά δίκαια Βη τοσαΰτα. 

Έττβι δε το 'ίσον το μ€ν κατ* αριθμόν το δε κατ' 5 
αναλογίαν, και του δικαίου €Ϊ8η έσται και της 

35 φιλίας και της κοινωνίας, κατ* αριθμόν μεν γαρ 
η {ΒημοκρατικηΥ κοινωνία, και η εταιρική φιλία 
[τω γαρ αύτω δρω μετρείται) , κατ* αναλογίαν δε 
η αριστοκρατική rf αρίστη και η* βασιλική {ου 
γαρ ταύτον Βικαιον τω ύπερεχοντι και ύπερεχο- 
μ€νω αλλά το άνάλογον) • και η φιλία δε ομοίως 6 

40 πατρός και τταιΒός, και εν ταΐς κοινωνίαις 6 αύτος 
τρόπος. 
1242 a Χ. Αεγονται 8η^ φιλίαι συγγενική, εταιρική, κοι- 1 
νωνικη, ή λεγομένη πολιτική, εστι μεν συγγενι- 
κή πολλά έχουσα εΐ8η, ή μεν ως αδελφών, ή 
δ ως πατρός και υίών^' και γάρ κατ* αναλογίαν, 
5 οίον η πατρική, και κατ* αριθμόν, οίον ή των 
αοελφών. εγγύς γάρ αύτη της εταιρικής• επι- 
λαμβάνουσι γάρ και ενταύθα πρεσβειών, ή 8ε 2 
πολιτική συνεστηκε μεν κατά το χρήσιμον καΐ 
μάλιστα' δια γάρ το μη αύταρκες'' Βοκοΰσι συμ- 

^ Sp. : των iv, * Sus. 

' ή add. Ross. * ή add. Rac. 

' Sp. : δέ. « [i7 μ^ν ώί . . . υΙων] ? Rac. 

' Rac. : αυτάρκη, 

" Cf. Politics viii., 1342 a 24 των αρμονίων παρ(κβάσ(ΐί (ΙσΙ 
414 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. ix. 3— x. 2 

constitutions as in the case of musical modes ") — 

4 paternal authority being royal, the relationship of 
man and wife aristocratic, that of brothers a republic, 
while the deviation - forms of these are tyranny, 
oligarchy and democracy ; and there are therefore 
as many varieties of justice. 

5 And since there are two sorts of equality, numerical 
and proportional, there will also be various species 
of justice and of partnership and friendship. The 
partnership of democracy is based on numerical 
equality, and so is the friendship of comrades, as it 
is measured by the same standard ; whereas the 
aristocratic partnership (which is the best) and the 
royal are proportional, for it is just for superior and 
inferior to have not the same share but proportional 

6 shares ; and similarly also the friendship of father and 
son, and the same way in partnerships. 

1 X. Specified sorts of friendship are therefore the Friendships 
friendship of relatives, that of comrades, that of ij^^e cialmr" 
partners and what is termed civic friendship. Really of various 
friendship of relatives has more than one species, d?ffer.*^ '^^ 
one as between brothers, another as of father and >Γ 
son * : it may be proportional, for example paternal > /ji- 
friendship, or based on number, for example the ■ ^ ^ 
friendship of brothers — for this is near the friendship ...^.v•^ 
of comrades, as in this also they claim privileges of 

2 seniority. (jCivic friendship on the other hand is/ . • ι . 
constituted in the fullest degree on the principle' ffi^^^ 
of utility, for it seems to be the individual's lack ofl 
self-sufficiency that makes these unions permanent-^ 

καΐ των μΐλών τα σύντονα καΐ τταρακεχρωσμένα, ' those harmonies 
and melodies that are highly strung and irregular in colora- 
tion {i.e. divergent from the regular scale in having smaller 
intervals) are deviations.' 

^ These two clauses look like an interpolation. 

415 



ARISTOTLE 

1242 a 

μάνβιν^ iirel συνηλθόν y αν καΐ του σνζην χάριν. 

10 μόνη δ' η πολιτική και η παρ* αύτην παρ4κβασις 
ου μόνον φιλίαι, άλλα και ώς φίλοι κοινωνοΰσιν , 
at δ αλλαι καθ* ύπ€ροχ'ήν. μάλιστα Se δίκαιον το ! 
iv TTJ των χρησίμων φιλία, δια το tout' eii^at το 
πολιτικον δίκαιον, άλλον γαρ τρόπον συνηλθον 
πριων και τ€χνη, ούχ evcKa κοινού τινό? {οΐον'^ γαρ 

15 όργανον και φυχή) άλλα του χρωμένου ev€K€v. 
συμβαίν€ΐ δε και αυτό τό^ όργανον ^πιμ^λ^ίας ^ 
τυγχαν€ΐν ης δίκαιον προς το ^ργον εκείνου γαρ 
€V€K€v €στι, και το τρυπάνω etvat διττόν, ών το 
κυριώτ€ρον €ν€ργ€ΐα, ή τρύπησις. και iv τούτω τω 
elhei σώμα και δούλος, ωσπ€ρ βΐρηται πρότ€ρον. 

20 Το Srj ζητ€Ϊν πώς δβι τω φίλω όμιλ^ΐν, το ζητ€Ϊν Ι 
8ικαιον τι βστίν. και γαρ όλως το δίκαιον ατταν 
προς φίλον τό τ€ γαρ δίκαιον τισι και κοινωνοΐς, 
και ο φίλος κοινωνός, ό μ€ν γάνους, ό he βίου. ό 
γαρ άνθρωπος ου μόνον πολιτικον* άλλα και 
οίκονομικόν ζωον, και ούχ ωσπ€ρ τάλλά ποτ€ 

25 συνδυάζεται και τώ τυχόντι και θηλ^ι καΐ appevi, 
άλλ' ίδια ου μοναυλικόν^ άλλα κοινωνικόν άνθρωπος ( 
ζωον προς ους φύσ^ι συγγένεια εστίν και κοινωνία 
τοίνυν και δίκαιον τι και ei μη πόλις €Ϊη. οικία ' 
δ εστί τι? φιλία• δεσττότου μ€ν ουν και δούλου 

^ Sus. : (TVfeXeuv. * Γ : δλον. ' αυτό τό Βζ. : τοΰτο, 

* Cas. : ά,νθρώττον μόνον ου πολιτίκόί {β,νθρωτΓΟί οΰ μόνον ττολι- 
τ^κbs Γ). 

' Sp. : άλλ' αί διάδυμον αύλικόν. 



4.16 



" Not its ^ζΐί, its shape, hardness, etc. 

* 1241 b 17-24. 
" i.e. ' friend ' in the sense of ' relation.' 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. χ. 2-7 

since they would have been formed in any case merely 
for the sake of society. Only civic friendship and 
the deviation from it are not merely friendships 
but also partnerships on a friendly footing ; the 

3 others are on a basis of superiority, ^^he justice 
that underlies a friendship of utility is in the highest 
degree just, because this is the civic principle of 
justice. < The coming together of a saw vv^ith the 
craft tmit uses it is on different lines — it is not for 
the sake of some common object, for saw and craft 
are like instrument and spirit, but for the sake of 

4 the man who employs them. It does indeed come 
about that even the tool itself receives attention 
which it deserves with a view to its work, since 
it exists for the sake of its work, and the essential 
nature of a gimlet is twofold, the more important 
half being its activity, boring." And the body and 
the slave are in the class of tool, as has been said 
before.'' 

5 Therefore to seek the proper way of associating Domestic 
with a friend is to seek for a particular kind of justice, relations. 
In fact the whole of justice in general is in relation 

to a friend, for what is just is just for certain persons, , ■ 
and persons who are partners, and a friend is a 
partner, either in one's family " or in one's life. For 
man is not only a political but also a house-holding 
animal, and does not, like the other animals, couple 
occasionally and with any chance female or male, 

6 but man is in a special way not a solitary but a 
gregarious animal, associating with the persons with 
whom he has a natural kinship ; accordingly there 
would be partnership, and justice of a sort, even if 

7 there were no state. And a household is a sort of 
friendship — or rather the relationship of master and 

2 Ε 417 



ARISTOTLE 

1242 a „ ^ ^ 

TjTrep και τβχνης /cat οργάνων καΐ φυχης καΐ 

30 σώματος, αϊ δβ τοιαυται οϋτ€ φιλίαι οϋτ€ δίκαιο - 
σνναι αλλ•' άνάλογον, ωσττερ και ro vyieivov^ ου 
δίκαιον αλλ' άνάλογον. γυναικός δε και άν8ρ6ς 8 
φιλία ώς χρησιμον καΐ κοινωνία• πατρός δε και 
υιοϋ η αύτη ηπβρ θβοΰ προς άνθρωπον και του βυ 
ποιησαντος προς τον παθόντα και δλως του φύσβι 

35 άρχοντος προς τον φύσ€ΐ άρχόμ€νον. ή δέ των 9 
αο^λφών προς αλλτ^λου? εταιρική μάλιστα, ι^^ κατ' 
ισότητα — 

ου γάρ τι νόθος τωδ' άπε^είχθην,^ 
άμφοΐν he πατήρ* αύτος^ €κληθη 
Zeu? €μ6ς άρχων — 
40 ταΰτα γαρ ως το ίσον ζητούντων λέγεται, διό iv 
1242 b οικία πρώτον άρχαι και πηγαΐ φιλίας και πολιτείας 
και δίκαιοι». 

Εττει δε φιλίαι τρεις, κατ άρετην, κατά το Κ 
χρησιμον, κατά το η8ύ, τούτων δε εκάστης δυο 
8ιαφοραί {η μεν γάρ καθ* ύπεροχην ή δε κατ' 
5 ισότητα εστίν εκάστη αυτών), το δε δίκαιον το ττερι 
αυτά? εκ τών αμφισβητήσεων^ ^ηλον, εν μεν ττ^ 
καθ ύπεροχην άζιοΰται το άνάλογον ούχ ωσαύτως, 
αΛΛ ο μεν υπερέχων ανεστραμμενως το αναλογον, 
ως αυτός προς τον ελάττω, ούτω το παρά του ελάτ- 
τονοςγινομενον προς το παρ* αύτοϋ, ^ διακείμενος* ώσ- 
10 περ άρχων προς άρχόμενον ει δε μη τούτο, αλλά 11 
το ίσον κατ αριθμόν άξιοι {και γάρ ^η και επι 

^ vyieivof corruptum edd. : (irieiK^t ? Sus. 

*^ lac. : ή. 3 Cas. : άττΐΜχθη. 

* Γ: πατρ6ί. β Nauck: atVos. 

® Fr. : άμ,φισβψ-ησάντων {άμψισβητιηθέντων Bz.). 

' Fr. : τψ. 8 liac. : αύτοΰ. 

* Bz. : διακΐίμ^νον. 

418 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. x. 7-11 

slave is that of craft and tools, and of spirit and 
body, and such relationships are not friendships or 
forms of justice but something analogous, just as 

8 health <* is not justice but analogous to it. But 
the friendship of man and wife is one of utility, a 
partnership ; that of father and son is the same as 
that between god and man and between benefactor 
and beneficiary, and generally between natural 

9 ruler and natural subject. That between brothers 
is principally the friendship of comrades, as being 
on a footing of equality — 

For never did he make me out a bastard. 

But the same Zeus, my lord, was called the sire 

Of both— ," 

for these are the words of men seeking equality. 
Hence in the household are first found the origins 
and springs of friendship, of political organization 
and of justice. 

10 And since there are three sorts of friendship, unequal 
based on goodness, on utility and on pleasure, and fr'enfisiiips 
two varieties of each sort (for each of them is either forms. 

on a basis of superiority or of equality), and what is 
just in relation to them is clear from our discussions, 
in the variety based on superiority the proportionate 
claims are not on the same lines, but the superior 
party claims by inverse proportion — the contribution 
of the inferior to stand in the same ratio to his own 
as he himself stands in to the inferior, his attitude 

11 being that of ruler to subject ; or if not that, at all 
•events he claims a numerically equal share (for in 

" Perhaps the text is corrupt. 

'' Sophocles fr. 735 Jebb and Pearson (684 Nauck). 
The third Hne is completed in a quotation by Philo, θνητών 
δ' ούδείί. (For τφδε dative of agent see Kuhner-Gerth, i. 422). 

419 



ARISTOTLE 

1242 b 

των άλ . χοίνωνιών ούτω συμβαίνει, 6τ€ μεν γαρ 
αριθμώ το ΐσον^ μετεχουσιν, 6τ€ δε λόγω• el μεν 
γαρ Ίσον αριθμώ είσήνεγκον άργνριον. Ισον και τω 

15 ισω αριθμώ ^ιαλαμβάνουσιν , ει δε μτ] ϊσον, άνά- 
λογον), ό δ' ύττερεχόμενος τουναντίον στρέφει το 
αναλογον και κατά, ^ιάμετρον συζεύγννσιν ^όζειε 1 
δ αν οΰτως ελαττοΰσθαι 6 υπερέχων, και λειτουρ- 
γία η φίλια και rf κοινωνία, δει αρα τινί ετερω 
ανισασαι και ττοιησαι άνάλογον τοϋτο δ' εστίν η 1; 

20 τιμή, όπερ και τω άρχοντι φύσει και θεώ προς το 
αρχομενον. δει δε Ισασθτιναι το κέρδος προς την 
τιμήν. 

Η δε κτατ' ΐσα φιλία εστίν ή πολιτική. ή δε 1- 
πολιτική εστί μεν κατά το χρήσιμον, καΐ ωσπερ αί 
πόλεις άλλί^λαΐδ" φίλαι, ούτω και οι πολΐται, και 
ομοίως 

25 ούκετι γιγνώσκουσιν ^Αθηναίοι Μεγαρήας 

και οι πολΐται, όταν μή χρήσιμοι αΧλήλοις, αλλ' εκ 

1 Rac. : του ίσου. ^ ή] οΰ Fr. (cf. Ν.Ε. 1163 a 29). 

" The inferior party ρ claims to draw a larger share of 
benefit Β and to leave the smaller share b to the superior 
party P, the result of which would be ρ + Β and Ρ + b. The 
superior party Ρ also invokes the principle of inverse pro- 
portion (line 7), but applies it to their contributions to the 
common cause, not to the benefits drawn from it : he claims 
to make a smaller contribution c, while the inferior party 
makes a larger one C, the result of which would be Ρ -c 
and ρ - C. The proposed conjunctions are in fact both of 
420 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. χ. 11-14 

fact it happens in this way in other » iations 
too — sometimes the shares are numerically equal, 
sometimes proportionally : if the parties contributed 
a numerically equal sum of money, they also take 
a share equal by numerical equality, if an unequal 
sum, a share proportionally equal). The inferior 
party on the contrary inverts the proportion, and 

12 makes a diagonal conjunction" ; but it would seem 
that in this way the superior comes off worse, and 
the friendship or partnership is a charitable service.'' 
Therefore equality must be restored and proportion 

13 secured by some other means ; and this means is 
honour, which belongs by nature to a ruler and god 
in relation to a subject. But the profit " must be 
made equal to the honour. 

14 Friendship on a footing of equality is civic friend- Political 
ship. Civic friendship is, it is true, based on utility, ™° ^ '^' 
and fellow-citizens are one another's friends in the 

same way as different cities are, and 

Athens no longer knoweth Megara,** 
nor similarly do citizens know one another, when^,-^ 
they are not useful to one another ; their friend- 

them diagonal, connecting the larger person with the smaller 
thing and vice versa : 

Ρ Β PC 



ρ b ρ c 

'' Perhaps the Greek should be altered to give ' friendship 
is a charity and not a partnership.' 

" i.e. the advantage in the shape of protection, guidance, 
etc., that the inferior party derives from the friendship. 

^ Lit. ' the Athenians no longer recognize the Megarians.' 
Author unknown (Bergk, Fr. Eleg., Adespota 6). 

4.21 



ARISTOTLE 

1242 •> , , ^ ^ , ,, 

χ€ίρ6ς els Χ^ίρα 'ή φίλια. έ'στι δε ενταύθα και 1 
άρχον καΐ άρχόμ€νον, οντ€ το φυσικον ovre το 
βασιΧικόν, άλλα το iv τω /xepet, ovSe τούτου 
30 eveKa όπως ev ttoitj ως 6 θζός, άλλα ίνα ίσον rj^ 
του άγαθοΰ καΐ^ της λβιτουργίας. κατ' ισότητα δη 
βούλ€ται etvat η ττολίΤίκη φιλία, βστι δέ της 1 
χρησίμου φιλίας βϊΒη δυο, η μεν νομική η δ' ηθική. 
βλ€π€ΐ δ' ή μεν πολιτική €ΐς το 'ίσον και βις το 
πράγμα, ωσπερ οι πωλοΰντες και oi ώνούμενοι• 
διό €Ϊρηται 

μισθός avSpi φίλω. 

35 όταν μ€ν ουν καθ^ όμολογίαν fj,^ πολιτική αυτή 1 
φιλία και νομική' όταν δ' επιτρίπωσιν αύτοΐς* 
ηθική βουλΐται etvat φιλία και εταιρική, διό 
/ιιάλιστα τα εγκλήματα^ iv ταύτη τή φιλία• αίτιον 
δ' ότι παρά, φυσιν eVepat yap φιλίαι ή κατά το 

40 χρήσιμον και ή κατά τήν άρετήν, οι δ' αμφότερα^ 
βουλονται άμα εχειν, και όμιλοΰσι μεν του χρησίμου 

1243 a ένεκα, ήθικήν δε ποιοϋσιν ώς επιεικείς, διό ώς 

πιστεύοντες ου νομικήν ποιοϋσιν. 

"Ολω? μεν γαρ εν τή χρήσιμη των τριών πλείστα^ 1 

εγκλήματα (ή μεν γαρ αρετή άνεγκλητος^ οΐ δ 

ή^εΐς έχοντες και Βόντες άπαλλάττονται, οΐ δε 

5 χρήσιμοι ουκ ευθύς διαλύονται, αν μή νομικώς 

και' εταιρικώς προσφερωνται)' όμως δε της 1 

1 ίχτι ? Rac. 

* καΐ Γ : ■)) {ίσον g τό ά-γαθόν rrj Xeirovpyiif. ? Rac). 

' Fr. (et Γ) : ή. * Rac. : aurois. 

* τά έ-γκλήματα Sp. : ?Ύκ\ημα. 

• άμφοτέραί ? Rac. ' πλείστα τά Sp. 

* Sp. : άνέ-'/κλητον. ' και : ά\\' ? Rac. 

« C/. Ν. Ε. 1262 b 26. 

* iV^.Z?. 1164 a 28. Hesiod, W.D. 371 /Λίσί^ό? δ' avipi φίλφ 

422 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. χ. 15-19 

15 ship is a ready -money transaction. * Nevertheless 
there is present here a ruhng factor and a ruled — not 
a natural ruler or a royal one, but one that rules in 
his turn, and not for the purpose of conferring benefit, 
as God rules, but in order that he may have an equal 
share of the benefit and of the burden. Therefore 
civic friendship aims at being on a footing of equality. 

16 But useful friendship is of two kinds, the merely 
legal and the moral. Civic friendship looks to 
equality and to the object, as buyers and sellers do 
— hence the saying 

Unto a friend his wage — .* 

17 When, therefore, it is based on a definite agreement. Complaints 
this is civic and legal friendship ; but when they frfemiThips 
trust each other for repayment, it tends to be moral of utility 
friendship, that of comrades. Hence this is the basis. 
kind of friendship in which recriminations most 

occur, the reason being that it is contrary to nature ; 

for friendship based on utility and friendship based 

on goodness are different, but these people wish to 

have it both ways at once — they associate together . , -^ I ' 

for the sake of utility but make it out to be a morai. '' 

friendship as between good men, and so represent 

it as not merely legal, pretending that it is a matter 

of trust. 

18 For in general, of the three kinds of friendship, it 
is in useful friendship that most recriminations occur 
(for goodness is not given to recrimination, and pleas- 
ant friends having got and given their share break 
it off, but useful friends do not dissolve the association 
at once, if their intercourse is on comradely and not 

19 merely legal lines) ; nevertheless the legal sort of 

eip -ημένο^ apKios 'έστω, ' let the wage stated for a friend stand 
good.' 

423 



ARISTOTLE 

1243 a ^ ^ 

χρησίμου η νομική άν€γκλητος. eWt δ' ή μβν 

νομική διάλυσι? ττρος νόμισμα {μ€τρ€Ϊται γαρ 

τοντω το Ίσον), η δ ηθική ακούσιος, διο Ινιαχοΰ 

νομός eon τοις όντως ομιλονσι φιλικώς μη eti'at 

10 Βικας των ακουσίων συναλλαγμάτων, ορθώς• τοις 
γαρ άγαθοΐς ου ττέφυκζ ^ίκη^ elvai, οι δ' ως 
αγαθοί και πιστοΐς^ συνα?^άττουσιν . έ'στι δ' iv 2 
ταύτη τη φίλια τα ίγκληματα αμφιβάλλοντα αύτοΐς 
άμφότ€ρα, πώς ίκάτερος ey/caAet/ όταν ηθικώς 
άλλα μη νομικώς πιστ€νσωσιν. 

15 Και €χ€ΐ Srj άπορίαν ποτ^ρως δει κρίνειν το* 2 
hiKaiov, πότ€ρα προς το πράγμα βλέποντα το 
υπηρβτηθζν ποσόν η ποιον, η^ τω πβπονθότι• ev- 
δ€;^€ται yap* etvai όπερ Aeyei ©eoyt'i? — 

σοι μζ,ν τοϋτο, θ^ά, σμικρόν, €μοι he μέγα, 

εΐ'δεχβται δε' και τουναντίον γενέσθαι, ωσπζρ iv 
20 τω λόγω, σοι μεν τταιδιάρ' tout' elvai, €μοι δε 
θάνατον. €ντ€ΰθ€ν δ' ώσπερ^ είρηται^ εγκλήματα' 2 
ό μεν γαρ άξιοι άντιπαθεΐν ως μέγα ύπηρετησας 
OTL 6εομενω εποίησεν, η τι άλλο τοιούτο λέγων 
προς την εκείνου ώφελειαν πόσον εΒύνατο αλλ' ου 
Tt ην αυτω, ο οε τουναντίον όσον εκεινω αλλ 

^ Sol. : δίκαιον {ayaOoh αύτοΐί ττέφυκΐ δικαίου Sp.). 

* lac. : Toh. 

' [ttws . . . εγκαλεί] ? gloss, (an lege ^7καλ^σ« ?) Rac. 

* Sp. : τον. 6 7)v Fr. • Γ : 5i. 

'' Fr. : yap. * ώστηρ add. Fr. 

' Rac. : εϊρηται το. '••' Rac. : αύτφ. 

" Or, adopting another conjectural emendation, ' since it 
is natural for good men to be just of their own accord.' 

*■ Solomon renders ' It is uncertain how either will re- 
criminate on the other, seeing that they trust each other, not 
424 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. χ. 19-22 

useful friendship is not given to recrimination. The 
legal method of discharging the obligation is a matter 
of money, for that serves as a measure of equality ; 
but the moral method is voluntary. Hence in some 
places there is a law prohibiting friendly associates of 
this sort from actions as to their voluntary contracts — 
rightly, since it is not natural for good men to go to 
law,* and these men make their contracts as good 

20 men and as dealing with trustworthy people. And 
in fact in this sort of friendship the recriminations are 
doubtful on both sides — what line of accusation each 
party will take, inasmuch as their confidence was of 
a moral kind and not merely legal. ^ 

21 Indeed it is a question in which of two ways one Estimate of 
ought to judge what is a just return, whether by " ^™^' 
looking at the actual amount or quality of the ser- 
vice rendered, or by its amount or quality for the 
recipient ; for it may be as Theognis says — 

Goddess, 'tis small to thee, but great to me," 

and also the result may be opposite, as in the saying 

22 ' This is sport to you but death to me.' Hence 
recriminations, as has been said ** ; for one party 
claims recompense as having rendered a great service, 
because he did it for his friend in need, or saying 
something else of the sort as to how much it was 
worth in relation to the benefit given to the recipient 
and not what it was to himself, while the other party 
on the contrary speaks of how much it was to the 

in a limited legal way but on the basis of their characters.' 
But the Greek text may be questioned. 

" Theognis 14. This quotation illustrates that the amount 
of a service is ' subjective,' the next quotation shows that 
its quality is. 

" 1242 b 37. 

425 



ARISTOTLE 

1243 a 

25 ούχ όσον αύτω} ore 8e και /xera^ctAAei^• ο μ^ν 23 
γαρ όσον αύτω^ μικρόν άπββη, ο δ' δσον αντώ^ 
μβγα^ εΒννατο, οίον, el κιν8νν€νσας 8ραχμης αζιον 
ωφίλησζν, 6 μ€ν το του κινδύνου μ^γ^θος ό 8e το 
του αργυρίου, ωσπ€ρ iv tjj των νομισμάτων άττοδόσβι 

30 — και γαρ ει^ταυ^α πepl τούτων η άμφισβητησις' 
ο μ€ν γαρ άζιοΐ πώς τότ -ην, 6 8e ττώ? νυν, αν 
μη διβι'ττωνται. 

Η μβν ουν ττολίτικη βλέττ^ι els την ομολογίαν 24 
και €Ls το πράγμα, η δ' ηθική els την πpoaίpeσιv' 
ωστ€ καΐ Βίκαιον τοϋτο μαλλόν εστί, και δικαιο- 
σύνη φιλική, αίτιον δε του jU,ci;^eCT^at διότι κιαλλιωι^ 25 

35 juev η ηθική φιλία άναγκαιοτ€ρα Se ή χρησίμη• οι 
δ άρχονται'^ μ€ν ως ήθικοΙ φίλοι και δι' άρετήν 
ovTes, όταν δ' αντίκρουση^ τι των ιδίων, δήλοι γί- 
νονται ότι eTepoi ήσαν. €κ π€ριουσίας γαρ διώ- 
1248 b κονσιν οι πολλοί το καλόν, διό και την κάλλια» 
φιλιαν. ωστ€ φαν€ρόν πώς Siaipereov πepι τούτων. 26 
61 μεν γαρ ηθικοί φίλοι, els την προαίρεσιν. 
βλεπτέον el 'ίση, και ούθεν άλλο άξιωτ€ον Θατ4ρω 
πάρα Θατάρου• el δ' ως χρήσιμοι και πολιτικοί, 
5 ως αν ελυσιτελει* ό/Μθλο•)/οίισΐΓ. αν δ' ο μεν 
φη ωδε 6 δ' εκείνως, ου καλόΐ',' άντιποιήσαι 
Seov, τους καλούς λέγειν λόγους, ομοίως Se και 

^ (bis) Rac. : αντφ. 

* μεταβά'\λ€ΐ (vel μεταλαμβάνει) Rac. : μεταλαμβάνων και 
αμφιβάλλει. 3 μ^γ^ι] Soi_ 

* Bus. : άρχονται. ^ lac. : άντικρυί tj. 

* 'έωί Άν λικτιτελ-η ? Rac, (tus άν λικτίτελί/ Sp.). 
' Rac. : καλύν μίν. 

" Or, altering the Greek, ' they agree for as long as it 
profits them.' 

426 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. χ. 23-26 

23 donor and not how much it was to himself. And 
at other times the position is reversed ; the one 
says how little he got out of it, the other how much 
the service was worth to him — for instance, if by 
taking a risk he did the other a shilling's worth of 
benefit, the one talks about the amount of the risk 
and the other about the amount of the cash ; just 
as in the repayment of a money loan, for there too 
the dispute turns on this — one claims to be repaid 
the value that the money had when lent, the other 
claims to repay it at the present value, unless they 
have put a proviso in the contract. 

24 Civic friendship, then, looks at the agreement and 
to the thing, but moral friendship at the intention. ; 
hence the latter is more just — it is friendly justice. 

25 The cause of conflict is that moral friendship is 
nobler but friendship of utility more necessary ; 
and men begin as being moral friends and friends 
on grounds of goodness, but when some private 
interest comes into collision it becomes clear that 
really they were different. For most men pursue 
what is fine only when they have a good margin in 
hand, and so Avith the finer sort of friendship too. 

26 Hence it is clear how these cases must be decided. 
If they are moral friends, we must consider if their 
intentions are equal, and nothing else must be 
claimed by either from the other ; and if they are 
friends on the ground of utility or civic friends, we 
must consider what form of agreement would have 
been profitable for them.*" But if one says they are 
friends on one footing and the other on another, 
it is not honourable, when an active return is due, 
merely to make fine speeches, and similarly also in 



427 



ARISTOTLE 

1243 b 

€771 θατβρον αλλ' εττβιδη ον Βιβίποντο ώς ηθικώς, 2' 
8et Kpivetv ηνά, μ'ηΒ^ ύποκρινόμ^νον μ•φξ.τ€ρον^ 
αυτών βζατταταν• ώστε δει στίργειν ίκάτερον την 

10 τνχ-ην. ΟΤΙ δ' εστίν η ήθικη κατά προαίρεσιν 2ΐ 
8ηλον, eVet καν el μεγάλα παθών μη άττοΒωη δι' 
ά^υναμίαν αλλ' οσ'" εδυνατο, καλώ?• και yap' 6 
θεός άν'εχεται κατά δυν'α/Αΐν' λαμβάνων τάς θυσίας, 
αλλά τω ττωλοΰντί ούχ ίκανώς βζβι αν μη φηστ] 2'. 
δυνασ^αι πλέον δούναι, ούδε τω Βανείσαντι. 

15 Πολλά εγκλήματα ytVeTai εν ταΐς φιλίαις ταΓ?* 3ι 
μη κατ εύθυωρίαν , και το δίκαιον ΐδειν ου pahiov 
χαλεπον γάρ^ μετρησαι ενί τώδε τά* /χτ) κατ' εύθυ- 
ωρίαν οίον συμβαίνει, επΙ τών ερωτικών, 6 μεν 3 
γαρ 8ιώκει ώς τον' ή8ύν επι το συζην, 6 δ' 
εκείνον ενίοτε ώς χρησιμον , όταν δε παύσηται του 

20 εράν, άλλου γενομένου^ άλλος γίνεται, και τότε 
λογίζονται τι άντι* tiVos, και ώς ΥΙύθων και 
ria/MjMeVTys• ^ιεφεροντο, και όλως διδάσκαλο? και 
μαθητής {επιστήμη γαρ και χρήματα ούχ ενΙ 
μετρείται), και ως ηροοικος ο ιατρός προς τον 
αποδίδοντα μικρόν τον μισθόν, και ώς ό κιθαρωδός 

25 και ο βασιλεύς. 6 μεν γαρ ώς ήΒεΐ ό δ' ώς 31 

^ Syl. : ύίΓοκρινόμενοί μηδέτ€ρο%. * Rac. : ώϊ. 

' καΐ yap Fr. : καΐ. * Βζ. : roh. 

' Γ : yip χαλεττόΐ'. * Γ : τφ. 

' [τόν] Sp. * Rac. : yι^>oμέvoυ. 

' τι άντΙ lac. : τταντί. ^" Sp. : Πρόδικοί. 

" i.e. in a moral friendship it is not honourable to insist 
on a return on a business footing. 

* ' Dissimilar friendships, where action and reaction are 
not in the same straight line ' (Solomon). 

" The distinguished Theban general, friend of Epa- 
minondas. Pytho may be a dramatist of Catana, or a 
Byzantine rhetorician of the period. 

428 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. χ. 27-32 

27 the other case ** ; — but since they did not provide for 
this in the contract, on the ground that it was a 
moral friendship, somebody must judge, and neither 
party must cheat by pretending ; so that each must 

28 be content with his luck. But it is clear that moral 
friendship is a matter of intention, since even if a 
man after having received great benefits owing to 
inability did not repay them, but only repaid as 
much as he was able, he acts honourably ; for even 
God is content with getting sacrifices in accordance 

29 with our ability. But a seller will not be satisfied 
if a man says he cannot pay more, nor will one who 
has made a loan. 

30 In friendships not based on direct reciprocity ^ Causes and 
many causes of recrimination occur, and it is not οΓάίκριΓίΜ. 
easy to see what is just ; for it is difficult to measure 

by one given thing relations that are not directly 

31 reciprocal. This is how it happens in love affairs, 
since in them one party pursues the other as a 
pleasant person to live with, but sometimes the other ■ 
the one as useful, and when the lover ceases to love, 
he having changed the other changes, and then they, 
calculate the quid pro quo, and quarrel as Pythoi 
and Pammenes " used, and as teacher and pupil ,^,^ 
do in general (for knowledge and money have no — 
common measure), and as Herodicus '^ the doctor 

did with the patient who offered to pay his fee with 
a discount, and as the harpist and the king fell out. 

32 The king associated with the harpist as pleasant ■ 
and the harpist with the king as useful ; but the 

"* Born in Thrace, practised in Athens fifth cent. b.c. ; tutor 
of Hippocrates. The mss. give ' Prodicus ' (the sophist, 
who figures frequently in Plato), and possibly the text has 
suffered haplography, and both names should be read. 

429 



ARISTOTLE 

1243 b 

χρησιμω ώμίλζ,ι•- 6 δ', βπβώη'^ έ'δβι άττοδιδόναι, 
αυτόν αύτον ώς η^ύν €7Τοίησ€ν, και €φη, ώσττβρ 
€Κ€Ϊνον ασαντα βύφραναι, οϋτω καΐ αύτος υπο- 
σχόμενος €K€LVii). όμως δε φανερόν καΐ ενταύθα 33 
ττώς γνωριστεον evl γαρ μ€τρητ€ον καΐ €νταΰθ\ 
αλλ ουκ αριθμώ^ άλλα λόγω. τω' άνάλογον 
30 γαρ μ€τρητ€ον, ωσπερ καΐ η ττολίτικη μετρείται 
κοινωνία' ττώς γαρ κοινωνήσει γεωργω σκυτο- 
τόμος, ει μη τω άνάλογον ίσασθησεται τα έργα; 
ται? δ•)^* μη κατ' εύθυωρίαν το άνάλογον μετρον, 34 
οίον ει ο μεν σοφιαν Sovvai εγκαλεί, ό δ' εκείνω 
άργυριον, τί^ σοφία^ ττρός το πλούσιον εΙναί' ; 
35 €ΐτα τι Βοθεν προς εκάτερον^ ; ει γαρ ό μεν του 
ελάττονος ήμισυ ε8ωκεν, 6 Βε του μείζονος μη 
πολλοστόν μέρος, 8ηλον ότι οΰτος ά8ικεΐ. εστί 35 
Βε κάνταΰθα εν άρχη άμφισβητησις, αν φη ό μεν* 
ώς χρησίμους συνελθεΖν αυτούς, ό Βε μη, αλλ' ώς 
κατ άλλην Tti^o. φιλίαν. 

1244a XI. ϋερι Βε του άγαθοΰ και κατ άρετην φίλου, \ 
σκεπτεον ποτερον Βεΐ εκείνω τα χρήσιμα ύπηρετεΐν 
και βοηθεΐν η τω άντιποιεΐν τα ΐσα^" Βυναμενω . τού- 
το Βε το αυτό πρόβλημα εστί, πότερον τον φίλον 
5 η τον σπουΒαΐον ευ ποιητεον μάλλον. άν μεν 2 
γαρ φιλος^^ και σπουΒαΐος, ΐσως ου λίαν χαλεπόν, 

^ Rao. : eirel. 

* lac. : ούχ δρψ. '• Fr. : τ6. 

* Rac. : Toh δέ {δη ? Sus.). « Βζ. : τ^. 

* Sol. : σoφίq.. ' dvai add. Rac. 

* πρόί έκατίρου Fr. : Κ,έκατέρον^ wp6s ϊκάτΐρον ? Rac. 

• Bk. : φήσωμεν. ίο lac. : άντιποιοΰντι και. 

" <καΙ> <pi\os ? Rac. : <ό> φίλοί Rieckher. 

" The story (also told N.E. ix., 1164 a 16) is related by 
430 



■ EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. χ. 32— χτ. 2 

king, when the time came for him to pay, made out 
that he was himself of the pleasant sort, and said 
that just as the harpist had given him pleasure by 
his singing, so he had given the harpist pleasure by 

33 his promises to him." Nevertheless here too it is 
clear how we must decide : here too we must measure 
by one standard, but by a ratio, not a number. 
For we must measure by proportion, as also the 
civic partnership is measured. For how is a shoe- 
maker to be partner with a farmer unless their ^ 

34 products are equalized by proportion ? Therefore 
the measure for partnerships not directly reciprocal 
is proportion — for example if one party complains 
that he has given wisdom and the other says he has 
given the former money, what is the ratio of wisdom 
to being rich ? and then, what is the amount given 
for each ? for if one party has given half of the 
smaller amount but the other not even a small 
fraction of the larger, it is clear that the latter is 

35 cheating. But here too there is a dispute at the 
outset, if one says that they came together on 
grounds of utility and the other denies it and says 
it was on the basis of some other kind of friendship. 

1 XI. About the good friend and the friend on the casuistry of 
basis of goodness, we must consider whether one friendship. 
ought to render useful services and assistance to 

him or to the friend who is able to make an equal 
return. This is the same problem as whether it 
is more one's duty to benefit a friend or a virtuous 

2 man. If a man is a friend and virtuous, perhaps ^ 

Plutarch, T)e Alexandri fortuna ii. 1, of the tyrant 
Dionysius of Syracuse. 

* Or, altering the punctuation with Fritsche, ' is a friend 
and virtuous equally.' 

43! 



ARISTOTLE 

1244 a 

άν μη τι,ς το μ€ν αύξηστ) το Se ταπβινώσΎ], φίλον 

μ€ν σφόΒρα €v^ ποιών, €7η€ΐκη δε -ηρίμα. el 8e μη, 

πολλά προβλήματα γίνεται, οΐον el 6 peev ην ουκ 

ίσται he, 6 he εσται οϋπω he, η 6 μέν eyeveTo έ'στι 

ου, ο ο eoTLV ουκ ην oe oυoe εσται. αΛΛ 

CKetvo epywheoTepov . μη γάρ τι Aeyet Έιύριπί8ης 3 

ποιησας 

λόγων' hiKaiov μισθον αν λόγους φίροΐζ,*^ 
epyov δ' eKelvos^ epyov δς" παρ4σχ€το• 

και ου πάντα δει τω πατρί, αλλ' έ'στιν αλλ' α heV 
τη μητρί, καίτοι βeλτίωv 6 πατήρ ' oiihe γάρ τω 

Ιό Διι πάντα λύεται, ουδ' έχει πάσας τάς τι/χά? άλλα 
τιΐ'ά?. ίσως οΰν εστίν ά δει τω χρησίμω, άλλα 4 
δε τω άγαθώ• οΐον ουκ el σΐτον hίhωσι και Tavay- 
καία, και συζην τούτω δεΓ• ουδ' ω τοίνυν το συζην,^ 
τούτω ά μη ούτος hίhωσιv αλλ' ό* χρήσιμος' 
αλλ' οι τοΰτο πoιoϋvτeς [τουτω]^" πάντα τω ερω- 
μ€νω hιhόaσιv ου heov, oύh€vός^^ elaiv άζιοι. 

20 Και οι ev τοις λόγοις οροί της φιλίας πάντ€ς 
μ4ν πώς elσι φιλίας, αλλ' ου της αυτής, τω μ€ν 5 
yap χρησιμω το βoύλeσθaι τάκβίνω aya^a, και 
τω ευ ποιήσαντι, και τω οποίω δτ^^^ [ου γάρ 
€πισημαίν€ΐ οΰτος 6 ορισμός της φιλίας), άίλλω δε 

ϊ εΰ add. Rac. 2 ^ §' gy], , 5,^_ 

^ Bus. : λόγο»'. 

* Bus. : λόγου ΐίσφέροα (λόγου φέροι% Bk.). 

* Musgrave: εκείνοι^. ' ί'ργοί' δ»^ Meineke : ^ργο. 

' Λλλ' a δίί Sus. : άλλα bL » βζ. : τό «5 f^;-. 

» Sus. : άλλα. 10 Rac. " Fr. : ούδ'. 

1^ lac. : OTTOiOs δβΐ. 

" See the first sentence of the chapter. 
" Fr. 882 Nauck. 
432 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. xi. 2-5 

it is not over-difficult, provided one does not ex- 
aggerate the one factor and underrate the other, 
benefiting him greatly as friend but only slightly as 
good. But in other cases many problems arise, for 
instance, if A was a friend but is going not to be and 
Β is going to be but is not now, or if A became one 
but is not one now and Β is one now but was not 
and is going not to be. But the former problem " 

3 is more difficult. For possibly there is something 
in the lines of Euripides * : 

Prithee take words as thy just pay for words, 
But he, that gave a deed, a deed shall have ; 

and it is not one's duty to give everything to one's 
father, but there are other things that one ought 
to give to one's mother, although the father is the 
superior ; for even to Zeus not all the sacrifices are 
offered, nor does he have all the honours but some 

4 particular ones. Perhaps, therefore, there are som.e 
services that ought to be rendered to the useful 
friend and others to the good friend : for instance, 
if a friend gives you food and necessaries you are 
not therefore bound to give him your society, and 
accordingly also you are not bound to render to the 
friend to whom you give your society the things that 
you do not get from him but from the useful friend ; 
hut those who by so doing vnrongly give everything 
to one whom they love are good-for-nothing people. 

' And the defining marks of friendship stated in the Different 
discourses all belong to friendship in some sense, .j?.\"^^,°j[. 

5 but not to the same kind of friendship. It is a marklhave difter- 
of the useful friend that one wishes the things ^"'^ ^ *'"''^' 
good for him, and so of the benefactor, and in fact 

a friend of any sort (for this definition of friend- 
ship is not distinctive) ; of another friend, that one 

2f 433 



ARISTOTLE 

1244 a ^ ^ 

25 TO eivac και άλλω το συζην, τω 8e καθ^ η8ονην 
το συναλγ€Ϊν καΐ συγχαίρβιν. πάντβς δ' ούτοι οΙ 6 
opot κατά φίλίαν μβν Χίγονταί τιι^α, ου προς μίαν 
δ ovSeig. διό πολλοί elai, και βκαστος /χια? 
eiv-ai δοκεΐ φιλίας, ουκ ών, οίον η τοΰ eti^ai ττρο- 
αιρεσι?• και ya/) ό καθ' νπ^ροχην και ποιήσας ev 
βούλβται τω €ργω τω αύτοΰ ύπάρχβιν {και τω 

30 δόντι το eti'ai δει και άι^ταποδιδόί^αι) , άλλα συΖ/ψ 
ου τούτω αλλά τω ηΒεΐ. 

Α8ικοΰσιν οι φίλοι evioi αλλήλους, τα γαρ 7 
πράγματα μάλλον, αλλ' ου φιλοΰσι τον^ €χοντα• 
διό φίλοι^ κακ^ίνω^ {οίον διότι ή^ύς τον οΐνον 
βΐλβτο και ΟΤΙ χρήσιμος τον πλοΰτον eiAeTo), χρησι- 
μωτβρος γαρ. διό δτ) άγανακτ€Ϊ,* ωσπβρ αν el 

35 μάλλον €ΐλοντο^ άντι ήττονος• οι δ'^ €}/καλοί?σιν, 
€Κ€Ϊνον γαρ νυν ζητοΰσι τον aya^ov, πρότ€ρον ζητή- 
σαντ€ς τον ήΒύν ή τον χρήσιμον . 
1244 b XII. Σικβπτ€ον δε και π^ρι αυτάρκεια? και 1 
φίλιας, πώς βχουσι προς τάς άλλτ^λων 8υνάμ€ΐς. 
απορησειβ γαρ αν τι? πότβρον, ei τις (ΐη κατά 
πάντα αυτάρκης, έ'σται τούτω φίλος, ή^ κατ' 
ένδειαι^ ζητείται φίλος και* έ'σται άγαθος^ αύτ- 
5 αρκζστατος . ei 6 μετ αρετής βίος^^ ευδαίμων, 
τι αν δεοι φίλου; ούτε γαρ των χρησίμων δει- 
σσαι αυτάρκους , ούτε των εύφρανούντων^^ ούτε τοΰ 
^ Βζ. : τα. " edd. : φιλεϊ. « Rac. : κάκείνοΐί. • 

* rec, Pb : 8ei. » β^β. : el'Xe7-o. « Vict. : ό δ'. 
"> Aid. : el. * Fr. : ή. » Ross : ayaObs. 

^• βίοί add. Syl. ^^ Sp. : eC φρονούντων. 

" i.«. the beneficiary. 

* This also means the beneficiary, who is the cause of 
the benefactor's being a benefactor ; so the benefactor ought 
to repay him in kind by wishing his existence (as he does 
also for the reason that he is his own product). 

434 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. xi. 5— xii. 1 

wishes his existence, of another that one wishes his 
society ; of the friend on the ground of pleasure, that 

6 one shares his gi*ief and his joy. All these defining 
marks are predicated in the case of some friendship, 
but none of them with reference to friendship as a 
single thing. Hence there are many of them, and 
each is thought to belong to friendship as one, though 
it does not : for instance, the desire for the friend's 
existence — for the superior friend and benefactor 
wishes existence to belong to his own work'* — and 
to him who gave one existence ^ it is one's duty to 
give existence in return ; but he wishes the society 
not of this friend but of the pleasant one. 

7 Friends in some cases wrong each other, because 
they love things more, not the possessor of them, 
and are friends of the possessor too on this account 
(just as a man chose his wine because it was sweet 
and chose his wealth because it was useful), for he is 
more useful." Hence naturally he is annoyed, just 
as if they had preferred his possessions to himself 
as being inferior ; and they complain, for now they 
look to find in him the good man, having previously 
looked for the pleasant or the useful man. 

1 XII. We must also consider self-sufficiency and Seif-sufflci- 
friendship, and the interrelationship of their poten- ^"°^ f|]ji *'*^ 
tialities. For one may raise the question whether friends. 
if a person be self-sufficing in every respect he will 
have a friend, or whether on the contrary a friend 
is sought for in need, and the good man will be 
most self-sufficing. If the life that is combined with 
goodness is happy, what need would there be of a 
friend ? For it does not belong to the self-sufficing 
man to need either useful friends or friends to amuse 

" Sc, on account of his possessions. 

435 



ARISTOTLE 

1244 b 

συζ'ήν, αύτος^ γαρ αντω Ικανός avveivai. μάλιστα 2 
θ6 Ύοϋτο φαν€ρόν εττι deov• SrjXov γαρ ώς ovbe- 
νος ττροσ^ζομ^νος ουδέ φίλου δβησεταί, ουδ' έ'σται 
10 αύτω e\ ye μηθβν Seoiro του.'' ωστ€ καΐ άνθρωπος 
ο ζύ^αιμονέστατος ηκι,στα Se-qaeraL φίλου, αλλ' η 
καθ όσον αδύνατον elvai αυτάρκη. ανάγκη άρα 3 
ελαχίστους elvai φίλους τω άριστα ζώντι, και 
aet' ελάττους γίνεσθαι, και μη σπου8άζ€ΐν δπως 
ώσι φίλοι, αλλ' ολιγωρ€Ϊν μη μόνον των χρησίμων 
15 αλλά και των* €ΐς το συζην αιρετών, άλλα μην 
και τοτβ^ φανερον άν eti^at So^eiev ώς ου χρήσεως 
ένεκα 6 φίλος ούδ' ωφελείας, άλλ' ο* δι' άρετην 
φίλος μόνος. όταν γαρ μηθενος ενδεείς ώμεν, 4 
τότε τους σνναττολαυσο μένους ζητοΰμεν^ ττάντες, 
και τους εδ ττεισομενους μάλλον η τους ποιήσοντας^• 
20 ayMetva» δ εχομεν κρίσιν αυτάρκεις οντες η μετ* 
ενΒείας, μάλιστα re* τών συζην άζίων Βεόμεθα 
φίλων. 

ΤΙερι Βε της απορίας ταύτης σκεπτεον μη ποτέ 5 
το μεν τι λέγεται καλώς το δε λαι^^άνβι δια την 
παραβολην. 8ηλον δε λαβοΰσι τι το ζην το κατ* 
ενεργειαν και ώς τέλος. φανερόν οΰν οτι το 6 
25 αισ^αν-εσ^αι και το γνωρίζειν , ώστε και το συζην 
το συΐ'αισ^αΐ'εσ^αί. και το συγγνωρίζειν εστίν, 
εστί δε αυτό τ6^° αισθάνεσθαι και αυτό το'" γνω- 
ρίζειν αιρετώτατον εκάστω {και διά τοΰτο του ζην 
ττάσιν έμφυτος η ορεξις, το γαρ ζην 8ει τιθεναι^^ 

^ Sp. : of'Toj. 2 lac. : αύτφ οϋτί μηθίν δΐσιτότον. 

' Sp. : δ€Ϊ. * των add. Sp. 

* τψδ( Rieckher, τούτφ Sus. • ό add. Aid. 

' Rac. : ί;-ητοΰσί. * Syl. : ττοιήσαντα^. 

• Syl. : τ€ μάλιστα. ι» (bis) Sol. : τό αυτό (τό αύτοΰ Βζ.). 

^^ Βζ. : δίατιθέναί. 

436 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. xii. 1-6 >«^^ 

him and society, for he is sufficient society for him- 

2 self. This is most manifest in the case of God ; 
for it is clear that as he needs nothing more he will 

not need a friend, and that supposing he has no \ y 
need of one he will not have one. Consequently ''*y 
the happiest human being also will very little need 
a friend, except in so far as to be self-sufficing is ι 

3 impossible. Of necessity, therefore, he who lives 1 
the best life will have fewest friends, and they will \ 
constantly become fewer, and he will not be eager 
to have friends but will think lightly not only of 
useful friends but also of those desirable for society. 
But assuredly even his case would seem to show that 

a friend is not for the sake of utility or benefit but 

that one loved on account of goodness is the only > ^^ 

4 real friend. For when we are not in need of some- '/"^-^ 
thing, then we all seek people to share our enjoy- 
ments, and beneficiaries rather than benefactors ; 

and we can judge them better when we are selft 
sufficing than when in need, and we most need 
friends who are worthy of our society. 

5 But about this question we must consider whether 
perhaps, although the view stated is partly sound, 
in part the truth escapes us because of the compari- 
son." The matter is clear if we ascertain what life 

6 in the active sense and as an End is. It is manifest Psychology 
that life is perception and knowledge, and that con- ufe"'"*^ 
sequently social life is perception and knowledge 

in common. But perception and knowledge them- 
selves are the thing most desirable for each indi- 
vidually (and it is owing to this that the appetition 
for life is implanted by nature in all, for living must 

« i.e. of man with God, 1. 8 above ; cf. 1245 b 13. 

437 



ARISTOTLE 

1244 b ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 

γνώσιν τίνα), el ovv ης άττοτ€.μοι και ποιησ€ΐ€ ^ 
30 το γι,νώσκ^ιν αυτό καθ^ αυτό και τό^ μιη (άλλα 
τοντο μ€ν λάνθανα ώσττ^ρ iv τω Χόγω γβγραπται, 
τω μβντοι ττράγματι βστί μη λανθάνειν), ονθβν 
αν Βιαφβροι η το γινώσκαν άλλον ανθ αύτοΰ• το 
δ' ομοίον τω^ ζην άνθ^ αΰτου άλλον, ευλόγα»? δέ 
το iavTov αίσθάνεσθαι καΐ^ γνώριζαν αίρ^τώτ^ρον . 
35 δεΓ γαρ άμα avvdelvaL δυο iv τω λόγω, ότι τ€ το 
ζην αίρ€τόν* καΐ οτι το αγαθόν, και βκ τούτων 

1245 a ΟΤΙ το αύτοΐς^ νττάρχαν την τοιαύτην φύσιν. et 8 

ουν ioTLV ael της τοιαύτης συστοιχίας η €Τ€ρα 
iv τη τον αΙρ€τοΰ τάζει, καΐ το γνωστόν και το 
αίσθητόν^ iστLV ώς όλως είτταν τω' κοινωνείν της 
ώρισμίνης φύσεως,^ ώστε το αύτοΰ βουλεσθαι 
5 αΙσθάν€σθαι το αύτον etvai tolovSl βονλεσθαι 
iστίv, eTTet ουν ου κατ αυτούς iσμ€v εκαστον 
τούτων άλλα κατά μβτάληφιν των δυνάμεων iv 
τω αίσθάνεσθαι η γνώριζαν {αίσθανόμενος γάρ 
αισθητός ytVeTat τούτω και* ταύτη και κατά 
τοΰτο καθ^ ο^" πρότερον αισθάνεται και fj και ου, 
γνωστός δε γινώσκων) — ώστε δια τοΰτο και ζην 
10 άει βούλεται οτι βούλεται άει γνωρίζειν, τοΰτο δε 
ΟΤΙ αυτό? είναι το γνωστόν, το 8η συζην αιρεΐσθαι 9 
δάνειε μέν αν είναι σκοττουμένοις πως εϋηθες — 

^ τό add. Wilson. ^ Sol. : τοΰ. 

* καΐ <ίαντόν> Sp. * Fr. : καΐ aiperbv. 

* Brandis : τό αύτ6 roh. * corr. Ρ*» : aifxrov. 

' Fr. : τό. * hie laciinam Sus. 

• τούτφ καΐ add. Rac. ^° Fr. : καθά. 

" τοιαύτην = dyaO^v. 

* e.g. the Pythagorean pair of series. One, Good, etc. 
opposed to Many, Bad, etc. (Solomon). ' The Determined ' 

438 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. xii. 7-9 

7 be deemed a mode of knowing). If therefore one 
were to abstract and posit absolute knowledge and 
its negation (though this, it is true, is obscure in the 
argument as we have written it, but it may be 
observed in experience), there would be no diiFerence 
between absolute knowledge and another person's 
knowing instead of oneself ; but that is like another 
person's living instead of oneself, whereas perceiving 
and knowing oneself is reasonably more desirable. 
For two things must be taken into consideration 
together, that life is desirable and that good is de- 
sirable, and as a consequence that it is desirable for 

8 ourselves to possess a nature of that quality .<* If, 
therefore, of the pair of corresponding series '' of this 
kind one is always in the class of the desirable, and 
the known and the perceived are generally speaking 
constituted by their participation in the ' determined ' 
nature, so that to wish to perceive oneself is to wish 
oneself to be of a certain character, — since, then, we 
are not each of these things in ourselves but only by 
participating in these faculties in the process of per- 
ceiving or knowing (for when perceiving one becomes 
perceived by means of what one previously per- 
ceives," in the manner and in the respect in which one 
perceives it, and when knowing one becomes known) 
— hence owing to this one wishes always to live 
because one wishes always to know ; and this is 
because one wishes to be oneself the object known. 

9 To choose to live in the society of others might. Reasons for 
therefore, from a certain point of view seem foolish of^sodetyT" 

(opposed to ' the Indeterminate ') belonged to the ' desirable ' 
series. 

" i.e. perception of sonaething outside oneself causes con- 
sciousness of self. 

439 



ARISTOTLE 

1245 a 

(eTTt των κοινών^ πρώτον καΐ τοις άλλοις ζωοις, 
οίον του avveadUiv r) τοϋ^ συμπίν^ιν τι γαρ δια- 
φ€ρ€ί το πλησίον ουσι ταΰτα συμ,βαίν€ίν η χωρίς 

15 αν άφ€λΎ)ς τον λόγον ; άλλα μην^ καΐ τον λογον 
κοινων€Ϊν του τυχόντος βτβρον τοιούτον, άμα τ 
οϋτ€ διδάσκειν οϋτ€ μανθάνειν τοις αύταρκίσι 
φίλοίς οΙόν τ€, μανθάνων μ^ν yap αύτος ουκ εχ€ΐ 
ως Set, διδάσκοντα? δ' ό* φίλος, η δ όμοιοτης 
φιλία) — άλλα μην φαίνεται ye οτι^ και πάντες Κ 

20 rjbiov των aya^tui' μετά των φίλων κοινωνοΰμεν, 
καθ^ όσον επιβάλλει εκάστω^ και ου δύναται 
άριστου, άλλα τούτων τω μεν η8ονης σωματικής Ι. 
τω δε θεωρίας μουσικής τω δε φιλοσοφίας' και 
το άμα 8η^ e^vat τω φίλω (διο φησι ' μόχθος οΐ 
τηλοΰ φίλοι '), ώστ^^ ου Βεΐ yei'ea^at άττ' άλλτ^λων' 

25 τούτου γινομένου, όθεν και ό έρως δο /cet φίλια 
ομοιον etvai• του yap συζην ορέγεται 6 ερών, άλλ' 
ούχ ^ /ζάλιστα Βεΐ, άλλα κατ' αϊσθησιν. 

Ό μεν τοίνυν λόγος εκεΐνά φησι ^ιαπορών, το 1! 
δ έργον οΰτω φαίνεται γινόμενον , ώστε δηλοΓ οτι 
παρακρούεται πως ημάς ό ^ιαπορών. σκεπτεον Γ, 
οΰν" εντεύθεν^'' τάληθες• 6 γάρ φίλος βούλεται eiv-at, 

30 ώσπερ η παροιμία φησίν, ' άΧλος 'Υϊρακλης,' άλλος 

^ Βζ. : κοινωνών, ^ Βζ. : οίον τό . . . ^ τό. 

' Bk. : μη. * Βζ. : οι). 

* δτι add. (et καΐ om.) Fr. ' Ross: ϊκαστον. 

' Rac. {καΐ το άμα δ€Ϊ Camerarius) : καΐ τολμφ δη (δίΐ Γ). 

* Fr. : ws. • οϋν add. Fr. 

ϊ" Sp. : ?νθ(ν. 

" This proverb looks like a quotation, being half a line of 
verse 

* See 1244 b 2 ff., 1245 a 27. " lb. 22 if. 

440 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. xii. 9-13 

(first in the case of the things common to the other 
animals also, for instance eating together or drinking 
together, for what difference does it make whether 
these things take place when we are near together 
or apart, if you take away speech ? but even to 
share in speech that is merely casual is a thing 
indifferent, and also neither to impart nor to receive 
information is possible for friends who are self- 
sufficing, since receiving information implies a de- 
ficiency in oneself and imparting it a deficiency in 

10 one's friend, and likeness is friendship) — but never- 
theless it surely seems that we all find it pleas- 
anter to share good things with our friends, as far 
as these fall to each, and the best that each can — 

11 but among these, it falls to one to share bodily 
pleasure, to another artistic study, to another 
philosophy — ; and so it is pleasanter to be with one's 
friend (whence the saying ' Distant friends a burden 
are ' "), so that they must not be separated when 
this is taking place. Hence also love seems to 
resemble friendship, for the lover is eager to share 
the life of the loved one, although not in the most 
proper way but in a sensuous manner. 

12 Therefore the argument in raising the question The Alter 
asserts the former position,*" but the facts of experi- ^^*'' 
ence are obviously on the latter lines," so that it is 

clear that the raiser of the question in a way mis- 

13 leads us. We must therefore examine the truth o>^ ** 
from the following consideration : ' friend ' reallj' ^ 
denotes, in the language of the proverb ,** ' anothei 
Hercules ' — another self ; but the characteristics are^ 

<* Quoted elsewfiere in the same connexion, but one may 
conjecture that the phrase originally meant ' as strong as 
Hercjiles.' 

441 



ARISTOTLE 

1245 a 

αύτος• διεσττασται 8e, /cat χαλίττον ττάντα^ €0' 
€νος yeveadat, άλλα κατά μ€ν την φνσιν δ σνγ- 
γβνβστατον, κατά 8e το σώμα όμοιος €Τ€ρος, άλλο? 
e κατά την ψνχην, και τούτων κατά μοριον €Τ€ρος 
€Τ€ρον. αλλ ovdev ye" 'ήττον βονλβταυ ωσττερ 
35 αντος διαιρετό? eit'at ό φίλος, το ουν του φίλου 1^ 
αίσθάν^σθαί {και το του φίλου γνωρίζ^ιν^^ το 
αυτοϋ ττως ανάγκη αίσθάνεσθαι elvaL και το αυτόν 
ττως γνώριζαν. ώστ€ και τα φορτικά μέν συνηΒβσ- 
θαι και συζην τω φίλω ηδύ βύλόγως {συμβαίνβι γάρ 
€Κ€ίνου άμα α'ίσθησις aei), μάλλον δε τάς θβιοτερας 

1245 b ηοονάς• αίτιον δ' οτι aei rjhiov ίαυτον θβωρ^ΐν iv 
τω βζλτίονι άγαθω, τοΰτο δ' ioTiv ότβ μ€ν πάθος, 
οτ€ δε πράζις, 6τ€ δε €Τ€ρόν τι. ει δ' αυτόν* ευ ^ryv» 
και οϋτω και τόν φίλον, εν δε τώ* συζην συν€ργ€Ϊν, 
ή κοινωνία των iv τε'λει μάλιστα γ€. διό δει* 
5 συνθβωρεΐν και συν€υωχ€Ϊσθαι, ου τά δια τροφην 
και τα avayKaia (αι τοιαυται yap κοιι^ωνιαι ού;\;' 
όμιλίαι δοκοΰσιν είναι αλλ' άττολαυσει?), αλλ' 
έκαστο? ου δύναται τυγχάν€ΐν τ€λους, iv τούτω 15 
βούλίται συζην, ει δε ρ,τ^, και ττοιειν ευ και 7Γ(χσ;^ειν 
υτΓΟ των φίλων αίροΰνται μάλιστα, οτι μβν τοίνυν 
10 και δει συζην, και οτι μάλιστα βούλονται ττάντζς, 
και οτι ο εύδαιρ,ονε'στατο? και άριστος μάλιστα 
τοιούτος, φαν€ρόν. οτι δε κατά τόν λόγον ουκ 
€φαιν€το, και τοΰτ' ευλόγως συνεβαινβ, λέγοντος 

ϊ Rac: τά. 2 Syl. : re. » Rac. 

* V.l. ΐΐ δυνατό» (el δ' αυτόν δυνατόν ed ξ'ην οϋτω και τόν φίλον 
Sus.). 

» ei δέ τό Fr. β Set add. Fr. 

' yap κοινωνίαι ούχ add. Rac. (ομιλΙαι yap οΰχ Sus.). 

" C/. 1244 b 2 fF., 1245 a 27. 
44.2 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. xii. 13-15 

scattered, and it is difficult for all to be realized in 
the case of one person ; though by nature a friend 
is what is most akin, yet one resembles his friend ^ 
in body and another in spirit, and one in one part 
of the body or spirit, another in another. But still 
none the less a friend really means as it were a 

14 separate self. To perceive and to know a friend, 
therefore, is necessarily in a manner to perceive 
and in a manner to know oneself. Consequently 
to share even vulgar pleasures and ordinary life 
with a friend is naturally pleasant (for it always 
involves our simultaneously perceiving the friend), 
but more so to share the more divine pleasures ; 
the reason of which is that it is always more pleas- 
ant to behold oneself enjoying the superior good, 
and this is sometimes a passive, sometimes an active 
experience, sometimes something else. But if it is 
pleasant to live well oneself and for one's friend 
also to live well, and if living together involves 
working together, surely their partnership will be pre- 
eminently in things included in the End. Hence we 
should study together, and feast together — not on 
the pleasures of food and the necessary pleasures 
(for such partnerships do not seem to be real social 

15 intercourse but mere enjoyment), but each really 
wishes to share with his friends the End that he 
is capable of attaining, or failing this, men choose 
most of all to benefit their friends and to be bene- 
fited by them. It is therefore manifest that to live 
together is actually a duty, and that all people wish 
it very much, and that this is most the case with 
the man that is the happiest and best. But that the 
contrary appeared to be the conclusion of the argu- 
ment " was also reasonable, the statement being 

443 



ARISTOTLE 

1245 b 

άληθη. κατά rrjv σύνθβσιν γαρ της παραβολής 
αληθούς ούσης η λύσις Ιστίν οτι yap 6 ^eo? ου 

15 Ύοίοϋτος οίος δεΓσ^αι φίλου, /cat τον ομοιον a^Lol} 
καίτοι κατά τούτον τον λόγον ουδεν^ vorjaei, ο 1 
σπουδαίος' ου γάρ ούτως 6 θζός ed €χ€ί, αλλά 
βζλτιον η ωστ€ άλλο τι voelv τταρ' αυτό? αυτόν, 
αίτιον δ' ΟΤΙ ημΐν μεν το eu καθ^ έτερον, εκείνω^ 
δε αυτό? αύτοΰ το ευ εστίν. 

20 Και το ζητεΐν ημΐν καΐ εϋχεσθαι πολλούς φίλους, 1 
άμα δε λέγειν ώς ούθεις φίλος ω πολλοί φίλοι, 
άμφω λέγεται ορθώς, εν^εχόμενον* γάρ πολλοίς 
συζην άμα και συρ-αισ^άνεσ^αι, ώς πλείστοις^ 
αίρετώτατον επει δε χαλεπώτατον, εν ελάττοσιν 
ανάγκη την ενεργειαν της συναισθησεως ειν-αι, ώστ' 1 

25 ού μόνον χαλεπον το πολλούς κτησασθαι {πείρας 
γάρ δει*), άλλα και ουσι χρήσασθαι. 

Και ότε μεν άπείναι ευ πράττοντα τον φιλούμενον 
βουλόμεθα, 6τέ δε μετεχειν τών αυτών, και το 
άμα βούλεσθαι είναι φιλικόν εν^εγόμενον*' μεν γάρ 
α/Μα και εύ, τούτο πάντες αίροΰνται' μη εν^εχό- 

S0 μενον* δε άμα,'' ώσπερ τον ' Ηρακλή^ ίσως αν ή 
μητηρ εΐλετο θεόν είναι μάλλον η μετ αύτης οντά 
τω Έιύρυσθεΐ θητεύειν. ομοίως γάρ αν εΐποιεν και 1 
ο* 6 Αάκων εσκωφεν, επεί τις εκελευσεν αυτόν 
χειμαζόμενον επικαλεσασθαι τους Αιοσκούρους. 

' Βζ. : άξιον. * Rac. : ονδ(. ^ iKeiuos ? Rac. 

* Rac. : (νδεχομένου. * Sp. : νλ^ίστονί. 

* Syl. : aet. ' lae. : άλλα. 

* Γ: τφ Ήρακλΐϊ. • lac. : tu, 

" i.e. of man with God, 1241• b 7. 

* He doubtless said that being in trouble himself he did 
not wish to involve the Dioscuri in it (Solomon). 

444 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. xn. 15-19 

true. For the solution is on the Hne of the com- 
parison," the correspondence being true ; for the . 
fact that God is not of such a nature as to need'i/ 
a friend postulates that man, who is like God, also 

16 does not need one. Yet according to this argument 
the virtuous man will not think of anything ; for 
God's perfection does not permit of this, but he is 
too perfect to think of anything else beside himself. 
And the reason is that for us well-being has reference 
to something other than ourselves, but in his case 
he is himself his own well-being. 

17 As to seeking for ourselves and praying for many Practical 
friends, and at the same time saying that one who has '"^'^^^lons. 
many friends has no friend, both statements are correct. 

For if it is possible to live with and share the per- 
ceptions of many at once, it is most desirable for them 
to be the largest possible number ; but as that is 
very difficult, active community of perception must 

18 of necessity be in a smaller circle, so that it is not 
only difficult to acquire many friends (for probation 
is needed), but also to use them when one has got 
them. 

One for whom we feel affection we sometimes Presence 
wish to prosper in absence from us, but sometimes of Γη^ιΐάΓί^η 
to share the same experiences. And to wish to be prosperity 
together is a mark of friendship, for if it is possible adversity. 
to be together and to prosper all choose this ; but 
if it is not possible to prosper together, then we 
choose as the mother of Heracles perhaps would 
have chosen for her son, to be a god rather than to 

19 be with her but in service to Eurystheus. For men 
Avould say things like the jest which the Spartan 
made when somebody told him to invoke the Dioscuri 
in a storm.'' 

44,5 



ARISTOTLE 

1245 b 

Αοκ€Ϊ he τοΰ μ€ν φιλοΰντος το αττΕίργαν elvai τ'ής 

35 σνμμ€θέζ€ως των χαλξπών, τον he φίλονμ€νον το 

βovλeσθaι συμμeτ€χet.v. καΐ ταύτα άμφότ€ρα συμ- 

βaLveι ευλογώ?" hei γαρ τω φίλω μηθ€ν elvat οντω 

λνπηρόν ώς rjhv τον φίλον, hoKel he helv αίρβΐσθαί 

μη το αύτοΰ. διό κωλνουσί συμμeτeχeLV• lkcwol 2 

γαρ avTOL KaKonadouvTeg, ίνα μη φαίνωνται το 

ί2Μ&αύτών OKOTTovvTes καί αιρεΓσ^αι το xaipetv λυττον- 

μ4νου τοΰ φίλου, ctl he^ κovφότepoι eii^at μη μόνοι 

φ€ροντ€ς τα κακά. eirel δ' alpeTov τό τ' ev καΐ το 2 

άμα, hrjXov οτι και το άμα elvai μ€τ' ίΧάττονος 

αγαθού αΙρ£τώτ€ρόν^ πως η χωρίς μ€τά μζίζονϋς. 

ί> eTTei he^ άhηλov το πόσον δύναται τό άμα, ηhη 

hιaφepovτaι, καΐ οι μ€ν* οΐονται^ τό μeτ€χeιv άμα 

πάντων φιλικόν, /cat* ώσττβρ CΓυvh€ιπveΐv άμα φασιν 

'qhiov^ ταύτα €χοντας• οι δ' άμα^ μ^ν του €u* βοΰ- 

λονται, eπeιhη «Γ" τις ύπ€ρβολάς ποιησ€ΐ, ομολόγους 

€ΐναι" άμα κακώς πράττοντας σφόhpa τ)*^ ev 

10 σφόhpa χωρίς, παραπλήσιον he τοντω και περί τάς 2 

ατυχία?• ότ€ μ€ν γαρ βovλόμeθa τονς φιλονς άπ- 

etvat/^ ovhe λυπeΐv όταν μηθ€ν μάλΧωσι ποιησ€ΐν 

πλέον, ότ6 he αυτούς^* jjhiaTov πapeΐvaι. τό he^^ 

της vπevavτLωσeως ταύτης και μάΧ' eΰλoγov. δια 

γαρ τα πpoeιpημeva τοΰτο συ/χ^αινει, και οτι μ€ν 

15 το λυπoύμevov η ev φαύλη οντά e^ei τόν φίλον 

^ U (et lacunam ante in) Bk. : δί τό. 

* Sp. : aiperbu. ' Sp. : έπΐώτη. 
* oi μβν add. Sus. ^ Cas. : ohv καΐ. 

* και om. Γ. ' ■ήδιον <7j Ιδία> Fr. 

* Sp. : &v. * lac: μέντοι ov. 

^^ lac. : iird δ^ y^. ^^ lac. : 6μο\(τ^ονσιν, 

1* ή] καΐ ? Rac. 13 Cas. : elvai. 

1* Syl. : τούϊ. " rb δ' <αΐτιον> Fr. 

44() 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. xii. 19-22 

It seems to be characteristic of one who feels 
affection for another to debar him from sharing 
his troubles, and of the person for whom affection 
is felt to wish to share them. Both these things 
happen reasonably ; for to a friend nothing ought 
to give so much pain as his friend gives pleasure, yet 
it is felt that he ought not to choose his own interest. 

20 Hence people hinder their friends from sharing 
their sorrows ; they are content to be in trouble by 
themselves, in order that they may not appear from 
selfish considerations actually to choose the joy of 
their friend's grief and furthermore to find it a 

21 relief not to bear their misfortunes alone. And as 
both well-being and companionship are desirable, it 
is clear that companionship combined with even a 
lesser good is in a way more desirable than separation 
with a greater good. But as it is not clear how much 
value companionship has, at this point men differ, 
and some think it is friendly to share everything in 
company, and say, for instance, that it is pleasanter 
to dine with company though having the same food ; 
others wish to share only in well-being, because, they 
say, if one supposes extreme cases, people experi- 
encing great adversity in company or great pro- 

22 sperity separately are on a par. And it is much the 
same as this in regard to misfortunes also ; sometimes 
we wish our friends to be absent, and do not want 
to give them pain when their presence is not going 
to do any good, but at other times for them to be 
present is most pleasant. And the reason of this 
contrariety is very easily explained ; it comes about 
because of the things stated before," and because to 
behold a friend in pain or in a bad state is a thing 

" Cf. 1245 b 26—1246 a 2. 

447 



ARISTOTLE 

1246 a 

dewpelv φ^υγομ^ν απλώς, ωσττερ καΐ ημάς αντονς, 
το δ οραν τον φίλον η^ν ωσπβρ άλλο τι των ηΒίστων, 
δια την ζίρημβνην αΐτίαν, καΐ μην^ κάμνοντα el 
αντος• ωστ6 οττότ^ρον αν τούτων η μάλλον rjSv, 2ί 
20 ποΐ€Ϊ την ροπην του βούλ^σθαι παρ€Ϊναι η μη. καΐ 
τοΰτο^ €7Γΐ των χ€ίρόνων συμβαίνα^ και δια την 
αύτην αιτιαν γίν^σθαΐ' μάλιστα γαρ φιλοτιμούνται 
τους φίλους μη ττράττειν eu μη8' άττ€Ϊναι* άν^ 
ανάγκη -η^ αύτοΐς κακώς, διό eViore τους Ιρω- 
μ^νους συναποκτιννύασιν μάλλον γαρ του οικείου 
25 aia^arcCT^ai κακοϋ, ώσπβρ αν, el και μβμνημενος 
ΟΤΙ 7Τοτ€ €ύ €7τραττ€, μα?^ον η €ΐ ω€το άει κακώς 
πράττ€ΐν. 

^ Sol. : μη. 2 γ,. . ^^^^_ 

' Camot : συμβαίνειν. * Rac. : elvai. 

^ ac add. Fr. « ^ add. Fr. 



448 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. xii. 22-23 

we absolutely shun, as we shun it in our own case, 
but to see a friend is as pleasant as anything can 
be, for the reason stated," and indeed to see him ill 
23 if one is ill oneself ; so that whichever of these is 
more pleasant, it sways the balance of wishing him 
to be present or not. And it fits in that the 
former occurs in the case of inferior people, and for the 
same reason ; they are most eager for their friends 
not to prosper and not to be absent if they them- 
selves have to suffer adversity. Hence sometimes 
suicides kill those whom they love with themselves, 
as they think that they feel their own misfortune 
more if their loved ones are to survive ^ ; just as, 
if a man in trouble had the memory that he had once 
been prosperous, he would be more conscious of his 
trouble than if he thought that he had always done 
badly. 

" Cf. 1245 a 26-b 9. 
^ In the Greek this clause is left to be understood. 



2g 4.49 



Θ 

1240 *τ»» / ί>» '»' '' 1 ' 1 

1. Απορησ€ί€ ο αν τις et cgtlv €καστω χρησα- 1 
σθαι και e<j^' ο^ 7Τ€φνκ€ καΐ άλλως, καΐ τοΰτο fj 
αυτό Tj αυ^ κατά συμβ^βηκός• οΐον rj* οφθαλμός, 

30 IBelv rj καΐ αλλω? Trapihelv Βίαστρ4φαντα ware δυο 
το ev φανηναί, αύται μ€ν Srj χρ€Ϊαί^ άμφω οτι μβν 
οφθαλμός €στιν,* ην δ' όφθαλμώ αλλτ^' δε, κατά 
σνμβββηκός, οϊον el rjv άπο^όσθαι η φαγ€Ϊν. ομοίως 2 
δ€* καΐ €τηστ'ημΎ^• και yap άλτ^^ώ? και άμαρτείν, 
οίον όταν €κών μη ορθώς γράφη, ώς αγνοία Srj νυν 

35 χρησθαι, ώσπερ μεταστρίφασαι^" την χ€Ϊρα και 
τον τΓοδα^^ τω ττοδι ττοτβ ώς χ^ιρι και ταντη ώς 
ττοδι χρώνται αΐ^' όρχηστρί^ες. el δη πασαι αϊ 3 
άρ€ται" ίττιστημαι, e'ίη άν^* και τη δικαιοσύνη ώς 
αδικία χρησθαΐ' άδικτ^σει^^ αρα από δικαιοσυι^τ^? 
τα άδικα πράττων, ώσπep και τα άγνοητικα από 
\2Aeb eπιστημης• el Be τοντ αδύνατον, φαν€ρ6ν οτι ουκ 

^ Ρΐ": έκάστψ φί\φ Μ^. ^ Sp. : <^ ant &. 

' lac. : τοΰτο fj aiVo ηδύ. * lac. : rj. 

^ Xpelai add. Sp. * έστιι^ lac. : δτι. 

' lac. : Λλλτ;. * Sp. : δη. 

* Sp. : επιστήμη. ^^ lac. : μΐταστρέψα^, 

^^ rbv πόδα add. lac. ^^ αί add. Sp. 

^' Sp. : 6.ρι.σταί. ^* ef?; Blv Sp. : eljrai'. 

" Sp. : d δίκηί d. 

' In M*' the remainder of the work forms part of the pre- 
450 



BOOK VIII « 

1 I. But one may raise the question whether it is c. i. Good- 
possible to use any given thing both for its natural Know- 
purpose and otherwise, and in the latter case to use ^^^^™;^ ^^'® 
it qua itself or on the contrary incidentally : for are not 
instance, with an eye qua eye, to see, or also just ^nowiedge,^ 
to see wrong, by squinting so that one object appears which is 
tΛVO — both these uses of the eye, then, use it because ^suae? ° 
it is an eye, but it would be possible to make use of 

an eye but to use it in another way, incidentally, 
for example, if it were possible to sell it or to eat it. 

2 And similarly with the use of knowledge : one can 
use it truly, and one can use it wrongly — for instance, 
when one spells a word incorrectly on purpose, then 
at the time one is using knowledge as ignorance, just 
as dancing-girls sometimes interchange the hand and 

3 the foot and use foot as hand and hand as foot.** If 
then all the virtues are forms of knowledge, it 
would be possible to use even justice as injustice — 
in that case a man will be behaving unjustly by 
doing unjust acts as a result of justice, as when one 
makes ignorant mistakes from knowledge ; but if 
this is impossible, it is clear that the virtues cannot 

ceding Book, and some editors print it as cc. xiii.-xv. of 
Book VII. The text has been fully treated by Jackson, 
/. Phil. xxii. 170. 

* i.e. stand on their hands and wave their feet in the air, 
see Diet. Ant.^ " Saltatio." 

451 



ARISTOTLE 

αν €L€V €7Τίστημαι αι aperat. ουο ei /χή εστίν 
άγνο€Ϊν άπο €πίστήμης αλλ' αμαρτάν^ιν μόνον καΙ 
τά αυτά /cat άττό ayvota? ttolcZv, οϋη άττό 
Βικαιοσύνης ye ώ? από αδικία? 7τράζ€ί. αλλ' εττεΓ 
5 φρόνησις €7τιστήμη και άληθ€ς τι, το αυτό ποιήσει 
κάκ^ίνη• ivSexoLTO γαρ αν άφρόνως άπο φρον'ησ€ως 
και άμαρτάνειν ταΰτά απερ ό άφρων el δε άπλ•^ 
•!^ν* 1^ έκαστου χρ^ία fj €καστον, καν φρονίμως 
€πραττον ούτω πράττοντας. επι μ€ν οΰν ταΐς 4 
αλλαι? Ιπιστ-ημαις άλλη κυρία ποι,ΐΐ την στροφην 

10 αύτης δε τ-ί^? πασών κυρίας τις ; ου γαρ έτι επι- 
στημη γε η νους. άλλα μην ούδ' άρεττ)• χρηται 
γαρ αύτη,^ η γαρ του άρχοντος αρετή τη του 
αρχομένου χρηται. τις οΰν εστίν; η ώσπερ λε'yεται 5 
άκρασία η* κακία του αλόγου της φνχης, και πω?' 
ακόλαστο? ό άκραττ^?, αχών νουν, άλλ' ■^δτ^ άν 

15 ισχυρά η η επιθυμία, στρέφει και λoy ιεΓται τάναν- 
τια; η ξ.στι'^ ^ηλον δτι, καν iv μέν τούτω αρετή εν 
δε τω λόγω άνοια η, έτερα' μεταποιούνται; ώστε 
εσται δικαιοσυνι^ τ' ου* δικαι'ω? χρησθαι και κακώς 
και φρονήσει άφρόνως• ώστε και τάναντία. άτοπον 

20 γαρ ει την ρ,έν ε'ν τώ λoytστtκώ άρετην* μοχθηρία 
ποτέ έγγενομένη εν^" τώ άλόγω^^ στρέφει και 

1 ^7re2 ή ? Rac. ^ 9ji> add. Rac. {'ή" pro ή Bus.) 

* αύτη aiirfj ? Rac. * ή add. Rac. 

* lac. : irws. * lac. : ^ σ^ί. 

' lac. : irepai. * r' ού lac. : τό. 

* Γ : TTJs , . . dper^. '■ Sp. : /u.ii'. 

^^ Sus. : \6y<f). 

452 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VIII. i. 3-5 

be branches of knowledge. And also if it is not pos- 
sible from knowledge to be ignorant, but only to 
make mistakes and do the same things as one does 
from ignorance, a man will assuredly never act from 
justice in the same way as he will act from injustice. 
But since wisdom is knowledge and a form of truth, 
wisdom also will produce the same effect as know- 
ledge, that is, it would be possible from wisdom to 
act unwisely and to make the same mistakes as 
the unwise man does ; but if the use of anything 
qua itself were single," when so acting men would 

4 be acting wisely. In the case of the other forms of 
knowledge, therefore, another higher form causes 
their diversion ; but what knowledge causes the diver- 
sion of the actually highest of all ? Obviously there 
is no longer any knowledge or any mind to do it. 
But moreover goodness does not cause it either ; for 
wisdom makes use of goodness, since the goodness 

5 of the ruling part uses that of the ruled. Who then 
is there in whom this occurs ? or is it in the same 
way as the vice of the irrational part of the spirit 
is termed lack of control, and the uncontrolled man 
is in a manner profligate — possessing reason, but 
ultimately if his appetite is powerful it will turn him 
round, and he will draw the opposite inference ? 
Or is it manifest that also if there is goodness in the 
irrational part but folly in the reason, goodness and 
folly are transformed in another way ? so that it 
will be possible to use justice unjustly and badly, 
and wisdom unwisely ; and therefore the op- 
posite uses also will be possible. For it is strange 
if whereas when wickedness at any time arises in 
the irrational part it will pervert the goodness in 

" As in § 1 above it was shown not to be. 

453 



ARISTOTLE 

1246 b ^ 

■ποί-ησβι αγνοεΐν, η δ άρετη rf ev τω αλόγω 
ev τω λογιστικά)^ άνουας ζνονσης ον στρ€φ€ΐ ταυττ^ι^ 
καΐ ποίησβι φρονίμως κρίν€ΐν και τα δεον'τα/ καΙ 
πάλιν η φρόνησις η Ιν τω Χογισηκω την ev τω 
αλόγω άκολασίαν'^ σωφρόνως πράττ€ΐν, οττερ δο /cet 

25 etvai^ η εγκράτεια, ωστ έ'σται και' άττό άνοια?' 
φρονίμως. Ιστι δε* ταύτα άτοττα, άλλως τ€ και 6 
άττο άνοιας^ χρησθαι φρονήσει φρονίμως• τοΰτο 
γαρ €πΙ των άλλων ουδαμώς 6ρωμ€ν• ωσττΐ,ρ την 
ιατρικτην η γραμματικην στρζφβι ακολασία, αλλ 
ού^° την άγνοιαν, iav -η εναντία δια το μη eveivai 

30 -την ύπ€ροχην, αλλά την άρετην δλως μάλλον etrat 
ττρος την κακίαν οϋτως εχονσαν και γαρ α}^ ό 
άδικος πάντα 6 δίκαιος δύναται, και δλως eveoTii' 
iv τη 8υνάμ€ΐ η άΒυναμία. ωστ€ 8ηλον δτι άμα φρό- 7 
νιμοι και αγαθοί, eKeivai^^ δ' άλλου (.ζεις, και όρθον^^ 
το Ίίωκρατικον^* δτι ovSev ίσχυρότερον φρονησεως . 

35 αλλ ΟΤΙ βπιστημην εφη, ουκ όρθώς^^' άρ€τη γάρ 
€στι, και ουκ επιστήμη άλλα γένος άλλο γνώσεως }^ 

II. Επει δ ου μόνον η φρόνησις ποιεί την ι 
εύπραγίαν κατ άρετην,^'' άλλα φαμεν και τους εύ- 

1247 a TU^et? εΰ πράττειν ώς και της ευτυχίας εμποιούσης^^ 

εύπραγίαν κατά^^ τα αυτά. τη επιστήμη, ^° σκεπτεον 

^ η add. Rac. * ^u τψ λο-γιστικφ add. Sus. 

^ δέονται <7Γράττείΐ'> vel ^ττοιεΊρ"^ ? Rac. 

* Γ : κόλασιν Άν. ' είναι add. Rac. 

* και Γ : και ή. ' (liis) lac. : ayvolas. 

* (στι δέ Sp. : έττί re. * φρονήσει add. Sp. 

^' ου Rac. : ονν ό {ονν ον lac). 

^^ & add. lac. (post πάντα Γ). 

^^ lac. : καΐ ayadai έκεΐναι αι. 

^' Rac. : όρθωί. ^* Bek. : το σώμα κραττητικίιν. 

^* Rac. : ορθόν. 1* Sp. : yvwa . . . 

^' lac. : και άρετήν (καΙ αρετή Sp.). 

454 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, viii. i. 5— ii. 1 

the rational and cause it to be ignorant, yet good- 
ness in the irrational part when there is folly in 
the rational should not convert the folly and make 
it form wise and proper judgements, and again 
wisdom in the rational part should not make profli- 
gacy in the irrational act temperately — which seems 
to be what self-control essentially is. So that there 

6 will actually be wise action arising from folly. But 
these consequences are absurd, especially o'J?^^^.-/ 
using wisdom wisely as a result of folly ; -j-t^.^t 

is a thing which we certainly do not &^^ .^ 

cases — for instance profligacy perverts one's medical 
knowledge or scholarship, but it does not pervert 
one's ignorance if it be opposed to it, because it 
does not contain superiority, but rather it is good- 
ness in general that stands in this relation to bad- 
ness ; for example, the just man is capable of all 
that the unjust man is, and in general inability yV 

7 is contained in ability. So that it is clear that M-* 
men are wise and good simultaneously, and that ^^r 
the states of character above described belong to \Γ 

a different person, and the Socratic dictum ' Nothing \3^\ 
is mightier than wisdom,' is right. But in that by J^f^ 
' wisdom ' he meant ' knowledge,' he was wrong ; \ 
for wisdom is a form of goodness, and is not scien- 
tific knowledge but another kind of cognition. 
1 II. But wisdom is not the only thing which c. ϋ. Good 
acting in accordance with goodness causes welfare, luo™*'^' 
but we also speak of the fortunate as faring well, ^^^^^° 
which imphes that good fortune also engenders nature/not 
welfare in the same way as knowledge does ; we ^y w'sdom 
must therefore consider whether one man is fortu- dence. 



^* έμΐΓθίθύσ'η3 Fr. : eC ττοιούσ-η^. 
" Sp. : καΐ. ^° Sp. : τη? επιστήμης. 

^55 



ARISTOTLE 

1247 a „,,,, ,, , ^ , , , v«w 

ap' earl φνσ^ι ό μεν ευτυχής 6 δ άτυχης η ου, 
καΐ πώς e^et περί τούτων, οτι μεν yap είσί Tires' 2 
ευτυχείς όρώμεν άφρονες γαρ οντες κατορθοϋσι 
5 ττοΧλοΙ^ εν οΐς η τύχη κυρία, οι Βέ καΐ εν οΐς τέχνη 
εστί, πολλη^ μεντοι καΐ τύχη' ενυπάρχει, οίον εν 
στρατηγία καΐ κυβερνητική, πότερον οΰν άπό τίνος 3 
e^v^c ουτοί είσιν, η ου τω* αυτοί ποιοι τίνες eirai 
γαατικοί είσι των ευτυχημάτων ; νυν μεν γαρ 

10 ούτως οϊονται ως φύσει τινών όντων η 8e φύσις 
ποιους τίνα? ποιεί, και ευθύς εκ γενετής Βιαφερου- 
σιν, ώσπερ οι μεν γλαυκοί οι δε μελανόμματοι 
τω τοδι* τοιονδι εχειν, ούτω και οι ευτυχείς και 
ατυχείς. οτι μεν γαρ ου φρονήσει κατορθοϋσι 4 
SrjXov, ου γαρ άλογος η φρόνησις αλλ' έχει λόγον 

15 δια τι ούτω πράττει, οι δ' ουκ αν εχοιεν ειπείν δια 
τι κατορθοϋσι, τέχνη γαρ αν ην ετι Βε φανερον οτι* 5 
οντες άφρονες, ούχ οτι περί άλλα {τούτο μεν γαρ 
ούθεν άτοπον, οίον Ιπποκράτης γεωμετρικός ων, 
άλλα περί τά άλλα εΒόκει' βλάζ και άφρων efvai, 
κ:αι τΓολύ χρυσίον πλέων* άπώλεσεν ύπο των εν 

20 Βυζαντιω πεντη κοστολόγων δι' εύηθειαν, ως λε- 
γουσιν) αλλ' οτι και εν οι?* εύτυχοΰσιν άφρονες, 
περί γαρ ναυκληρίαν ούχ οι δεινότατοι ευτυχείς, 6 
αλλ' {ωσπερ εν κύβων πτώσει ό μεν ούΒεν, άλλος 

^ lac. : ΤΓολλά. * Rac. : ττολλοί (πολύ Cas.). 

* Rac. : τύχη!. * Γ : oiku. 

* Sp. : τό δ(ΐν. « δτί add. Sp. 

' Β' : δοκΐΐ. * Sp. : πλέον. * Β' : iV/ois. 

456 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VIII. ii. 1-6 

nate and another unfortunate by nature or not, and 

2 how it stands with these matters. For that some 
men are fortunate we see, since many though fool- 
ish succeed in things in which luck is paramount, 
and some even in things which involve skill although 
also containing a large element of luck — for ex- 

3 ample strategy and navigation. Are, then, these men 
fortunate as a result of a certain state of character, 
or are they enabled to achieve fortunate results not 
by reason of a certain quality in themselves ? As it 
is, people think the latter, holding that some men are 
successful by natural causes ; but nature makes men 
of a certain quality, and the fortunate and unfortu- 
nate are different even from birth, in the same 
way as some men are blue-eyed and others black- 
eyed because a particular part of them is of a par- 

4 ticular quality. For it is clear that they do not 
succeed by means of wisdom, because wisdom is 
not irrational but can give reason why it acts as it 
does, whereas they could not say why they succeed 

5 — for that would be science ; and moreover it is 
manifest that they succeed in spite of being 
unwise — not unwise about other matters (for 
that would not be anything strange, for example 
Hippocrates " was skilled in geometry but was 
thought to be stupid and unwise in other matters, 
and it is said that on a voyage owing to foolish- 
ness he lost a great deal of money, taken from him 
by the collectors of the two-per-cent duty at Byzan- 
tium), but even though they are unwise about 

6 the matters in which they are fortunate. For in 
navigation it is not the cleverest who are fortunate, 
but (just as in throwing dice one man throws a 

" A Pythagorean philosopher of Chios, /. 460 b.c. 

457 



ARISTOTLE 

1247 a , ^ 

δ e^^ βάλλ€ΐ) καθά rjv^ φύσα iarlv (ύτυχης. η τώ 
φιλβΐσθαί, ώσπΐρ φασίν, νττο Oeov, καΐ εζωθίν τι 

25 elvaL το κατορθοϋν , οίον ττλοΐον κακώς vevavm)- 
γημ€νον αμβινον πολλάκις διαττλεί/ αλλ' ου δι' 
αυτό αλλ' οτι e^et κνβ€ρνήτην aya^ov; αλλ' όντως 
ο ευτυχών* τον δαι/χον e^et κυβερνητην.^ αλλ 
άτοπον 9e6v η δαίμονα φίλείν τον τοιούτον, άλλα 
μ,ή τον βέΧτι,στον καΐ τον φρονιμώτατον . el δη 

30 ανάγκη η φύσει τ) νόίρ η επιτροπια tlvl κατορθοϋν, 
τα δε δυο μη εστί, φύσει αν elev οι ευτυχείς, άλλα 
μην η γε φύσις αίτια η τον άει ώσαυτω? η του ώς 
επι το πολύ, η δε τυχτ^ τουναντίον, ει μεν ουν το* 
παραλόγως επιτυ'^/χάνειΐ' τύχης Βοκεΐ είναι/ άλλ , 
ε'ίπερ δια τύχην ευτυχής, ουκ αν Βόζειε^ τοιούτον 

35 είναι το αίτιον οΐον άει του αύτοΰ η ώς επι το πολύ- 
έ'τι ει οτι' τοιοσδι ε7Γΐτυ•)/χάνει η αποτυγχάνει,^" 
ωσπερ ότι^^ γλαυκός ουκ οζύ όρα, ου τύχη αίτια 
άλλα φύσις' ουκ άρα εστίν ευτυχής άλλ' οΓον ευ- 
φυης. ώστε τοΰτ' άν ε'ίη λεκτέον, οτι ους λεγομεν 
1247 b ευτυχείς, ου δια τνχην εισίν ουκ άρα είσιν ευτυχείς, 
εύτυχεΐς^^ γαρ οσοις^^ αιτία τύχη άγαθη ά•)/α^ών. 

1 Ιί add. hie Rac. (post βάλ\€ΐ Β', lac). 

* lac. (et post φύσ^ι, <τ ψ ττην φύσιν ixeif (ύτνχη^) : καθ' ijv. 
' Syl. : δέ ΊτΧΐϊ. * Syl. : ouros ευτυχή? (ευτυχώ»» edd.). 

* post κνβ(ρνητΊ}ν add. άγαέ'όΐ' codd. plur. 

* οδί» <οί'τω> τό Bus. 

' treat <ό δέ δια τύχην ει)τιιχτ;5> lac, <ό δί δίά τύχην ΐνι- 
τνγχάνων εντνχηί^ ? Rac. 

* δόξ€ΐ€ add. lac. * ότι add. Fr. 

^*• ^ airoTiyxavei add. Siis. ^^ δτι ό codd. plur. 

^^ B' : εΰτύχτ)!. ^' lac. : ΰσων. 

458 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VIII. π. 6-9 

blank and another a six) a man is fortunate accord- 
ing as things were arranged by nature." Or is it 
because he is loved by God, as the phrase goes, and 
because success is something from outside ? as for 
instance a badly built ship often gets through a 
voyage better, though not owing to itself, but be- 

7 cause it has a good man at the helm. But on this ^ 
showing the fortunate man has the deity as steers- «^ 
man. But it is strange that a god or deity should Yet nature 

1 ii_ J i'* uniform, 

love a man of this sort, and not the best and most luck is not. 
prudent. If, then, the success of the lucky must 
necessarily be due to either nature or intellect or 
some guardianship, and of these three causes two 
are ruled out, those who are fortunate will be so by 

8 nature. But again, nature of course is the cause 
of a thing that happens either always or generally 
in the same way, whereas fortune is the opposite. 
If, then, unexpected achievement seems a matter of 
fortune, but, if a man is fortunate owing to fortune, 
it would seem that the cause is not of such a sort 
as to produce the same result always or generally 

9 — further, if a man's succeeding or not succeeding 
is due to his being of a certain sort, as a man does 
not see clearly because he has blue eyes, not fortune 
but nature is the cause ; therefore he is not a man 
who has good fortune but one who has as it were 
a good nature. Hence we should have to say that 
the people we call fortunate are so not by reason 
of fortune ; therefore they are not fortunate, for the 
fortunate are those for whom good fortune is a cause 
of good things. 

" Or, with Jackson's emendations, ' another a six according 
as nature determines, so here a man is lucky because his 
nature is such.' 

459 



ARISTOTLE 

1247 b , , „ 

Et δ' οϋτω, TTorepov ούκ^ εσται τνχ•η όλως, η 
εσται /tev, αλλ ουκ αΐτία^ ; αλλ' ανάγκη και etvat 
καΐ αίτίαν elvai. ear at άρα καΐ αγαθών' τισίν Κ 
5 αίτια r) κακών et δ' δλως i^aipereov, καΐ^ 
ovBev* από τνχης φατέον γίν€σθαι, αλλ' ly/xets• 
άλλης οϋσης αιτίας δια το μη όράν τνχην etvai 
φαμεν αιτιαν διό και οριζόμενοι την τύχην τιθβασιν 
αιτιαν αλογοί'* άνθρωπίνω λογισμω, ώς ούσης τινό? 
φύσεως, τοΰτο μεν ονν άλλο πρόβλημα αν εϊη' 

10 επει δε* ορώμεν τινας άπαζ εύτνχησαντες , δια τι 
ου και πάλιν αν δια το αυτό κατορθώσαιεν ,^ και 
πάλιν, και πάλιν^ ; του γαρ αύτοϋ το αυτό' αίτιον. 
ουκ άρα εσται τύχης τοΰτο^°• αλλ' oVar τό αυτό 1] 
αποβαίνη άττ'" απείρων και αορίστων, εσται μεν 
τω^^ αγαθόν η κακόν, επιστήμη δ' ουκ εσται αύτοϋ 
η δι εμπειρίαν ^^ επεί εμάνθανον άν τινε? ευτυχείς,^* 

15 η και ττασαι άν αί βττιστη/χαι, ώσπερ εφη Έωκράτης, 
εύτυχιαι ήσαν. τί οΰν κωλύει συμβηναί τινι εφ- U 
εζης τα τοιαύτα πολλάκις ούχ οτι τοιοσδί/' αλλ' 
ΟΙΟΙ' αν εΐη^^ το κύβους άει μακαρίαν^^ βάίλλειν; 
τι δε Βη; άρ' ουκ ένεισιι^ όρμαι εν τη φυχη αί μεν 
απο λογισμού αί δ' άπο όρεζεως αλόγου; και 

20 προτεραι αύται; ει γάρ εστί φύσει η δι' επιθυμίαν 

^ ούκ Sp. : ή. * Sp. : άλλ' ούκέτι. 

' [καΙ] Sp. * μ-ηζ^ν Sus. 

* lac. : avoKoyou. • Β' : έιτβιδί}. 

' lac. : δια τό άττοκατορθωσαι (propter idem dirigere unuvi 

' καΐ ττάλιν και πάλιν Μ": και ιτάλιν Ρ*•. 

* Β': τό yap αυτό τοντ'. ^^ Β': ού τό. 
'^ Β': άττ' cm. codd. ** lac. : τό. 

'^ Β': aireip'iav. ^* ίΐ/τυχί?»' Sp. 

'* lac. : roij Set. ι* Syl. : ffei'. 

^' Fr. : μακρό.!/. 

460 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VIII. ii. 9-12 

But if so, shall we say that there is no such thing 
as fortune at all, or that it does exist but is not a 

10 cause ? No, it must both exist and be a cause. Con- 
sequently it will furthermore be a cause of goods or 
evils to certain persons ; whereas if fortune is to be 
eliminated altogether, then nothing must be said 
to come about from fortune, in spite of the fact that, 
although there is another cause, because we do not 
see it we say that fortune is a cause — owing to which 
people give it as a definition of fortune that it is a 
cause incalculable to human reasoning, implying that 
it is a real natural principle. This, then, would be a 
matter for another inquiry. But since we see that 
some people have good fortune on one occasion, why 
should they not succeed a second time too owing 
to the same cause ? and a third time ? and a fourth ? 

11 for the same cause produces the same effect. There- 
fore this will not be a matter of fortune ; but when 
the same result follows from indeterminate and in- 
definite antecedents, it will be good or bad for some- 
body, but there will not be the knowledge of it that 
comes by experience, since, if there were, some fortu- 
nate persons would learn it, or indeed all branches 
of knowledge would, as Socrates said,*^ be forms of 

12 good fortune. What, then, prevents such things from 
happening to somebody a number of times running 
not because he has a certain character, but in the 
way in which for instance it would be possible to 
make the highest throw at dice every time ? And 
what then ? are there not some impulses in the 
spirit that arise from reasoning and others from ir- 
rational appetition ? and are not the latter prior ? 
becaxise if the impulse caused by desire for what is 

" Plato, Euthydemus 279 d. 

461 



ARISTOTLE 

1247 b , ^ ^ , V 

η8€ος, και ή ope^is φνσ€ΐ ye εττι το αγαθόν βαΒίζοί 
αν TTavTore} el hr] τίνες elaiv εύφυέις {ωσπ€ρ οι 1 
wSlkoL•^ ουκ ετηστάμενοί αδειι^ οϋτως ev ττβφνκασι) 
και oivev λόγου όρμώσιν fj^ η φύσις ττίφυκε καΐ 
€πιθυμοΰσι και τούτου καΐ τότ€* καΐ οϋτως ώς Set 

25 /cat ού 8et και δτ€, ούτοι κατορθώσουσι^ καν 
τυχωσιν άφρονες οντβς και άλογοι, ωσπερ και eu 
ασονται^ ού' διδασκαλικοί οντες. οΐ δε' ye τοιούτοι 
εύτυχβΐς, όσοι άνευ λόγου κατορθοΰσιν ώς επί το 
πολύ. φύσει άρα οΐ ευτυχείς εΐεν άν. 

Η πλεοναχώς λέγεται η ευτυχία; τα μεν γαρ 1 

30 πράττεται από της ορμής και προελομενων πράξαι, 
τα δ ου, άλλα τουναντίον και ei* εν εκείνοις 
κακώς λογίσασθαι δοκουσι κατορθοΰντες, και* εύ- 
τυχησαί φαμεν και πάλιν εν τούτοις, ει εβούλοντο 
άλλο^" η ελαττον η^^ ελαβον τάγαθόν. εκείνους li 
μεν τοίνυν εύτυχεΐν δια φύσιν ενδέχεται- ή γαρ 

35 όρμη και η ορεξις ούσα ου ε'Βει^^ κατώρθωσεν, ό 
8ε λογισμός ην ηλίθιος' και τους μεν ενταύθα, 
όταν ό^' μεν λογισμός μη 8οκών όρθός^* eiv-at τύχη,^^ 
ορμη^^ δ αύτοίϊ αιτία ούσα, αύτη^^ όρθη ούσα 
εσωσεν^^• αλλ' ενίοτε δι' επιθυμίαν ελογίσαντο^" 
πάλιν ούτω και ητύχησαν .'''' εν δε 8η τοις ετεροις 1* 

^ lac. {semper Β'): παν. 

* Syl. : άδικοι {άδίδακτοι ωδικοί lac, indocti Β')• 

* ri add. lac. {secundum quod W). 

* Sp. {tunc W) : iroTk. * Fr. {dirigeiit W) : κατορθονσι. 

« Syl. : ίσονται. ' Fr. {non BO : oi P", ^i M»». 

* fl add. Rac. (post έκείνοΐί Sp.). 

* [καΐ] (vel κατεντί'χησαι) Bus. 

" lac: Af. " ^add. lac. ^* Fr. : M. 

" ό add. Rac. " v.l. : όρθωί Ρ», Μ". 

" Sp. : τύχη. 1' όρμη add. Rac. (ή add. Sp.). 

^' Sp. : ai'Tj; δ'. " Sp. {saluauit B') : i^wffev. 

462 



EUDPLMIAN ETHICS, VHI. ii. 12-15 

pleasant exists by nature, appetition also would merely 
by nature proceed towards what is good in every 

13 case. If, therefore, some men have good natures — - 
just as musical people though they have not learnt 
to sing " have a natural aptitude for it — and without 
the aid of reason have an impulse in the direction 
of the natural order of things and desire the right 
thing in the right way at the right time, these men 
will succeed even although they are in fact foolish 
and irrational, just as the others will sing well 
although unable to teach singing. And men of this 
sort obviously are fortunate — men who without the 

aid of reason are usually successful. Hence it will ^ 

follow that the fortunate are so by nature. ^ 

14 Or has the term ' good fortune ' more than one Luck an 
meaning ? For some things are done from impulse term^"^it"* 
and as a result of the agents' purposive choice, other includes 
things not so but on the contrary ; and if in the former really*^ 
cases when the agents succeed they seem to have caused by 
reasoned badly, we say that in fact they have had 

good fortune ; and again in the latter cases, if they 
wished for a different good or less good than they 

15 have got. The former persons then may possibly 
owe their good fortune to nature, for their impulse 
and appetition, being for the right object, suc- 
ceeded, but their reasoning was foolish ; and in their 
case, when it happens that their reasoning seems 
to be incorrect but that impulse is the cause of it, 
this impulse being right has saved them ; although 
sometimes on the contrary owing to appetite they 
have reasoned in this way and come to misfortune. 

" Or, with Jackson's additions, ' just as untaught musical 
geniuses, without professional knowledge of singing.' 

^* Sp. : eXoyLaaro. *" Sp. : ήτύχησεί'. 

4-63 



ARISTOTLE 

1247b ^ „ , , , » w ■* ' 'έ 

ττως earat η βντυχια κατ ευφυιαν ορζξβως και 
i2i8 Λ εττίθυμίας ; αλλά μην η ivravda βντνχία κάκίίνη 
■η αύτη. η vXeiovg at euTUVtat και τνχη διτττί^; 
€7T€i Ο ορωμ€ν τταρα ττασας τας €τηστημας και τους ■ 
λογισμούς τους ορθούς βύτυχονντάς rcvas", hrjXov 
b ότι €Tepov αν τι €Ϊη το αίτιον της ζύτυχίας. €Κ€ίνη 
8e TTOTcpov ζστιν^ €ύτυχία η ούκ ecniv, fj^ επεθύμη- 
aev ων e8et και δτ€ e8et ω* λογισμός ανθρώπινος 
ουκ αν τούτου €Ϊη ; ου γαρ δη πάμπαν άλόγιστον 
τούτο ου γε" φυσική ioTiv ή επιθυμία, άλλα 8ια- 
φθειρβται υπό τίνος, εύτυχ^εΐν μεν οΰν Βοκεΐ ότι ή ] 

10 'τνχΐ] T<J^v πάρα λόγον αιτία, τούτο* δε πάρα λόγον, 
παρά, γαρ την επιστήμην και το καθόλου, αλλ' ώς ] 
εοικεν, ούκ άπο τύχης, άλλα δο /cet δια τούτο, 
ωσθ ούτος μεν ό λόγος ού Βείκνυσιν ότι φύσει εύ- 
τυχεΐται,^ αλλ οτι ού πάντες οι 8οκούντες εύτυχεΐν 
δια τύχην κατορθοΰσιν, αλλά' διά φύσιν ούδ' οτι 
ού^εν εστί τύχη ^ούδ' οτι ούκ εστί τύχη^ αίτια 

15 ούθενός ^είκνυσιν, αλλ' οτι^" ού των πάντων ων 
Βοκεΐ. 

Τούτο μεντ αν άπορήσειε τις, άρ' αυτοϋ τούτου ί 
τύχη αιτία, του «πι^υ/χησαι ου δει και δτε δει; η 
ούτω γε τταν'τα»!' εσται; και γαρ του νοησαι και 
βουλεύσασθαΐ' ού γαρ δή εβουλεύσατο βουλευσά- 
μενος και πριν^^ tout' εβουλεύσατο οι)δ' ενόησε 

^ καΐ τύχη διττή hic Sp. : ante κάκΐίνη codd. 
^ ^τιν Sp. : ή Mb, om. Ρ•». ' Fr. : ή. * lac: τό. 

' o5 ye lac. : οϋτΐ. ' Vict, {hoc B') : τούτου. 

' lac. {bene fortunate agatur W): εύτυχΐΐν. 

* άλλ' <einoTe> ? Rac. : άλλα <7Γολλοί> ? Sus. 

» lac. 1» Stl add. Cas. 

" πριν add. Rac. {anteqiiam. consiliaretur B'). 

<• Cf. 1247 b 30 τά δ• οι» (Solomon). 
464 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VIII. ii. 16-20 

16 But in the case of the others," then, how will good 
fortune be due to natural goodness of appetition and 
desire ? The fact is that the good fortune here and 
that in the other case are the same. Or is good 
fortune of more than one kind, and is fortune two- 

17 fold ? But since we see some people being fortu- 
nate contrary to all the teachings of science and 
correct calculation, it is clear that the cause of good 
fortune must be something different. But is it or is 
it not good fortune whereby a man formed a desire 
for the right thing and at the right time when in 
his case human reasoning could not make this calcu- 
lation .'' For a thing the desire for which is natural 
is not altogether uncalculated, but the reasoning 

18 is perverted by something. So no doubt he seems 
fortunate, because fortune is the cause of things 
contrary to reason, and this is contrary to reason, 
for it is contrary to knowledge and to general prin- 

19 ciple. But probably it does not really come from 
fortune, but seems to do so from the above cause. 
So that this argument does not prove that good 
fortune comes by nature, but that not all those 
who seem fortunate succeed because of fortune, but 
because of nature ; nor does it prove that there is 
no such thing as fortune, nor that fortune is not the 
cause of anything, but that it is not the cause of all ', ι 
the things of which it seems to be the cause. i 

20 Yet someone may raise the question whether Right desire 
fortune is the cause of precisely this — our forming chancrbut 
a desire for the right thing at the right time. Or, a gift of 
on that showing, will not fortune be the cause ^''^*"• 

of everything — even of thought and deliberation ? 
since it is not the case that one only deliberates 
when one has deliberated even previously to that 

2 Η 465 



ARISTOTLE 

1248 8 

20 νοησας rrporepov η^ νοησαι, /cat τοΰτ' εΙς ατταρον, 
αλλ' €στιν άρχη τι?.^ ουκ άρα του νοησαι 6 νοΰς^ 
αρχή, ούδε του βουΧ^νσασθαι βουλή, τι ow άλλο 
ττλήν τύχη ; ώστ' άττό τύχης άπαντα έ'σται. ■^^ έ'στι 
Tts Ο'ΡΧ''? 'ή^ ουκ eoTLV άλλη €ζω, αύτη he δια το 
τοιαύτη ye eWt τοιούτο^ δύναται* ττοΐέΐν; το 2 

25 δε ζητούμ€νον τοΰτ^ εστί, τι? ij τί^? κινησ€ως άρχη 
ev τη φυχη. 8ηλον Βη' ωσπ€ρ ev τω ολω, deos και 
ττάν cKel KiveV • Kivei γάρ πως πάντα^ το ev ημίν 
deZov. λόγου δ' άρχη ου λόγος αλλά τι KpeiTTOV. 2 
τι οΰν άν KpeiTTOV και €πιστημης εϊη^ και νοΰ^^ 
πλην θ€Ος; η γάρ άρ€τη του νου όργανον και δια 

30 τοΰτο, ο" ττάλαι eλeγov, eύτυχeΐς καλούνται οι 
οΓ^ άν όρμησωσι κατορθοΰσιν^^ άλογοι 6vτeς. και 
βoυλeύeσθaι ου συμφ€peι αύτοΐς• €χουσι γάρ άρχην 
τοιαύτην η κρ€ίττων^* του νου και βουλ€ύσ€ως 
[οι δε τον λόγον, τούτο δ' ουκ €χουσι), και ev- 2 
θουσιασμόν ^^ τοΰτο δ' ου δύνανται, άλογοι γάρ 

35 6vτeς €πιτυγχάνουσι^^ και του των" φρονίμων και 

σοφών ταχειαν είναι την μαντικήν και μόνον ου 

την από του λόγου δει ά7Γολα)8εΓν, αλλ' οι μ€.ν δι' 

€μπ€ΐρίαν, οι δε δια συντ^^ειαν του" τω σκoπeιv 

1 ii add. Sp. 
^ ά\\' . . . ris hie Rac. : ante ούδ' ένόησε codd. 
* ό vovs Cas. : σννοΰσα.. 
* ^ Sus. {aut B') : ei (ei </iT/> Sp.). 
* lac. : 5ia rl τοιαύτη τό elvai τό τοΰτο. 
• Syl. {potest Β') : δύνασθαι. 
' έκεΐ Kivel lac. : έκΐίνφ. ® ττάντα <τά ^ι» ήμΓί'> lac. 

* Sp. : efTTot. ^^ κα'ί νοΰ add. Sp. {et intellectu W). 

^^ lac. : oi. *^ of add. Ross. 

^' Fr. (dirigunt B') : κατορθονν. 
" Aid. ; KpeiTTOV. ^^ Sp. : ενθουσιασμοί. 

" Syl. : ά7Γοτι;7χάνοΐ'σι• 
" ToD τώΐ' Syl. : τούΓωί» (horum B'). " τοΟ Sol. ; re iv. 

4,66 



EuDEMIAN ETHICS, VIII. ii. 20-23 

deliberation, nor does one only think when one has 
previously thought before thinking, and so on to 
infinity, but there is some starting-point ; therefore 
thought is not the starting-point of thinking, nor 
deliberation of deliberating. Then what else is, save 
fortune ? It will follow that everything originates 
from fortune. Or shall we say that there is a cer- 
tain starting-point outside which there is no other, 
and that this, merely owing to its being of such 
and such a nature, can produce a result of such 

21 and such a nature ? But this is what we are in- 
vestigating — what is the starting-point of motion 
in the spirit ? The answer then is clear ; as in the 
universe, so there, everything is moved by God ; 
for in a manner the divine element in us is the cause 

22 of all our motions. And the starting-point of reason 
is not reason but something superior to reason. 
What, then, could be superior even to knowledge 
and to intellect, except God ? Not goodness, for 
goodness is an instrument of the mind ; and owing 
to this, as I was saying some time ago," those are 
called fortunate who although irrational succeed in 
whatever they start on. And it does not pay them 
to deliberate, for they have within them a principle 
of a kind that is better than mind and deliberation 

23 (whereas the others have reason but have not this) : 
they have inspiration, but they cannot deliberate. For 
although irrational they attain even what belongs to 
the prudent and wise — swiftness of divination : only 
the divination that is based on reason we must not 
specify, but some of them attain it by experience 
and others by practice in the use of observation ; 

« See 1247 b 26. 

467 



ARISTOTLE 

1248 a 

χρησθαΐ' τω θ^ίω^ δε ούτοι. ^ τούτο yap* ev 
ορα και το μ€λλον και το 6ν, καΐ ών άττολυεται ό 
40 Aoyo? οΰτοί.* διό οΐ μελαγχολικοί και evuvoveipoi• 
1248 b eoi/ce yap τ^ ο,ρχη άττολνομενου του Aoyot»* io;)(ueiv 
μάλλον, ωστίβρ^ οι τυφλοί μνημονβυουσι μάλλον, 
απολυθέντες του προς τοις όρωμενοις'' e?vai το 
μνημόνευαν .^ 

Φανερον hrf οτι δυο εί'δη ευτυχίας, η μεν θεία• 2' 

διό και δο/ί€ΐ ό ευτυχής δια θεον κατορθοΰν, οΰτος 

5 δ εστιι^ ό «τατά την όρμην κατορθωτικός,^" 6 δ' 

έτερος 6 παρά την όρμην. άλογοι δ' αμφότεροι. 

και η μεν συνεχής ευτυχία μά?0^ον, αΰτη δε ου συν- 

III. Κατά μέρος μεν οΰν περί εκάστης αρετής 1 
ειρηται πρότερον επει δε χωρίς 8ιείλομεν την 
10 Βυναμιν αυτών, και περί της αρετής ^ιαρθρωτεον^^ 
της εκ τούτων ην καλοΰμεν^^ η^η καλοκάγαθίαν. 

^ Sp. : θίψ. * Von Arnim: αΰται. ^ VonArnim: καΐ. 

Sol. : oOros (11. 37 fF. συνήθΐίαν rb έν τφ σκοπεΐν χρησθαι τφ 
θεψ δύνανται τοντο καΐ e5 όραν καΐ τό μέλλον καΐ τό 6ι>, και ών 
άίΓολύβται ό λό-γο^ outws lac). 

Sp. (cum B^) : άπολνομέρονί τούί λόγου?, 

* Von Arnim : καΐ ώσπερ. 

' Rac. : €ίρηυ.4νοΐί {του πρόί rotj <.όρατοΐ$ etvai τφ ττρό? TOis> 
€ΐρημένοΐί <.στΓουδαιότερον> elvai τό μνημόνευαν lac, ad mirabilia 
uirtuosius esse quod memoratur W). 

* [to μνημόνευαν] ? Rac. • Fr. (itaque W) : bi. 
" Von Arnim : διορθωτικός. " v.l. δωρθωτέαν. 
^* Γ, lac. {uocamus B') : έκαλοΰμεν. 

" The MS. reading gives ' and experience and habit use 
God.' 

* Or, with Jackson's text, ' But some of them by experi- 
468 



EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VIII. ii. 23— iii. 2 

and these men use the divine." For this quality 
discerns aright the future as well as the present, 
and these are the men whose reason is disengaged. ** 
This is why the melancholic even have dreams that 
are true ; for it seems that when the reason is dis- 
engaged principle has more strength — ^just as the 
blind remember better, being released from having 
their faculty of memory engaged with objects of 
sight.*' 

It is clear, then, that there are two kinds of good 
fortune — one divine, owing to which the fortunate 
man's success is thought to be due to the aid of God, 
and this is the man who is successful in accordance 
with his impulse, while the other is he who succeeds 
against his impulse. Both persons are irrational. 
The former kind is more continuous good fortune, 
the latter is not continuous. 

III. We have, then, previously spoken about each c. ui. 
virtue in particular ; and as we have distinguished x^e com^" 
their meaning separately, we [must also describe in binatioa of 
detail the virtue constituted from them, to which we *^^ virt